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The United Nations Guidelines for Regional Approaches to Disarmament

This article will discuss the consensus "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security" approved by the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) at its 1993 session. Outside the delegations in New York whose representatives formulated it (and the relevant "desk officer" in their respective capitals), that document, arduously elaborated over a period of three years, appears little known and, when raised, attracts even less interest. In my view this is a serious mistake. I make this assertion because the document in question represents common ground on the issue of the content of a regional security dialogue in a vast and diverse region, most of the countries of which have agreed only recently—and somewhat grudgingly—to sit down together at the cooperative security table.

Pengiran Osman bin Pengiran Haji Patra writes in this publication on the history, current status and future prospects of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the region-wide security dialogue forum which held its inaugural meeting at the Ministerial level in July 1994. As Chair of the second annual meeting to be held in July 1995, Brunei is well-placed to provide an assessment of where the ARF has come from and where it is going. In the final part of his comments, Osman addresses the "process versus content" debate. On the "content" side, he notes that proposals received to date—largely from Western participants—had been grouped into four categories:

(a) confidence-building measures (CBMs);

(b) preventive diplomacy;

(c) disarmament measures and

(d) conflict resolution mechanisms.

A realistic approach, in his view, is to start with confidence-building measures, then consider issues of preventive diplomacy and "in the long-term possibly conflict resolution". Such an approach, he argues, is well-suited to the ASEAN way of working which centres on consultation, quiet diplomacy, inclusiveness and a gradual pace, while avoiding "formal and legalistic" approaches. Security was viewed in a holistic manner as a comprehensive concept and the aim of the ARF was to provide a venue for consultation and cooperation on regional security matters so as to, in turn, establish the necessary stable, peaceful context for economic growth to proceed and to continue. As such, the ARF was an "evolving process" where the aim of "keeping it going" is as important as concrete results. Above all, informality is the key.

A vivid metaphor for the ARF has been provided by Sadaaki Numata of Japan, a participant in the meeting in Kathmandu. He described it as a "young plant" which should not be "overburdened" by the expectations of its multiple parents. Above all, there was an evident need for "consensual parenting".

If the European experience of confidence-building teaches anything at all, it is that the process of altering traditional security perceptions cannot be "forced", as if it were one of the thousands of Canadian tulip bulbs manipulated to blossom in time for Ottawa's annual Festival of Spring. On the otherhand, if the ARF is not to find itself as unprepared as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was when the Balkan conflict erupted in its midst, then the salient question must be, will the region's plethora of simmering disputes remain quiescent until the maturation of the regional process to the point where it can effectively deal with them? It is not enough that a consensus is reached to give the plant water. If it also needs light to survive and become strong, then that too must be provided.

The problem with the plant analogy is that it is usually pretty evident what a plant needs to grow strong and healthy. It is somewhat more complicated to determine what subjects are fertile soil in which to nourish the recently acquired, and still somewhat peckish, appetite of many ARF participants for multilateral dialogue on security-related issues. It is more difficult still to agree to actively pursue those subjects.

In putting meat on the bones of the Asia-Pacific regional dialogue processes (whether official, non-governmental or "mixed"), there is an understandable reluctance among Asian nations to directly borrow from the European experience. And even if they wanted to, they would find nothing in that region's landmark Stockholm Document of 1986

on confidence- and security-building measures to address the maritime dimension that so dominates the Asia-Pacific security equation. But a rejection of the architecture for security cooperation constructed in other regions does not mean that the Asia-Pacific has to begin drafting its blueprints on an entirely blank page. For the last decade the international community has been studying various regional experiences in an effort to identity principles and guidelines of more general application. It is the central thesis of this paper that the series of agreements resulting from this multi-year effort at the global level represent a *common foundation* upon which Asia-Pacific nations can begin to build their own indigenous security structures.

If consensual parenting is indeed a *sine qua non* for a healthy, well-adjusted child, then the ARF's disparate array of progenitors would be wise to pay heed to any child-rearing principles upon which agreement amongst them had already been reached, particularly when the alternative—at least at present—is no agreed approach at all. If it is not straining the metaphor too much, the Disarmament Commission effort in developing agreed regional approaches to disarmament, together with the earlier confidence-building and transparency agreements on which it builds, can be compared to a rolling series of seminars on "cooperative security parenting" which ultimately yielded a common *modus operandi.* And the fact that many of the Asia-Pacific participants were elaborating the guidelines in the firm belief that they, at least, would never become the parents of such an unattractive and unwieldy offspring, makes the consensus finally achieved no less significant nor less worthy of careful study.

The "Guidelines"

The United Nations Disarmament Commission is a global, deliberative body which meets annually in New York for a three-week session beginning in mid-April. Like the First Committee of the General Assembly, all members of the United Nations are entitled to participate in its working groups. Unlike the First Committee, however, there are no resolutions to be voted upon. Rather, the Commission focuses on a limited range of items (up to a maximum of four) over a three-year period and, like the Conference on Disarmament (CD), works by consensus. Every participating country must either agree or, at a minimum, refrain from objecting, to the document elaborated if there is to be a successful result. Once agreed in the Commission, the document is then endorsed by the First Committee and the General Assembly, representing three occasions when member States pass judgment on the agreement in question.

Because the Commission is a *deliberative,* rather than a negotiating body—the CD is the sole global, negotiating forum—the results constitute *politically,* rather than *legally* binding agreements. Nonetheless, such "political commitments" can carry considerable weight, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms being a clear case in point. In truth, the strength of the commitment is as great as the international community wishes it to be. If a significant number of participating States act in accordance with the document negotiated and communicate their expectation that other participating States will do the same, then few will easily flaunt the consensus which they, after all, shared in creating. Conversely, if the document is negotiated and then promptly forgotten, only those who find it convenient to rely on will feel bound to do so.

A final point about the participation of Asia-Pacific States in this process. The Indonesian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti, chaired the Working Group on the subject during its first year of work. During the third and final session when the critical compromises had to be made to secure overall agreement, Indonesia, as Chair of the United Nations Member States which belong to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, was again in a pivotal position.

After three years of work, the Commission produced a 52-paragraph document comprised of four sections and an appendix. Section 1 explores the relationship between regional disarmament and global security. Section II outlines general "principles and guidelines" which "should govern" regional approaches to disarmament. Section III identifies five types of "ways and means" including confidence-building measures, disarmament and arms limitation agreements, zones free of weapons of mass destruction and consultative and cooperative arrangements. The role of the United Nations in facilitating regional approaches is outlined in Section IV and the Appendix includes an illustrative list of confidence-building measures drawn from relevant global and regional agreements.

Scope of the Document—Disarmament as a Broad Concept

As the above outline suggests, the subject matter is not restricted to disarmament in the narrow sense of formal agreements to limit or reduce arms. Rather a broad process is envisaged from tension reduction and confidence-building at one end of the spectrum through the establishment of consultative fora on security cooperation to the regulation of armaments at the other. Likewise, non-military aspects of the regional context which might affect security are also included.

Regional approaches to disarmament, thus defined, are deemed one of the "essential elements in global efforts to strengthen international peace and security" (para 2). Positive benefits to be expected from the implementation of concrete arms reduction measures include relaxed regional tensions (para 5), the "freeing up" of resources for the promotion of economic and social development (para 16) and the creation of an atmosphere conducive to political settlement of regional disputes (para 26). Paragraph 32 outlines the merits of CBMs:

> "Appropriate confidence- and security-building measures which foster mutual trust and understanding, as well as transparency and openness, can defuse tensions and promote friendly relations among States. Furthermore, such measures can facilitate the disarmament and arms limitation process and can improve the prospects for the peaceful settlement of disputes, thus contributing to maintaining and enhancing regional and international peace and security."

Note first that it is not every CBM that will have such congenial effects but only those that are "appropriate" to the specific conditions and characteristics of the region (the need to tailor efforts to the region in question being expressed as a general principle in paragraph 15). Note also that "transparency and openness" are seen as a positive result of confidence-building on par with "mutual trust and understanding". The language is even stronger with respect to one particular type of transparency—openness in military matters. In paragraph 28 it is asserted that regional approaches to disarmament and arms limitation *"should* promote transparency and openness in military matters in order to build confidence among the States of the region concerned" (emphasis added).

That Asia-Pacific States embraced that formulation may well seem surprising to those accustomed to the oft-repeated assertion that "transparency" is a particularly unsuitable term for the region, translations of which inevitably conjure up notions of vulnerability and nakedness. The difference in attitude is not just because the disarmament experts were, by then, thoroughly familiar with a concept about which they had first reached agreement in the Commission's 1988 Guidelines for Appropriate Types of Confidence-Building Measures and had elaborated in even greater detail Guidelines and Recommendations for Objective Information on Military Matters, adopted by the Commission in 1992. The key factor was that, during those lengthy negotiations, the implications of transparency, its benefits and limitations and, above all, its appropriateness elsewhere than in Europe, had all been carefully considered and the necessary nuances and caveats articulated to the satisfaction of all participants from

every regional grouping (including China which began the 1992 discussion with the announcement that it did not believe in openness in military matters). In a very real sense, the end result was to *internationalize* both the terminology and the underlying principles.

But because the disarmament bodies in New York and Geneva are still mainly the province of a narrow range of experts, that singular transformation is little known and less appreciated. As a result, the debate over the merits of transparency for the Asia-Pacific continues. This is not to suggest that, even if the promotion of openness and transparency in military matters was widely accepted *in principle* by ARF participants, they would find it any easy to *implement.* What an acknowledgement of the global framework for confidence-building could do, however, is to decisively shift the focus from a now largely sterile debate over "whether" to a more concrete consideration of "how".

Paragraph 2 of the 1992 "Guidelines on objective information on military matters" asserts that, "through a dynamic process over time", the encouragement of openness and transparency on military matters will "build confidence, enhance mutual trust and contribute to the relaxation of tension and to promote specific disarmament agreements and other concrete disarmament measures". Other purposes include assisting States in determining the level of forces and armaments sufficient for an adequate defensive capability, increasing the predictability of military activities in order to head off dangerous errors or misperceptions and promoting greater public understanding and discussion of disarmament and security-related issues.

Paragraph 4, first subparagraph, asserts that, "All States have the *responsibility* to provide objective information on military matters and the right of access to such information" (emphasis added). The public dimension referred to above is further elaborated in the Principles section with the assertion in the third subparagraph that such information "should be accessible to the public of all States to the maximum degree possible consistent with national security and the provisions of related agreements". In the fourth subparagraph, which places a "special responsibility" on the States with the largest and most sophisticated arsenals, the "duty" of all States to provide objective information on military matters is reiterated. Any field of military activity might be considered for the provision of objective information (subparagraph 7 and paragraph 5). In determining the "practical level of information necessary to promote openness and transparency, with the aim of contributing to confidence and stability", account should be taken of the specific characteristics, degree of political stability and

political climate in each particular region (subparagraph 6). Subparagraph 8 declares that "States should promote, through consultations on their own initiative, practical measures on the exchange of objective information on military matters, in the light of their specific situation and political, military and security conditions."

That injunction to States to *take action* in respect of the provision of objective information on military matters is repeated in the recommendations section of the document, paragraphs 13 and 14.

All in all, the consensus language of the 1992 document on objective information on military matters is unqualified in its commitment to the *objective* of transparency and forthright in its injunction to States to take appropriate action to implement it. Note in particular that regional specificities are cited not as an excuse for limiting transparency but as factors to be taken properly into account in order to ensure that transparency is effectively implemented.

In a region which is going in the opposite direction from the global downward trend in military spending and arms acquisition, it might be instructive to examine how the main document under discussion, the 1993 Guidelines on regional approaches to disarmament, treats the issue of conventional armaments, the acquisition of which, in and of itself, is a legitimate aspect of the inherent right of self-defence of all States. While the *objective* of undiminished security at the "lowest possible level of armaments and military forces" was enshrined in the 1978 Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I), it took the end of the Cold War and the revelations of the Gulf war to compel the international community as a whole to begin to address conventional armaments. Reflecting both the practical experience of conventional disarmament in Europe, and lessons from the Iraqi arms build up, the Guidelines outline several criteria for addressing conventional armaments at the regional level.

In the Principles section, paragraph 18 states that priority should be given "to the elimination of the most destabilising military capabilities and imbalances". Regional approaches, however, are not restricted to such situations of instability and imbalance. Reflecting the original consensus in SSOD-I, paragraph 20 establishes a positive standard or goal in respect of arms acquisitions—the "lowest possible level of armaments and armed forces consistent with undiminished security for all of the participating States." This standard is expressed in a slightly different way in paragraph 23. Accumulations of conventional weapons "beyond the legitimate self-defence requirements of States" should be addressed. Paragraph 38 states that, in addition

to seeking the lowest level of armaments consistent with undiminished security, the aim should be to eliminate the capability for large-scale offensive action and surprise attacks. States are then explicitly admonished not to "seek an armament and military spending level that exceeds their legitimate self-defence requirements."

On 31 January, 1992, in the aftermath of the second war in the Gulf, the Security Council held its first ever (and, to date, only) summit meeting. In a unanimous declaration, the Council *inter alia* underlined the need for all member States "to avoid excessive and destabilising accumulations or transfers of arms". Paragraph 40 of the Guidelines takes this admonition to the next logical step and encourages all States to "regulate" the acquisition of armaments in order to prevent their "excessive and destabilising accumulation".

In South-East Asia and elsewhere in the region, it is commonplace to hear that there is no need to scrutinize the conventional arms build up because all that is taking place is prudent force modernisation in light of increased economic prosperity and new United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) mandated maritime responsibilities. At the same time, while most analysts agree that there is no arms race, many still caution that the lack of transparency, predictability and demonstrable rationality in the arms acquisition process is bound to generate suspicions over time. The thrust of the 1993 Guidelines is unmistakable. Whether or not one believes there is anything disconcerting about the procurement patterns in the Asia-Pacific, governments have a duty to shed more light on these and other "military matters", as a first step toward ensuring that enhanced national self-reliance contributes to, rather than detracts from, increased regional confidence and stability.

Who Should Participate?

Principles 12 and 13 deal with the vexed question of who should participate in regional efforts. On the one hand, the "participating" States should define the region to which the arrangements would apply. On the other, such arrangements should be open to all "concerned" States. A definition or means of determining what constitutes a "concerned State" is conspicuously lacking. The dilemma here is between the need to include all States necessary to satisfactorily resolve the issues at hand (which may mean, for example, that a subregional geographic criteria is too narrow) and the desire to avoid giving one or more States the means to block the process from getting underway at all. The language also reflects the need to allow maximum flexibility in the potential design of regional and subregional

approaches, depending on the particular problem sought to be addressed. In the Asia-Pacific region, at least three levels of security building activity have been identified.

The first is the issue-specific level, involving only those players directly involved in the dispute and perhaps a small number of facilitators. A good example is the Canadian-financed and Indonesian-hosted series of workshops dealing with the South China Sea. The second level is the subregional one, involving States of a particular geographic location, for example, ASEAN. Finally, the third level is the region-wide process, of which the ASEAN Regional Forum promises to be an example.

None of these levels is entirely self-contained, however. Issue-specific fora may fail without the moral suasion that only a larger process can provide, particularly if there are significant asymmetries in the size and military capacity of the parties to the dispute. At the other extreme, a region-wide dialogue seeking to embrace many diverse perspectives may satisfy no one unless it can draw from, build on and, ultimately, reinforce sub-regional efforts among more like-minded participants.

Muthiah Alagappa, addressing the second annual Kathmandu seminar, contended that, while the process of regional cooperation was being broadened, intra-ASEAN cooperation must be deepened "to move the Association further along the road towards a pluralistic security community". In particular, he urged ASEAN to demonstrate a greater political commitment to resolving outstanding bilateral disputes by embracing conflict resolution rather than avoidance. A continued deepening of intra-ASEAN consultations is clearly necessary if the needs of its members—existing and prospective—in a time of transition, uncertainty and increasing complexity are to be effectively met. Certainly, if the Association wishes to continue to exercise the leadership role it has so deftly carved out for itself in the ARF process, then it must begin to demonstrate an ability to bring coherent, forward-looking proposals to the ARF table.

Despite the deep-seated reluctance of most ASEAN members to begin to discuss sensitive military issues on a multilateral basis even amongst themselves, it is possible that the way might be smoothed somewhat by an initial focus on global principles which ASEAN members have already participated in developing, albeit in another forum. What are "legitimate self-defence needs" in the ASEAN context? What of the "duty" to provide objective information on military matters? What is the "practical level of information necessary" to promote

openness and transparency on military matters in South-East Asia? The 1993 Guidelines might prove an even more useful reference point for discussions among the disparate membership of the ARF. A working group could be tasked to solicit national perspectives on each of the key principles, as a basis for further discussion.

The United Nations can help inform the content part of regional cooperative security-building by providing a global framework or foundation of principles to be further elaborated and applied in the Asia-Pacific context. It can also help by facilitating the process itself. Section IV of the Guidelines envisages the United Nations promoting "complementarity" between regional and global processes of disarmament "by establishing effective liaison and cooperation with relevant regional bodies". In the Asia-Pacific context this would imply liaison and cooperation with both the ARF and ASEAN. Although there have been some efforts to this end, a lot remains to be done. The United Nations, beset with financial and staffing restraints even as its sphere of activities grows by leaps and bounds, has largely concentrated its regional dialogue efforts on support for the Arms Register (through a variety of workshops and seminars) and the "Kathmandu process" of regional conferences and seminars. Recently, the Director of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific has sought to establish ties with the leading non-governmental organisation focusing on security dialogue, the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), by seeking Observer status with that organisation.

Important efforts have also originated within the region to establish more effective liaison between the United Nations and regional security organisations. In 1992, ASEAN introduced a resolution at the First Committee, explicitly in furtherance of the call by the United Nations Secretary-General in *Agenda for Peace* for a closer relationship between the United Nations and regional associations (47/53 B). The resolution invited all United Nations Member States to endorse the guiding principles of the Association which are enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and was ostensibly a first step toward the Association becoming an Observer Intergovernmental Organisation (IGO) to the United Nations. Although the resolution was adopted without a vote in both the First Committee and the General Assembly, this promising initiative has not been taken further, perhaps reflecting some internal debate about the merits of moving closer to the United Nations but more likely a casualty of the charged ASEAN agenda in light of the newly created ARF.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand and the United Nations organised three ASEAN-United Nations Workshops on Cooperation for Peace and Preventive Diplomacy in the period from March 1993 through February 1994. Involving academics and officials from 16 Asia-Pacific countries and United Nations representatives, topics included the role of multilateralism in South-East Asia, cooperation between regional groupings and the United Nations and specific territorial and boundary disputes. Once again the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was also examined as a possible basis for a statement of common principles (work which is now continuing in the context of preparations for the second ASEAN Regional Forum in July 1994).

In December 1994, NIRA, a think-tank with close ties to the Japanese government, sponsored a small conference on "Preventive Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region" which took as its starting point the definitions in the United Nations Secretary-General*'s Agenda for Peace.* Invitees were mainly officials in their "personal" capacity, senior academics with a strong policy orientation and the Assistant Secretary-General for the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Ms. Rosario Green. Symptomatic of the ongoing difficulties which the United Nations secretariat has in staffing "non-essential" activities. Green was forced to cancel out at the last minute. The meeting was surprisingly united in its view that concrete regional initiatives such as a Japanese-sponsored centre for preventive diplomacy, and not just endless "track two" meetings, were now required. However, agreement on the thorny question of which disputes such a centre might begin immediately to tackle proved more elusive.

Most recently, the CSCAP Working Group on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific has invited a political officer from the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs to its second meeting to be held in Singapore in mid-May of 1995. This is most appropriate in light of the agenda of that meeting which will focus on both regional and global confidence-building measures and it is a welcome departure from past practice in American-led efforts. In this case, not only was the American co-chair of the Working Group instrumental in getting the invitation issued in the first place, another American non-governmental organisation is making possible its acceptance by covering the United Nations official's travel costs.

While these efforts suggest a growing interest in greater cooperation between the United Nations and regional bodies, more fellow-through is required if effective, regularised liaison is to be established. One practical problem that should be easier to address than the financial

crisis at the United Nations is the location of the Asia-Pacific Regional Centre in Kathmandu, Nepal. Nepalese support in 1989 for the creation of the Centre was both far-sighted and courageous. It was also absolutely essential to the Centre's successful emergence at a time when most of the region was hostile to the notion of a United Nations regional role. Nonetheless, its remote location has proven such a significant barrier to effective liaison efforts that discussions are now quietly underway to relocate the Centre, on a temporary basis at least, to a more central locale, probably in South-East Asia. If the move takes place, ASEAN will be in an enviable position to enhance its organisational and substantive links with the cooperative security "outreach" arm of the United Nations secretariat.

In paragraph 51 of the UNDC Guidelines, the United Nations is urged to make available its own, hands-on experience in carrying out activities related to the maintenance of international peace and security. It was from just this type of practical experience that the Thai-sponsored United Nations and Preventive Diplomacy workshops hoped to benefit. However, more Member States must be willing to speak up at the United Nations General Assembly, the First Committee and most especially in the Fifth Committee (where the budget is considered) on the fundamental importance of United Nations participation—and indeed leadership—in longer term efforts at cooperative security-building. Without this kind of advocacy, it is inevitable that crisis-management will continue to monopolize virtually all of the preventive diplomacy assets at the United Nations disposal.

Similarly, member States need to pay more constructive attention to the continuing reorientation of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs (CDA) to enable it to take a more holistic and activist approach to disarmament issues as one facet of a complex security equation encompassing military and non-military factors. Despite its implicit recognition in the UNDC Guidelines of the need to end its artificial segregation, the disarmament community *per se* has been slow to embrace a more integrated approach. The CDA, on the otherhand, has not.

A good example of the new approach is the United Nations Advisory Mission to the Saharan-Sahel. Initially in response to a request to the United Nations Secretary-General from the President of Mali to provide assistance in the collection and control of illicit small arms proliferating in his country, it soon became clear that this problem could not be considered in isolation, without focussing on its many causes and consequences including a deteriorating security situation and cross-

border arms flows involving several of Mali's neighbours. The resulting United Nations Advisory Mission (which has, to date, carried out two fact-finding visits to the subregion) is the first ever to include political officers from the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, the African Regional Centre and the African division of the Department of Political Affairs. The two outside experts recruited to lead the Mission—former Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity, Eteki-Mboumou of Cameroon, and retired Brigadier-General Henny Van der Graaf (who now heads a prestigious verification institute in the Netherlands)—also represent a balance of geographic and substantive disarmament/conflict resolution expertise.

Such combined efforts from within previously discrete (and often excessively turf-conscious) components of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs will begin to build a base of international security expertise within the Centre for Disarmament Affairs which will increasingly enable it to provide important practical, as well as conceptual, inputs into nascent regional and subregional efforts.

Concluding Remarks

At the outset of my remarks, I referred to Numata's warning that the fragile ARF "plant" not be overburdened. He also added, that neither should it be "invisible". ASEAN has been described as the institutional anchor of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The quality of leadership it provides will determine in large measure whether the ARF flourishes or withers on the vine. Michael Krepon, in another article in this publication, underscores the importance of political leadership in moving the security dialogue process forward. This is certainly true but solid policies are the bedrock of successful engagement and the development of those policies is the responsibility of government bureaucrats.

The Asia-Pacific is a region where increases in defence spending in real terms and the number and quality of the weapons being acquired have made it the fastest growing arms market in the world. It is also a region where security analysts have fundamental disagreements over the implications of the arms build up, where the level of transparency in military expenditures is so low that it is often impossible to relate the procurement process to a perceived set of military needs, and where all of this is taking place against a backdrop of uncertainty, vastly increased geostrategic complexity and simmering disputes over sovereignty, territory and control of offshore resources. At the same time, it is also a period of relative calm and of increasing national and regional confidence. In short, it is hard to imagine how the

circumstances could be *more* propitious for the introduction of a little substantive "bite" into official efforts to strengthen peace and stability in the region.

In the wake of the short-lived burst of multilateral-mania that marked the end of the Cold War, completely unrealistic demands were made of the United Nations by an international community unprepared to provide the material and political support necessary to sustain far more modest objectives. Now that the rose-coloured glasses are gone, and with them the illusion that the United Nations can do everything, there is a tendency to conclude that the United Nations can therefore do nothing. A more measured analysis suggests a trend toward a new kind of burden sharing in which regional organisations increasingly seek to equip themselves to find practical, workable solutions to regional problems which might become crises requiring broader involvement if left unaddressed. In taking on these new roles, however, regional organisations need not start with a blank slate. They themselves have contributed to a body of global principles and practices which now should be put more directly to the test. Through just such an examination, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations might find a way to marry the "ASEAN approach" on the process of trust-building with concrete cooperation in the security field.

RISK REDUCTION AND MARITIME SECURITY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Risk reduction and maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region are increasingly important aspects of broader regional stability. The military emphasis of many large, medium, and even smaller Powers of the region has shifted increasingly to more extended and capable off-shore maritime defence capabilities—spurred by reduced military focus on internal/counter-insurgency issues and by the November 1994 entry into force of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), extending exclusive economic zones (EEZ) to two hundred miles off-shore (with corresponding increased demands on maritime policing and resource management). Of course, it is the phenomenal trade-driven economic growth of Asia-Pacific nations that both enables greater expenditures on maritime security and increases the importance of the security of sea lanes and ocean resources. An additional factor in the new maritime-security equation in the Asia-Pacific region is the end of the Cold War, which has eliminated the most serious previous single maritime risk of conflict (between the United States and Soviet navies), only to give rise to a variety of new

maritime security concerns more directly affecting Asia-Pacific nations, particularly the reduced extent of the United States continued stabilising military presence in the region and the—likely related—future naval potential (and interaction) of other major regional Powers (China, India and Japan).

The more complex new maritime security context requires a new assessment of potential maritime risk reduction in the region, taking into consideration the relevance of existing maritime measures in the Asia-Pacific as well as the maritime risk reduction experience in other regions. A variety of maritime confidence-building measures (CBMs) merit consideration for applicability to the Asia-Pacific region, including the most developed maritime CBM—incidents at sea (INCSEA) agreements—as well as broader CBM measures to enhance openness and transparency of regional military forces and plans.

Asia-Pacific strategic Context

In assessing the specific relevance of maritime CBMs, the unique characteristics of the Asia-Pacific region must be noted. As a recent survey of CBMs noted:

> "The region is more geographically, politically, and culturally diverse than any other in which confidence-building efforts have been pursued. Perhaps, most importantly, while troubled with some of the world's most explosive hot-spots, the Asia-Pacific as a whole is characterised less by actively adversarial relationships than by the potential for conflict. Territorial disputes, competing economic and resource interests and lingering domestic insecurities suggest the need for measures aimed at averting the rise of tension and conflict."

That is not to suggest that previous maritime CBM experience (more oriented to actively confrontational situations) is not relevant to the Asia-Pacific region, but rather to argue for careful adaptation of each experience. Also, the geographic disparities in the Asia-Pacific region suggest the need for varying subregional approaches in some CBM areas between North-East Asia, South-East Asia, the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean. In North-East Asia, the maritime interests and forces of four major Powers (China, Japan, Russia, and the United States) intersect, while the continuing stand-off on the Korean peninsula implies that confidence-building, in the absence of political preconditions of normal relations, may be best limited to Cold War-type conflict-avoidance measures. In South-East Asia, there is a long history of informal ASEAN maritime cooperation, supplemented by a more recent web of bilateral and multilateral confidence-building and cooperative maritime measures. In the South Pacific, broad

cooperative maritime regimes have developed between Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Island States, focussed on non-military maritime concerns of EEZ surveillance and control of fishing resources. The Indian Ocean area has been less examined as a focus of localised maritime CBMs or cooperation. It is noteworthy that, in both North-East and South-East Asia, the main territorial disputes are maritime in nature (e.g., the Kurile Islands/Northern Territories (Russia-Japan), Dok-Do/Takeshima Island (Korea-Japan), Diaoyutai-Senkaku Island (China-Japan), as well as Taiwan and, in the South China Sea, the Paracel Islands (Vietnam-China) and the Sprauey/Nansha Islands (Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam). CBMs cannot substitute for formal diplomatic/legal negotiations to settle territorial disputes, but maritime CBMs may be particularly valuable in minimising the risk of conflict in such circumstances.

Maritime Confidence-Building Measures

There are a variety of maritime CBMs, in addition to Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreements (to be discussed separately below), which should be considered as a menu for region-wide and/or subregional application in the Asia-Pacific region.

I. Declaratory Measures (Figure 1)

Although not strictly maritime in nature, statements of intent such as the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia and the Declaration of Concord may establish regional principles of conflict-avoidance that can, over time, be developed through concrete CBM measures. In the maritime context, region-wide acceptance of the Law of the Sea principles of UNCLOS III would probably be the most appropriate CBM. Broader bilateral non-attack pledges, such as the Indo-Pak Shimla Accord of 1971 and the Republic of Korea-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreement of 1991, also have obvious positive implications for maritime security. One of the most useful maritime declaratory measures might be for China and other nuclear-capable Asia-Pacific nations to join the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and France in unilaterally renouncing normal deployment of nuclear weapons on ships and maritime aircraft.

II. Transparency Measures (Figure 2)

A second general category of CBMs, transparency measures, encompasses information exchange, communication, notification, and observation and inspection measures.

Figure 1: Declaratory Measures

Briand-Kellogg Pact renouncing war (1928)
Soviet nuclear no-first-use pledges
Indo-Pakistani Shimla Accord (1971), renouncing force
Helsinki Final Act (1975), acceptance of existing borders
December 1991 ROK-DPRK Agreements, non-attack and nuclear-free Peninsula pledges
Negative Security Assurances (NSA), pledging no nuclear attack of non-nuclear powers

Source: Susan Pederson and Stanley B. Weeks, A *Survey of Confidence-building Measures* (Forthcoming, CSIS Significant Issues Series).

1. Information Exchange

In the current context of strategic uncertainty and maritime force development in the Asia-Pacific region, information measures may be the most valuable CBMs, applicable region-wide.

(a) Dialogue: In addition to the measures listed which might be applied in the Asia-Pacific maritime context, the value of maritime aspects of broader regional and subregional security dialogue is particularly noteworthy. In addition to the annual United Nations conferences in Kathmandu on regional security and confidence-building and the official ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) security discussions, inaugurated in 1994, a host of unofficial or "track-two" conferences and workshops dealing with Asia-Pacific maritime security and confidence-building have been conducted in recent years. Since its inception in 1988, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and its associated workshops have led the way in making maritime cooperation work. But all security dialogue meetings are particularly valuable for establishing contacts and serving as sources of ideas for future official consideration, when political conditions have ripened. Most important, even unofficial dialogue and contacts may help to establish expectations of routine cooperation and legitimize the concept of openness regarding maritime activities.

(b) Defence White Papers: Increasingly detailed White Papers have been published by many Asia-Pacific nations in recent years. The obvious next step is for other regional nations that have not yet done so to publish such papers, including details of their current maritime force structure and perhaps a five-year force and shipbuilding projection. In that regard, development (perhaps by an ASEAN Regional Forum working group) of common minimum standards/ outlines for Defence White Papers would be helpful.

(c) Arms register: The Malaysian Minister for Defence proposed in 1992 that a "regional register" be established to support the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in the Asia-Pacific region. The current United Nations regime provides for, among other things, reports of imports or exports of vessels or submarines of over 750 metric tons. Standardisation and development of further regional reporting requirements might usefully be undertaken by an ASEAN Regional Forum working group. First priority should be for those Asia-Pacific nations not yet doing so to fully report to the United Nations.

(d) Military-to-military contacts/seminars/personal exchanges: Recent trends in the Asia-Pacific region have been very positive (particularly United States-Russian exchanges, increased Korea-Japan maritime contact, the China-Japan strategic dialogue, and the web of interactions in the ASEAN/Australian area). That is an important area for developing (and making routine) professional contacts and exchanges. The recent Indian proposal for a February 1995 naval meeting of ships and leaders from both the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia also indicates how such exchanges can link subregions in Asia.

(i) Communications measures: The Western Pacific Naval Symposium workshops have developed a regional Maritime Information Exchange Directory and are now developing a common Tactical Communications Manual. In addition to wide adoption of those practical maritime communication measures by all Asia-Pacific maritime nations, any eventual INCSEA agreements (to be discussed below) would include provisions for communication/consultation on unusual or dangerous maritime activities.

(ii) Notification measures: Experience to date with notification CBMs has primarily been with ground force manoeuvres. The tailoring of such measures to the varied maritime force structures and practices of a broad region such as the Asia-Pacific would require very difficult negotiations, more characteristic of formal arms control than CBMs. Nations have tended to resist notifying the movement of air and naval units to avoid limiting the inherent flexibility and mobility of such units. Accordingly, such measures do not appear to be an early promising CBM for the Asia-Pacific maritime environment.

(iii) Observation/inspection measures: CBMs in that category which are potentially applicable to the Asia-Pacific maritime environment include observation of naval exercises/manoeuvres, inspection of naval facilities, and surveillance regimes and control zones. The voluntary issuing of invitations to observe naval exercises and to inspect naval

Figure 2: Transparency Measures

Information Measures	*Communications Measures*	*Notification Measures*	*Observation/ Inspection Measures*
Defense White Paper Publication	Crisis Management (Hotlines)	Military maneuvers/ Movements	Invitation of Observers
Calendar of military activities	Conflict Prevention Centers (CPC)	Military alerts	Surveillance and Control zones
Arms registry	Multilateral Communications Network	Increase in personnel (ground/air)	Open skies
Exchanges of military data	Mandatory consultations on unusual/dangerous activities	Call-up of Reserves	Troop separation and monitoring
Military-to-military Contacts	Communication for unexplained nuclear incidents	Test missile launches	Sensors/Early Warning Stations
Doctrine/defense planning seminars	Obligatory consultations in situations with increased nuclear war risk	Nuclear accidents	Nuclear missile factories
Military personnel/ student exchanges			Nuclear missile destruction
NBCM material inventories			Chemical facilities
NBCM facilities			

facilities would be noteworthy assurances of openness and should be considered by Asia-Pacific maritime nations. As with notification measures, however, attempts to negotiate such measures formally between the disparate Pacific maritime force structures would have the complexity of formal arms control and might engender less trust, not more. A particularly promising CBM for Asia-Pacific subregions is maritime cooperation on ocean resources surveillance. That type of surveillance regime has precedents in the Asia-Pacific region, including both multilateral (for example, fisheries surveillance cooperation in the South Pacific Forum) and bilateral (for example, Australia, Indonesia, Timor Gap surveillance and Malaysia-Indonesia pollution monitoring) measures.

III. Constraint Measures (Figure 3)

1. Risk Reduction Agreements

Those types of agreements, such as INCSEA agreements, are designed to prohibit or contain the consequences of inherently dangerous or inadvertent military activities through articulating codes of conduct for military forces and mandating crisis consultation and communication. Because they tend to address the consequences of mutually undesirable activities without unduly constraining operational forces, risk reduction measures have figured prominently in the early stages of political relaxation of tensions.

(a) INCSEA agreements: As more Asia-Pacific navies grow in reach and capability in the post-Cold War environment, both bilateral and tailored multilateral/subregional INCSEA agreements are potentially valuable CBMs. By way of background, the 1972 navy-to-navy United States-Soviet (INCSEA) Agreement was a product of initial Cold War detente and a landmark tension-reduction and confidence-building measure between the navies of the major Powers. Establishing special rules to minimize ship manoeuvres that create danger of collisions, to prohibit actions (simulated attacks etc.) that might be interpreted as hostile or harassing, and to set up special communications procedures, the United States-Soviet INCSEA Agreement has been remarkably successful in minimising incidents between the two navies—despite their more frequent global interaction in the first two decades after the conclusion of the Agreement. The 1972 Agreement has also served as a model for more than a dozen more recent similar bilateral INCSEA agreements, as well as for the broader 1989 United States-Soviet Agreement, at the Joint/General Staff level, on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities. The "high seas" coverage limits of the INCSEA

Figure 3. Constraint Measures

Risk Reduction Measures	*Exclusion/Separation Measures*	*Constraints on Personnel, Equipment, Activities*
Agmt to Reduce Risk of Incidents at Sea Agmt Russo-Japanese Air	Demilitarised Zones Nuclear War (1971) Disengagement Zones (1972) Traffic Safety Agmt (1985)	Personnel: -National limits -Category limits -Zone limits Equipment: -Deployment limits (by geographic area or numbers) -Category/type limits -Storage/monitoring limits -Nuclear missile types/deployment
Nuclear Risk Reduction Dangerous Military	Keep-out Zones (Air/Sea) Center Agmt (1987) NBCM-Free Zones Activities Agmt (1989)	Activities - Maneuvers/movements limits, by size or geographic area - Advance notification for movements, exercises, alerts - Limits on readiness - Bans on simultaneous exercises/alerts and/or certain force/unit types - NBCM testing - Nuclear fissile material production constraints

Agreement, however, do not address boundaries and operations in territorial waters, nor do the INCSEA provisions cover the inherently stealthy submerged submarine. Experience with the 1972 and 1989 Agreements suggests several supplementary approaches to minimize incidents at sea in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific region. Existing (United States-Russia, Russia-Japan, Russia-ROK) and potential additional bilateral agreements (Japan-China, ROK-China, Russia-China, DPRK-ROK, China-Taiwan, United States-China, and China-India) still provide a sound technical and political basis for avoiding particular bilateral incidents between naval Powers at sea.

Complementing those bilateral INCSEA agreements (or perhaps substituting for bilateral agreements not yet reached), serious consideration should be given to tailored INCSEA/"safety at sea" multilateral subregional agreements for North-East Asia, South-East Asia (and, perhaps, the Indian Ocean). Such multilateral agreements, which might be negotiated by naval specialists meeting in subregional groups on the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum or the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, would include the time-tested provisions of bilateral INCSEA agreements, requiring naval forces on the high seas to communicate and avoid dangerous manoeuvres and harassments. But those agreements could also be tailored to address particular subregional non-military maritime concerns, such as surveillance, fisheries, merchant shipping safety (search and rescue) and/or anti-piracy/anti-narcotics cooperation. In addition, provision should be made for an annual subregional review meeting/naval symposium, which would also provide the venue for the bilateral naval contacts and discussions that have proved so valuable and durable in existing (bilateral) INCSEA agreements.

Asia-Pacific nations might wish to reflect on some recent experience in other regions before disavowing as too ambitious such proposed subregional INCSEA/safety-at-sea regimes. In December 1994, a similar draft regional multilateral INCSEA text and a text on search and rescue, developed by the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group after more than a year of negotiation between Arabs, Israelis, and Palestinians (with Canadian mentoring and United States and Russian co-sponsorship), were adopted at a plenary meeting of the Multilateral Middle East Peace Process and are now available for adoption and implementation in the Middle East region.

The subregions of the Asia-Pacific should regard similar agreements as priority maritime CBMs. It is, however, important to recognize that INCSEA agreements alone cannot effectively address the problems of

inherently covert submerged submarines or law-of-the-sea disputes over boundaries of territorial seas and EEZs. A flexible variety of bilateral and multilateral actions is needed to minimize these more difficult causes of incidents at sea. Such actions might include continuing bilateral and/or multilateral negotiations on agreed interpretations (under the Law of the Sea) of territorial seas and EEZ boundaries, the exercise of prudent caution in all forward naval operations near disputed boundaries, and perhaps provisions for submarine underwater communications in extreme situations of perceived close danger. A proper complementary mix of these suggested actions can help further reduce global incidents at sea in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific.

(b) Exclusion/separation measures: Despite longstanding Soviet and Russian proposals to "keep out" other navies operating in the strategically significant the Sea of Japan/Sea of Okhotsk area and certain strategic straits, such "keep-out" zones may be seen to undercut traditional freedom of the seas and mobility of naval forces, and become a source of contention rather than of confidence-building.

(c) *Constraints on personnel, equipment, activities:* Those constraints have tended to prohibit military operations that have not been properly forecast or notified or that take place within certain exclusion or separation zones. In their European, Middle East, and South Asian forms, such measures have focussed almost exclusively on ground forces. Of all CBMs, constraint measures come closest to technical arms control/limitation, and thus pose significant challenges of negotiation and verification. Such measures (with the broader exception of nuclear-free zones) are not a well-suited or a promising focus for maritime CBMs in the Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusion

In the inherently maritime Asia-Pacific region, many navies are extending their reach and capability in the strategically uncertain post-Cold War regional security environment. To reduce uncertainty and risk regarding naval forces and plans, maritime CBMs—particularly those including a variety of information and transparency measures—are a first priority. To address potentially dangerous encounters of naval forces and to address particular subregional maritime problems through the establishment of routine procedures and meetings, selected bilateral INCSEA agreements and sub-regional multilateral INCSEA/safety-at-sea agreements should also be a priority for Asia-Pacific nations.

THE 1990s: THE DECADE FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) have played an essential role in improving East-West relations. Nevertheless, these unilateral, tacit or negotiated steps to improve cooperation or decrease tension were the forgotten stepchild of the Cold War, always taking a back seat to formal arms control negotiations. Now with the end of the United States-Soviet rivalry, CBMs are emerging from the shadows of strategic arms reductions to become the pre-eminent means of preventing accidental wars and unintended escalation in strife-ridden regions.

The East-West Experience

Beginning with the establishment of the "hot line" after the Cuban missile crisis, the East-West CBM toolbox grew to include agreed rules for super-Power navies operating in close proximity and data exchanges on military equipment and force deployments. The West made a concerted effort not only to negotiate CBMs in the military-security area, but also to develop other "baskets" of measures to promote economic and cultural exchanges as well as respect for human rights.

One of the most important breakthroughs in United States-Soviet relations—an agreement to accept mandatory on-site inspections—was first negotiated in Stockholm in 1986 to ease concerns arising from large-scale military exercises. Important new measures were added to the toolbox once the Cold War began to thaw, such as the acceptance of cooperative aerial inspections or "open skies", observations within military garrisons, and the creation of a crisis prevention centre. Today there are literally dozens of CBMs to ease East-West security concerns that can now be used to establish new patterns of cooperation between old adversaries.

Nonetheless, nuclear arms control negotiations took centre stage during the Cold War as both sides invested those weapons with symbolic power to match their destructive potential. The strategic arms limitation and reduction talks became, paradoxically, a reflection of the strategic competition and a means to ameliorate it. In conflict-prone regions like South Asia and the Middle East, CBMs assume that dual role. In the absence of political reconciliation in those tense regions, the negotiation and implementation of CBMs have been critical in maintaining the peace and preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The East-West experience presents the most fully developed model for CBMs. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act formally recognised the status quo in Europe and facilitated a process of interaction between East and West, including the inviting of observers to military exercises on a voluntary basis. The 1986 Stockholm Document mandated such inspections, in addition to requiring an annual calendar of *notifiable* military activities. The 1990 Vienna Document considerably broadened data exchanges, including detailed information on force deployment, major weapons programmes, and military budgets. The 1992 Vienna agreement added another level of transparency by requiring demonstrations of new types of military equipment.

In the East-West struggle, CBMs facilitated the negotiation of formal arms control agreements and provided strengthening measures for existing accords. Their continuing utility stems, in part, from their adaptability. CBMs could be a growth industry in the 1990s because they are flexible instruments that allow national leaders to adapt to a radically transformed security environment.

A Post-Cold War Growth Industry

After every major war, perverse problems and heady opportunities present themselves in strange and variable mixtures. Those conditions have reappeared with the end of the Cold War. Entropic forces coexist alongside integrative trends in economics and communications, while blood feuds proceed concurrently with democratic and market reforms. Under these confusing circumstances, political leaders would do well to accentuate the positive and guard against the negative. CBMs will become increasingly employed in many regions for precisely those reasons: they are well suited to consolidate gains while providing buffers against losses.

Once in place, CBMs can readily accommodate changed circumstances, as is most evident by the Open Skies Treaty. Negotiated to increase transparency in a region divided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Warsaw Pact alliances, cooperative aerial inspections can now be employed to alleviate security concerns between Russia and Ukraine and to dampen the potential for ethnic conflict between Hungary and Romania.

CBMs will also be a growth industry in the 1990s because they are easier to negotiate and implement than formal arms control agreements. CBMs can be tacit and informal, such as the general understandings between Israel and Jordan to cooperate in combating terrorist incidents across the Jordan river, including the establishment

of a hot line in 1975 between those nations' intelligence services, the Mossad and the Mukhbarat. Alternatively, CBMs can be quite specific but publicly unannounced, such as the existing agreements between India and Pakistan establishing ground rules for military exercises and aerial operations along their border.

Formal but private CBMs are also employed in the Middle East, where the United States routinely carries out aerial monitoring of the 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement. In those operations, blessed by the States overflown and code-named Olive Harvest, the United States confirms compliance with agreed-upon thin-out zones for military equipment and personnel. Many CBMs, however, are a matter of record, such as the agreement between Argentina and Brazil to permit international inspections of their nuclear facilities.

As those examples suggest, CBMs are already a world-wide phenomenon, as national leaders far removed from the East-West conflict have begun to adapt old CBMs and design new measures for their own purposes. Those leaders understand that CBMs cannot be transposed mindlessly from Europe to other regions of the globe. Nonetheless, adaptation is possible because concerns raised during the Cold War over border security, surprise attack, accidental war, and unintended escalation are felt in many regions.

During the Spring of 1990, for example, tensions were escalated by large-scale violence in Kashmir, supported by Pakistan. The Indian Government moved troops into Kashmir to contain disturbances, but then Indian Army's Chief of Staff, General V. N. Sharma, kept his tank deployments behind the Indira Gandhi Canal so as to signal an intention not to cross the Pakistani border. Moreover, to clarify their peaceful intentions, both countries allowed United States observers to monitor force deployments. For its part, Pakistan had permitted foreign defence attaches based in Islamabad to observe its 1989 Zarb-e-Momin exercises.

East Asian countries have also laid a strong foundation of CBMs. With the 1967 creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the commencement of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, multilateral institutions provide reassurance and improve security in the region. A variety of formal bilateral maritime-based CBMs, such as the Japanese-Russian Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), and informal mechanisms, such as military-to-military discussions between Japan and China or joint surveillance of the Timor Gap by Australia and Indonesia, have also taken root in the region.

The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea have negotiated an extremely ambitious CBM agenda including security, political, and trade-related measures. Implementation has been poor, however, as long as political conditions in the former are inhospitable to far-reaching transparency and reconciliation. Even in Central America, an area beset during the 1980s with internal conflicts and border friction, a five-nation security commission has begun to discuss region-wide CBMs. The Organisation of American States (OAS) has recently created a special committee on hemispheric security which is investigating CBMs.

That brief sampling of CBMs suggests many shortfalls and halting steps, but is nonetheless impressive for its regional diversity and creativity. More and more political and military leaders are turning to those tools to prevent conflict, to provide indications and warning of troubling developments, to negotiate peace agreements, and to strengthen fragile accords.

Stage One: Conflict Avoidance

Negotiating and implementing CBMs require political will, but only modest amounts of capital need be expended to get the process started. Even in regions of considerable tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, useful initiatives have been taken despite the inability or reluctance of national leaders to resolve fundamental differences. Those steps have met the minimal requirements of not worsening any State's security and not increasing existing levels of hostility. No matter how serious outstanding grievances are, wise national leaders wish to avoid inadvertent escalation or accidental war.

The initial steps, like the establishment of hot lines between Indian and Pakistani sector commanders along the line of control in Kashmir, and between Indian and Chinese sector commanders along their disputed border, cannot solve underlying political and territorial disputes. Nevertheless, if precursor steps help to prevent a full-blown crisis they can still have enormous worth. The implementation of those measures can serve as an essential safety net against explosive developments, such as the destruction of religious shrines, urban acts of terror, and increased levels of violence in disputed territories.

Perhaps it is best to characterize initial steps to avoid unwanted wars and unintended escalation as conflict-avoidance measures (CAMs) rather than CBMs. One such measure is the 1992 agreement between India and Pakistan to provide prior notification of military exercises

involving more than ten thousand troops and the establishment of no-fly zones along their border. By opening channels of communication and providing a modest degree of transparency in selected military practices, those small tests of trust may also lay the groundwork for more substantive measures later on, if the agreements are implemented properly and if political leaders are amenable to subsequent steps.

Conflict avoidance measures can be taken even when States have not established diplomatic relations, as attested to by the Israeli-Syrian aerial monitoring agreements along the Golan Heights. Conflict avoidance measures could include unpublicised "red lines" that are likely to trigger vigorous responses if crossed by outside military forces. Israel, for example, has drawn a red line for Syrian troops within Lebanon that Damascus has respected. Amman benefits from a similar Israeli red line for foreign troops crossing Jordanian borders.

Another conflict-avoidance measure, employed between Israel and Egypt, is the acceptance, with six hours' advance notification, of national aerial reconnaissance flights along the median line of the buffer zone separating Israeli and Egyptian troops in the Sinai peninsula. That practice, mediated by the United States in the 1974 Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, established a framework for cooperative aerial inspections between once hostile States.

Not every first step needs to relate directly to conflict prevention. When government-to-government communication channels become a forum for ritualised grievances and rebuttals or when such channels are completely absent, non-governmental meetings can help to stimulate problem-solving approaches while combating enemy images. The "Dartmouth Group" meetings between American and Soviet experts served those purposes at the height of the Cold War. A similar body, the "Neemrana Group" (named after a fort in Rajasthan), composed of Indian and Pakistani former officials and non-governmental experts, has been meeting regularly since 1991. Meetings among non-governmental organisations in East Asia played a key role in promoting security dialogues within ASEAN.

One reason to implement CAMs is to provide a cooling-off period after wars or periods of high tension. "Buying time" is neutral, however. Cooling-off periods can be used to prepare for new wars, to conduct diplomatic activity towards conflict resolution, or simply to freeze a conflictual situation, such as the ceasefire arrangements for the Turkish-Greek impasse over Cyprus. CBMs are not value-neutral: they will always be shaped by the motivation of national leaders.

As a result, fears will arise that initial steps may be a Trojan horse or the extension of a deadly strategic competition by other means. If that perception—whether real or imagined—is strongly felt, first steps will be halting, at best. In this way, the process of negotiating and implementing CBMs is self-regulating: if initial steps do not have proven worth, they will not readily be followed by others.

In South Asia, some fear that negotiating security-related CBMs will place national leaders on a dangerous "slippery slope" leading to membership in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. But leaders will always retain a veto power over the process: only those measures will be implemented that serve the interests of all participating States. The existing level of tension in South Asia has provided the most compelling reason to start that process, even though grievances over Kashmir clearly limit the extent of progress.

To get the process started, initial steps can be designed specifically to provide early indications and warning of hostile intentions. Measures that mandate annual calendars of military exercises or limits on their size and proximity to sensitive regions can be particularly useful in addressing domestic misgivings because they clearly promote national security. When agreed guidelines were not observed, a greater alert status would be warranted, and domestic advocates for more trusting arrangements would be weakened.

A building-block approach to CBMs is more appropriate in tense regions where little foundation for trust exists. Ambitious first steps, such as the comprehensive CBM agreements between the two Koreas, will face serious implementation problems, with no track record to alleviate distrust and no safety net to cushion failure.

The motivations behind the negotiation of initial steps need not be in concert as long as they are not implacably hostile. Nor do States require equivalent or balanced military capabilities to take initial steps, as the CBMs between Israel and Jordan or the Open Skies Treaty overflights suggest. All that is required is for the parties to see separate value in the particular steps chosen and for those steps not to intensify existing levels of hostility. If the parties view CBMs as a zero-sum game, negotiations will fail.

Integrated approaches that combine initiatives in the economic, political, humanitarian, cultural, and military realms are an ideal approach. In the East-West negotiations, the creation of separate baskets facilitated trade-offs: at the outset of negotiations, the East hoped for economic gains and the West wanted improved records on

human rights. Over time, both blocs came to see the value of security measures. That matrix proved a good fit.

A similar negotiating strategy has obvious limitations in other regions of tension. In the Middle East, for example, linkages between baskets is stymied by the lack of diplomatic relations between Israel and most of its neighbours. India and Pakistan have also confined their initial steps to conflict prevention, with the important exception of the 1962 Indus Waters Treaty brokered by the World Bank, which provides a cooperative structure for the sharing and use of the subcontinent's northwestern river waters that were disputed after partition in 1947. With the exception of the Korean peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region does not face the dilemma of how to construct CAMs amid high levels of tension. Instead, the primary task within that diverse region appears to be that of preventing security concerns from escalating into conflicts. Economic growth and increased trade can provide a positive context for the establishment of conflict-prevention measures—if political leaders in the Asia-Pacific region are so inclined.

Stage Two: Confidence-Building

Simply put, negotiating conflict-avoidance measures takes political will, but not in large measure, since prudent national leaders will wish to avoid unnecessary wars. The second stage of that process is far more difficult, as it requires traversing the critical passage from conflict-avoidance to confidence-building. Far more political capital is required to reach that higher plane when States have deep-seated grievances or core issues to resolve. The South Asian dispute is stuck here, between war and peace, awaiting national leaders willing and able to take politically risky initiatives toward reconciliation. The Arab-Israeli dispute is currently traversing that heavily-mined terrain.

In both regions, the building blocks for CBMs are in place, but more far-reaching measures have been held hostage to progress on core issues. In the Arab-Israeli dispute, demilitarised and thin-out zones along Israel's borders with Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic have been in place for two decades. Multinational peacekeepers effectively monitor buffer zones, and cooperative aerial inspections provide indications and warning of troubling developments. As a result, Arab and Israeli peace negotiators can argue that accidental war is no longer a great concern.

With the signing of the Israeli-PLO peace treaty in 1994, countries in the Middle East now face the test of moving towards true confidence-

building. Israel would like to negotiate CBMs, in part because of the uncertainties associated with territorial withdrawal. Arab leaders have expressed the view that CBMs are entirely negotiable, once Israel has agreed to tackle core political issues and swap land for peace.

In South Asia, the transition phase from conflict avoidance to confidence-building is even more difficult. To begin with, CAMs are far less sturdy and their implementation has been spotty. Moreover, an active negotiating channel still does not exist to address Pakistan's grievances over the status of Kashmir and its Muslim population, and India's central grievances over Pakistan's support of separatist groups. Both Governments are lethargic of taking any steps that can be viewed as conciliatory—and politically damaging in the face of continuing provocations.

As a result of lingering grievances, India and Pakistan are not yet ready to adopt an unequivocal "live-and-let-live" policy towards one another. Each continues to jab at the other's soft spots while avoiding open warfare. As a result, partial steps have been taken to decrease the probability of unintended escalation, but that foundation for CBMs remains unfinished, and new construction has stopped after the demolition of the Babri mosque (1992) in Ayodhya by Hindu chauvinists, the bombings in Mumbai apparently coordinated by Muslim criminal elements, and continuing high levels of violence in Kashmir initiated principally by Indian security forces but also by separatist militants.

In the light of those developments, Pakistan has deferred implementation of agreements negotiated with India in 1991 to exchange military bands and to conduct joint mountaineering expeditions and naval sailing races. Such measures are now considered cosmetic and damaging politically by Pakistani officials and high-ranking military officers. In contrast, Brigadier General Dilber Naqvi, the director of operations and intelligence on the Pakistani Joint Staff, asserted in an interview that the value of CAMs was "beyond question".

Interviews with Indian Government officials suggest similar political constraints to the negotiation of CBMs for reconciliation at this time. As the former Indian director general of military operations, Lieutenant General V.R. Raghavan, said in an interview, "As long as we are exchanging fire every day, there can be no CBMs". With the existing level of violence in Kashmir, cautious national leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad can use existing CAMs to contain explosions, but not as a springboard towards political reconciliation.

The current situation in other parts of the Asia-Pacific region seems ripe for further CBM negotiation. Unlike Europe or Latin America, much of the Asia-Pacific region does not have the habit of formal multilateral security cooperation. Potential conflict areas include territorial claims over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, border disputes between China and Vietnam, and defence modernisation programmes spurred by rapid economic growth in the region. Since the seas connect the far reaches of the Asia-Pacific region, and since the seas can also become a medium of conflict, maritime CBMs appear to merit special attention. Yet, clearly there are benefits to be derived from confidence-building in all spheres of military activity.

Within the region, Australia has broken important ground by unilaterally committing itself to open military exercises for international inspections, to prepare a calendar of military exercises, and to publish defence papers. Malaysia has proposed a regional arms register to collect information not just on arms transfers, but also on current holdings and financial terms of sale. At a time of reduced tensions, the negotiation and implementation of such CBMs by other States can build a firm foundation for future cooperation in the region. It is particularly important for China to join its neighbours by embracing increased transparency in its defence programmes and policies.

CBMs can become vital companions to peacemaking, but not substitute for it in regions of great tension. Indeed, without CBMs, including the good offices of a trusted third party, politically risky peacemaking efforts can easily fail. Many measures are available to facilitate the transition to confidence-building when political conditions permit. Those CBMs might build upon precursor steps, such as formally acknowledging tacit understandings already in place or resolving border disputes that are not central to national security.

The forms adopted for CBMs can be as important as their substance. The transition from conflict avoidance to confidence-building can be symbolised by the acceptance of foreign military observers at pre-notified exercises. If that transition is too difficult to accomplish in one step, third parties can be usefully engaged, including multinational inspection teams composed of representatives from adversarial States.

Security measures are absolutely essential during the transition stage, but true peacemaking also requires CBMs in the commercial, humanitarian, and cultural areas. The objectives at that stage are to establish new patterns of interaction that will become perceived as beneficial within participating States, and to make those patterns harder to reverse when perturbations occur.

The process of transition from conflict avoidance to confidence-building is obviously easier if there are no core issues blocking the way. Domestic impediments that have prevented progress will still have to be surmounted, however. In the case of Argentina and Brazil, it is noteworthy that CBMs on nuclear programmes were undertaken only after fledgling democracies were in place in both Governments, which were committed to devoting greater resources to economic development. Even without deep-seated grievances, both countries were unable to agree to transparency measures under military-dominated Governments.

Risk-taking for Peace

The stakes involved in the United States-Soviet competition ensured a far more perilous transition from conflict avoidance to conflict resolution. Mikhail Gorbachev successfully challenged Washington to move beyond Cold-War thinking with powerful symbolic gestures and public declarations, such as his frank acknowledgment that the Krasnoyarsk radar constituted a violation of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was a risk-taker of similar stature. His trip to Jerusalem utterly recast Israeli-Egyptian relations, despite the hard-nosed content of his speech before the Israeli Knesset. President Fernando Collor de Mello symbolised his intention to close down the Brazilian military's nuclear weapons programme by flying to the Amazon and shoveling dirt into a deep shaft originally dug for the purpose of carrying out an underground nuclear test.

Significantly, the symbolic gestures and transformational journeys of Sadat and of Collor de Mello did not occur in a vacuum; they were preceded by useful conflict avoidance measures. In the United States-Soviet competition, precursor CBMs, such as the hot line and the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, helped to prevent unintended escalation until Gorbachev was willing to change ingrained habits of superpower hostility. Sadat's initiatives were facilitated by an impressive set of conflict-avoidance measures brokered after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war by the Nixon administration.

In each of those cases, the groundwork for CBMs was different in important respects. In the East-West competition the precipitous decline in the Soviet economy appears to have been critical to Gorbachev's calculations. In the Middle East, Sadat earned freedom of manoeuvre by waging war against Israeli occupation of Egyptian land. In the Southern Cone, discredited military regimes allowed fledgling

democracies to break new ground. Comparative studies of those and other transitions from conflict avoidance to confidence-building are essential in order to understand better the dynamics of transformation.

Active and farsighted leadership is required when the risks associated with political reconciliation are great. When security issues weigh heavily in that transition, conflict-avoidance measures provide an essential safety net for peacemaking. The implementation of those prior steps was intrinsically valuable and absolutely essential for the transition to confidence-building in United States-Soviet relations and in the Israeli-Egyptian peace process. Conversely, in regions where building blocks to CBMs have yet to be implemented, such as the Korean peninsula, the process remains stuck.

Conflict avoidance measures are also a necessary precondition to confidence-building because setbacks will inevitably occur during peacemaking. The process of political reconciliation will energize opposing forces, and opposing forces in tense regions often resort to violent means. Precursor steps can help to contain the damage and make setbacks less severe and long-lasting.

Just as important, conflict avoidance measures can have a trampoline effect if and when peacemaking takes hold, allowing leaders to elevate political relations onto a higher plane. The transition from Cold War to unsettled peace in United States-Soviet and Israeli-Egyptian relations came remarkably fast, considering the distances travelled. The rate of transformation was accelerated, in part, by channels of communication and patterns of cooperative behaviour developed through precursor steps.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Anwar Sadat received international acclaim for their risk-taking strategies, but both paid a heavy price for their leadership. Nor did President Conor de Mello fare well, despite his path-breaking efforts. Does the fate of those national leaders suggest that future risk-takers will be deterred from peacemaking and confidence-building?

A careful assessment of cause and effect is warranted here. The downfall of Collor de Mello was due to personal corruption, not CBMs. On the other hand, Argentine President Carlos Menem has been well served by his efforts to strengthen Argentine-Brazilian cooperation. Sadat's death can clearly be tied to his efforts at political reconciliation, which were widely opposed within Egypt as well as by the Arab world. A decade later, however, his framework for peace with Israel has resulted in a peace agreement between Israel and the PLO. As a

result, a renewed appreciation of Sadat is evident among Egyptian elites; his place in history is already secure outside the region.

Evaluations of Gorbachev's downfall will continue for decades. Most assessments are likely to focus on the bankruptcy of the Soviet economy and Communist party leadership and the poverty of communism as an ideology. The Stockholm accord and other CBMs may have accelerated the demise of a surprisingly brittle system, but so, too, did bloated United States and Soviet defence spending, the Kremlin's disastrous decision to intervene in Afghanistan, and a dozen other factors. As such, it is wildly inappropriate to credit or blame CBMs for Gorbachev's failure and that of the Soviet system.

What, then, can be said of the political fortunes of those who wanted to make the transition from conflict avoidance to confidence-building? Only that the biggest risk-takers lost the most in the near term, and will probably gain the most recognition and appreciation over time. Clearly, the negotiation of CBMs to accompany peacemaking can be the source of lasting credit, regardless of other leadership failures.

Few national leaders, however, are willing to tackle peacemaking in extraordinarily bold steps. A safer strategy is to employ smaller tests of trust—a process perfectly suited to CBMs. That process is obviously easier when there are no core issues in dispute, as in the Argentine-Brazilian case. Still, in that case, as in the United States-Soviet and Israeli-Egyptian cases, breakthroughs were accomplished only after earlier tests of trust had been passed.

Every case of risk-taking for confidence-building and peacemaking is unique. Some national leaders may well be deterred from embarking on that path because their security problems are not ripe for solution, or because they lack domestic support, personal courage or regional standing. There simply are no substitutes for the political will and the political base to assume the risks associated with the transition from conflict-avoidance to confidence-building.

Occasionally, heroic efforts are called for, but true heroes at the presidential or prime ministerial level are a rare breed. Extremely tough decisions are unavoidable, however, when confidence-building must proceed parallel with peacemaking, as is the case in the Middle East. Progress on the CBM front is also painfully slow in South Asia, where there is still no active negotiating track to deal with core issues. Fortunately, most national leaders face less daunting challenges when negotiating CBMs.

Stage Three: Strengthening the Peace

If formidable hurdles can be surmounted to avoid war and then to negotiate a fragile peace, national leaders can continue to employ CBMs to strengthen the peace. Objectives at that stage of the process include broadening and deepening existing patterns of cooperation and making positive developments as irreversible as possible. The creation of properly functioning institutions to develop trade and cultural exchanges can be particularly helpful.

A number of security-related CBMs can also be usefully employed. Peace-strengthening measures might include constraints on the size and location of military exercises. Highly intrusive transparency measures, such as agreements to permit virtually unrestricted open skies and short-notice observations within military garrisons, could demonstrate non-hostile intent.

One way to measure progress in normalising relations is to monitor the nature and number of exchanges between formerly hostile States. In 1992, the Israeli Government of Yitzhak Rabin made a significant gesture to Cairo by returning archaeological objects collected by Moshe Dayanin the Sinai. United States and Russian exchanges are now routinely carried out at nuclear-weapon laboratories and bases. In contrast, India and Pakistan have almost no contact at official levels. They have agreed in principle to a regular exchange of military officers at each other's national defence colleges, but implementation has been held up for political reasons. China and India have made considerable progress in that sphere. High-level exchanges between governmental officials and military leaders have been routinised, as one would expect between States that are in the process of reducing tension and thinning out forces along their disputed border.

CBMs: A Tool for Security in 90s

Confidence-building measures are pragmatic steps towards ideal objectives. Those steps will necessarily be small at the outset if serious grievances must be bridged. A broad CBM negotiating framework that facilitates linkages and trade-offs is advisable, but when central security concerns are at issue, and when States have powerful military establishments, military-related steps tend to dominate at the outset. Ultimately, however, success in negotiating CBMs in the military sphere will depend on multiple initiatives in the political, economic, cultural and humanitarian realms.

The process naturally begins by identifying shared interests and developing an ethos of cooperation over time. CBMs can be molded to fit multiple needs, ranging from avoiding unintended escalation to

making new wars unthinkable. An evolutionary step-by-step approach seems to work best, at least until core security issues must be tackled. It makes sense to start the process modestly, with steps that will be perceived widely as successful, not with suggestions that would lessen a nation's ability to defend itself. A successful CBM process can be encouraged with follow-up meetings, review conferences, and other techniques to institutionalize patterns of cooperation.

CBMs are like motherhood, apple pie, hummus, falafel, pakora, and kebab. They do not generate reflexive opposition except among those ideologically opposed to tension reduction. CBMs naturally commend themselves to national leaders who are both risk-averse and risk-takers.

A successful CBM process involves creating a framework of principles, values and objectives that will govern foreign relations. Building blocks can be symbolic as well as substantive. After all, when Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev declared that a nuclear war must never be fought and could never be won, they changed nothing and everything: while targeting plans remained constant after their declaration, the status of nuclear theologians on both sides began to plummet. The importance of symbolic gestures in confidence-building cannot be underestimated.

The record to date suggests that the decade of the 1990s can be a time of considerable progress for CBMs. Those steps cannot resolve blood feuds like those under way in the former Yugoslavia, but they can help States in South Asia, the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East to avoid new explosions. Existing conflict-avoidance measures are fragile between India and Pakistan. Strengthening measures might be especially useful for large-scale military exercises, which led to tense confrontations in 1987 and 1990. In the Middle East, it will take little imagination to devise CBMs to facilitate peacemaking, if only national leaders can be persuaded to take bold steps. In the Southern Cone, CBMs can help democratic Governments consolidate recent gains.

CBMs could also be usefully employed to avoid conflict and reduce tensions in the former Soviet Union, Africa, South-east Asia, and other regions well suited for missionary work of this kind. In short, CBMs are an ideal tool for the 1990s, a decade of great opportunity as well as of great potential for backsliding. It makes sense to promote CBMs in regions of tension and to call attention to the East-West experience, not as a blueprint, but to stimulate problem-solving approaches. Outsiders can provide useful help and general guidelines, but the heavy lifting must come from within regions of tension.

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Openness, Assurance of Security and Disarmament

THE GROWING SIGNIFICANCE OF REGIONAL APPROACHES TO DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Regional meetings of this kind contribute positively to the understanding of complex issues and concerns in the area of security and disarmament, and foster the process of openness and confidence-building through an exchange of ideas and information in an atmosphere of informal deliberations. In these historic times, if we genuinely want peace and security, making progress in disarmament means searching for more common ground, not more divisions.

As a person who has spent 15 years of his life in the disarmament field, I am a pragmatic optimist and am convinced that the final outcome will be positive. There is simply no other alternative.

1995 has great significance for the cause of international security, arms limitation and disarmament. It marks the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the United Nations and the end of the Second World War, a war that brought unbearable suffering to the peoples of the world, including those in the Asia-Pacific region. This year stands at an important political juncture which will provide us with an opportunity to reflect on the past, to assess achievements and setbacks, to draw lessons from them, as well as to explore future approaches to the challenges ahead of us in order to find a common agenda for a safer and better world.

As the Secretary-General of the United Nations has pointed out on a number of occasions, it is important to maintain the momentum

created by positive developments in the field of disarmament. In his statement during the First Committee of the forty-ninth General Assembly, he said:

> "Never before has there been more opportunity for global cooperation towards arms control and disarmament. We must make full use of this opportunity. Not only do arms control and disarmament make the world secure, they release economic, scientific and technological resources for peace and human progress."

Our efforts have acquired even greater significance in the context of an increasing number of regional and sub-regional conflicts.

Either by coincidence or by destiny, 1995 has also been the year of the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). I think that there is no doubt in the minds of disarmament experts that the NPT remains the central pillar of global non-proliferation and of future stability and security in the world.

This meeting offers the Asia-Pacific States an opportunity for an in-depth informal dialogue and examination of nuclear-related issues, thus contributing to the search for acceptable common ground.

In terms of the increasing importance of regional approaches to peace and security, this meeting will address the following topics: openness and assurance of security, regional approaches to disarmament, the future course of the regional forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), efforts towards risk reduction and maritime security in Asia and the Pacific, the implementation of confidence-building measures and the merits and problems of existing regional disarmament proposals.

One of the Regional Centre's functions is to provide support for the initiatives or any other activities mutually agreed upon by Member States for the enhancement of peace and disarmament in the region. The Centre's agenda has been crowded with regional and subregional disarmament and security issues. For instance, informal conditions for the initiation of a North-East Asian regional dialogue on cooperation issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula is a familiar item on its agenda since 1990.

The entire world welcomed the satisfactory solution of the problem between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to the implementation of the former's commitment to its safeguards agreements.

Openness and transparency in military matters are essential to increase confidence among States and to contribute to global and regional stability. Efforts to develop non-discriminatory practical means to enhance openness should be continued.

Since 1992, the international community has witnessed substantial progress in disarmament particularly in the area of weapons of mass destruction. It is evident, though, that such parallel progress should be made by parallel progress in the conventional field, particularly light arms; lately, those weapons have been killing people in the hundreds of thousands.

Over the past years, we have witnessed the intensification of interest in developing new approaches for dialogue on regional and subregional security and disarmament issues which is taking place in different parts of the world. It is encouraging to see ASEAN countries and their dialogue partners make a significant leap by the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). I hope that discussions will reveal a clearer picture of the direction of political dialogue, as well as possible cooperation between ASEAN and the Regional Centre with respect to the common endeavour of promoting disarmament measures.

Last year, the Regional Meeting held a preliminary discussion on the regional disarmament guidelines adopted by consensus at the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The discussion and comments presented to the Regional Centre afterward encouraged the exploration of a set of principles applicable to the region. The Regional Centre would welcome a concrete examination of those proposed guidelines.

The end of the Cold War has brought about a significant change in the world situation. We have witnessed a growing tendency towards the development of regional approaches. That could indicate a greater role to be played by the Regional Centres. As you are aware, the activities carried out by the Asia-Pacific Centre are called "the Kathmandu process". As the word "process" indicates, there is no magic and instant solution for disarmament and peace. In order to achieve visible results, long and painstaking efforts will be required. The Regional Centre is ready to take another step forward with your renewed commitment and wisdom.

REGIONAL DISARMAMENT SHOULD COMPLEMENT GLOBAL EFFORTS

I am delighted to have the opportunity of addressing this august gathering of eminent diplomats, learned academicians, and renowned

experts who have dedicated themselves to promoting peace and security through disarmament in our region and elsewhere in the world. We note with great satisfaction that the Kathmandu process initiated in recent years has received wide acclamation for its contribution to regional disarmament dialogue. This meeting, I believe, will add to the string of significant achievements of the Kathmandu process.

Disarmament is a paramount concern of our time. The present century has lived through the trauma and tragedies of unspeakable devastation in two world wars and several other conflicts of various proportions. This century has also witnessed an unprecedented arms race that was honed and expanded the ability to kill. Millions of lives have been lost owing to the use of increasingly lethal weapons. Mankind possesses in its arsenals weapons sufficient to annihilate the world many times over. We have lived in fear of the nuclear Armageddon that loomed large in an ideologically divided and hostile world during the Cold War. That fear lingers still in our psyche, and we are confronted with the continued existence of stockpiled nuclear weapons.

No less traumatic and tragic has been the eruption, on the heels of the Cold War, of innumerable ethno-religious conflicts, accompanied by narrow nationalistic motives, which have spawned societies asunder and inflicted horrendous suffering and genocide on a multitude of people in many parts of the world. The severity of those contretemps in the civilised societies of our time has been accentuated by the use of highly sophisiticated arms weaponry.

The lifting of the pall of superpower rivalry has left the ground open for regional arms races. Regional escalation of an arms build-up would be far more frightening than the Cold War had ever been. It would not only compromise meticulous and detailed safety requirements to prevent an accidental triggering of weapons of mass destruction, but would also heighten the prospects for pre-emptive use of such weapons at the slightest provocation. A regional arms race would also sap the capacity of developing countries to invest in socio-economic development, which they badly need.

The world has not become a peaceful and secure place with the amassing of weapons. On the contrary, it has turned into a dangerous tinder-box. We are now in a bind from which we must break loose in order to establish a more dependable security environment. The road to lasting peace and security in the world leads through conscientious and committed endeavours to disarmament, poverty alleviation, sustainable economic development and harmonious social progress.

The Asia and Pacific region embraces a vast geographical area. It is home to the largest population in the world and is characterised by ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity. The vast array of geographic, economic and social differences offer us both splendid opportunities for mutual sharing of unique experiences and daunting challenges for building confidence and progressing together towards lasting peace and security built on the foundations of socio-economic advancement.

Nepal has always stood for transparency and openness in security relations in order to foster predictability and discourage surprises. The international community has already found a toe-hold in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. That, however, addresses the least of our concerns, as non-conventional weapons—more deadly and destructive—remain outside the purview of the Register. Nepal staunchly and unequivocally supports initiatives to expand the scope of the Register to cover all categories and grades of weapons as the cornerstone for an edifice of confidence. We also see the possibility of working towards an agreement on a regional arms register which embraces all categories and grades of weapons, and I take this opportunity to urge you to explore that possibility.

During peacetime, measures related to keeping neighbours abreast of major troop and weapons deployment and military exercises, evolving cooperative security arrangements, effecting regular consultation between security personnel, and collaborating on defense technology, among others measures, could also go a long way to enhance openness and create an environment of mutual trust.

We live in a world marked by staggering disparities among nations: land and population sizes, levels of socio-economic development, technological progress, resources endowment, military strength and possession of weapons, to name a few. The bipolarity to which we had inured ourselves in the latter half of this century has eroded, and the power configuration of the post-Cold War era has brought about incertitude in international security relations. Nepal believes that mutual security assurances must be the pragmatic means to pursue to foster confidence in the changed circumstances rather than yield to runaway military aspirations.

The question of security assurances, therefore, deserves serious consideration. Credible and firm security assurances from nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States, for instance, would help to cap nuclear proliferation. The question of legal use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be interpreted in that light. Nepal appreciates the underlying merit of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a central element

of common security and has extended its support wherever they have been proposed. Moving one step further, it is our earnest yearning that comprehensive and credible security assurances, including no-first-use of weapons of mass destruction, and no-first-attack agreements, be made a kingpin in international arrangements.

The most disturbing nightmare in weapons technology has been the development and production of nuclear weapons—weapons that have in their rudimentary stage indicated their killing potential by inflicting a holocaust on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is our privilege to have the distinguished Mayor of Nagasaki and the Vice Governor of the Nagasaki Prefecture here with us to remind us how disastrous the use of nuclear weapons can be. Nepal feels strongly that it is the duty of our generation, which is responsible for developing most of the sophisticated nuclear weapons of increasingly lethal capacity, to exorcise the ghost of such weapons and leave a safer world for our children.

Twenty-five years have elapsed since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came into force. The Treaty is now awaiting renewal. It has been evident, in the face of the international community's failure to iron out major differences in four preparatory committee meetings, that we would be participating in the NPT review and extension conference in April this year with differing assessments and perceptions about whether the renewal of the Treaty should be for an indefinite period, a definite period or a series of definite periods. Like all human instruments, it is not a perfect treaty, but it has elicited near universal acceptance, with more than 165 State parties, and has stemmed the tide of nuclear weapons proliferation. The NPT review and extension conference affords the international community a rare opportunity, as well as an unprecedented challenge, to plug loopholes and remove inadequacies so as to make the Treaty equitable and acceptable to all and to consolidate its past achievements. That, in turn, will pave the way for nuclear disarmament.

NPT extension cannot and should not be dealt with in isolation. Issues relevant to nuclear disarmament such as the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) and a fissile materials cut-off treaty, as well as a ban on production of nuclear weapons accompanied by expeditious dismantling of the existing stockpiles, must receive serious attention from the international community.

It is disheartening to note that the journey from the Partial Test Ban Treaty to the CTBT has been rather long. Further delay in committing firmly to, if not concluding, CTBT will jeopardize the

prospects for the indefinite extension of the NPT. The imposition of voluntary moratoriums on nuclear testing, if made by all the nuclear-weapon States which have not done so, as well as by threshold States, would promote an environment of trust conducive to both NPT extension and a CTBT. A global compact on the prohibition of production and enrichment of fissile materials for weapons purposes, in our view, must be taken up with a sense of urgency. Safeguards mechanisms to monitor and prevent diversion of such materials also should be strengthened concomitantly and applied in a non-discriminatory manner.

Disarmament has regional dimensions for Asia and the Pacific, with nuclear disarmament the top of the agenda. South Asia, East Asia, West Asia and the Pacific subregions have for long lived in tension of dangerous proportions, including the eruption of wars of varying intensities. The existence of declared and threshold-nuclear-weapon States renders our region extremely volatile. In view of that, disarmament in general and the elimination of nuclear weapons in particular should be a regional concern of high priority.

Global nuclear and general disarmament initiatives which can be envisioned or are already on track can and should be complimented and strengthened by regional initiatives. We should therefore seriously contemplate the Asia and Pacific region leading the rest of the world in such initiatives and contributing immeasurably to world peace and security.

The United Nations has been celebrating its 50th anniversary this year. The first 50 years of the world body have been basically devoted to promoting international peace and security. We must make the next 50 years an era of international development. That will be a fitting tribute to the United Nations' 50th anniversary—to re-dedicate ourselves to the cause and goals of world wide development as a means of promoting peace.

I wish to conclude by reaffirming Nepal's abiding faith in the United Nations and emphasising the latter's catalytic role in promoting the goal of durable world peace and security through disarmament, poverty alleviation and sustainable socio-economic development—a goal Nepal cherishes and to which it stands pledged.

SUSTAINING MOMENTUM TOWARDS COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and the foundation of the United Nations. For more than

forty years of those fifty years, under the influence of the East-West confrontation, we lived in fear of another world war, especially an all-out nuclear war. While it is true that the danger of a world war diminished substantially after the collapse of the Cold War, the fact remains that there are States which still possess nuclear weapons. And new causes for concern have arisen after the Cold War, such as outbreaks of conflict and confrontation kept in check during the Cold War and the problem of nuclear weapon proliferation.

Russia and the United States have intensified their efforts towards nuclear disarmament. Ukraine also took positive steps by acceding to the NPT and allowing the START I Treaty to enter into force. Now that the momentum for disarmament has accelerated, I believe we should propel that positive movement towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

With a view to promoting disarmament and coping with the new set of issues arising from regional conflicts and nuclear proliferation, the United Nations should assume an increasingly important role in enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific region by facilitating cooperation and building confidence through dialogue. It is in that context that this conference takes on such significance.

One of the items for discussion at the meeting is the NPT Review and Extension Conference to be convened 17 April-12 May this year. As an advocate of the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, I hope that some effective measures for nuclear non-proliferation and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons will be identified during that meeting. It is our ardent wish that declarations be made by the nuclear-weapon States in favour of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a commitment to the non-use of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, we request that the nuclear-weapon Powers declare their willingness to make continuous efforts for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons.

Nagasaki fell victim to the atomic bomb in 1945. We experienced first-hand the devastation that nuclear weapons can bring. With the firm determination not to allow the tragedy to repeat itself, the people of Nagasaki Prefecture have been very vocal in pressing for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the realisation of eternal world peace, as reflected in the Nagasaki Prefectural Declaration on the Dignity of Freedom and Peace in 1990.

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the atomic bomb, we in Nagasaki, as victims of the atomic bomb, reaffirm our deep commitment

to continue to convey the meaning of our experience to the rest of the world, and our strong desire for peace.

Nagasaki will be hosting the next United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in June this year. Our expectations are that the conference in Nagasaki, coming after this meeting and the conclusion of the NPT Conference, will be another step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

To create a peaceful global society, the issues we have to grapple with, including the problems of the environment and refugees, are colossal. In an attempt to explore ways to establish lasting peace and sustainable development, the Prefecture is sponsoring an International Forum with the theme "Peace, Disarmament and the Environment", which will be attended by experts in those fields from different countries.

It is my sincere hope that the spirit of the people of Nagasaki, our wish for the abolition of nuclear weapons and for eternal peace will be appreciated by all peoples, and I encourage all of you in your efforts towards the realisation of those worthy goals.

I would like to take this opportunity to express officially the deep gratitude of the people of Japan for the sympathy and great assistance extended to us by many following the recent earthquake in Kobe and its surrounding area. As a Japanese citizen, I must tell you how much Japan appreciated the many warm expressions of concern we received. That incident has convinced me that as long as such goodwill exists in the hearts and minds of people, eternal peace can surely be made a reality.

ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

I would like to extend our deep appreciation for the support and sympathy offered by many countries after the Great Hanshin Earthquake. This is the second Regional Disarmament Meeting I have had the privilege to attend. I am here at Kathmandu with Kiyoura, Vice Governor of Nagasaki Prefecture, to convey to you the wish of the citizens of Nagasaki for the total abolition of nuclear weapons. I carry this message to you as Mayor of Nagasaki City, which will host the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues to be held in June this year in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombing.

On 9 August 1945, fifty years ago, the city of Nagasaki was devastated by an atomic bomb. By the end of that year, 73,000 people

had lost their lives and another 74,000 had been injured. Since then, tens of thousands of people have passed away and many "hibakushas" (atomic bomb victims) continue to suffer from the sequela of radiation exposure and from fear of death.

We, the citizens of Nagasaki, experienced the atomic bombing and realised that nuclear weapons are the ultimate weapons to annihilate all mankind. Because of our experience, we began to appeal for the abolition of nuclear weapons. That appeal stems from our humanitarian desire to prevent the destruction of all humanity.

You may have heard that the Smithsonian Institution in the United States gave up its plans to hold an exhibit commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. When I heard the news, I was amazed to contemplate the vast differences in how the Americans and the Japanese perceived the atomic bombing.

Japan annexed Korea and fought the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War, which resulted in the dropping of the atomic bombs on two Japanese cities. I believe that the Japanese should apologize to the people of Asia and the Pacific for having inflicted on them so much sacrifice and suffering. But at the same time, I wonder how right it was to have dropped atomic weapons and to have sacrificed so many civilians in those towns. What do you think, ladies and gentlemen?

We, the citizens of Nagasaki, strongly assert that the dropping of an atomic weapon, a weapon of indiscriminate mass destruction, can never be justified under humanitarian and international laws. We shall continue our efforts in collaboration with peoples of other nations for the elimination of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date.

The current international situation has undergone remarkable changes in the area of nuclear-weapons reductions, as can be seen by the START II agreement between the United States and Russia and the nuclear testing moratoriums declared by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Even with those large reductions in American and Russian nuclear arsenals, enough nuclear weapons remain to destroy humanity many times over. There is a general trend now to believe that nuclear weapons are no longer a threat. I think that is a misperception. As long as nuclear weapons exist, we can never be free from toe-risk of annihilating humanity. The citizens of Nagasaki long not only for the reduction, but for the total elimination, of nuclear weapons.

The NPT Review and Extension Conference will be held in April this year. The Treaty is based on the assumption that five nuclear

Powers will continue to possess nuclear weapons and is not aimed at their elimination. Nuclear weapons can never be eliminated as long as the five nuclear-weapon States depend on the theory of nuclear deterrence.

As Mayor of one of the cities that experienced nuclear destruction, I am against the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, as nuclear-weapon States have not shown their intention to abolish nuclear weapons altogether.

A total ban on nuclear testing is the first step towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. History has shown clearly that nuclear tests facilitated the development of nuclear weapons and increased the risk of nuclear proliferation. It is our wish in Nagasaki that the multilateral negotiations under way at the Conference on Disarmament will lead quickly to agreement on a CTBT, and that a treaty to totally ban nuclear weapons will soon follow.

The United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues will be held in Nagasaki City in June this year. I should like to assure you that the city of Nagasaki and the Nagasaki Prefecture are doing their utmost to ensure the success of that conference, particularly in the light of the important commemorations this year—the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombing and of the foundation of the United Nations.

Peace is the supreme asset we can bequeath to our descendants. I would like to urge you to extend your efforts to make the 21st century a century of peace.

DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS AND AGREEMENTS: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL APPROACHES

This report does not purport to be a full account of the deliberations in Working Group I. It can only summarize the main themes that came up in the discussions. Also, the report is not intended to be a consensus document of the Working Group, but only the reflections of the moderator.

I have been most impressed with the patience and skill with which Evgeniy Gorkovskiy and Tsutomu Ishiguri have handled this meeting. This has been a constructive meeting, and I have greatly enjoyed participating in it.

For this report on Working Group I, I am indebted to my good friend, Ben Sanders. Ben took extensive notes of the deliberations of the Working Group and assisted me in preparing the final report.

The five presentations in the Working Group were split into two halves, with the first set focusing on the regional and global approaches to disarmament and the second on peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. The presentations in the first half focussed largely on the regional dimension.

The moderator set the tone with a brief outline of the meeting held in January 1995 in Goa as part of the four-nation Shanghai Initiative, a unique Track II venture involving officials and non-officials. The Shanghai Initiative meeting adopted a consensus document that seeks to address the core issues covered by the topic of our Working Group I in Kathmandu. The document suggests a framework for global and regional disarmament which, if adopted internationally, would revolutionize the arms control agenda and help to usher in a new security order based on equity. The document recommends the elimination of all nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles within a specific time-frame, no-first-use and non-use nuclear conventions, mutually agreed force reductions at the regional level, and the development of an international system based on collective security.

Michael Krepon was the first speaker in Working Group I. He presented a "typology" of three categories of measures which in one form or another might be applicable to regional problems. Those range from conflict-avoidance measures—the most elementary, most easily applied measures to avoid unwanted, unintentional conflict through the more challenging confidence-building measures, to peace-making measures, which form the most complex and difficult set of the three groups of measures. Peace-making measures, he argued, are often the product of far-sighted leaders. Krepon cited events in southern Asia to illustrate his points. Although Pakistan and India have conflict-avoidance measures in place, neither side appears to have confidence in them. So in the event of another crisis, to quote Michael Krepon, "the two sides are in a very poor position to deal with it" In contrast, China and India have adopted substantial CBMs which, he contended, "have removed the threat of war and made a return to chilly relations very remote."

Khalid Aziz Babar submitted a paper that serves as a useful primer on the merits and problems of regional disarmament. In his presentation, he stressed that disarmament approaches have to be determined by the different problems and characteristics of the regions involved. The approaches have taken into account internal and external issues. He outlined a variety of instruments that might serve the interests of specific areas, pointing out that they should be so designed

and applied as to fit not only regional requirements but also the precepts laid down by the United Nations and its agencies as well as the principles and rules of international law. He stressed that confidence-building measures (CBMs) ranged widely in nature from civil to military to those imposing various forms of policy constraints. Citing the example of the CSCE, he argued that CBMs ought to be transparent and legally binding in order to be effective. Verification of compliance is another important consideration, as are ways of enlightening and informing the public at large.

Peggy Mason focussed on the processes involved—or, as one speaker earlier said, how to "get on with it". She sought to address two basic issues: (a) why there is a need to "get on with it" and (b) the possible role of the United Nations in facilitating the regional initiatives. She saw a progression of measures: CBMs, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, but warned against "overloading" any newly created institution with too many functions. The real challenge usually is whether the process would be completed in time to address acute, pressing problems. In that regard, she referred to the comment of one participant that the Asian Regional Forum was a "young plant" that should not be overburdened and that, with its "multiparents," there was need for "consensual parenting". A lesson to be drawn from the CSCE process is that CBMs are initial steps only—not ends in themselves. They addressed symptoms rather than causes. It is worth noting that the idea to boost CSCE functions to include conflict prevention was never fully realised. That illustrates that we are dealing with a lengthy process which cannot be rushed and within which the various elements do not automatically follow each other. Progress in the Asia-Pacific region might be facilitated if more attention is paid to agreements reached in the global (United Nations) deliberative bodies which, she argued, had "internationalised" certain concepts and principles originally developed in other regional contexts.

The second half of the Working Group dealt with issues relating to cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Brahma Chellaney pointed to the growing web of export controls that impede peaceful nuclear energy cooperation and called for a proper balance between non-proliferation concerns and the rights of nations to harness the atom for commercial power under international safeguards. He said the growing emphasis on controlling dual-purpose technologies raised issues that went beyond the subject of peaceful nuclear energy cooperation and touched the core issues of civilian modernisation in the developing world. He stressed the need for fresh,

innovative thinking in the 50th anniversary year of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings—not for apologies to justify existing constraints to nuclear disarmament and peaceful nuclear cooperation. The future of non-proliferation depends on consensus-building and international cooperation, not on unilateral or cartel actions. A prerequisite for such consensus-building is respect for, as well as a readiness to address, the aspirations and concerns of the 85 per cent of the nations in the world which are outside the present system of security alliances and umbrellas. Those nations believe that the bargain that was struck in 1968 between the nuclear-weapons States and non-nuclear-weapon States has become lopsided. To address their concerns, Chellaney called for United Nations supervision of multilateral export barriers; transparency in the functioning of the London Club, which, he pointed out, lacks international sanction; and the streamlining of export controls. It should be remembered that the NPT was not designed solely to deter horizontal proliferation; rather it represents a far-reaching, multidimensional bargain. He said it was vital to build international consensus and cooperation on non-proliferation, and that all the components of the non-proliferation regime should be the product of such consensus and sanction.

Hiroyoshi Kurihara described in detail the proposal for an Asiatom, or Paciatom. That would consist of a cooperative arrangement in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and include multinational production facilities and inspections, nuclear safety assistance and nuclear material control. He preferred the term Paciatom, since it would reflect wider cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy issues in the Asia-Pacific region. He argued that Asiatom/Paciatom need not be modeled on Europe's Euratom and that it could evolve its own distinct Asian identity and structure. If sensitive production facilities were operated by a multinational body, it would serve the cause of non-proliferation well. For compliance with non-proliferation rules, he said the new Asiatom/ Paciatom agency could look at regional arrangements like Euratom and ABACC (Argentine-Brazil Joint Inspectorate). The process for creating Asiatom/Paciatom would first have to involve exploratory meetings, a careful planning exercise and eventually the creation of a framework for various options.

A lively discussion followed the presentations. Among the comments and suggestions, the following stood out:

(a) One reason why more progress had not been made on CBMs in the Asia-Pacific region might be because many of the proposals had relied too much on European concepts that are not directly

applicable or understood elsewhere. Roger Ball said Western strategic concepts could not be transplanted in the Asia-Pacific region. It was pointed out by more than one delegate that the term "transparency," for example, translated as "nakedness" in some Asian languages, and that being "naked" was not a good thing in those societies. Western concepts must be integrated with indigenous thinking. Pengiran Haji Osman Bin touched on that theme earlier, when he spoke on the regional notions of comprehensive security.

(b) The terminology used was not always clear. Terms should be unambiguous and relate regionally.

(c) The distinction between "process" and "framework" should not be overestimated. Indeed, the process itself is a CBM.

(d) It was pointed out that CBMs need not necessarily be only governmental in nature and could involve all manner of private and informal exchanges of information and specialists.

In the discussion on Part II of the Working Group, Lawrence Scheinman contended that the restrictions placed on exports were not directed indiscriminately at the South but aimed deliberately at containing recognised risks to the non-proliferation regime. He argued that NPT parties in compliance with their treaty obligations had wide access to peaceful nuclear assistance. "Non-nuclear-weapon States unwilling to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA have shown they are not committed to non-proliferation and most suppliers agree these States should not be given the benefits of nuclear assistance", he declared. He argued that nuclear export controls were a requirement of the NPT itself and that the London Club was "now an open process." In contrast, Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat questioned the justifications for export controls and said that peaceful nuclear energy cooperation assured under Article IV should be seen in the context of Article VI, which obligates the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate "in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament". Ben Sanders raised the possibility of associating would-be nuclear recipients with the Nuclear Suppliers' Group process, possibly at the price of an a priori acceptance of full "special inspection" procedures or other extended safeguards.

The idea of an Asiatom/Paciatom involving multinational cooperation in fuel-cycle activities was well received, although a note of caution was sounded against too much ambition. It was noted that

Japan and the Republic of Korea were already cooperating with China on nuclear matters. It was also pointed out that any concern that Japan would ever make nuclear weapons was highly misplaced.

REGIONAL ISSUES AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

Working Group II focussed on the situation in Korean peninsula, in ASEAN countries and in South Asia respectively. Five presentations were made: on disarmament and stability on the Korean peninsula by So Chang Sik and by Seo-Hang Lee; on opennes and transparency in ASEAN countries by Md Hussin Nayan; and on the impact of economic development and democracy on regional stability by Burhanudeen Gafoor and by Kazi Anwarul Masud. That quick tour through the Asia-Pacific region brought into relief some of the challenges and opportunities common on the region as a whole, as well as the diverse problems pecuiliar to respective parts of it. There were notes of optimism and caution.

Korean Peninsula

Lively exchanges took place with respect to the Korean peninsula, reflecting real and divisive issues. While some concern was expressed regarding the perceived delay in the IAEA's close scrutiny of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear development activities, it was felt generally that the implementation of the October 1994 Agreed Framework signed by the DPRK and the United States was a key to the resolution of the nuclear issue. The discussion also encompassed the respective views of the participants on such issues as the Korean Armistice Agreement and the related new peace agreement, the path to reunification, the role of confidence-building and arms control measures and the combined Republic of Korea-United States military exercise. Concerning inter-Korean issues and the implementation of the related agreements and declaration, it was observed that the lack of trust or political will, as the case might be, stood in the way of an early improvement of relations. Interest was expressed by non-Korean participants in how the North-South dialogue might be resumed and what mechanisms might be used. There was general recognition of the need for a favourable political climate and, in that context, the need to address the security concerns of the two Koreas.

Openness and Transparency

The discussion on openness and transparency in ASEAN countries was based on the evolution of ASEAN since its foundation. It stressed

that ASEAN had consistently taken a multidimensional approach to peace and stability, i.e., emphasising economic, social and cultural development over military matters. It was noted that even when faced with the communist threat after the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, ASEAN rejected a military-bloc-type response. ASEAN had done well in terms of openness and transparency through its assiduously cultivated habit of cooperation and dialogue. Specific cooperation in the security and defence fields had been based on interlocking webs of bilateral contacts and exchanges. Informal mechanisms and an informal approach towards CBMs, openness and transparency were preferred, and an alliance-type institutionalisation of defence or military cooperation was considered inappropriate.

The point was raised as to how that process, having evolved into the ASEAN Regional Forum, might yield further substance. The response was that consolidation of the confidence building process was necessary before going on to tackle specific disarmament or maritime security issues collectively. It was suggested that ASEAN might move beyond quiet, bilateral approaches in trying to resolve sensitive issues, e.g., border disputes, among its member States. That, however, did not seem to be an immediate possibility. The possible expansion of ASEAN Regional Forum membership, in which a specific interest had been expressed, was examined.

Economic Development Stability

The discussion on the impact of economic development and democracy on regional stability brought out some contrasts between the perceptions of ASEAN and of small South Asian States. In the context of ASEAN's multidimensional approach to security, the two-way relationship between economic development and security was recognised. It was pointed out that as long as the economic pie was expanding and everyone got a share, political differences tended to recede. In its pursuit of economic development, ASEAN fostered the habit of cooperation and dialogue, which in turn led to the security dialogue embodied in the ASEAN Regional Forum.

The Singapore-Malaysia-Indonesia and Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand "growth triangles" could have a favourable impact on stability and thus provide a foundation for political consultation. A similar logic might hold for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

On the basis of the Bangladesh experience, it was asserted that the shift to a democratic government with accountability contributed to improved economic performances. However, there remained security

concerns which emanated from the major disputants in the region and were beyond the control of the smaller States. The fear of nuclear proliferation and the long-standing problem of water-sharing were cited in that connection. There were grounds for optimism that in the long term economic development would lead to stability. In the short term however, some of the outstanding political issues bedevilling the relations among South Asian States did not offer the immediate prospect of either confidence-building measures or real disarmament, nuclear or conventional. It was stressed that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) had an important role to play both in reducing tensions in the region and in contributing to economic development through the early implementation of South Asian preferential trade arrangements.

Mention was also made of Myanmar's transformation from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy and the stated intention of its interim leadership to hand power back to the people.

NPT Review and Extension Conference

While views still differ on the degree of progress made by nuclear-weapon States in the fields of nuclear disarmament and peaceful nuclear cooperation, and on the issue of the extension of the Treaty, there is nevertheless a general feeling among States parties that the political and legal authority of the Treaty should be upheld.

In view of the fact that the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT) was pivotal to the outcome of previous NPT Review Conferences, the meeting heard with great interest Dr. Scheinman's report on President Clinton's recent decision to withdraw the United States proposal made during the CTBT negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for a special "right of withdrawal" from the treaty 10 years after its entry into force. I hope that shift in United States policy will help to make headway in the complex negotiations in Geneva.

I am gratified that the meeting has provided the Asia-Pacific region with a further opportunity to discuss the issues connected with the forthcoming NPT Conference, and that it helped to make maximum use of the time between the PrepCom and the Conference itself to attempt to bridge differences among the States parties on substantive issues and the length of extension. The meeting has also proved to be an additional opportunity for States parties to exchange; views with non-States parties of the NPT on an effective regime to enhance the goal of nuclear non-proliferation.

Openness and Transparency

This meeting acknowledged last year that openness and transparency had emerged as significant international norms in the field of disarmament and security. That understanding was confirmed again at this meeting during consideration of the questions of regional disarmament and regional dialogue.

Michael Krepon's presentation on various types of confidence-building measures (CBMs), which he illustrated with concrete events and with an explanation of how to introduce CBMs on a step-by-step basis, started with conflict-avoidance measures (CAMs) and confidence-building and ended with the strengthening of peace. It contained valuable suggestions for Asia-Pacific nations. Stanley Week's proposals on maritime CBMs, including the establishment of regional incidents-at-sea agreements, adds to the notion that the basic ingredients of CBMs are openness and transparency. With the close cooperation of Asia-Pacific nations, the Regional Centre will be able to conduct a preliminary study on how to develop region-oriented CBMs.

Openness and transparency in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was also pointed out. Lengthy discussions took place in connection with the utilisation of plutonium for civil use. Hiroyoshi Kurihara presented a detailed picture of Japan's plutonium recycling programme, with emphasis on its present transparency and further efforts in that regard. In view of the foreseen long-term increased demand for nuclear energy in the region, he introduced the idea of establishing an ASIATOM or PACIA-TOM organisation to promote regional cooperation and coordination in research and development (R&D) of the peaceful use of nuclear energy or to meet the challenge stemming from the further development of a commercial nuclear fuel cycle. In my view, although that proposal may be considered ambitious under current conditions, it can be useful in promoting cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and as a CBM to expel any doubt about the purpose of nuclear activities in a given country. I am looking forward to hearing of new developments that may lead to the realisation of that idea when we meet here again.

ASEAN Regional Forum

In the context of regional dialogue and subregional political developments, the meeting heard a report on the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum and its future course. It seems to me that the Forum's gradual approach based on consensus-building, which reflects the Asian culture, is gaining broad-spectrum support from the Asia-

Pacific nations. Many are taking part in the process with enthusiasm. In that regard, I hope consideration will be given of how best to utilize the Regional Centre in relation to the ASEAN Regional Forum's agenda, particularly in connection with items such as confidence- and security-building, nuclear non-proliferation, and the exchange of military information, including the use of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

Korean Peninsula

Concerning confidence-building and peace and security on the Korean peninsula, we heard presentations from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Throughout the discussions that took place, I felt that the most pressing issues facing the two countries, and their neighbours, were the implementation of the agreed United States-DPRK Framework Agreement and the resumption of North-South dialogue. Those would ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy and open ways to explore other forms of cooperation. A long-term process seems required to achieve peace and stability on the peninsula. In that regard, the Regional Centre is proud to bring all the parties in the region together at this annual exchange of views. I believe that the Regional Centre can be useful for exchanging views on regional cooperation as a way of establishing the "habit of dialogue" among the North-East Asian nations in the coming years.

Guidelines to Regional Disarmament

As in last year's programme, we explored the "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security" adopted by consensus at the Disarmament Commission in 1993. Peggy Mason's detailed examination of agreed principles and measures, and her valuable suggestions, gave us hope that a set of guidelines applicable to the region could be developed. Very shortly, the Regional Centre will compile for future consideration the suggestions and proposals made at this meeting, along with the comments made on the same subject at last year's meeting. Any comments and suggestions on possible guidelines would be much appreciated.

Role of Regional Centre

In view of the new trend towards exploration of regional approaches parallel to the "traditional" search for global solutions, the Regional Centre, with the requisite political and financial support, could play a

greater role in promoting openness, transparency and confidence-building in the region. This meeting, I trust, has shown that it can be a useful tool to foster mutual understanding and to promote dialogue as a basis for building consensus. With your continued support, I should like to create a Centre that is a linchpin between global and regional approaches and a hub of disarmament-related activities among the subregions of the greater Asia-Pacific area.

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Asian-Pacific World in Transition

As the post-war crust crumbles in Eastern Europe, other issues loom into view. The transformation of Marxist systems in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe reveals once again the force of nationalism, so often the root cause of war in this destructive and tumultuous century. The old order changes: intractable and complex problems remain. Many are as ancient as human society itself: recourse to violence in pursuit of national objectives; the persistence of poverty, famine, disease, injustice, racial and religious intolerance. Others are more recent and the direct consequence of the pace of developments in the modern industrialised world: the weakness of many, perhaps most, modern nation States; the challenges of global climatic change, over-population, industrial pollution and the destruction of the natural environment. Others again are old challenges, made more devastating by modern technology: terrorism, civil strife and revolutionary struggle. Above all, there remains—as what should be the overwhelming preoccupation of the international system—the need to do so much more to achieve a fair and easier life for the vast majority of people.

PACIFIC BASIN: CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY

Along the western rim of the Pacific there is no equivalent of the regional fault that has divided east and west in Europe since 1945. The security equation is dominated by two very different factors. The first, and most potent, factor is the intersection, in the northern part of the region, of great-Power interests and strategic concerns on the part of the four most powerful countries in the world—China, Japan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. The second factor is the perpetuation, in different parts of the region, of ancient enmities, linked sometimes with religious or ideological fervour, or exacerbated by differences between rich and poor and—often enough—by the intervention of outside Powers.

The mosaic of Asian-Pacific nations is made up of many nationalities and cultures; the geography is disparate and difficult; most significant of all, in terms of the security preoccupations of the region, power is unevenly spread. The single most striking feature is diversity.

Population Density

In terms of population density, compare, for example, China itself with what is in effect an offshoot of China: Singapore. China has an area of 9,561,000 square kilometres, and in 1986 recorded a population of over a billion people, the equivalent of 110.5 per square kilometre. The city-State of Singapore is 600 square kilometres in area and has a population of 2,613,000; at 4,355 persons per square kilometre, Singapore is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. In the Pacific, New Zealand by contrast is 269,000 square kilometres in area, with a population of 3.4 million (12.6 persons per square kilometre). Japan, with a land area of 370,000 square kilometres and a population of 122.27 million (1987), has a population density of 330.4 persons per square kilometre, almost three times that of the People's Republic of China, 26 times that of New Zealand.

Of another order again in the region, at least in terms of population density, is Australia; the island continent is the fifth largest country in the world in terms of area and one of the least populated: 16.4 million persons live in 7,680,000 square kilometres, or just over 2 per square kilometre. Again, at another extreme in the Asian-Pacific region are the small island States of the Pacific Ocean. The phosphate island of Nauru has an area of 22 square kilometres and a population of 8,000; smaller again are Niue, with a population of no more than 4,000, and the Tokelau Islands, with a population of 2,000.

Per Capita Wealth

In terms of per capita wealth, another perspective emerges. Nauru is one of the wealthiest countries in the world, with a gross domestic product per head of $A 21,400. In Singapore, wealth per capita was $US 12,626. Such statistics are hardly a satisfactory measure of relative weight or of the security issues within the Asian-Pacific region. They certainly cannot measure quality of life or other major factors involved in the security equations. They do no more than underscore the diversity of the Western Pacific and the wide range of national entities which must be taken into account in any attempt to come to terms with the concerns of individual countries.

Recent Events

What is more, this year's events in the region have taken, in some respects, the opposite course from that charted in Europe. The miserable struggle of the Cambodian people for internal order and decency goes on and on. Refugees from Indochina, whether displaced by war or in hope of some relief from a harsh and threadbare existence, continue to flood the resettlement camps. In Burma (Myanmar), repression and the restoration of military power have followed the high expectations of reform generated in 1988. In the Philippines, the Government of President Aquino has been assailed by a further military coup. The framework for authority in Manila is now weak and the Government must proceed with caution. In attempting to bring guerrilla insurgency under control it is challenged by anti-communist forces, ostensibly because it is dealing with the terrorists.

Regional Groupings

As regards groupings, the Asian-Pacific world is in transition. There is no long history of regionalism and there are no institutions capable of bringing together the many-sided elements in the regional equation. Few now recall the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), an initiative taken by a grouping of nine countries of the region during the 1960s to meet regularly to try to develop a (generally anti-communist) focus on matters of common political and security concern. With neither a strong sense of homogeneity nor experience of working together the participants found that such an arrangement lacked the necessary strength to cope with the intricacies of the region. It was evident also that at that time, with the Vietnam War the major issue, major-Power preoccupations were dominant. At a subregional level, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has become, in the course of almost twenty years, a principal element in the foreign policies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand—with Brunei Darussalam a more recent member. ASEAN has served as a means of concerting national points of view and promoting common interests, particularly in matters of economic collaboration and development assistance. Most important perhaps, the Association has served as a sounding-board for many of the concerns of the region, particularly in respect of Indochina. It is a measure of the respect that ASEAN has attained that major external Powers—the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the European Community—attach importance to their status as dialogue partners of the ASEAN group—so much so that they are almost invariably

represented by senior ministers at the annual discussion meetings of ASEAN.

The South Pacific Forum, established in 1971, is another important subregional grouping, comprising the island States of the Pacific plus Australia and New Zealand. Annual meetings are held to consider the issues facing the region and to plan regional co-operative programmes to meet some of the particular difficulties in trade, transport and communications, and matters relating to fishing and the law of the sea, which face the often small Pacific Island countries.

In recent years, the questions of decolonisation and nuclear testing within the region, and the onset of marked instability in some parts of the Pacific, have also claimed the attention of Forum countries. The Forum has established specialist secretariats, for example the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation and the Forum Fisheries Agency, to co-ordinate efforts in certain fields. The Forum also provides a focus for outside Powers with interests in the region, which have now been invited to an annual discussion meeting.

In 1989 an initiative of the Australian Prime Minister to promote a wider association of Pacific rim countries for the purpose of co-ordinating economic and development interests began to bear fruit. A meeting was held at Canberra early in November, at which it was agreed to proceed further with exploring practical measures of economic co-operation. The new grouping has been tentatively called Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

In other regions of the world—Africa and Latin America—there are single institutions capable of providing a focus for the concerns of regional States. No such concentration of interests has yet been possible in Asia and the Pacific. The contrast with Europe is even more marked. While the coherence of Eastern Europe is changing, its economies still have much in common. In Western Europe, the European Community derives strength from its political institutions, legal processes, and far-reaching programmes of economic and agricultural co-operation. The Asian Development Bank is one regional agency in the Western Pacific that has a mandate to promote economic progress; however, in the absence of the Soviet Union, Vietnam and China, its membership is hardly representative of the region. Business/ governmental organisations such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council provide some further coherence for economic interests.

The World Economy

In view of the phenomenon which is present-day Japan and the associated rapid economic progress of the Asian new industrial

countries—the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, with Thailand generally reckoned to be the most recent addition—the region is a driving force in the world economy. It appears too that the success of these countries is contagious. Indonesia and Malaysia follow close behind the leading members of the group of so-called Asian "tigers". What were regarded, not so long ago, as developing countries are showing the way to solid economic progress associated with noteworthy political stability and a growing sense of national confidence. Within the space of 12 to 15 years this process had dramatically changed the geopolitical map. The archipelagos and islands of the Western Pacific are no longer an uninterrupted zone of instability and under-development. Sources of insecurity deriving from political discontent and ideological struggle are gradually vanishing. There has been no territorial aggrandizement or assertion of military power behind the startling economic progress of the region. Nor has the leap forward of these remarkable countries been a consequence of the exploitation of their own sources of mineral wealth. Rather they have achieved spectacular economic growth by harnessing the industrial techniques of the modern age to the opportunities of an increasingly free international industrial trading system.

Regional Security Issues

There remain serious regional security issues and challenges. In Indo-China, the fighting has flowed across international borders. Even there, however, the Soviet Union has exercised influence in achieving the withdrawal from Cambodia of Vietnamese forces. However, inability to agree at an international level on a regime acceptable to all contending parties has meant that the long and bitter travail of the Khmer people continues. Territorial disputes over the islands and reefs in the South China Sea have led to military confrontation between China and Vietnam; Malaysia and the Philippines are also claimants with strong interests. The dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union over Soviet occupation, in the last days of the Second World War, of four small islands to the north of Hokkaido continues to be a major impediment to constructive relations between these two major regional Powers. The border between China and Vietnam has been the cause of major fighting in recent years, while that between China and the Soviet Union along the Amur River has periodically raised levels of tension in the region. In South-East Asia, Thailand has been in military confrontation with Laos over border alignments; while Malaysia and the Philippines have, it seems, resolved longstanding differences about their respective boundary lines to the north of Sabah. The border between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia is in effect a major global

boundary between the Pacific and the Asian worlds. As such it has been the scene of military activity on both sides to keep a check on the flow of people across what is an ill-defined line in difficult country. The presence of foreign military bases and/or other military installations is an irritant to sectors of political opinion in several countries. In the changed relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States, the continuation of their bases in Vietnam and the Philippines has become increasingly uncertain. Direct super-Power involvement in South-East Asia may well come to be seen, sooner rather than later, as no longer required or appropriate. All of the ASEAN countries now have their own effective military capabilities; all maintain an intense interest in the strategic waterway which bisects the region.

The strategic relationship of the United States with Japan is however far from being a thing of the past. Any abrupt, unplanned changes in the present subtle balance of interests would be a cause for global concern. Change can nevertheless be expected as the global alliance system is reconsidered in the light of shifts in the strategic balance elsewhere. In this context, the interactions between the major Powers—in the north-west of the region—remain delicately poised. There is nothing immutable about the respective positions of the Powers involved—particularly when set against the forces of regionalism and nationalism now at work in the Soviet Union and, it seems, in China.

The same considerations apply to the animus that marks the relationship between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea at the 38th parallel. The new-found wealth of Taiwan and the recent tragic failure to find a political balance in the People's Republic of China decrease the chances for peaceful settlement of the burning issue of reconciliation between the two. Political stability in the Philippines has proved elusive and insurgency remains a serious threat. The sorry civil strife in Burma (Myanmar) has locked that country back in on itself. Indonesian reconciliation with independence movements in East Timor and Irian Jaya is, to say the least, incomplete. In the South Pacific, military coups in Fiji, riots in Vanuatu, threats of secession in Papua New Guinea, violent confrontations in New Caledonia, an act of terrorism by French officials in New Zealand, and concerns about external meddling in some small island States have shattered illusions of a calm and sequestered part of the world.

The picture is therefore dominated by the dynamic economic advance of several countries, but this must be balanced against the many challenging and all too often tragic manifestations of political

and social pressures which cannot yet be accommodated. There is no reason, however, for concern about major challenges to the existing balance of power in the region, such as occurred before and during the Second World War. There is nothing to suggest that one or other of the major Powers involved in the region intends to mount direct military action in support of its interests. While there remain powerful military forces capable of being brought to bear should the strategic balance be broken, there appears to be little likelihood that this will occur.

While the overall picture in Asia and the Pacific is now encouraging, the recent history has been one of deep divisions and painful struggle. The anti-colonial impetus has largely been removed. It is nevertheless clear that many security concerns are not superficial and will not readily be smoothed over. The region has been, for a number of years, the arena for the contest between conflicting ideologies. Regional revolutionary struggle thus became enmeshed in the larger confrontation between major global interests, so much so that the South-East Asian region became a by-word for instability and dislocation. Around the entire rimlands of the Eurasian continent, struggles for national self-determination against established colonial regimes broke out at the conclusion of the Second World War.

The travails of the South-East Asian and wider Asian regions have been many and costly. For many years, it appeared that the region would, for a long time to come, be beset by tumult and political instability. Concerns about security extended beyond the immediate region to influence the attitudes and policies of Australia and New Zealand, both countries with vested interests in stability and constructive development in the whole broad zone of the western Pacific. Great-Power preoccupations focussed not only on the outcome of the ideological struggle in the area, but on the strategic importance of preserving a balance of power, particularly in relation to the vital trade routes traversing the region. Against the evidence of a turbulent recent history, there will clearly continue to be widespread and continuing sensitivity to the complexity and inherent difficulties of this part of the world.

SCOPE FOR DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

In the circumstances it is difficult to be optimistic about the prospects for meaningful disarmament or arms-control negotiations in the region. The political and military back-cloth to the successful disarmament initiatives taken in Europe is simply not present in Asia. So far it has been possible to achieve some limited progress only by

way of an adjunct to the agreements on major weapons systems in the European theatre. Thus the Western side sought to ensure that intermediate-range missiles would not just be transferred to Asian targets when a global limit of 100 missiles was set for each side in the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles adopted in 1987. Further development of that agreement to eliminate these classes of weapons entirely has of course removed this question from super-Power calculations in Asia. China and the Soviet Union have succeeded in reaching agreement on major reductions in ground forces deployed along their common border. For both parties the issue has been less the attainment of balanced security at lower levels of forces than a response to other pressing domestic considerations. China in particular is making impressive reductions in overall troop strengths. The aim however has been to reshape the People's Liberation Army as a more modern and leaner force, better equipped and more mobile than the previous mass army. The Soviet Union for its part has seen redeployment away from the Chinese border as an important means of reducing defence costs.

In Eastern Europe, an entirely new strategic perspective is beginning to open up in which the old presumptions of imminent danger have become redundant. The interests of the principal Asian-Pacific actors are also changing, so that strategic confrontation is being blurred. Japan has become the major economic partner of China; the United States is concerned to preserve the openness of China to the West; the Soviet Union has staked its irrefutable claims as a Pacific Power; there are powerful interests in Soviet Asia in the promotion of economic linkages with Japan; the interest of the Soviet Union in rebuilding constructive relations with China was made manifest by the historic visit which Mikhail Gorbachev paid to Beijing in May 1989. There is no longer any clear demarcation of ideology, let alone of strategic or economic interests. In the absence of effective regional institutions, careful and balanced statecraft is required and that in turn calls for openness and understanding, qualities which are, it seems, difficult to develop after many years of suspicion and hostility. Arms control in the Asian-Pacific region must also start from the fact of a notable increase in the acquisition of modern weapons systems by South-East Asian countries. Policies of self-reliance and independence demand nothing less.

Regional and subregional approaches certainly offer possibilities. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty is predicated on this principle. The Treaty has given South Pacific countries the opportunity to declare their commitment to renunciation of the acquisition,

manufacture, stationing or testing of nuclear explosive devices. The area of the Treaty joins to the east the zone of application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. To the South the Treaty area abuts on that of the Antarctic Treaty, which has long provided for exclusion of nuclear testing and the banning of military activity. The concept of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia has been given earnest consideration by the ASEAN members. Australia has taken an important initiative in focusing international attention on the need to reinforce and bring up to date existing international provisions for banning chemical weapons. There are hopes in the international community that it will prove possible for the Super-Powers to extend their agreements about intermediate-range nuclear missiles on land to similar sea-borne weapons systems. So far however there is little incentive to promote such concepts in the Asian-Pacific region. The strategic issues are perhaps less pressing than the regional. At that level too, however, history is against rapid progress.

Conclusion

The Asian-Pacific region has its own dynamism. It is plainly not immune to the sweeping changes in the global order that have had their origins in recent events in Europe. At the same time, it is itself rapidly developing and moving away from a recent turbulent history. Security concerns for all the countries of the region are nevertheless bound to be shaped to a large extent by experience of that stormy past. Above all, it will be recalled that the catastrophe of all-out war in the Asian-Pacific region during the years from 1935 to 1945 was not confined to the immediate area of Japan. The maritime character of much of the region, together with the interpenetration of interests of most if not all of its member countries, ensures a wide sharing of strategic-concerns.

The most pervasive danger would plainly arise should the complex balance of forces of the region again be disturbed by one of the major Powers seeking to pursue its objectives by military means. There is however no such prospect in view. Moreover, intra-regional challenges to the established order appear to be lessening. There remain many sources of tension. Fighting goes on and many lives are continuing to be blighted in the process. The fact that the struggles of the region—however regrettable in themselves—are now mainly at the lower end of the military spectrum offers hope, at least, that it will be possible to bring such tragedies as Cambodia under control, perhaps by collective action under the auspices of the United Nations. That in itself would

be a new step for the region and a cause for further optimism for the future.

PEACE AND SECURITY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC—A VIETNAMESE APPROACH

The region of Asia and the Pacific is most impressive in size. It accounts for two thirds of the world population and three fifths of the area of the planet (including land and sea). The characteristics of the region play a central role in the peace and security concerns of the Asian and Pacific nations.

In the era after the Second World War, thinking has been dominated by the bipolar confrontation between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its effects on global security or on the national security of individual States. The stress on the role of the major Powers has also led to neglect of the security concerns of medium and small States, except with regard to their importance in the larger strategic context. The security concerns of the States of the Asia and Pacific region can be analysed only in the global strategic context, which, in turn, provides a basis for a regional approach to the settlement of peace and security issues of the region.

Asia and the Pacific

The problem of peace and security in Asia and the Pacific is similar to that in Europe and the whole world. However, this region has special characteristics of its own. Forty-five years ago, all countries in this region—except the Soviet Union, the United States and Japan—were colonies or semi-colonies of Western Powers. The most striking feature of the situation was and is the struggle for freedom of all peoples in the area and their achievement of political independence through different means, peaceful or military. The coming into existence of the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China, the victorious armed struggle of the peoples of Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, among others, have added glorious pages to the history of national liberation movements and have altered the political map of this region. It is noteworthy that during the same period there has been no modification whatsoever of the map of Europe. In spite of a bitter Cold War, a state of peaceful co-existence between the two groupings of nations with different political and social systems has, in fact, prevailed.

In 1954, India and China advanced the five principles of peaceful co-existence, the Pancha Shila. The 1955 Afro-Asian Conference held

at Bandung, Indonesia, laid the foundation of solidarity among Asian, African and Latin American peoples in their struggle for independence and freedom and led to the founding of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in 1961. The rising tide of peace, national independence and non-alignment in the region paralysed and then wiped out such military alliances as the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation and the Central Treaty Organisation.

Today, peace and development have characterised the prevailing trends in the Asian and Pacific area. Mongolia's proposal for the establishment of a mechanism for the non-use of force in relations among countries in Asia and the Pacific has been widely supported. The increasing endeavours of the hinterland and littoral States to convene the International Conference on the Indian Ocean heralds their contribution to the promotion of peace and security in the region. The Soviet statement at Vladivostok and the Indo-Soviet New Delhi statement have expressed the desire of the Asian-Pacific nations for peace and have charted a practical way to attain regional peace and security.

As the first victims of the atomic bomb, the people of Asia and the Pacific are also among the fiercest opponents of the use of nuclear weapons in their region or elsewhere in the world. In this respect, Japan has proposed three nuclear-free principles, and thousands of cities and towns in that country have declared themselves nuclear-free. With the Treaty of Rarotonga, the South Pacific has become a nuclear-free zone and there is now a growing tendency among South-East Asian countries to follow suit. Of the three nuclear Powers in Asia and the Pacific, the Soviet Union and China have committed themselves never to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

At the same time, most countries in Asia and the Pacific are making every effort to get rid of poverty and backwardness, and are striving for economic development; this is one of the main factors motivating them to safeguard peace, security and stability in the region together with their own independence and freedom. According to data provided by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, there are as many as 510 million people in this region living in poverty—89 per cent of the poverty-stricken population of the world. The demand for economic development is now a driving force making this region the most dynamic in the world. This dynamism reveals itself in the high rate of progress recorded by India, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and some other countries. The new stage of the scientific and technological revolution that began

in the 1970s will bring about achievements of decisive significance in different fields in decades to come.

South-East Asia

South-East Asia has been the scene of greatest tension in Asia and the Pacific since the end of the Second World War. Three major wars, involving many world Powers, have been unleashed in this region in the past four decades. This area was also the scene of dozens of lesser wars and conflicts, in which hundreds of thousands of armed men participated. Millions of people in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma (Myanmar) and other countries rose against foreign invaders for freedom and democracy. As the result of their struggle, all of the countries in South-East Asia have regained their national independence. A radical change occurred in this area in the sense that, in the past, the destinies of South-East Asian nations were decided in Western capitals, whereas now they are in the hands of the South-East Asian peoples, who have become the real masters of their lands.

The change in South-East Asia is due mainly to the incentive created by the struggle of peoples in the area for political and economic independence and against colonialism and foreign aggression. Nevertheless, two other factors come into play, rendering the situation in this part of the world more explosive and complicated than in many other regions.

The first factor is the tendency of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to follow the path to socialism, contrary to the will of certain colonial and major Powers and their followers in the area. All forms of opposition have been raised against those three countries, from crude intervention and intimidation, political isolation and economic embargo to protracted and bloody wars of aggression, with devastating consequences in terms of human lives and resources. However, these three peoples are determined to follow their chosen way. As a result, there has emerged in South-East Asia the same phenomenon as in Europe after the Second World War—the existence of the two main groupings of nations with different political and social systems—the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Indochina— whose relationship can best be maintained through peaceful co-existence.

Another important factor lies in the strategic interests of great Powers in South-East Asia—namely the United States, China and the Soviet Union, more particularly the United States and China—and their triangular relationship to this area. In view of the changes in their strategic interests during the past forty-odd years, that complex

relationship has undergone radical changes decade after decade. In the 1950s China allied itself with the Soviet Union against the United States, but in the 1960s it switched to opposition to both the Soviet Union and the United States, while in those two decades the United States was strongly against both China and the Soviet Union. In the 1970s China went along with the United States against the Soviet Union and this fully accorded with the intentions of the United States to take advantage of its relationship with China in order to contain its main enemy in the world—the Soviet Union. In the 1980s efforts were made by those three countries to improve and normalize their dual and triangular relations.

Needless to say, the relationship—and the changing mood—among the three big Powers has greatly affected the situation in South-East Asia. The conflict or convergence of interests of the three big Powers always brings with it an alignment of smaller regional Powers opposing each other, causing instability and disharmony in the region.

Faced with that situation, after the end of the Vietnam war, many South-East Asian countries tried to embark upon a policy of peace and peaceful co-existence among the nations in the area and to resist the interference of big Powers in the affairs of the region. In this respect, we might mention Indonesian President Suharto's concept of national and regional resilience, by which we understand that nations in the area and South-East Asia as a whole should be strong enough to oppose foreign influence and intervention. In February 1976, following the concept of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) put forward in the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration, the ASEAN summit meeting held at Bali, Indonesia, adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South-East Asia, both of which are open to all countries in the region. In 1984, ASEAN again proposed that South-East Asia become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The major principles of these proposals, if implemented, would undoubtedly promote regional peace and security.

In July 1976—right after national reunification—the Socialist Republic of Vietnam made public its four-point policy towards its neighbours in South-East Asia:

(a) Respect for one another's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-intervention in one another's affairs, equality and mutual benefit;

(b) Solution of all disputes among countries in the area through peaceful means, without foreign interference;

(c) Non-participation in any military alliance and refusal to allow its territory to be used against neighbouring countries in the region;

(d) Co-existence with one another in peace, friendship and co-operation, and the conversion of South-East Asia into a zone of peace, independence and neutrality.

We fully share President Suharto's concept of national and regional resilience and hold the view that all regional matters must be solved by the countries of the region without interference from outside. In the mid-1980s, Vietnam declared its readiness to adhere to ZOPFAN and the Bali Treaty and favoured the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in our region. In 1988, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, on its own behalf and on behalf of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam proposed establishing a zone of peace, freedom, neutrality, friendship and co-operation in South-East Asia.

With detente and the normalisation of relations among the United States, China and the Soviet Union, and in the present circumstances in South-East Asia where the burning issue of Cambodia is in the process of being solved peacefully, conditions are now favourable for the realisation of all these lofty initiatives and proposals for peace, security, stability and co-operation in this long-suffering region. Attainment of these common goals still requires the concerted endeavours of all the countries and peoples in the region.

The Problem of Cambodia

Cambodia has long been an area of tension in South-East Asia, a fact that has been attributed by some to the presence of Vietnamese volunteer troops in Cambodia. Unless the subject is clearly understood, no real solution will be possible.

The Cambodian question goes back to the extermination in the "killing fields" of 3 million Cambodians at the hands of the genocidal Pol Pot regime. At that time, worldwide indignation at the atrocities reached its climax. Public opinion and many statesmen joined in recommending that troops from the third world be dispatched urgently to Cambodia to overthrow the genocidal regime and save the Cambodian people, as had been done in the case of certain other brutal regimes.

In 1979, the Vietnamese volunteer troops were sent to Cambodia to fight alongside the Cambodian people against the genocidal clique. Three years later, as the rebirth of the Cambodian people was making

progress, Vietnam began withdrawing part of its forces on a yearly basis, until they were pulled out completely by 26 September 1989.

The two Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM), held in July 1988 and February 1989 respectively, have created the necessary conditions, internationally, for the Cambodian parties to enter into talks with a view to finding a solution to the internal aspect. On the basis of the talks between the two sides in Cambodia and of the conclusions of the two Jakarta Informal Meetings, the International Conference on Cambodia was held in Paris from 30 July to 30 August 1989 under the co-presidency of France and Indonesia. Although a few substantial differences still remain, the Paris Conference agreed on many important issues and laid the groundwork for an early, comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem. It is generally accepted that the momentum generated by the Paris Conference must be maintained and that the initial results must be built upon further if lasting peace and stability in Cambodia and in all of South-East Asia are to be restored in the near future.

The Paris Conference did in fact reach an agreement on all the fundamental and long-term issues of an over-all solution to the Cambodian problem, namely: total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia; non-return to power of the genocidal regime in Cambodia; cessation of foreign military aid to the Cambodian parties; respect for the independence, sovereignty, neutrality and non-alignment of Cambodia; implementation of the Cambodian people's right to self-determination through free, fair and democratic general elections; an international guarantee of the agreements and the setting up of a body, the International Control Mechanism (ICM), for supervision of the implementation of the agreements.

Two issues remain outstanding. The first is the setting up of a provisional authority with the task of holding general elections in the transitional period between the total pull-out of Vietnamese troops and the general elections. The second is the United Nations role in the International Control Mechanism.

As the question of an interim authority during the transition period in Cambodia relates to Cambodia's internal affairs, it is to be decided by the Cambodians, free from outside interference. No one has the right to force the Cambodian people to share power with the perpetrators of genocide and to take the risk of testing co-existence with them. Jeane Kirkpatrick, former Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, wrote in an article for the *Washington Post* of 13 October 1989:

> "The Vietnamese army, which was the only important obstacle to the Khmer Rouge return to power, has been removed. The Cambodian people are now confronted with re-establishment of the genocide that symbolised Pol Pot's rule. The Khmer Rouge say they will behave differently should they return to power. They say they have revised their beliefs and goals and changed their leadership. But refugees report that in the border communities controlled by the Khmer Rouge they rule as they ruled Cambodia—by terror—and that no matter who has the title, Pol Pot still has the power."

On the other hand, merely leaving the power struggle in Cambodia to the Cambodian parties to resolve by themselves while foreign countries continue to supply military aid to the warring parties and oppose each other over Cambodia's internal affairs would be dangerous and might turn Cambodia's internal dispute into an international conflict. In our view, the best option would be to encourage the Cambodian parties to sit down together and settle their internal affairs while ensuring that the settlement would in no way be detrimental to any country. Any future Cambodian government should pursue a policy of neutrality and friendly relations with all other countries, and with neighbouring countries in particular. This would be fully in conformity with the principles of respect for Cambodia's sovereignty, with the long-term peace and security interests of Cambodia as well as other countries in the region, and with the agreements reached at the Jakarta Informal Meetings, the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the summits meetings of the non-aligned countries.

As for the role of the United Nations, there is a point that needs to be spelt out here. Vietnam does not object to—indeed it even welcomes—a United Nations role in a Cambodian settlement and in an international control mechanism in Cambodia, provided however that the United Nations takes a fair and impartial attitude towards the Cambodian issue.

Vietnam has more than once expressed its appreciation of the personal efforts made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to encourage dialogue aimed at a political solution to the Cambodian question. At the Paris Conference, Cambodia and Vietnam approved from the very beginning the Secretary-General's proposal with regard to dispatching a fact-finding mission to Cambodia.

It is our hope that the United Nations will adopt such a fair and impartial stand in keeping with the positive developments embodied in the JIMs, the talks between the two Cambodian sides, the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the summit meetings of the non-aligned countries and will therefore play a major role in this regard.

After the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in September 1989, the upsurge of the fighting among the Cambodian parties has given rise to general concern all over the world regarding the threat of a return to power of the Khmer Rouge. Many initiatives and proposals have been set forth in an attempt to prevent civil war and the recurrence of the genocidal Pol Pot regime and to promote the search for a solution. Among those initiatives are the proposal made on 23 September 1989 by the Prime Minister of Thailand, His Excellency Chatichai Choonhavan, for a ceasefire in Cambodia and the convening of an informal meeting to discuss the setting up of an international mechanism with a mandate to verify Vietnamese troop withdrawal and to supervise the ceasefire and the cessation of all foreign arms supply to all parties in Cambodia; and the joint statement of 23 September 1989 by the United States and the Soviet Union regarding a moratorium on military assistance to all Cambodian factions. Most recently, the Australian Foreign Minister, His Excellency Gareth Evans, made a proposal regarding a United Nations-controlled interim administration in Cambodia during the transition period between the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the holding of free, fair and democratic general elections. This would necessarily involve having the Cambodian seat in the United Nations currently occupied by Democratic Kampuchea left vacant.

Vietnam and the State of Cambodia greatly appreciate all those initiatives and are prepared to participate in any meeting with other parties and countries concerned in order to find a political solution to the Cambodian problem. They are also ready to take the recent Australian initiative into serious consideration. It is our firm belief that with the goodwill and reasonableness of all parties concerned, in particular the parties directly involved, a satisfactory solution to the Cambodian issue will soon be achieved.

Today international relations are entering a new stage and differ substantially from those of the past. The new situation requires of us a new way of thinking. Many old concepts and approaches which were valid for decades and deeply affected international relations in the past are today losing their significance and cannot be applied to restructuring international relations. The renewal of thinking is not an easy process. For all nations of the world, and for all South-East Asian nations in particular, this is a struggle between the new and the old. South-East Asia is on the threshold of a new era, an era of peace, security, friendship and co-operation. In harmony with the present general trend in world politics, the new and realistic approach to peace and security should be applicable to our region also.

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Prospects of Arms Limitations in the Asia-Pacific Region

The Asia-Pacific region is vast, encompassing a large number of countries which are littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. It is a region that has witnessed major international conflicts since the Second World War.

Regions and subregions cannot, of course, be regarded as water-tight compartments. The rapid integration of the global system through political and economic interchange has been accelerated by the combined pressures of technological change, modern communications and the response to the challenge of environmental degradation. The prospects for arms limitation in one area cannot therefore be considered without taking into account the global trends set in motion by the Super-Powers and developments in other regions. Thus even the subregions of north-east Asia and south Asia are interconnected, not least by the naval presence of the superpowers in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and their naval strategies. About 50 per cent of the United States Navy is based in the Pacific, while the USSR has half its submarines there. Both have a considerable presence in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, since the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and its prelude, developments in Sino-Indian relations have had a strong influence on prospects for arms limitation in south Asia, dominated as it is by the overwhelming size of India.

While we are witnessing the dismantling of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty in Eastern Europe, its assertion elsewhere— and not only by the great Powers— reminds us that spheres of influence are still being staked out. Power projections of major Powers and other countries are not confined to their own regions and subregions and thus a discussion of arms limitation prospects in specific areas is more complex than it might appear.

Three nuclear great Powers—the USSR, the United States and China—and two potential great Powers—Japan and India—occupy dominant positions in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. Cultural diversity and different perceptions of economic and political interest are factors that must be taken into account in their interaction, which affects the other States in the region—mostly developing countries desperately seeking conditions of peace and stability to improve the quality of life of their people and make possible the modernisation of their societies.

NORTH-EAST ASIA

The north-east Asian region is characterised by the unique configuration of Powers in it and the undisputed importance of maritime Powers. The two Super-Powers—the USSR and the United States—face each other across the Pacific Ocean while another great Power, China, looms large in the region together with the economic super-Power, Japan. In addition, the unresolved confrontation between North and South Korea has added tension in the region, with over 40,000 United States troops stationed in the Republic of Korea. The vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean lying between the Super-Powers and the crucial importance of sea lanes for the survival of Japan's industrial powerhouse make the likelihood of naval warfare greater than in many other regions.

The area—once described by Brzezinski as the "Second Strategic Theatre"—has, since the Korean War, been regarded as a powder-keg. The 1989 *SIPRI Yearbook* notes with regard to regional military expenditures that in the mid-1980s "about 10 per cent of the world total was being spent by the countries in the Asian-Pacific region", adding that, outside of Europe, "this was the highest regional concentration of defence spending." Growth rates of defence expenditure were also noted as being high. The IISS publication *The Military Balance 1987-1988* estimates that out of a total global defence expenditure of approximately $900 billion the two Super-Powers and their alliances accounted for 75 to 80 per cent, and the total Asian expenditure excluding Indochina was $65 billion or 7.2 per cent.

The dramatic economic prosperity in this subregion after the Second World War has heightened its strategic importance, leading to somewhat extravagant claims of a "Pacific Century". The miracle of Japan's recovery after the Second World War and its emergence as a front-line economic Power has its own politico-strategic implications. The wider Asia-Pacific region or the Pacific Basin contains the booming

newly industrialising countries (NICs), together with Australia and New Zealand, making the prosperity of the area quite broad-based. The economic potential of the eastern USSR with its oil and gas deposits and that of China add to the economic importance of the region in global terms, especially in foreign trade, shipping and financial services. One estimate is that the subregion is very likely to contain over 20 per cent of world gross domestic product (GDP) by the year 2000, equalling that of Europe or of the United States. Trading patterns and the productivity of the area, both current and potential, convert north-east Asia into an indisputably important strategic theatre.

Because of this importance and close linkages to the two Super-Powers, north-east Asia is strongly influenced by the changing relationships between those Powers. The dramatic improvement in the USSR-United States relationship in the period 1985-1990 and the bewildering velocity of political changes in Europe have had world-wide repercussions. In north-east Asia the same general improvement in international relations and prospects for disarmament and international security can be expected. At the same time, the individual roles of China and Japan and the complex relations between North and South Korea must be considered. These aspects give the subregion an internal dynamic that is unique. A detailed analysis of likely trends in arms limitation involves discussion of the approaches of the countries in the area and the interplay of their relations.

President Gorbachev's Proposals

The change in Soviet foreign policy brought about by Mikhail Gorbachev has not been focussed on the European theatre alone. In his important Vladivostok speech of July 1986 and the Krasnoyarsk speech of September 1988 he made important proposals for the Asia-Pacific region, recognising the United States as a Pacific Power and offering "new, fair relations in Asia and the Pacific". The proposals call for a freeze in the number of nuclear weapons in the region and reductions or a freeze in naval force deployments, especially nuclear-armed ships; a dismantling of Soviet bases in the region, provided that there is a reciprocal move by the United States; guarantees of the security of sea lanes and air communications; reduction of armed forces and conventional arms to levels of "reasonable sufficiency"; the lowering of military confrontation; and the establishment of regional negotiating machinery for confidence-building measures and arms control. The response to these proposals and actual negotiations on them have been superseded by the conclusion of the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-

Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), the negotiations on a 50 per cent reduction of their strategic nuclear weapons (START), and the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE), which signify a preoccupation with relations between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty (WTO) having a greater priority. The proposals, however, remain on the table and will have to be addressed in any discussion of arms limitation in the Asia-Pacific region. They have been buttressed by unilateral moves such as major withdrawals of Soviet troops from Mongolia.

Nuclear Weapons

The self-evident priority of nuclear disarmament requires that we examine first the prospects for nuclear arms limitation in north-east Asia, where indeed the first nuclear bombs were used. Three declared nuclear Powers exist in the region. The existing INF Treaty, 70 per cent of which has been implemented today and the much-heralded and long-awaited START agreement promising a 50 per cent reduction in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States will undoubtedly have their impact in the region. It has been suggested that the Soviet Union and the United States should act reciprocally to close their bases in the Pacific such as Cam Ranh Bay and Guam. Negotiations on the United States Subic Bay naval base facility with the Philippines were expected to be tough, but the precarious position of the Aquino Government after the recent attempted coup makes any fundamental change unlikely. It is estimated that China, the USSR and the United States have nearly 3,000 nuclear warheads committed to the Pacific Ocean area. The proliferation of nuclear weapons at sea has been an alarming feature in the Pacific. Both the USSR and the United States maintain large fleets in the Pacific. Infrastructural facilities for nuclear warfare are also located in the region by the three States. A reduction of the nuclear-weapon deployments by the USSR and the United States in this region will have to result from a global arrangement between the Super-Powers. Such an arrangement should include limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

China's continued modernisation of its nuclear arsenal—especially the 1988 nuclear weapon test believed to be of a neutron bomb, and continuing submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) tests—indicates no reduction in nuclear arms despite an improving relationship with the USSR. The alleged neutron bomb test has been interpreted as a Chinese effort to develop tactical nuclear weapons, which would reflect a departure from its earlier minimal nuclear force posture, which has been confined to long-range weapon delivery

systems. The SLBM test has also caused disquiet within the region since it is seen as an indication that China is close to having nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines with operational capability. A related development was the Chinese sale of intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, although these were modified to carry conventional warheads. The implication is that China is phasing out this category of missiles and developing a new generation of missiles and that it is also a source of ballistic missile proliferation, and this has created great concern. Despite these developments, the political crisis caused by the events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 and the severe austerity programme launched by the Chinese leadership are bound to affect China's nuclear arms development programme. In addition, it is encouraging continuation of the process of *rapprochement* with the USSR.

Despite the fact that both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, rumours have persisted about clandestine nuclear-weapon programmes. Full access by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to nuclear power plants in the Korean peninsula would enhance confidence in the region. It has been noted that

> "If either of the Koreas were to acquire the capability to extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel, nuclear tensions would intensify significantly."

Reports in 1987 that Taiwan was engaged in constructing a small-scale plutonium extraction unit led to fears that Taiwan was considering a nuclear-weapon option. United States intervention resulted in the halting of work on a 40-megawatt research reactor supplied by Canada and in its dismantling. Political trends in the region will ultimately determine whether Taiwan's leadership will provide credible proof of abandoning any nuclear ambitions it may harbour.

Chemical Weapons

The danger from chemical weapons does not appear to be a major problem in north-east Asia, and with moves in the Conference on Disarmament to achieve the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban instrument, one can safely conclude that the prospect of the development and use of chemical weapons in north-east Asia is unlikely. There have, however, been allegations traded between the two Koreas regarding the stockpiling of chemical weapons. China's sale of missiles outside the region has also led to fears that the purchasers may equip such missiles to carry chemical weapons.

Within the larger Asia-Pacific region, Australia has proposed creating a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Pacific.

Conventional Weapons

With regard to conventional weapons, economic pressures have prompted Soviet initiatives for arms limitation and caused an actual decline in China's military expenditure. In China, political changes led to important defence reductions linked to new military strategies. China's military forces were cut by one million troops, and large defence industries were converted to serve civilian needs. The pragmatic trends in China's foreign policy appeared to suffer a set-back following the June 1989 crisis and the sharp international reaction to it. However, China's acceptance of a United Nations role in the resolution of the Cambodian problem, Li Peng's visit to Moscow and other attempts by China to resume its international responsibilities augur well. The pattern of reduced defence spending is likely to continue, largely because of economic pressures and the restructuring that is going on within China. According to official statistics, the share of the defence budget in the total budget was halved, to around 8 per cent, in 1988.

In Japan, concerns have been expressed regarding the breach of the self-imposed ceiling of 1 per cent of GNP for defence expenditure. The last budget showed a growth of 5.2 per cent in defence expenditure and this upward trend is expected to continue. Japan has emerged as one of the top six military spenders in the world. It has, however, been argued that the strengthening of the yen *vis-a-vis* the United States dollar has inflated Japanese defence spending. While in real terms defence expenditure has increased and an expansion of military capability has occurred, Japan remains defence-oriented in terms of article 9 of its Constitution and without a long-range attack capability. Its arms production remains low. Moreover, United States pressures for burden-sharing have contributed to Japan's increased allocations for defence. In the period 1984-1988 Japan was the fourth largest importer of arms, most of which came from the United States.

Defence expenditures by North and South Korea remain high. Economic constraints and policy shifts at the top may lead to changes in North Korea, especially if there is an acceleration of the current North-South conciliatory moves. North Korea was the eighth largest importer of arms in the period 1984-1988. Its possession of Scud missile technology and of the fourth largest air force in the world is significant. South Korea too has a missile capability. So does Taiwan.

The Soviet-United States negotiations on arms reductions and limitations have a greater potential to improve prospects for arms

limitation in north-east Asia than in south Asia. It should at the minimum decrease United States-USSR arms supplies, which in the period 1971-1985 accounted for 80 per cent of the total volume. The progress of USSR-China *rapprochement* is also important for developments in north-east Asia and its security environment. Tensions in the Korean peninsula remain, however, and have shown themselves to be governed more by indigenous factors than by great-Power relations in the area—although the problem has in the past been exacerbated by super-Power rivalry. The Japan-United States security nexus is also an important factor in the subregion. An improvement in USSR-United States relations alone will not be sufficient to allay Japanese apprehensions of the USSR, and progress in resolving disputes between the USSR and Japan is necessary. No regional organisation exists in north-east Asia to encourage the diminution of political tensions and facilitate arms limitations and political co-operation.

SOUTH ASIA

In the south Asian subregion we are confronted by the fact of India's overwhelming size and power. Relations between India and its neighbours, especially Pakistan, are crucial to the stability of the area. The Indian Ocean, with the prospect of naval competition within it, is another important factor.

Nuclear Weapons

The peaceful nuclear explosion carried out by India in 1974, together with its refusal to sign the non-proliferation Treaty, has led to persistent rumours of India's nuclear-weapon capability. Policies pursued since the time of Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto in Pakistan, evidence of clandestine acquisition of technology and *materiel,* and the existence of the unsafeguarded Kahuta enrichment plant have also led to suspicions that Pakistan—which is also outside the NPT regime—is engaged in a clandestine nuclear-weapon programme. At any rate, both countries are commonly referred to as nuclear "threshold" States with a nuclear-weapon capability. While both have officially proclaimed that their nuclear programmes are for peaceful purposes, they have also asserted that they could build the bomb if they so wished. The perception of a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, even if it is not based on fact, has a destabilising influence. Since the partition in 1947, the two countries have been at war on three occasions. Despite the Shimla Accords of 1972, tensions have waxed and waned. Domestic unrest in India, specifically in the Punjab and in Jammu and Kashmir, has

been blamed on Pakistan, and mutual suspicions have lingered. The emergence of a democratically elected government in Pakistan led by Benazir Bhutto presented an opportunity for change. Her statement rejecting a nuclear-weapon option for Pakistan and the agreement reached with India on 31 December 1988 to exchange information on nuclear plants and not to attack each other's nuclear installations have opened a new chapter. The defeat of the Congress Party Government in India and the appointment of Vishwanath Pratap Singh as the new Prime Minister was widely expected to signal improved relations between India and its neighbours. We may therefore expect steps that will allay suspicions of a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. It remains to be seen whether Sino-Indian negotiations will progress in such a way as to reduce the level of hostility between those two countries.

Chemical Weapons

The south Asian subregion is not known to have any stocks of chemical weapons, and although allegations of the use of such weapons in Afghanistan have been made, these were directed against the USSR. South Asian States have co-operated in the international quest for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

Conventional Weapons

With regard to conventional arms the situation is not very reassuring. The 1989 *SIPRI Yearbook* reports that:

> "Thus far in the 1980s, India has become the country which imports the greatest number of major conventional weapons in the world. The Indian Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard have all been recipients of significant amounts of new equipment either imported directly or produced under licence in India."

There is no denying the fact that India's conventional armed forces are widely regarded as being in excess of its subregional needs even if Pakistan is regarded as a threat. India's smaller neighbours can only aspire to be minor irritants. Thus India's armed might has an extra-subregional rationale, ostensibly for defence against an extra-subregional threat. Its purchases for the period 1984-1988 placed India as the second largest procurer of conventional weapons in the world—next only to Iraq, which was involved in a war with Iran at the time. India's blue-water naval capability was enhanced significantly with the lease of nuclear-powered attack submarines from the USSR. Its domestic arms production sector has grown and India has become an arms exporter.

India's missile programme has also led to concern, both within and outside south Asia. It has been known that India had a programme for developing space launch vehicles (SLVs), which was described as being for civilian purposes. In addition, a military missile programme has been initiated, and in February 1988 a ballistic missile (known as the Prithvi) with a range of 250 km and a pay load of about 1000 kg was successfully tested. A larger ballistic missile (the Agni), officially described as being for research purposes and with a longer range of 2400 km, was successfully tested on 22 May 1989. The combination of India's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines and the development of missiles with longer ranges than necessary for purely defensive requirements represents a qualitative escalation in the militarisation of south Asia.

Pakistan's military expenditure received a major boost following the intervention of the USSR in Afghanistan and the conversion of the country as a base for Afghan *muja-heddin* resistance to the pro-Soviet Government installed in Kabul. SIPRI'S tentative figures place Pakistan's military expenditure at between 6.6 and 6.9 per cent of GDP during the period 1981-1986 (India's was between 3 and 3.7 per cent). In April 1988 Pakistan announced the testing of two types of ballistic missiles. On 5 February 1989 a further test, of a surface-to-surface long-range missile, was announced. Pakistan also has a civilian rocket research programme and a space-launch vehicle programme. With Pakistan's nuclear-weapon capability having been widely rumoured, attention has been focussed on the possible delivery of such weapons by long-range aircraft. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and negotiations with a view to arriving at a permanent settlement of the Afghan problem the rationale for these forms of military expenditure by Pakistan has diminished. However, until the various issues are negotiated, tensions will remain between India and Pakistan.

Military expenditure in other countries of south Asia is not so significant as to pose a threat to the stability of their neighbours. In Sri Lanka, while the internal conflicts caused by Tamil militant groups and the People's Liberation Front continue at horrendously brutal levels, actual defence expenditure has begun to decline. The Sri Lanka phenomenon and the Sikh agitation in India focussed on the problem of arms acquisition by sub-national groups and the need for curbs on the arms trade. The abortive Maldivian coup of 1988, which employed mercenaries, highlighted the special security needs of small States and led to the adoption, at the forty-fourth session of the General

Assembly, of a resolution, sponsored by Maldives, on the use of mercenaries.

Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

The implementation of the 1971 United Nations Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be a key factor in achieving arms limitation in South Asia. Despite favourable developments in the relationship between the Super-Powers, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the progress achieved in other regional conflicts, the convening of the Conference to convert the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace remains a controversial issue. At its most recent meeting, the three Western nuclear weapon Powers announced their decision to withdraw from the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, while all but two of the remaining Western States decided not to participate in the committee's work. This has added further complications to the functioning of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and the negotiations for the convening of the Conference.

Within the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean a host of proposals have been made for confidence-building measures on land and at sea. At the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean held in 1979 a set of principles was adopted forming a code of conduct. Adherence to this code would undoubtedly encourage arms limitation in the area, and an initiative could be taken by Indian Ocean States outside the *Ad Hoc* Committee. The presence in the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the permanent members of the Security Council, the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean and other Member States has made the task of achieving consensus a difficult one. A date for the Colombo Conference with universal participation is the first issue on which there has to be a consensus before the Indian Ocean can be converted into a zone of peace binding the countries both within and outside the region to a code ensuring regional peace and security and facilitating arms reduction both on land and at sea.

ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL FEATURES

Naval Arms

Both the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean are characterised by a high level of military activity; hence the subject of curbing the naval arms race must be addressed. While the navies of the Super-Powers enjoy dominant positions, there is also concern about the growing naval strength of States in the Asia-Pacific region. The need to include naval arms control in the disarmament negotiations between the United

States and the USSR is urgent. The risk of incidents at sea leading to war is grave. Economic constraints have already acted in the United States to reduce the naval budget, and this factor alone may result in naval arms limitation. Arguments that an asymmetry exists between the two superpowers, with the United States perceiving itself as a maritime island nation having a genuine need to protect its sea links for national security reasons, have been advanced to justify its global naval presence and to oppose moves towards naval arms control. Proposals by the USSR such as those made in President Gorbachev's Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk statements in pursuit of naval arms control have thus met with a negative response. However, the inclusion of SLBM launches in the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement and the application to the naval area of the 1989 Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities Agreement indicate that small steps are possible as confidence-building measures. Even if actual reductions of naval forces do not take place, the adoption of a number of limited measures, such as notification of naval exercises, negotiation of a multilateral incidents-at-sea regime, and exchanges of information, appear possible. None of the measures that are being discussed is specific to the regions of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The measures are global in scope but should be of major effect in reducing tensions, caused by the naval arms race, in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Politics or Economics?

Francis Fukuyama has discerned in the tumultuous events of the recent past a triumph of liberal democracy over Marxism-Leninism, which he has perhaps presumptuously labelled "the end of history", deriving the notion from the Marxist view of history as a dialectical process and the Hegelian view that history is motivated by overcoming contradictions between thesis and antithesis. Others have demurred over this hyperbole and have referred to an acceleration of history with "imperial overstretch" affecting both the United States and the USSR. Both notions reflect essentially a Eurocentric view, the applicability of which to the Asia-Pacific region is more apparent than real. The non-aligned countries in the Asia-Pacific region have long and consistently stood for an independent approach to international relations outside the contradiction between the two alliances of the post-Second World War bipolar world, portrayed at the time in Manichaean terms. Safeguarding their national independence from all forms of domination and intervention, these nations have for decades been pledged to the principles of peace, disarmament and the democratisation of international relations, and to multilateral co-

operation, especially through the United Nations. The inception of the Movement of Non-aligned Countries can in fact be traced to the Bandung Conference of 1955 in the Asia-Pacific region. Fukuyama himself in a subsequent article looks ahead to "a world where economic concerns are dominant, where no ideological grounds exist for major conflict between nations, and where, consequently, the use of military force becomes less legitimate". He adds:

> "Consumers do not always want what can be measured in GNP. They also demand things like clean air and a safe environment for their children, and it is this broader set of goals that will shape the political agendas, both domestic and international, of the post-historical world."

The emergence of the NICs in the Asia-Pacific region, the post-1979 economic reforms in China, and the achievement of self-sufficiency in cereals in India are examples of the region's economic advances in comparison to other areas. This demonstrated pragmatic concern with basic economic development issues diminishes the danger of military confrontation and increases the prospects for arms limitation. National rivalries will of course continue and ethnic nationalism will persist in acquiring militant forms. A decrease, if not the total elimination, of the great-Power presence in the region is crucial and would reduce tensions and create conditions of peace and security. That has yet to take place as a logical sequel to improving East-West relations. Trade wars are more likely to be fought in the forums of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) than by arms. As the components of power change slowly but surely from the politico-military to the economic we are going to see a multipolar world of a different kind. Certainly, large-scale wars between nations will become less likely. The micro-chip of modern technology may prove more potent than the Kalashnikov. That in itself will be a force for demilitarisation but it can come in the Asia-Pacific region only with the great Powers taking the lead.

Evolving a Security Consensus

The pattern of regional co-operation for peace and development is unique for each region. No model can be entirely replicated elsewhere. However, lessons can be learned from the successes and failures of others. The experience of Helsinki and Stockholm must therefore be examined objectively. With so much cultural diversity and other disparities amongst the countries of the region, we are a long way from talking of a common Asia-Pacific home. While the danger of large-scale conflict may have been averted with the improved

international atmosphere, the pressures for disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region are still not as strong as they should be. On 16 January 1990, a three-week colloquium began in Vienna among the chiefs of staff of European countries on military doctrines. It is perhaps time for a similar dialogue among the nations of the Asia-Pacific region as a first step towards an understanding of one another's legitimate interests and aspirations. It is only after a regional consensus is reached, accommodating the national interests of all, that genuine arms limitation and disarmament measures can be implemented. Regional security leading to disarmament is best and more durably achieved through consensus arrangements than through the emergence of regional Powers as gendarmes. Some of the regional organisations in the Asia-Pacific region—ASEAN, the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation and the South Pacific Forum—have the potential of developing such a consensus following further advances towards their present goals for economic co-operation.

A further prospect for arms limitations and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region lies in the concept of "non-offensive defence", also known as "non-provocative defence" and" alternative defence". Developed in the European context, the conceptual objective is to achieve conventional stability by maximising the defensive orientation of forces, thus reducing the danger of surprise attack and achieving security at lower overall levels of armaments. It is claimed that it is possible to achieve structural incapacity to attack, thereby reducing threat perceptions and enhancing confidence. At a recent symposium, UNIDIR invited a group of scholars and diplomats to explore the applicability of "non-offensive defence" to other regions as a preliminary attempt to broaden the discussion of this concept. While the primacy of political factors cannot be denied, the influence of military doctrines that assure equal national security is also important, and further exploration of new concepts is urgent.

Conclusion

The former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, in his annual report to the General Assembly for 1989, said:

> "There is a ubiquitous desire to turn over a new leaf, to try innovative approaches for the solution of old problems. In diverse regions, there is weariness with wars and there is recognition of their futility. Nor do the postures of hostile competition have the appeal to public opinion that they unfortunately exerted not too long ago. Instead, it is the combat against the causes of conflict, the struggle against economic inequities and social

evils and the degradation of the environment that must evoke all the courage and determination of battle."

We must continue to explore new concepts leading to peace and disarmament. We have to breakout of the old moulds of thinking, abandoning also the emotional baggage acquired through past historical experiences, if we are to create a better world to usher in the twenty-first century. More arms have not brought more security, and war is no longer the inevitable extension of politics but rather the failure of civilised political behaviour, unthinkable in a nuclear age.

CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND MILITARY SECURITY

Introduction

This paper examines a number of problems which the negotiation and implementation of confidence-building measure (CBM) regimes may pose for military planners. It is written in the conviction that CBMs can play a vitally important role in enhancing military security outside the European framework. But it stresses that for CBM regimes to be negotiated and implemented effectively, security planners need to be forewarned about the problems which may arise in the process.

A "confidence-building measure" is, as James Macintosh has pointed out, a concept notable for the imprecision of various attempts to define it. There is little consensus about what may be included under the general rubric of confidence-building measures or how they are to be distinguished from other arms control measures. There is also confusion over the critically important question of what CBMs are intended to achieve—and whose confidence is supposed to be built by CBM regimes.

Are CBMs intended to engender confidence on one side about the benign intentions of the other? Or vice versa? Or both? And even if the nature and goals of CBMs can be agreed upon, this still leaves unresolved the almost wholly unresearched issue of what are the psychological mechanisms by which confidence may be built.

Role of CBMs

It is probably true to say that much of the support for CBMs within the Western arms control community has been predicated on the assumption that the major risk of armed conflict between the rival alliances arose, not from unprovoked aggression, but from a crisis escalating out of control and propelling adversaries into an unintended confrontation. CBMs, in other words, were seen as most relevant to the goal of minimising the dangers of inadvertent war.

But if premeditated and unprovoked aggression, rather than crisis instability, is assumed to constitute the central security problem, the strategic utility of CBMs may be questioned. Attempts by our side to reassure an adversary bent on aggression about our intentions will be, at best, futile and at worst amount to appeasement. The confidence which the British believed had been built at Munich between Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler turned out to be a sad delusion.

Does this mean that CBMs are of no use in the face of potentially aggressive adversaries? Not necessarily. At the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm, the then United States Secretary of State, George Shultz, defined the United States objective at the talks as the achievement of a CBM regime which would "reduce the danger of surprise attack, miscalculation, or misunderstanding".

In a similar vein, Jonathan Alford has defined CBMs as "measures that tend to make military intentions obvious." CBMs thus defined are clearly highly relevant to military security. Indeed the Alford definition is synonymous with good intelligence and good intelligence would be a great value to any nation facing an adversary bent on aggression. In third world States which lack the sophisticated surveillance and intelligence capabilities of the Super-Powers, information CBMs, such as those advocated by Shultz and Alford, may be a particularly useful hedge against surprise attack.

What then does it mean to say that measures designed to clarify military intentions and contribute to decreasing the risk of surprise attack are confidence-building measures? The short answer is that while they may not build mutual confidence, they may well create confidence on our side about our ability to detect aggressive preparations by adversaries early enough to make an appropriate defensive response. From a purely military point of view this is highly desirable.

The strong emphasis on the military utility of CBMs which was stressed by the NATO side at the Stockholm negotiations is partly responsible for the increasing adoption of the term "confidence- and *security-building,* measures" (CSBMs), which will be used in the rest of this paper.

It is of course true that a State bent on aggression might well refuse to negotiate a CBM regime which minimised the chances of its aggression succeeding. But the refusal to negotiate should in itself have a useful cautionary effect.

If the above argument is accepted, it would seem to follow that the most limited CSBMs are those which increase a nation's own confidence in its abilities to detect an adversary's preparations for acts of aggression. More extensive CSBMs (i.e. those where confidence may be increased on both sides) are relevant where neither side in fact harbours aggressive intentions against the other, but where the relationship between the two is nevertheless characterised by a considerable degree of suspicion and hostility. Here the confidence-building process—a process which seeks to reduce hostility and fear—should be mutual.

In the sections which follow I examine a number of the problems which may be encountered in negotiating and implementing CSBMs and consider a number of the more common military objections to CSBM regimes.

Problem of Surprise Attack

A central North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) objective at the Stockholm Conference was to negotiate CSBMs which would reduce the risk of surprise attack. NATO's concern was understandable. Western analysts believed that Soviet strategy for the Central Front in Europe sought to exploit the advantage of surprise in blitzkrieg-type offensive thrusts against NATO forces. CSBMs which made Moscow's strategic task more difficult were clearly in NATO's interest. But herein lay a problem. In so far as surprise attack is seen by one side (or indeed both) as having clear military utility when war is perceived to be inevitable, what security interest does the side contemplating a surprise attack have in negotiating CSBMs designed to undercut this tactic?

Anti-surprise-attack CSBMs would certainly have had no appeal for Israel in June 1967. Israel's extraordinary success in the Six-Day War owed an enormous amount to the pre-emptive surprise attack launched by the Israeli Defence Force which destroyed many of the combat aircraft of Syria and Egypt on the ground. Similarly, the strong emphasis in the United States Navy's maritime strategy on the need for initiative and surprise may be a determinate factor in the Navy's strong resistance to naval CSBMs which might reduce the element of surprise.

The problem of surprise attack is related to the more general problems raised by offensive strategies and force structures which are addressed in the conclusion.

CSBMs and Deterrence

Can CSBMs undermine deterrence and in so doing increase the risk of aggression? The reasons the United States Navy advances for its opposition to a range of CSBM constraint measures illustrate how particular security concerns may lead to the rejection of CSBMs. The Navy's argument runs roughly as follows: Constraints on exercises (as proposed by the Soviets on a number of occasions) will prevent the Navy from practising its strategy effectively. In so far as this is true the Navy's war-fighting capability will decline, which will in turn undermine deterrence and thus increase the risk of aggression. CSBMs, in other words, may actually increase the risk of war.

When it is pointed out that the CSBM constraints apply to both sides, the Navy is quick to respond that its activities will be affected far more than those of the Soviet side, since United States ships are forward deployed, while the Soviet Navy is more defensively oriented and its operating tempo has slowed considerably over the past four years.

Problem of False Confidence

Pressures to achieve negotiated arms control agreements are likely to be most intense when there is widespread public enthusiasm for such agreements, when a perceived reluctance to reach an agreement could be politically costly to the Government conducting the negotiations, and when the adversary is making apparently reasonable proposals. Under such circumstances, agreements may be made for essentially domestic political reasons, which could have adverse long-term security consequences.

Agreements which create the illusion of progress where there is no substance may have a dangerously lulling effect on public consciousness—this may be a particular problem with CSBM regimes. False confidence may lead to a dangerous decline in vigilance. While it is true that CSBMs are intended, among other things, to reduce the risks of surprise attack, they will only succeed in doing this if the warnings that are generated are heeded. If Governments and publics have been lulled into a sense of false confidence, there is a strong possibility that these warnings will be ignored or misinterpreted.

Quite apart from military objections to CSBMs in principle, there are a range of problems which may arise in the negotiating process itself.

Security Mindsets

The ways in which adversaries perceive security may be very different and the differences may in themselves generate suspicion during the negotiating process. In the Stockholm negotiations, for example, the Soviets initially placed great emphasis on "declaratory" or "political" CSBMs. Such CSBMs, Barry Blechman has argued, could:

> "... signal the desire of those States party to the agreement to adopt a co-operative posture in regional affairs. This type of declaration could be a necessary precedent to further arms control negotiations. It could be used to clear the air of past grievances and to signal the beginning of new relationships. A further and very important purpose would be to demonstrate the political commitment of the signatory States to sustain the policies required to bring about stabilisation in the region".

However, the United States has traditionally rejected the Soviet emphasis on such political/legal CBMs, arguing that they are largely inspired by propagandistic motives. Soviet statements of peaceful intent were disbelieved because of the very American suspicions that they were ostensibly intended to dispel.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has tended to argue that the gravest risks of war are to be found in political relationships, and their negotiating style has reflected these concerns. From the Soviet perspective, the United States approach was unhelpful, since, in focusing on narrow military/technical CSBMs, it dealt with the symptoms of the super-Power conflict and ignored its fundamental causes. The Soviets have also argued that crisis-avoidance is a more prudent security goal than crisis-stability. They further suggest that crisis-avoidance is best approached via political CSBMs rather than the military/technical CSBMs favoured by NATO. Thus, Moscow has repeatedly stressed the importance of declaratory agreements such as the 1972 basic principles Agreement, stressing the need to avoid situations likely to lead to increased tensions, and the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War.

The Soviets have argued that the military/technical CSBMs which NATO promoted were largely irrelevant to the task of preventing crises from arising in the first place. NATO, on the other hand, has wanted "... deeds, not words or sweeping pledges, to be the basis of confidence- and security-building efforts in Europe."

On the Korean peninsula quite different security mindsets have also prevented progress towards creating even the most modest CSBM regime. For the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea),

the central security goal is reunification of the two Koreas and the central negotiating task is to construct a blueprint for reaching that goal. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) agrees that reunification is an ultimate goal but believes that a minimal degree of trust must be created between the two sides before negotiations on reunification—or the form that it will take—can commence. Modest CSBMs are seen as a means towards the latter end. However, scholars from the North have argued that the CSBMs advocated by the South would have the effect of reinforcing the *status quo* of a divided Korea and would thus be antithetical to the eventual goal of reunification. The Republic of Korea sees the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's reluctance to countenance even the most modest CSBMs as evidence of Pyongyang's bad faith.

In other conflict situations adversaries may have quite different but equally incompatible security mindsets which may create barriers to progress. But such problems will be alleviated if they are recognised and addressed at the outset. Discussions on military doctrine, with the various parties seeking an empathetic understanding of each other's security perspective, could be particularly helpful in this respect.

Problem of CSBMs

Another major difficulty which may be encountered in negotiating CSBMs derives from the fact that the measures proposed often impact very differently on the parties which are subject to them. The Stockholm Conference negotiating record again provides a number of usefully cautionary examples.

1. Transparency and Information CSBMs

In January 1984, NATO presented six measures for negotiation at the Stockholm Conference. These measures included exchanges of military data, advance notification of military activities, observation of military activities, verification of military activities and enhanced communication procedures. Richard Damek has noted that in this list of CSBMs, "the quest for information predominates, especially information provided by the other side." The Soviets saw this stress on information-gathering as little more than legalised espionage—and complained that NATO's proposals meant that the United States would be able to spy on much of the USSR, while United States territory was not subject to transparency inspections by the East.

Moscow's concern arose because, even though transparency CSBMs might be applied equally to all sides, they would in practice provide the

West with more information about the closed and traditionally secretive East than vice versa. Moscow could glean detailed information on military developments in the United States from such public domain sources as Congressional Hearings, the National Technical Information Service, and even *The New York Times.* There were no comparable sources of public information in the Soviet public domain accessible to the United States and its allies. The key point here is that asymmetry in existing access to information meant that transparency CSBMs, when implemented, would confer a disproportionate advantage on one side.

2. Constraint Measures

Among the constraint CSBMs proposed by the East at the Stockholm negotiations were certain prohibitions on the size of exercises. The standard United States response to all constraint proposals was that "it was difficult to conceive of measures that did not impact disproportionately on NATO." Indeed the Soviet proposal for a ceiling of 40,000 troops on manoeuvres would have had the effect of constraining NATO far more than the Warsaw Treaty States, which traditionally exercised with smaller troop numbers than NATO.

A number of the USSR's naval arms control proposals would also impact far more on the forward-deployed United States Navy than on the more defensively deployed Soviet Navy—this has been one of the reasons advanced by the United States Navy for its persistent rejection of proposals for naval arms control.

The fact that some constraint measures may impact more on one side than another is, however, not a good reason for rejecting constraint measures *per se.* It does suggest that if negotiations are being conducted in good faith (they may be engaged in for propagandistic reasons), then great care should be taken to try to avoid advocacy of particular CSBMs which, even though they might be applied symmetrically, would impact asymmetrically—i.e., would disadvantage one side more than the other.

The foregoing underlines the need for extreme care when proposing that CSBMs which may have worked well in one theatre be applied to a quite different theatre in which their impact may be asymmetrical.

Goals of Negotiation

Negotiating teams are comprised of individuals who very frequently represent different bureaucratic interests as well as their own individual views as to what the real goals of the negotiation process

should be. Thus for every committed arms controller on the team, there may be one or more others who see the negotiation process as simply another arena in which the adversarial struggle should be played out. From the latter perspective, the name of the game is to gain a military or political advantage over the other side, not the achievement of greater common security. As Stephen Larrabee and Alien Lynch observed of the Stockholm process:

> "Since each side tends to put forward those CBMs that constrain the behaviour of the other, while resisting those that would inhibit its own, progress in negotiating CBMs has been slow."

Negotiation Process

Even where there is a genuine will to achieve an agreement, its achievement may be frustrated by failures in the negotiation process. It is somewhat ironic that, while arms control negotiating teams usually include military, legal, technical, political and arms control experts, they almost never include experts in the process of negotiation *per se.* It is sometimes the case that negotiations fail because there is simply no basis for a satisfactory resolution of the issues being addressed. But at other times they fail not because the dispute was inherently insoluble, but because of avoidable failures in the negotiation process itself. The case for negotiating teams to include experts in the process of negotiation—or at least for providing negotiators with training in negotiating skills—would appear to be compelling. This is particularly true with respect to CSBMs, where the issues being discussed may well be more sensitive than is the case with force-reduction negotiations. Some interesting work in this area has already been undertaken by Roger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard Negotiation Project.

Where negotiations reach an impasse there may be a case for mediation or other forms of intervention by third parties in whom both sides have confidence. For example, North and South Korean arms control experts have each noted the similarity of the other's proposals to create a genuine demilitarised zone along the border between their two countries. One scholar from the North noted, however, that the South invariably rejected the North's proposals and vice versa—notwithstanding their similarity. Had the proposals been put forward by a third party, he suggested, it would have been much easier for each side to accept.

Implementation Problems

Even when CSBM agreements have been successfully negotiated, their practical implementation may be a process which actually

undermines confidence and is fraught with frustration. Colonel Jim E. Hinds, a retired United States army officer who had been involved in observing a number of Soviet military activities, clearly found the experience a thoroughly negative one. Commenting on his experiences as an observer under the terms of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, Hinds notes:

> "Observers were only permitted to witness demonstrations, not manoeuvres. They were not permitted to provide their own equipment, not permitted freedom of movement, but were transported by Soviet hosts, and were given no opportunities freely to interview Soviet officers or soldiers."

Such frustrations in monitoring Helsinki CBMs, which have been noted also by many other Western officials, often left observers confident only that they were being deceived. Hinds argues that:

> "... CBMs produce nothing positive when implemented negatively. Without positive implementation, CBMs can produce negative results, and perhaps themselves provide the spark to set off serious confrontations."

Most of the problems which were associated with the Helsinki CBMs have been overcome in the Stockholm regime, but the difficulties with the Helsinki regime implementation offer a useful warning of possible implementation problems for States contemplating creating CSBM regimes in non-European theatres.

Conclusion

This list of problems may suggest a certain scepticism about the basic utility of CSBMs in regional conflicts. It is not intended to. Like any approach to enhancing security, that of CSBMs is complex and often difficult to implement. Recognising that this is the case is a necessary antidote to any unrealistic expectations about the CSBM process.

It should also be recognised that the "arms control paradox", namely, that arms control is hardest to negotiate when most needed and easiest to negotiate when least needed, applies with particular force to CSBMs. There will undoubtedly be times when levels of hostility and suspicion between adversaries are simply too high for CSBM negotiations to have any chance of succeeding. In such circumstances it is better to avoid negotiations at the official level completely. But even where official bilateral negotiations are impossible, so-called "track II diplomacy" involving unofficial meetings, possibly between scholars and former officials, may fulfil a useful role. Furthermore, detailed consideration of possible CSBM regimes within the security communities on each side may facilitate negotiations when hostility declines.

I noted earlier in the discussions on both surprise attack and deterrence that much of the military scepticism which exists about CSBMs derives from the fact that strategists frequently see military virtue in that which CSBMs (particularly of the constraint variety) attempt to control. CSBMs, it is argued, may undermine deterrence, preclude successful resort to pre-emptive attack and reveal essential military secrets.

Under certain circumstances it is possible to imagine examples where this might be true—though the history of CSBM negotiations suggests that the parties to them rarely compromise what they perceive as their essential security interests. But what is critical to stress here is that any approach to security has drawbacks. The fact that CSBM regimes under certain circumstances may pose certain risks is, in itself, no argument against seeking to achieve them. The critical question is whether, in creating a CSBM regime, the balance of risk is, or is not, outweighed by the balance of advantage. This is particularly pertinent when looking at the alternatives advocated by critics of CSBMs—alternatives which stress deterrence rather than reassurance, national security rather than common security, and pre-emption rather than withholding. Such alternatives are most frequently associated with offence-dominant force structures and strategies.

The argument for offensively-oriented strategies and force postures is that these enhance deterrence and offer a more efficacious mode of war-fighting if deterrence nevertheless fails. Both of these assumptions are open to question. But whatever their claimed advantages in the realm of war-fighting, there is no doubt that offensive strategies undermine policies of both crisis-avoidance and crisis-control. Because offensive forces can be used for aggression as well as in response to aggression, their very existence is bound to generate suspicion in the minds of prudent defence planners on the other side. Offensive force postures do not, of course, cause conflicts, but they may well exacerbate them, while at the same time providing rationales for arms races. Because they place considerable emphasis on preemption and on escalation once the threshold to war has been crossed, offensive strategies are also inimical to crisis-stability. In seeking to maximize deterrence against unprovoked aggression, they may unwittingly increase the risk of inadvertent war. Offensive strategies, in other words, are quite antithetical to confidence-building.

Defensive strategies are designed to eliminate incentives for pre-emption in crises and escalation in war by abjuring the capability seriously to threaten an adversary, while retaining the capability for

effective defence. Most constraint CSBMs may be seen as contributions to the creation of defensive force postures. Indeed, defensive force postures and strategies may in one sense be seen as the ultimate form of constraint CSBMs. In Europe, however, negotiations to reduce capabilities for large-scale offensive operations are being conducted at a separate venue (the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)) from the ongoing talks on CSBMs in Vienna.

In considering whether or not the CSBM/defensive strategy path to security may be as useful for regions outside Europe as it clearly has been for those within, it will be necessary to bear in mind not only the particular problems which negotiating and implementing the CSBMs will involve, but also the broader question of what is the most probable cause of war in the region in question.

The evidence suggests that wars which arise out of crises getting out of hand and escalating into unwanted confrontations are more likely to occur than wars in which unprovoked aggression provides the trigger. Sarajevo and World War I may be a more relevant lesson of history than Hitler, Munich and World War II.

In so far as this is true, then the CSBM/defensive strategy route to security will have much to recommend it.

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Implications of the Regional Environment for Regimes of Confidence- and Security-Building for Asia and the Pacific

This article will focus on the prevailing environment for confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Asia and the Pacific, the potential of and possibilities for these CSBMs and obstacles to achieving them.

In this article, "confidence-building measures" (CBMs) will refer to the enhancing of confidence about military intentions. "Security-building measures" will refer to the enhancing of military security between the parties involved. "Confidence- and security-building measures" will, therefore, be a combination of both, essentially pertaining to the military field. That is what is understood in the conventional, technical sense. The concept underlying the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) is, of course, broader than confidence- or security-building measures essentially in the military sphere. Security-building measures can be much more than that. They may encompass military, security, political, economic, cultural, social, human rights and environmental measures—at the least. Hence, we may be examining the application of CSBMs in the Asia-Pacific region while, at the same time, we are talking about the application of the CSCE to Asia and the Pacific. Given the present stage of development of this region, it would appear much more profitable to talk, not about the CSCE-type of military-related CSBMs, but rather about the broader CSCE concept of confidence-building and cooperation, which applies to all spheres. This is because the potential for confidence-building and security-building measures in the military field *per se* seems rather limited in the Asian and Pacific environments. So, this study will look beyond CBMs and CSBMs.

Environment and Parameters for Asia-Pacific CSBMs

First, when we consider CSBMs and a CSCE-type of arrangement in Asia and the Pacific, we are talking about a very vast area, stretching from the Middle East or western Asia and the Persian Gulf to East Asia and the Pacific, including Australia and New Zealand and the islands of the South Pacific Ocean. Europe, by comparison, is rather small—and we have to be very clear about the sheer expanse of the area we are talking about.

Secondly, the geographical, historical, political, cultural and social heterogeneity of the area has to be taken into account. There is, of course, heterogeneity in Europe, but there is much more homogeneity than exists in Asia. Indeed, in Asia and the Pacific there is no common identity or consciousness except, in practical terms, in a very basic and minimal sense. Instead, the best we can argue for in Asia and the Pacific is subregional consciousness or identity. For the many countries in this region which emerged from colonialism only after the Second World War, not only is there very little sense of regionalism—and any that exists is very nascent and embryonic—but there is more nationalism than anything else. There is nothing comparable to the ongoing process of European regional integration in Asia and the Pacific in any pan-Asian sense.

Instead, subregional organisations have been established. I am, of course, referring to several in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, to SAARC—the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation—in South Asia, to ASEAN—the Association of South-East Asian Nations— in South-East Asia, and to the South Pacific Forum—in the South Pacific islands subregion. These arrangements of course have an impact on prospects for CSBMs in the area and its respective subregions and for any CSCE-type of organisation in the area. There are no shared historical or security perceptions for the area as a whole, and this would rather limit any prospect for any application of CSCE concepts across the whole region. The best one could hope for, for the near term and foreseeable future, if CSCE-type regimes are wanted in the area, would be subregional schemes. Several other factors indicate the same limitation, and will be addressed later.

One should also consider the multiplicity of balances of power or separate theatres that the region contains in contrast to the very clear bipolar power configuration of post-war Europe, at least until recently. In Asia, there is, or was, the super-Power balance and even today it exists in the North-East Asian subregion. It was superimposed, however, upon a number of local balances of power—in the Middle

East, in South Asia, in South-East Asia, in the South Pacific and even in North-East Asia. So, we have had overlapping, multiple conglomerations of power balances in the region, unlike in Europe. This factor will, of course, heavily influence regimes of the CSCE type throughout the area.

On a related point, there are great asymmetries of power across this vast region, which further complicate CSBM and arms reduction efforts, whether these are on a region-wide, subregional or even bilateral basis. These asymmetries are of two types: between nations as a whole, and between the different characteristics of their military power, including whether it is land-based, air-based or naval, and whether it is conventional or nuclear. There are, of course, the Super-Powers, the United States and the USSR, which stand apart, at least in the nuclear sense. Then there are the major Powers of the region, and I refer here to China, Japan and India. Thirdly, there are what could be called middle Powers: Indonesia, the Koreas, Pakistan and Vietnam. Finally, there are the lesser Powers, some of the weakest and smallest in the world. Thus some of the most powerful and some of the weakest countries in the world are represented in Asia and the Pacific. In view of these asymmetries of power, there is little room for reciprocity and little perception of shared benefits from certain forms of CSBMs in the area. How, for instance, are arms reductions handled between large Powers and much lesser Powers? The larger Powers will in any case be left with a preponderance of military might over the smaller ones. And this particular aspect will have a crucial impact on any multilateral, particularly region-wide, CSBMs in the area.

Thirdly, the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region ought to be addressed. It has become more fluid and dynamic during the past two years. This is, of course, true for many other parts of the world as well. Certainly we are not sure where we are heading in terms of the strategic scenario in the region. It is uncertain whether it will become unipolar, with the United States dominating everything, or whether it might be bipolar, at least in certain subregions of Asia and, particularly, North-East Asia, or multipolar. In many parts of Asia and the Pacific the strategic scene is going to become predominantly multipolar. Among the strategic changes that have just taken place during the last two years, I would refer specifically to the Soviet reductions and pull-back, the reduction in the United States role and the presence and increasing emergence of regional Powers in the area. These developments may have both positive and negative effects on the climate for CSBMs.

Fourthly, despite an all-round improvement in relations between the countries in the area, particularly in South-East Asia and East Asia, in South Asia serious problems remain unresolved and, with regard to Japan and the Soviet Union, there is the problem of the Kurile Islands. Elsewhere in the subregion there have been dramatic improvements in inter-State relations and also improvements in relations between the regional States and the two Super-Powers.

While there is of course *detente* between the USSR and the United States, there is also *rapprochement* between the major Powers: the United States and China, the Soviet Union, China and the Republic of Korea, and Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. China and Vietnam have improved relations and, also in South-East Asia, China has renewed diplomatic relations with Indonesia and established diplomatic relations with Singapore. Relations are also improving among the Indo-Chinese countries, particularly between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries. These developments, again, have had a mixed impact: on the one hand, they reflect a relaxation of tensions in many parts of Asia which will be conducive to at least certain forms of CSBMs. On the other hand, they have been accompanied by an increase in nervousness and a sense of insecurity in some countries and also by concerns about a rise in intraregional tensions which have hitherto been suppressed as a result of perceived common threats or problems.

In the case of the ASEAN countries, for instance, the Cambodian question was a unifying factor, which gave birth to numerous regional cooperative ventures, but, as the Cambodian problem recedes, the intraregional tensions among the ASEAN countries themselves may rise to the fore. This will surely have implications for CSBMs in the subregion—however, not necessarily negative ones. It could provide an impetus for more CSBM measures, and in fact that is what seems to be happening among the ASEAN countries.

A fifth point is that, unlike in Europe, where the situation soon stabilised after the war, in Asia there have been innumerable post-war conflicts and multiple centres of conflict, just as there has been a multiplicity of power centres. The levels of this conflict and tension have varied widely, covering a whole range from hot wars to internal conflicts to intense or moderate bilateral confrontations and tensions. The existence of hot wars and an intense degree of confrontation, in certain cases, make the climate unfavourable for a CSCE-type accommodation in Asia and the Pacific. But this does not preclude the potential for certain similar CSBMs in areas where conflict is either reduced or very much under control.

A sixth point concerns the sustained or increasing arms expenditures aimed at maintaining or increasing military capabilities in many parts of Asia. There are a few notable cases where either military expenditure is being reduced, or where selective, limited reductions in military capabilities, often unilateral, are being carried out. But the general trend, especially for smaller Powers with the financial wherewithal to increase their military capabilities, is one of increase. The highest levels of expenditures on arms next to Europe are found in this region, particularly in recent years.

Several factors drive this phenomenon. One is national ambition. There are countries which are newly rich or otherwise have the wherewithal and want to play a larger role in the region. Therefore, they perceive themselves as needing the necessary military sinew to play that more dominant role. Another factor is that many countries in the region are starting from a very low military base and building it up. They have not yet attained what they consider for themselves to be reasonable sufficiency. And then there is of course modernisation and replacement of equipment. Yet, another factor has been the extension of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) at sea, which have vastly increased their areas and created a need for many countries to strengthen their navies.

There have also been modifications of military doctrines and strategies, from an emphasis on counter-insurgency to one on external defence capabilities. A number of countries in the region which traditionally concentrated upon internal disorder have now pacified their internal areas and are building up conventional force capabilities with an external orientation. There are, of course, the problems of perceived external threats, and, in some cases, they have been perceived as rising. Some countries are in fact worried about reductions in the United States role or even in the Soviet presence, and are fearful of some of the larger Powers in their areas. As a result of the cutting down of the United States, presence there arises the need for sharing the defence burden with the United States: for some countries this is leading to decisions to increase their expenditures. And, finally, there have arisen the factors of competition and of the arms race among countries in the region. All this will have to be taken into account in the negotiation of CSBMs in the relevant subregions.

A seventh point concerns the existence of many territorial disputes and some questions regarding the sovereignty and legitimacy of regimes in the area. In some of the cases in point there is very little genuine inclination for peaceful resolution of the dispute, or the environment

is very volatile, such as in western Asia, and to a lesser extent in the Korean peninsula. Even in the latter case, the potential for conflict remains. The Kurile Islands question, sovereignty questions between China and Taiwan, province of China, territorial disputes and claims in South-East Asia, particularly between the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia and Thailand, and the conflicting claims of six littoral States in the Spratly Islands dispute in the South China Sea are additional, volatile situations. The Kashmir and the Sino-Soviet border areas should of course also be mentioned. All of this contrasts with the much more settled situation in Europe.

My eighth point concerns the Pacific islands, where the situation is different from that in mainland Asia. There the main security concerns are nuclear-weapon testing and the environment. In the case of some of the South Pacific islands, the natural environment is a matter of very real concern. With global warming, it has been put forward that some of them, which just have their noses above the current sea level, could find themselves below sea level in a relatively short time.

Finally—my last point—we must bear in mind when we consider CSBMs for Asia and the Pacific the limited technology and resources available for the operation of certain kinds of CSBMs in the region. I refer particularly to communications for verification. This deficiency may be overcome to some extent by assistance from international organisations, such as the United Nations, or from more advanced nations. Nevertheless, it could be a very strong constraint and it has already governed some kinds of CSBM measures in the region.

Characteristics and Potential of Asia-Pacific CSBMs

All these diverse factors mentioned might give the impression that the environment for CSBMs in the Asia-Pacific region is very unfavourable. This is not necessarily so. There are constraints, definitely, but there are also possibilities for confidence-building, security-building and confidence- and security-building measures in the region.

First, although CSBMs are sometimes spoken of as something new for Asia and the Pacific, various kinds have actually been applied in Asia, but not of the CSCE type. They have been localised, bilateral, or subregional, and there are many examples of them in the Middle East, in South-East Asia and in Indo-China. Then there are ASEAN, SAARC, the South Pacific Forum, proposals for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality and a nuclear-weapon-free zone and, finally, the United

Nations effort for peace in Cambodia. These include initiatives as well as systems already in place. Some of them of course are more significant in declaratory terms than in actual implementation. But CSBMs are not a new phenomenon in the region, and this should be stressed, although none is equivalent to those under the CSCE.

While legal or institutional regimes are often stressed, it should be pointed out that a feature of CSBMs in Asia is that they tend to be less institutionalised and less formal systems, as reflected, for instance, in some of the measures worked out between China and the Soviet Union.

Thirdly, we should forget about a pan-Asian CSCE-type conference. The sooner this is realised, the better. Given the factors mentioned, it does not appear to be a possibility for the region. We should strive instead for subregional approaches and bilateral CSBM regimes, which would be more in tune with the prevailing situation in the region. We should also, as noted earlier, seek comprehensive security measures rather than military ones, as sometimes there is greater need to focus on political, economic, social and other forms of non-military cooperation than on military CSBM arrangements as such. This approach will provide the greater potential for the reduction of tensions and conflict in the area, and eventually it could lead to military CSBMs as well.

Fourthly, given the nature and problems of the area, CSBM measures would best be modest, incremental and not very detailed or advanced "high-tech" types. The process could in fact start with very basic activities, such as consultation, dialogue and communication among the military in certain areas.

The potential exists for new CSBMs or comprehensive security and cooperation types of arrangements in Asia. Again, these should be on a lesser, subregional scale.

One subregion to be considered is South-East Asia. As we know, in ASEAN we have a CSBM regime which was introduced in 1967. The purpose behind ASEAN, although there are economic and cultural aspects, was actually security: to enhance confidence and reduce conflicts and tensions between countries which were previously adversarial, or whose relationships were marred by conflict.

For most of the past decade, Cambodia has divided South-East Asia, but now Cambodia is a less divisive factor, and trends towards South-East Asian reconciliation, particularly between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries and Laos, have started. We should take advantage of this by looking into confidence-building measures, if not

security-building measures, even at this early stage. In fact there is already the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South-East Asia of 1976, whose signatories are the ASEAN countries and Papua New Guinea. A first objective could to secure the accession of Vietnam and Laos to that Treaty. It is actually a very comprehensive Treaty, in some ways like CSCE, without the stress on transparency and arms control.

Another new initiative—in keeping with the recommendation to stop talking about a CSCE for Asia as a whole—would be to begin with one for the Asia-Pacific region, that is, in the sense of the Pacific rim of Asia. It could be called, for instance, a "conference on security and co-operation in the Asia-Pacific". It would be less institutionalised than CSCE, particularly its military aspect, and, unlike the CSCE, it should and would not supplant or undermine smaller subregional CSBM regimes in the area, such as ASEAN or SAARC. It should also be noted that, unlike Europe, the Asia-Pacific region—in the sense of its Pacific rim—comprises large expanses of water. Therefore, CSBM measures in this area will have to focus also on the naval elements. And in this context one of the areas for attention would be the South China Sea, particularly the Spratly Islands, where the ongoing disputes have potential for armed conflict.

RELEVANCE OF CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES FOR AFRICA

We are holding this seminar when tension and rivalry between the two Super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, has been reduced to a great extent. The division of Europe into two blocs has ended, and once again Germany is one. Most important in this situation are the efforts by the two Super-Powers and their allies genuinely to reduce their arms build-up. The improvement of relations between the United States and the USSR has resulted also in their mutual efforts towards finding political solutions to regional conflicts in the third world. In this regard, we commend the United Nations, which has also made substantial contributions to talks and agreements on peace and disarmament. The participation by all of its Member States in the efforts to create a peaceful world constitutes recognition by the world body that we all have a collective responsibility. All nations large or small, developed or developing, armed or unarmed, have a moral obligation to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security.

African Countries' Need for Confidence-building

Let me say at the outset that when considering confidence and security-building measures, one must remember that the experience of the South is different from that of the North. What is relevant in Europe will not necessarily be applicable to Africa. We have had a different experience. We suffered for many years under colonialism. We inherited insecure and controversial boundaries. We are ending the political liberation of our continent and are now embarking on its economic liberation.

Hence, certain measures which apply in Europe may be difficult to implement in Africa. For example, in Africa, where border problems and ethnic conflicts continue, it is very difficult to exchange information on military forces and on plans for the deployment of weapons. While it is possible to have military contacts and exchanges of units, prior notification of military activities is only practicable among countries with good political relations. Countries must develop mechanisms to put an end to threats against others. Confidence-building measures concern the removal of threats by one country to the peace and security of another. It is not my wish to go into the polemics of which comes first, disarmament or confidence-building measures. But we cannot deny that a certain measure of confidence and trust has to exist among nations for them to disarm or even to reduce their defence budgets. To the developing world, the latter is most relevant and urgent.

Needs and Efforts to Reduce Military Spending

Many developing countries spend a great portion of their national budgets on defence. And most countries will give the same reason for increases in their arms purchases and military build-up, that is, the existence of a threat to their security. But the accumulation of weapons by one country is in itself a threat to another. It is this policy of building an impressive military force in order to try, through the threat or indiscriminate use of force, to solve the complex problem of peace that has committed humankind to arms build-ups and thereby created serious threats to peace.

Military expenditures in developing countries, calculated at 1979 constant prices, amounted to $33 billion in 1972. One decade later, in 1981, they had already reached the figure of some $81 billion, that is two and a half times more. In 1991, it is believed that the figure is over $150 billion. These countries' share of total military expenditure has more than trebled in the last twenty years and now accounts for over 26 per cent of the world total. This is not a healthy situation.

The arms trade constitutes a considerable burden on the weak economies of the developing countries. It is a most sterile, unproductive and unequal exchange for those countries. The arms trade deprives the importing country of resources that could be used for productive activities. Arms import expenditures do not generate increased consumption or increased production, or even future production, to pay for their costs, nor do they promote public health, education or water and housing. Arms imports worsen the balance of payments deficits of the developing countries. As a whole, arms imports account for almost 50 per cent of the current account deficits in most of the developing countries. Is it fair for us to spend so much and call it defence or national security and leave our citizens to die of hunger, disease and malnutrition and to remain illiterate? I think it is time that we in the developing countries, and especially in Africa, looked seriously into this matter.

Our countries have the moral obligation to design and to agree upon measures that will eradicate any kind of threat by one country or ethnic grouping against another. I shall here use, as a positive example, the region from which I come. In East Africa, meetings to promote good neighbourliness, held between leaders and officials at all levels, have gone a long way towards the path of confidence- and security-building measures. Problems are discussed and forecast, and channels of communication are established for dealing with border and other related problems. Good neighbourliness, which is one of the foreign policy pillars of Tanzania, has contributed a great deal towards ensuring peace and security along our borders and with all our neighbours. The establishment of border commissions with our neighbouring countries has eradicated the possibility of the development of any tension. Such efforts at the end remove the need to keep troops on the borders of neighbouring countries. This will influence policies towards the reduction in size of the armies in the region, which in turn will result in the release of funds from defence to the social welfare of our people.

In another regional grouping, the member countries of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) have come together to liberate their economies from dependence on South Africa. SADCC is a reaction against the South African racism which is the root cause of instability and conflict in the region. South Africa has had a policy of aggression against independent neighbouring States. This is manifested in various kinds of incursions, border violations and support of the bandits to which Angola, Mozambique, Zambia,

Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are constantly exposed. This situation has forced these neighbouring countries to increase their arms purchases and military build-ups. The frontline States have a regular strategic consultative meeting of their ministers of defence and security. Taking note of the fact that some positive changes have taken place in South Africa, the countries in the region should now subscribe to a different conceptualisation of how peace should be won and how regional relations should be structured following the consolidation of a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa. Therefore, with the dismantling of apartheid, the countries of the region should be able to chart a common strategy on confidence-building measures and on security and, finally, to start reducing their military expenditures.

Needs for Cooperative Confidence- and Security-building

For Africa, then, the future lies in regional cooperation; for within their own organisations, intra-African problems can be discussed, solutions found, and interests harmonised. This will lead to reduction of tension and the reduction of military expenditures, and in turn to non-military sectors of the economy being given bigger shares of national GNPs. Subsequently, such a process must lead to peace and stability.

The prevalence of inter-State and intra-State conflicts in various parts of Africa is a compelling reason for the application of appropriate confidence-building measures as a means of containing or resolving such conflicts. Many African States have experienced various forms of intermittent and protracted civil wars. In contrast with the situation in Europe, however, there are no competing and ideologically antagonistic military alliances in Africa. The need for the introduction of permanent military-related confidence-building measures is therefore less compelling than that for measures aimed at the overall improvement of inter-State relations in the political, social and economic spheres, and hence at the alleviation of intra-State conflicts.

Since the ultimate goal of confidence-building is to create favourable conditions to enhance disarmament, peace and security in the world, enhancement of regional confidence should be a part of a global endeavour. However, the reality of international politics shows that the easing of tension in one region of the world may, sometimes and in some cases, create insecurity in other parts of the world, or even complicate the process of confidence-building elsewhere. For example, the relative easing of tension in Europe has not led to any greater sense of security in the developing countries.

The overriding security concern in the world today is the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race and the risk of nuclear war. There is a growing apprehension in many countries outside of Europe and North America about nuclear weapons, as the number of ships, submarines and bomber aircraft equipped with such weapons in the world's oceans and skies continues to increase and the arms race goes on. The global projection of power by the superpowers necessitates the establishment of bases and staging facilities in various regions of the world. The military presence of extraregional powers introduces a delicate security equation in those regions, which may upset regional balances of power and lead to new fears and mistrust among the neighbouring States.

Appropriate confidence-building measures in the security and military-related fields have to evolve from concrete situations in each State and each region as a whole. Africa's security concerns are primarily related to intra-State and inter-State conflicts. As noted, some of the most serious security preoccupations in Africa since independence have been conflicts within, rather than among, States. The Nigerian civil war, the incessant war in Chad and the long-standing armed conflicts in Angola and the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia and Mozambique are among the many conflicts that have entailed military operations whose impact has been felt by neighbouring States. In many cases, domestic conflicts and prolonged unrest may have a spill-over effect and adverse impact on neighbouring States. The most common domestic sources of inter-State conflicts have been lack of national cohesion and clear State boundaries, development problems and, in some cases, authoritarianism and political instability. The ongoing peace talks in the pertinent African countries provide another contribution towards building confidence among their peoples.

The African countries themselves will have to address these and other related problems if peace and security are to prevail, although some of these problems have been externally imposed on those facing conflict or experiencing other problems. But, in the majority of our countries, there is room for solutions and compromises. Only the necessary courage is needed for them to face their realities and avoid civil strife and suffering of the innocent, and to bring the refugee problem to an end.

Countries of the southern hemisphere and, especially, of Africa, need to open up and democratize their systems. Governments must be accountable to the people. We must respect human rights, allow freedom of the press, and apply the rule of law. If Governments respect their

peoples, and if it is the will of the people which is supreme, then it is possible for them to develop healthy relations with their neighbours.

Summing Up: The Need for Elimination of Threats

Finally, let me again repeat what I said earlier. Peace is not only the absence of war, but it is basically the absence of any threat: any threat to one ethnic group by another, any threat to one religion by another, any threat to one nation or State by another. Each group must take certain measures to assure the peace and security of another group. One country must work hard to be able to enjoy the confidence of another country, and especially that of a neighbouring country.

The creation and consolidation among nations of peace and stability, in this case through confidence- and security-building measures, is not an easy task, but efforts are bearing fruit. We must not give up, for we all have a responsibility, and that responsibility is to make the world a safe and a happy place for mankind.

NATURE OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN LATIN AMERICAN ENVIRONMENT

The subject of confidence-building in Latin America and the Caribbean focuses on the question of how the implementation of confidence-building measures (CBMs) may serve the interests of the region. Without any intention of going into an elaborate academic discussion, I would like to say that basically there are two views with regard to confidence-building.

In the northern hemisphere with its accumulation of arsenals of all types and a fierce East-West confrontation prevailing until very recently, the idea of promoting confidence has been generally related to concrete steps oriented towards the avoidance of an armed conflict. Confidence, in this strict sense, means confidence that no specific threat will materialize, for instance, a surprise attack; it is therefore linked to military and military-security aspects.

As to the other view, the idea of confidence not only relates to its military aspects, but may encompass a wider spectrum of security concerns that could be relevant in a specific situation. In this case, the perception of threat may derive not exclusively from a concrete possibility, such as the surprise attack already mentioned, but also from more general elements such as policies that may be detrimental to confidence. These would include, for instance, a policy of interference or domination or a menace that does not necessarily originate in a neighbouring country. This is known as confidence in the larger sense.

In the case of Latin America, the question of confidence is understood in the larger sense. This is an inherent feature of the historical and social character of the countries of the region as well as of their perception of the nature of their intra-regional relations.

Evolution of Latin American Security Experience

The regional actors' belief in their intrinsic identity goes back to the beginning of their independence. In the Treaty of Perpetual Union, League and Confederation, subscribed to under the influence of Simon Bolivar in Panama in 1826, provisions were made not only for economic integration and political consultation, but also for the organisation of common military institutions, both army and navy.

A good part of the nineteenth century witnessed a very substantive political disintegration and a number of conflicts, mainly of a territorial character, throughout the region. By the beginning of this century, the political map of Latin America had been drawn, but the countries and the ideal of unity were severely weakened. Not surprisingly, this was also the beginning of the period of pan-Americanism as a political force behind the growth of the United States. Ideologically, the new significance of that country was already present in the Monroe Doctrine and in the idea of the pursuit of its "manifest destiny".

With the conclusion of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, Latin American countries were encompassed in the world-wide security situation established by the Super-Powers. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) of 1947 formalised our adherence to the strategic system of world confrontation.

With the passage of time, however, a form of strategic independence began to prevail in the views and deeds of a number of the countries of the region. This was coincidental with an increased presence of the military in politics, and, as a consequence, accompanied by substantial increases in terms of numbers of troops, military expenditures, and diversification and modernisation in the procurement of weapons in Latin American countries.

Also in Latin America strategic concerns are not precisely defined, are often vaguely presented and poorly understood, and are not necessarily shared by the public or even by politicians. This translates into the implementation of defensive systems that only the military seems to understand and support. As a result, there has been no clear social and political understanding of who the enemy may be, or of how the defence should be prepared.

With regard to security matters, it should be noted that, at the same time, in the western hemisphere and specifically in Latin America, over the years a complex system for peaceful resolution of conflicts has been established. There are a substantial number of arbitration agreements that have entered into force among many countries of the region. In the past three decades, wide-ranging integration processes have been organised at both the regional and subregional levels. Also, a number of joint development projects have taken shape. Slowly, the concept that Latin American regional security could not be a by-product of United States security was being acknowledged. At this point in time, it is clear to decision makers that there is a strategic differentiation between the United States and Latin America.

Finally—and for some years now—the possibility of defining the elements of common or shared security on a Latin American regional or subregional basis has attracted interest in academic and political quarters. The concept of regional common security may be returning to its source, as reflected in the thinking of Bolivar. Hopefully, this may occur without the rhetoric that for many years served essentially to dissimulate Latin American inability to act in unison.

It should similarly be taken into account that Latin America is not alien to matters of arms control and disarmament. The Treaty of Tiateloico of 1967 was a pioneer in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated area of the world, since the earlier agreements establishing zones, the Antarctic Treaty and the sea-bed Treaty, pertain to unpopulated environments. It is evident that a tremendous responsibility rests upon Governments and peoples in the region to see that the Treaty of Tiateloico is duly adhered to. There could be no more serious situation in the region than one arising from a violation of the letter or the spirit of the Treaty. Also, the Ayacucho Declaration of 1974 was followed by formal negotiations among the Andean countries to limit their armaments. More recently, the conflict situation in Central America called for the confidence-building and disarmament measures that were eventually agreed upon in the Contadora Act and the Esquipulas agreements.

There have also been a number of political declarations which underline an increasing openness in the area of security concerns. Among the more substantive ones which should be noted are the Acapuico and Galapagos Declarations. In the former, the idea of common regional security was presented at the heads-of-State level of the Mechanism of Political Consultation and Concerted Political Action (Rio Group), together with the call for increased cooperation against

drug-trafficking and terrorism. In the latter, possible orientations for confidence-building measures and joint border commissions were set out by the presidents of the Andean Group of countries.

It is clear, then, that there is a specific and manifest Latin American interest in matters of security, and perhaps also that slowly but steadily this concern is attracting academic and political attention and being translated into concrete decisions that are bound to have significant influence in regional affairs.

Present and Future Regional Confidence-building

A consideration of undeniable importance is the fact that Latin America and the Caribbean, which cover a vast expanse with a variety of political and strategic problems, may not be very suitable for a single or region-wide project for the enhancement of their security. In this respect, it would be wise to take a more restricted geographical approach and select subregions which could be more amenable to the task of promoting confidence than the region as a whole. Very briefly, it may be said that the Caribbean and Central America present a quite complicated strategic situation in which there is significant influence from extraregional Powers. The case of South America is more manageable for a number of reasons, including its almost insular configuration and the possibility of establishing a zone of peace in the area. In any case, the continent certainly looks like the more promising subregion for confidence- and security-building measures.

As to the specifics of building confidence in the region, it should be noted that measures of the Helsinki type, concerning manoeuvres or military movements, relevant as they might be for Latin America, are not likely to be of paramount importance. This is due to the fact that the strategic situation—despite the existence of a number of elements with a potential for conflict—does not centre around the notion of surprise attack nor is it overly dependent on any concentration of military forces. There are places where the military presence is very thin, such as along the Brazilian-Peruvian border—which stretches for thousands of kilometres with only token military posts.

Nevertheless, CBMs, including some related to military or military-security matters, have been established and consistently applied in the region. Among the more frequently commented upon are the programmes of medical assistance by the navies of Brazil and Peru, Colombia and Brazil, and Colombia and Peru in their border area the surveillance operations conducted by Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay in the South Atlantic; various types of participation by foreign officers

in training courses in a number of countries; and the talks on CBMs by Peruvian and Chilean military authorities. Two other elements may be of interest: first, the CBMs approved by Argentina and the United Kingdom for activities in the Malvinas area; and, second, those mentioned in the Central American peace process, specifically, the Contadora Act and the Esquipulas Agreement mentioned earlier.

Additionally, it could be said that there are a number of CBMs currently being applied in various situations without their being given that name. Activities and understandings for the avoidance of incidents or their handling, courtesy visits and practices, institutional contacts for different purposes, including sports, health care and other matters, all seem to occur more frequently than is generally thought. Latin America can thus demonstrate practices germane to confidence-building even in the strict sense.

But this does not preclude the possibility that many other CBMs, belonging either to the military-security realm or to the wider political context, could be negotiated and agreed upon. The latter are clearly favoured, almost as a vision for the strengthening of peaceful relations among Latin American countries. These CBMs or, perhaps more accurately, measures and policies for the promotion of confidence, could encompass several areas, and some may be categorised as follows.

Military

Some potential measures in the military field lie in these sub-categories:

1. Information: the exchange of publications, including programmes of studies; agreements on pre-notification of manoeuvres and military movements; and invitations to observers;
2. Training: exchanges of students in military schools; special courses open to foreign students for certain subjects, such as military participation in civilian activities (road construction, disaster relief, etc.); courses for military officers on arms control and disarmament and the economy of defence; participation in activities such as search and rescue;
3. Contact: increased military visits and delegations; military contacts in border areas; procedures for the avoidance of incidents and for their handling; procedures for consultations with various purposes, including the limitation of some types of armaments; direct lines of communication among military authorities; joint exercises and manoeuvres; other contacts for institutional purposes, such as health and sports;

4. Institutionalisation: regional military conferences of South American authorities for the consideration of additional CBMs, various other aspects of security and other issues.

Political

Consultation at different levels could be held on a number of matters of common interest, such as:

- External debt;
- Integration and other forms of cooperation;
- Meetings of parliamentarians for the identification of ways of restraining arms expenditures, for the promotion of peace and for the reiteration of the principle of peaceful solution of disputes;
- Identification by political leaders of the elements of strategic differentiation and common security for the region and the establishment of policies of "defensive defence";
- Mechanisms for the curbing of drug trafficking and subversion and for joint action in the case of natural disasters;
- Prioritisation of development projects that are of interest to more than one country, particularly in border areas;
- The possibility of the limitation and integration of military industries;
- Incorporation into political programmes of precise definitions of strategic concerns, defence postures and the like.

Diplomatic

Measures sponsored at the diplomatic level should include:

- Courses on arms limitation and disarmament at training institutions;
- International seminars on relevant issues;
- Establishment of sections at foreign ministries that would specialize in disarmament matters and would be open to visits by diplomats of other countries;
- Political seminars on strategy.

Academic

Academic studies on the economy of defence, arms limitation and peace research; on the relationship between disarmament and development (or the arms race and underdevelopment); and on the question of military expenditures and external indebtedness could all promote the building of confidence.

Civic

Civic activities are those involving non-governmental organisations, churches, the media and other opinion makers. They could include seminars and other mechanisms for the orientation of public opinion on matters pertinent to the confidence-building problem and on ways of promoting interest in the maintenance of peace at lower levels of military forces, equipment and expenditure.

It is essential to take into account at this time that there are not only momentous changes taking place at the political and strategic levels worldwide—as proven by events in Europe, the Middle East and other areas—but also in the nature of threats, at least for a number of countries, including some in Latin America.

For instance, at this juncture the most serious challenges to Latin American sovereignty and independence are certainly not found in the threat of armed conflict with a neighbouring country, but mainly from the new and urgent danger to national viability reflected in such problems as governability, subversion, drug trafficking, extreme poverty and environmental decay. All these elements constitute menaces to national security that were perhaps not foreseeable in the past but now command such immediate action that no delay in dealing with them can pass without dire consequences.

All this requires that Latin America make renewed efforts to promote confidence among countries in the region. Such improved confidence would not only be instrumental for the preservation of peace and strengthening of security, but also for providing the region as a whole with the capacity to deal more effectively with the problems of the hour.

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Changes in the Diplomatic and Strategic Environment in the South-East Asian and Pacific Regions

There has been significant progress in detente and in arms control and disarmament throughout Europe and between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, there is no evidence of a parallel development in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions. Even if there is a time lag between Europe and the South-East Asian and Pacific regions, we could see hopeful signs of a change in the diplomatic and strategic environment into a more secure international regime if there was a shared political will and a decision to enhance international security in these regions.

Why is this so? First of all, there is a fundamental structural change in world politics at the present time, with the ending of the long-drawn-out Cold War. Most important, both the United States and the Soviet Union have seriously embarked on efforts towards nuclear arms control and disarmament, however embryonic the efforts may appear or however limited the present results may be. Consequently, the two Super-Powers have sought further detente to reduce tensions, which will result in an epoch-making change in the rules of the diplomatic game. This new type of detente is what we call "strategic interdependence".

The motivation for the new games of strategic interdependence has not been, or will not be, identical for the two Super-Powers. However, strategic realism can be observed among the political leaders and policy-forming groups in both of the Super-Powers. On the one hand, strategic realism comes from domestic vulnerability, particularly in terms of economics. Because of this domestic vulnerability, the two Super-Powers seem to be declining, though only relatively, and to

some extent also in power and influence. The United States no longer seems to be a hegemonic State as it was in the decades following the Second World War. Nor is the Soviet Union: it cannot afford those hegemonic or imperial costs. Confronted with the need for strategic realism, both the United States and the Soviet Union must overcome their domestic vulnerability by reducing the costs of the nuclear arms race, by restructuring their economies because of current internal dislocation, and/or by recovering international technological advantages. These aims can be achieved through policy innovations and burden-sharing with their allies. The two Super-Powers must deal with each other as legitimate actors: they must co-operate with each other, secure in the knowledge that there is little or no risk of nuclear or conventional war. It is indeed surprising to learn how much the top decision-makers in both nations are going to change their earlier images and perceptions with respect to each other.

The latest United States-Soviet summit meeting was held on the island of Malta in the Mediterranean in December 1989. It appears to be more than a mere historical co-incidence that the summit meeting took place at Malta, where the British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff met in 1945.

In considering the security of the South-East Asian and Pacific regions, it is very important to look at the change in strategic and diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The change will affect the political climate in these regions, albeit with a time lag. It took time for the Cold War in Europe to spread to the South-East Asian and Pacific regions: in 1945 we saw the beginning of the United States-Soviet conflict in Europe; the United States-Chinese conflict began in 1948-1949; and the Korean War broke out in 1950. The current change in the strategic and diplomatic relations between the two Super-Powers is quite new. In an article entitled "Detente", Professor Stanley Hoffman said:

> "the international structural change toward a new detente is not part of a cycle from detente to tension or vice versa."

The new detente is clearly different in a number of ways. The first change is that an improvement in communications and dialogue between political leaders has been evident in American-Soviet strategic and diplomatic relations since the middle of the 1980s. These improvements in communication and dialogue relate to strong policy concerns about the revival of detente—particularly since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and began to re-evaluate Soviet foreign and defence policies.

The most important change in American-Soviet relationships seems to be, however, that both sides are now making efforts to move away from the so-called "prisoners' dilemma", thereby making mutual co-operation one of the rules of the game, instead of making deep mutual distrust, mutual deceit and mutual confrontation the normal behaviour. According to the rules of the game, the "prisoners' dilemma" shows how people (including the leaders of nations in world politics) can be trapped into self-defeating acts. The "prisoners' dilemma" is played by two persons who either remain incommunicado or are in a situation of false or significantly distorted communication. The theory of this game is basically, if not entirely, analogous to the arms race and crisis management behaviour in American-Soviet strategic and diplomatic relations during the era of the Cold War. In a situation of non-communication and distrust, there is no rational reason or incentive to co-operate. The two actors will attempt to deceive each other and both will end up with rather bad results (*a constantly unstable world situation and a costly arms race*).

As noted earlier, the new approach of the Super-Powers is based on strategic realism. Particular importance should be placed on the Soviet Union's "new thinking" in the strategic and diplomatic fields. As Richard H. Ullman recently argued,

> "... under Gorbachev the Soviet Union is approaching something of a historic turning-point .... Gorbachev's Soviet Union, unlike that of his predecessors, seems in significant ways to be on the way to becoming an 'ordinary state' .... Perhaps the most important characteristic of an ordinary state is its legitimacy." Regardless of the uncertainty and unknown factors in regard to the prospects for *perestroika* in all areas of Soviet policy and practice, it seems that it will most likely continue to influence the Soviet Union's strategic and diplomatic policies, if only in order to lessen the economic costs involved in being a super-Power under the old rules. The United States has recently decided to support *perestroika.* This is in keeping with the Bush Administration's foreign policy of supporting political and economic reforms, which are in fact occurring not only in the Soviet Union but also in Hungary and Poland, in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. We know also that other Western industrialised nations, members of the summit group of seven, including Japan, are making similar efforts to support the domestic reform movements in the Eastern European countries through economic assistance.

Let us try to describe diplomatic and strategic characteristics in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions in the period from the 1980s to the present. First, we should emphasize the ambiguity of the current international system caused by the continuance of the Cold War at the same time as a gradual change towards detente is taking place. The

diplomatic and strategic environment was, in our view, increasingly complex in the late 1980s. The Cold War structure still remains today. Such systemic characteristics as the distinction between "friends" and "foes" in diplomatic terms has long been continued as a reflection of United States-Soviet Union confrontational politics. This is, in part, well illustrated by the military alliance system, in which countries allied with the United States are against countries allied with the Soviet Union. For instance, we have seen a series of bilateral alliances in the United States-Japan, the United States-South Korea (Republic of Korea), the United States-Philippines security arrangements; and also a series of bilateral alliances in the security arrangements between the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and the Soviet Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Such alliance networks are not as symmetrical as those found in Europe. However, the Cold-War type of military alliance is still functioning in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions.

Another important point in characterising the Cold-War diplomatic and strategic structure is the pattern of arms transfers from each Super-Power to its allies. Who is getting the most in major arms from whom? According to the data in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986,* there is an interesting pattern in these regions. For the period 1981-1985, Japan imported 98.6 per cent of its major weapons from the United States. South Korea imported 96.9 per cent of its major weapons from the United States. Thailand imported 69.3 per cent of its major weapons from the United States. In Singapore, 61.4 per cent came from the United States. On the other hand, Vietnam bought 96.0 per cent of its major weapons from the Soviet Union. Laos bought 94.1 per cent of its major weapons from the Soviet Union. Mongolia bought 100 per cent of its major weapons from the Soviet Union. In North Korea, 39.3 per cent came from the Soviet Union, 21.2 per cent from China, and 10.1 per cent from Poland. Therefore, the Cold-War system is still operating in the pattern of arms transfers among major countries in these regions.

However, in the past few decades, there have also been signs of a gradual transformation in the Cold-War system in these regions towards a relaxation of tension. As we know, the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) has been defunct since June 1977. The United States and China achieved a *rapprochement* beginning in the early 1970s. Despite the Tienanmen incidents the basic framework of *rapprochement* seems to be a constant factor in the strategic and diplomatic relations between the United States and China. We must not underestimate the importance of the Soviet Union's efforts to reduce

tensions with the United States and with its allies. The development of a trading relationship between the Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union is a good case in point. Although there is no substantial change in the diplomatic relationship between North Korea and the United States, there appears to be a change in the strategic environment towards a gradual relaxation of tensions.

Why do we think so? First, the Republic of Korea's economic performance as an Asian newly industrialising country has been remarkable. The same is true of Taiwan and Hong Kong. Also, trade is increasing between the Republic of Korea and Taiwan and other Asian newly industrialising countries. Thus, there is good reason for the Republic of Korea to strengthen the economic interdependent system in the Asia-Pacific region in order to further its strategic interests, regardless of the continued division and tension in the Korean peninsula.

The Soviet Union's diplomatic and strategic initiatives are important in any consideration of the possibility of a change in the international system in these regions. In July 1986 at Vladivostock, General Secretary Gorbachev announced the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw part of its troops deployed in Afghanistan and Mongolia, and its readiness to discuss measures for confidence building, arms control and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region. In September 1988, Gorbachev announced at Krasnoyarsk another set of proposals in favour of no increase in regional nuclear weapons and no increase in regional naval forces, coupled with naval confidence-building measures. Further, in May of 1989, at the time of his historic visit to Beijing, Gorbachev stated that the Soviet Union would unilaterally remove 120,000 men in the Far East and 16 vessels of its Pacific fleet and would reduce its forces deployed on the Sino-Soviet border, with a view to making it a demilitarised zone in the future. It is true that American decision-makers, particularly in the military field, are still sceptical as to the extent to which Soviet military doctrine and policy have been changed, in fact, towards a defensive defence mode of operations and the development of forces. For instance, in *Soviet Military Power 1989* it says:

> "Despite public avowals that nuclear war is unwinnable and that strategic arms must be dismantled, the Soviets continue deploying new generations of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and manned strategic bombers."

Therefore, on the part of military planners in the United States, the interpretation of the new Soviet military doctrine based on

principles such as "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive defence" has not been fully accepted. They tend to see these principles and changes as uncertain and debatable. However, it may be said that the Soviet diplomatic and strategic initiatives towards detente and arms reduction are important enough to change the nature of the so-called Soviet threat, and that as a consequence of this there may well be a gradual change in diplomatic and strategic environments towards the collapse of the Cold-War system. The change of intentions on the part of the Soviet Union is just as important as the change in military capability. Gorbachev's unilateral initiatives seem to be related to the possible change of strategic intentions. Again, it is true that the Soviet Union is still trying to continue to modernize its strategic naval forces, for example by building huge aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, opinion seems to be divided among top decision-makers in the Soviet Union as to whether the current naval policy should be continued. Recently, a top policy planner is reported to have said that he disagreed with the Soviet naval policy, and considered it wrong that the Soviet Union should follow the United States in the military strategic field.

However, the United States has not shown a similar active interest in talks on naval and nuclear arms control and disarmament in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions. The United States has had little incentive to expedite arms control and disarmament there. The United States is cautious in its assessment of the prospects for naval and nuclear disarmament and arms control in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions, for several measures.

First, unlike the Soviet Union, the United States is not actively interested in the banning of the sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). It seems that in the area of SLCMs the United States has clearly maintained a lead over the Soviet Union in the Pacific. Therefore, the United States does not want to lose an important area of superiority *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union.

Secondly, there is the difficulty of verification in regard to SLCMs. In the case of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, there is to be no more production of certain weapons which have been deployed on land. However, in the reduction of nuclear strategic weapons, namely in the case of the 50 per cent reduction discussed in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), weapon systems continue to be produced.

Thirdly, the United States would like its allies, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, to benefit from the American nuclear umbrella over the pacific ocean area. The United States is still keenly concerned

with the Cold-War type of international regional system in terms of its own legitimacy in these regions.

It would, of course, be unfair for us to be critical only of the American intentions and of the United States' reasons for being inactive or insensitive in regard to the arms control and disarmament talks for these regions. Unlike the case in Europe, where detente and arms reduction talks have been prominent, the diplomatic and strategic environment in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions has not been positive enough to be transformed into the new regime that is beginning to take hold in Europe. That, however, is not a persuasive reason. The crucial question is whether or not there is the political will to change relationships in the Pacific-Asia region from the confrontational to co-operative. No matter how suspicious or cautious American decision-makers tend to be in looking at Soviet behaviour in these regions, there is a need to change the system. If we consider how important these regions have become economically as well as politically, and if we consider how interdependent newly industrialising countries, countries members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations, and Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States are in economic terms, the security regime in these regions should not become wedded to the idea of the Cold War.

As regards the diplomatic and strategic environment in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions, there are two further considerations. First, there is the possibility of a change in the nature of the threat in these regions. We may assume that the threats of today are no longer purely the Soviet threat. Because of the Soviet initiatives and actions described above, the old images of the Soviet threat may be changed into the images of detente in the perceptions of the countries in these regions. The Soviet Union could and should attenuate the deep-seated negative images of its threat among the newly industrialising countries, the ASEAN countries, and the highly industrialised countries such as the United States and Japan, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Although there is still uncertainty about the change in Soviet military doctrine and policy, the Soviet Union could demonstrate by positive action a real change of naval doctrine and policy in the Pacific. This may lead American decision-makers to be more confident about the change in the nature of the Soviet threat.

Secondly, the South-East Asian and Pacific regions are increasingly more complex than before. In other words, these regions are going to be multipolarised further. Therefore, politics in the middle and small countries, whether developed or developing, could find more room for

foreign-policy activities which would not be influenced only by the Super-Powers or even only by the big Powers. If we calculate how power understood in terms of resources has been concentrated or diversified in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions, using the *concentration* index for the period 1974-1985, it is true that multipolarisation in gross national product, military expenditures, and arms transfers has not, evidently, taken place. The *concentration* index shows that there is rather a bipolar characteristic of the structure because the index is relatively high—from 0.51 to 0.70. However, if we look at power in terms of influence in these regions, the distribution of influence is coming nearer to the multipolarisation model. In other words, even the superpowers and the other big Powers cannot control as effectively as they might want to. Democratisation processes are in fact progressing in these regions.

We must ask ourselves how the political climate could be changed in order to reduce tensions in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions and to establish a new international security system.

First, we find it extremely important that the United States and the Soviet Union should make efforts to open talks on arms control and disarmament on sea-launched ballistic missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions. No matter how difficult such issues appear, negotiations on nuclear naval force reductions would help reduce tensions in these regions and materially help to end the Cold War there.

Secondly—and this point is related to the first—we should seriously consider the importance of establishing confidence-building measures in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions. The Helsinki Document adopted in 1975 may serve as a model for any consideration of confidence-building measures in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions. Such measures are very important in transforming the Cold War system into real detente and a true international system. In these regions, we should ask not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but also China and the Korean nations to make efforts to establish confidence-building measures as soon as possible, for example by institutionalising international security conferences and arms-control talks in these regions. Of course, Japan should be included in these diplomatic efforts. Confidence-building measures should be considered first in East Asia and the Pacific regions. Then they should be expanded to the much broader international security network of ASEAN and the South Pacific region. Through the institutionalisation of security conferences, the countries concerned could talk and co-

operate with one another on the issues of global environmental protection and economic assistance, as well as on military strategic security. This sort of international network has been lacking in these regions for four decades. In order for the Cold War structure to be transformed into the more interdependent security structure, confidence-building measures are required.

Thirdly, it is important to develop transnational, non-governmental relationships between the countries concerned in these regions. Of course, government-to-government diplomacy is crucial in creating peace and prosperity in these regions. However, non-governmental transnational links— for instance city-to-city, economic, social, cultural, educational and media transnational links—are becoming increasingly important in establishing the new international security regime. Transnational actors in non-governmental areas are likely to pursue other than national interests, by which the policy of governmental actors is often exclusively motivated. We would like to place emphasis on the emergence of an international society or transnational society. Without fear of war or international violence, people can and should live together to enhance interdependence and mutual trust.

NEW STABILITY IN THE EAST, SOUTH-EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGIONS

The Asia-Pacific region is more peaceful now, at the beginning of the 1990s, than at any other time since 1945. There are no great-Power tensions; there are no dangerous flash-points and there are only a few relatively minor territorial disputes. The war in Cambodia is close to settlement. The Korean peninsula is relatively quiet.

The Asia-Pacific region is, however, undergoing enormous changes. It is one of the most dynamic regions in the world. The economic and technological achievements of many countries in the region are the envy of the rest of the world. But economic development—sometimes because it is lacking and sometimes because it is too uneven—has generated considerable domestic social and political flux with consequences for external strategic priorities. The most dramatic example of this may be seen in the case of China. Its domestic turmoil has affected the conduct of Chinese foreign policy and regional perceptions of China's strategic reliability.

The strategic, economic, financial, technological and historical interests of China, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan interweave and overlap in the Asia-

Pacific region but today do not directly conflict. India, a South Asian Power, is showing increased interest in South-East Asia but has no substantive relationships. The nuclear Powers have bilateral security relations with several of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. The USSR has security treaties with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Vietnam. China has a security treaty with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and an "understanding" with Thailand. The United States has security ties with the Republic of Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia and tacit agreements with Taiwan and with China. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland retains a connection with Hong Kong. Australia has defence co-operation agreements with Malaysia and Singapore, with New Zealand and with several of the small South Pacific island States.

The security element in most of these relationships is being increasingly overshadowed by the process of economic and social change and the pattern of regional economic integration. Tension and suspicion generated directly or indirectly by super-Power confrontation have been replaced by greater understanding, co-operation and an appreciation of the importance of, and mutual benefit to be derived from, trade, investment and the exchange of technology and information. Former enemies have become friends and allies.

Governments and societies are more resilient, affluent and confident in their handling of intercommunal, religious and economic issues. Defence expenditure is under downward pressure in the USSR, the United States, China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam. There is strong pressure for political and economic reform in the Communist States. They share a common desire to join the region-wide trend towards greater economic co-operation and commercial consultation amongst the trading nations of the Pacific rim. There are outcrops of resistance to these positive currents in the Philippines, Myanmar and the Republic of Korea and there are deep systemic and infrastructural problems in the way of progress in China, the USSR and Vietnam. And there are strains on national unity and social stability in many of the small South Pacific island countries. On the whole, however, change in the Asia-Pacific region has contributed to a less-threatening regional security environment.

As well, any security assessment of the Asia-Pacific region must take account of the uncertainties arising from leadership and generational change. In the Soviet Union the Communist Party is being swept by such strong winds of political and economic reform

unleashed by Mikhail Gorbachev that the stability of the Communist Party and the tenure of Gorbachev himself for more than one or two years cannot be guaranteed. In China, an aging conservative leadership has apparently lost its direction and faces a legitimacy crisis of major proportions. The leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is also at a crossroads and the outcome of the leadership succession to Kim Ilsung will have important security implications for the Republic of Korea and countries with strategic interests in north-east Asia.

The leadership in Taiwan and in the Republic of Korea can point to remarkable economic progress but both face the problem of satisfying demands for more political freedom. This could have serious consequences in Taipei because it raises the sensitive issue of Taiwanese independence. In the Philippines, Mrs. Aquino's hold on power continues to look tenuous; many issues, including the future of the United States bases and hence the existing regional security framework, could be affected if she were overthrown. Generational change elsewhere in South-East Asia seems less uncertain with preparations for the succession to Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore and President Suharto in Indonesia well in hand. Prime Minister Mahathir seems to have consolidated his position in Malaysia after his recent troubles. In Japan, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and the Liberal-Democratic Party seem to have regained control of political affairs after a year of scandal and leadership resignations.

Leadership instability in the South Pacific island States is likely to continue and, while marginal to the primary security interests of most countries in the Asia-Pacific region, it will be closely monitored by such countries as Australia, New Zealand, France, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia. India has an interest in the welfare of the Indian community in Fiji but is too distant from the South Pacific for any significant security role.

The Soviet Union still figures prominently in the threat analysis of defence planners in Tokyo, Beijing and Washington. From bases in the Soviet Far East, the Soviet Union can threaten Japan, China, most of America, most Pacific sea-lines of communication, much of South-East Asia and United States bases in Guam, Hawaii, the Philippines and Australia. The Soviet Union also seeks to maintain sufficient nuclear and conventional forces in the Soviet Far East to deter China from taking advantage of Soviet involvement elsewhere. The most likely threat for Japan is perceived to come from the Soviet Union with China a possibility—if it can successfully modernize—in

the mid-twenty-first century. Japan's security is tied to the United States, with the not insubstantial Japanese Self-Defence Forces providing a shield to the sword of the American carrier forces. China too has long feared the Soviet Union. Over the last decade, however, through its modest but credible nuclear capability, great-Power diplomacy and large conventional forces, China has reached a point where it feels secure from the likelihood of attack from the Soviet Union and indeed from any other major Power.

The United States has its most powerful military force outside the continental United States forward-deployed in the Pacific. In a global war scenario, United States maritime strategy aims to protect Western Europe, Japan and the Republic of Korea by eliminating or at least threatening to eliminate the Soviet Union as a Pacific Power with early offensive operations against Soviet forces and infrastructure in the Soviet Far East, particularly the Soviet Union's fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic submarines (SSBNs). Their survival is essential for the credibility of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear retaliatory capability. For Washington, the success of the strategy depends on the correlation of a number of factors, including Japanese military support, United States naval and nuclear access on a neither-confirm-nor-deny basis to facilities throughout the Western Pacific and perhaps, in due course, China's naval modernisation.

Such a strategy is still important for Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, China, the ASEAN countries and Australia. It is, however, a less pressing priority with the current mood of relaxation, trade and dialogue in the Pacific community. If the United States forward strategy is becoming obsolete it is because, to all intents and purposes, the contest between centrally planned communism and Western democratic capitalism has been won by the West. The events unfolding in Eastern Europe and the phenomenal economic performance of many of the newly industrialising Pacific countries are testimony in this regard. Socialism as an economic model has lost its appeal. Countries in the Asia-Pacific region do not look to Moscow or Beijing; their inclination is rather to learn from Japan and the other newly industrialising market economies of east Asia.

The end of bipolar confrontation between the superpowers has reduced the general level of tension in the Asia-Pacific region. The Soviet Union is less worried about NATO and China than it is about its inability to produce consumer goods and curb unrest in the Baltic States and amongst its ethnic minorities. The Sino-Soviet border is now the scene of rapidly expanding barter trade and Sino-Soviet

economic co-operation on a scale unprecedented since the 1950s. China is relaxed about both the United States presence in the Western Pacific and the Soviet presence in Vietnam. The Soviet Union in any event is likely to withdraw from Camb Ranh Bay. The removal of a sense of threat on China's northern borders has reverberated southwards to the Sino-Vietnamese border—where cross-border trade has also resumed—and to Cambodia. China does not expect to be attacked by the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Gorbachev-Deng summit in May 1989 and Sino-Western disenchantment after the events in Tiananmen Square have temporarily strengthened the Sino-Soviet relationship. Vietnam for its part does not expect to be attacked by China again, at least in the next decade or so, except perhaps in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

Taiwan is reducing its defence expenditure and does not expect to be attacked by Chinese mainland forces. The Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea still fear a surprise attack each from the other but much of the heat has gone out of that once unremittingly hostile relationship.

These trends have been conducive to peace in the Pacific region although as far as the big Powers are concerned, they may also have less promising long-term security implications. In general, however, the concerns of countries in the region are problems of economic growth, trade rivalries, protectionism, market access, resource diplomacy, trading blocs, technology competition, economic readjustment and the demands of a rising middle class seeking more political freedom. Few countries have a perception that they are about to be attacked or invaded by a country inside or outside the region. There seems little doubt—even in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea—that the strongest political current in the Asia-Pacific region is towards a progressive lessening of ideological differences and greater economic interdependence and co-operation. Security is less about orders of battle and more about technology and trade. Economic development has become the fundamental goal of all countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Those countries that do perform best have—among other attributes—a global marketing mentality. They are not burdened by heavy defence expenditure and, instead, spend their resources on education and technological research and development.

Japan is universally recognised and admired as a successful economic Power, with the investment capital and technology that most countries want. Its emergence as a great Power is one of the most important strategic developments in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan,

however, is entering a new phase of political influence and industrial maturity. With its accumulated wealth, diplomatic prestige and the transformation of its economy towards a high-technology structure, Japan has less need for Soviet resources and American protection. Japan's rise to great economic power has led to a relative decline in the regional importance of the United States. The Japan-United States relationship none the less remains among the most important in the world. Defence relations have in fact been strengthened although there have been tensions over trade competition and the sharing of technology. If the United States continues to press Japan to increase substantially its military budget and play a larger security role in east Asia, other regional countries will be disconcerted. They prefer a Japan that does not shift away from the reassuring predictability that is, they perceive, provided by Japan's subordinate security relationship with the United States.

China and the USSR retain a residual core of distrust about Japan but on the whole they seem to have moved towards the ASEAN position, that is, acceptance of Japan's right to have a modest military force and acknowledgement of Japan's status as a wealthy banker and investor, as a leader in advanced technologies and as the world's largest giver of aid.

Japan's primary concern is the maintenance of its economic prosperity. Japan's sense of comprehensive national security goes beyond narrow concepts of military security. It is using methods similar to those applied by the United States in Europe after 1945. Japan is expanding its regional aid and investment programme throughout the Asia-Pacific region from China in the north to the island countries of the South Pacific in a burden-sharing approach that complements the United States military contribution. Japan has, for example, offered to fund the cost of a political settlement and peace-keeping operations in Cambodia. It is likely to use its economic influence in Manila to encourage the Philippines to continue hosting the United States bases. It supports efforts to create an OECD-type of arrangement in the Pacific through the Pacific Economic Co-operation Community and the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum.

Perhaps the greatest uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region has been presented by the crisis in China. China is still emerging as a major actor in the Pacific region in a variety of roles. Optimistic expectations about China's ability to become a modernised State and a responsible member of the Asia-Pacific community were thrown into doubt by developments in Beijing in June 1989. The killings in

Tiananmen Square precipitated a profound crisis of confidence in Hong Kong with the political effects rippling throughout the region. Many Western analysts believe China's hopes for modernisation have been set back by several years. Others are even more pessimistic. If China's reform processes remain stymied by a conservative central leadership, persistent economic problems could stoke social and political unrest well into the 1990s.

On the other hand, a too rapid decentralisation of political and economic control would have equally disastrous consequences. It was not long, moreover, before Hong Kong's stock market recovered all the ground lost in June 1989. Although there will continue to be lingering suspicion about China's domestic agenda and the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to govern a capitalist enclave such as Hong Kong in the lead up to 1997, it seems likely that Hong Kong will survive the many pessimistic assessments currently floating around. This is provided, of course, that a satisfactory formula balancing the authoritarian nature of the Chinese Communist Party and the social, economic and political demands of the Chinese people can be achieved in the next one or two years.

Equally important for regional security will be the outcome of reform in other Communist States, particularly the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea's economic indicators show impressive economic gains. Together with the Republic of Korea's growing military strength, these have compounded the problems of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Pyongyang's political, social and economic system and its foreign policy approach are unique but outmoded. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea suffers from all the disadvantages of an autarkic central command economy. Productivity and per capita income are one fifth of that in the Republic of Korea. Most consumer goods are in scarce supply. Many factories are simply obsolescent. Foreign exchange is lacking; international debts cannot be paid and there is little foreign investment. Tension in the Korean peninsula has none the less declined sharply in the last few years, primarily because of the rapid improvement in relations between China, the USSR and the United States. This has forced the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to re-examine its policies towards Seoul and to contemplate some, albeit cautious, domestic political and economic reforms of its own.

In South-East Asia no country is threatened with direct aggression by any other country. Thailand is not threatened by Vietnam, now chastened and impoverished and, until its withdrawal from Cambodia,

a regional pariah. Thailand in fact is regarded as a candidate for status as one of the newly industrialising economies of Asia; it has security guarantees from both China and the United States and has been a beneficiary of the war in Cambodia. Singapore has a sense of vulnerability owing to its position as a small rich Chinese island State surrounded by the large States of Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore has made much of threats to ASEAN by the Soviet Union and Vietnam, partly in order to focus ASEAN attention on an external threat. Singapore wants to preserve a United States military presence in the Philippines or, if necessary, in Singapore.

The Philippines has been preoccupied with problems of income inequality, poverty, underdevelopment, deteriorating terms of trade, a heavy external debt and accompanying domestic insurgencies and leadership instability. Manila's external security interests have been protected by the United States. The substantial United States military presence in the Philippines has, however, contributed directly to the internal social and political problems of the Philippines.

Neither Malaysia nor Indonesia perceives a direct or immediate threat to its security. Both find themselves in a relatively secure environment. Both have developed close bilateral military ties and hold regular joint exercises for their three armed services. Malaysian and Indonesian concerns are with the coherence and unity of ASEAN policies, the activities of foreign navies and regional trading blocs, a resolution of the Cambodia war and such regional issues as the security problems in Irian Jaya and in East Timor, but these are not of compelling national importance. Indonesia has worked hard to establish a considerably improved relationship with Australia and Papua New Guinea.

An area of diminishing concern is the war in Cambodia. That war is almost over as far as Thailand's Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan is concerned. He wants Thailand to take advantage of the commercial opportunities in Indochina ahead of competitors from Taiwan, Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea. Vietnam's conflict with China has eased and it seems poised to break out of its isolation in the region since the completion of its troop withdrawals in September 1989. The war inside Cambodia may continue at a low level, but provided that the Hun Sen Government can survive the present onslaught by the Khmer Rouge and their non-Communist allies, it will probably be accorded diplomatic recognition with the passage of time. Several European countries and the European Parliament have manifested an inclination to accept the reality of the Hun Sen

Government in Phnom Penh and cut their support for the fiction that a fractious Thailand-based coalition led by the Khmer Rouge can in any way represent the Government of Cambodia. They are also embarrassed by the Khmer Rouge, whose dismal human rights record has been compared with that of the Nazis of the Second World War. Cambodia, in other words, is no longer the dominant security issue for countries in South-East Asia that it once was.

This, not unnaturally, has implications for ASEAN as an organisation. ASEAN was formed in 1967 largely because of security considerations. Much of what held it together in the 1970s and 1980s came from the concern of member countries about the situation in Cambodia and the perception of a threat from Vietnam. These concerns have now largely dissipated. There is a question whether in the future there will be challenges as serious as the Cambodian issue that will be sufficient to transcend ASEAN racial, cultural, political and economic differences. The ASEAN countries no longer perceive a threat from China or from any other external Power. Indonesia is proceeding towards a resumption of diplomatic relations with China although there is still suspicion of Chinese regional ambitions and fear about renewed contact between Beijing and the several hundred thousand overseas Chinese resident in Indonesia.

Each ASEAN country has its own internal political and foreign policy agenda, and ambitions. There is limited intra-regional trade and most of the ASEAN countries have trade links outside ASEAN. There is no ASEAN defence co-operation as such: the Philippines and Thailand have defence arrangements with the United States and/or China. Singapore and Malaysia are members of the Five Power Defence Arrangement with the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. There are other anomalies. Thailand's close relations with China are looked at askance by Indonesia; Singapore and Indonesia have different attitudes on ASEAN's approach to Vietnam; and Malaysia and Indonesia have objected to Singapore's unilateral offer to host United States military facilities.

However, the ASEAN States have become accustomed to the operational structure of ASEAN as a regional forum. They have enjoyed the prestige and influence of their collective membership in ASEAN in the wider regional and global context. ASEAN is a successful formula. Moreover, the ASEAN States share a common interest in balancing the presence and pressures of the big outside Powers and, as a regional group of developing non-Communist economies, they have a common interest in challenging Japan, the European Community and the United

States. They have many different points of view but nevertheless the ASEAN States will be forced to combine their economic bargaining power as much as possible if they hope to deal effectively with the rest of the world. If ASEAN is joined by other South-East Asian countries, it will be an even stronger regional economic and political group. The solidarity of ASEAN on agricultural protectionism and at the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Forum in Canberra are instances of the way this new co-operation is already working.

The fact that super-Power tension has eased has led many countries in the Asia-Pacific region to argue for more, not less, defence expenditure. They want more modern defence technology and equipment on the grounds that the withdrawal of the Super-Powers from more direct military competition in the Asia-Pacific region leaves the way open for regional Powers to vie for influence in the ensuing vacuum. This kind of assessment has reinforced tendencies for regional military build-up as countries in the region follow the lead of neighbouring States.

Chinese military forces on the Spratly Islands are effectively stationed in the very centre of the South-East Asian land/sea environment. The numbers involved are small but they are perceived as representing a bridgehead for China's plans to consolidate its claims in the South China Sea and build up its presence in South-East Asia.

Indian strategists cite China's naval expansion into the South China Sea as one of the key reasons for the development of Indian naval facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar islands at the western entrance to the Malacca Strait.

Japan, meanwhile, is a major military Power. Despite the relatively low percentage of its GNP spent on defence, the amount is increasing in real terms to the point where Japan has the third highest defence expenditure in the world and the world's fifth largest navy. The amount spent on defence is to be increased by 6 per cent in the coming year. Japan has a force structure suitable for rapid expansion and it clearly could support much larger and longer-range armed forces than it does today. There has been some discussion in Japan of defensive aircraft carriers that could be used to protect Japanese sea-lines of communication.

Singapore has expressed regional concerns about these trends by its recent offer to host some of the American facilities currently located in the Philippines. Singapore fears that other great Powers as well as perhaps Japan would feel obliged or tempted to fill the gap left by the United States. Malaysia and Indonesia have expressed concern about

the ability of China to project naval power into the South China Sea. They are also concerned about India's naval expansion and the development of its ability to project tridimensional naval forces in a maritime are that stretches from the west coast of the Horn of Africa to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands adjacent to South-East Asia. Malay sian officials have suggested that Kuala Lumpur could follow the Thai example and lean towards China in the face of any substantially increased Indian naval activity in South-East Asia.

Economically, it is forecast that the Asia-Pacific region will expand more rapidly than most other parts of the world. The newly industrialising economies of Asia are growing fast. They see new market and investment opportunities in the reformist Communist economies. The insurgencies which once plagued many countries in South-East Asia have been eclipsed by the problems of rapid economic growth. Chin Peng, former Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Malaya, is the most recent Communist in South-East Asia to publicly renounce armed struggle in favour of the parliamentary road to socialism. Assured of domestic political and social stability and, in relative terms, with more money to spend, the nations of Asia are expanding their military capabilities. In particular, as they exercise their national sovereignty over offshore resources delineated by the International Convention on the Law of the Sea, they are putting more effort into acquiring high-technology air and maritime forces.

A regional naval build-up could gain momentum from developments in the Philippines, currently host country to the biggest forward-based American military presence in the Pacific. Those developments are designed to support United States military operations in the Western Pacific, north-east Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. The bases help preserve the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region. The agreement concerning the bases expires in September 1991. A continued United States military presence in the Philippines is considered to be of major importance to the security of the United States, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand.

But several ASEAN States, particularly Indonesia, do not perceive the prospective loss of the United States bases as catastrophic for regional security. They even suggest that a United States withdrawal could be followed by a Soviet pull-out and thereby improve the chances for ASEAN to achieve its goal of a South-East Asian zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN). Some would argue that the removal of the bases at a time of their decreasing strategic importance would contribute to greater stability in the Philippines and hence to greater regional security.

As well as opposition to the American presence in the Philippines, there is an expectation of a reduced United States naval and military presence in the Western Pacific in the face of domestic United States constraints on defence expenditure, growing nationalism in Japan and the Republic of Korea and the decline in Soviet naval deployments in the Pacific. On the other hand, many countries fear that a declining United States presence will contribute to a competition for influence by other ascending great Powers, such as India, China, Japan and perhaps Indonesia.

Interestingly, there is today little reference to the Soviet Union as a menacing contender for power and influence in the region. Few States now mention the threat allegedly posed by the Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang in Vietnam. The much more relaxed regional attitude towards the Soviet Union is due in no small part to the positive diplomacy of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. He has achieved *rapprochement* with China and detente with the United States, opened up access to the Republic of Korea and Taiwan and preserved Soviet relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Indochinese countries. He has hinted at concessions on Japan's Northern Territories claim and had planned to visit Tokyo in 1991. Moscow has also made a major effort to improve Soviet relations with the ASEAN States through its mediation efforts on the Cambodian issue, various bilateral exchanges, particularly with Indonesia and Thailand, and tacit endorsement of the ASEAN ZOPFAN concept.

Developments in the island countries of the South Pacific are, although relatively volatile, of little direct security concern to countries in the Asia-Pacific region apart from Australia, New Zealand and Indonesia. The suddenly volatile politics of the South Pacific were nowhere more apparent than in the coups in Fiji in 1987 and signs of a disregard for law and order and constitutional government in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Palau.

Tension in decolonising New Caledonia has been defused somewhat with the signing of the Matignon accords and the promise of self-determination in 10 years.' The longer political devolution is delayed, however, the more likely it is that a more militant and radicalised independence movement and accompanying civil strife will re-emerge.

The Pacific island States all suffer from one or more of the following problems: limited employment opportunities for an increasingly educated population; deteriorating terms of trade and limited export potential; exposure to the consumer-society values of the West; a narrow, stagnant economic base; negative growth rates; dependence

on external financial assistance; growing income inequality; politicisation of the security forces; a breakdown in the customary village social support system; a decline in traditional authority; the problems associated with a growing drug trade; and divisive ethnicity and racial factors. These factors have contributed to problems of unemployment, social unrest, racial tension and separatist movements. The inability of the political system to deal with the social and economic problems of change in Pacific island communities is reflected in the situation in Fiji and the almost endemic instability in Papua New Guinea and secessionist tendencies in Bougainville. The fishery agreements between Kiribati and Vanuatu similarly reflect the sometimes desperate economic circumstances of many of the small island States of the South Pacific.

The general prospect is for continued uncertainty and the constant fear of intervention by outside influences. The solution lies in economic development and increased foreign aid. Australia is playing a more active role and has increased its defence ties in the region. France and the United States have tried to improve their respective regional images, with some success. Japan has shown an increasing interest in bolstering the Western presence in the South Pacific with economic aid and investment. The ASEAN States, led by Indonesia, also seek to contribute to stability in the South Pacific by developing closer political relations with Pacific island States, particularly Papua New Guinea and Fiji.

For Western Powers, such as the United States and Australia, earlier concerns about an intrusive Soviet presence have now eased with the retreat of Soviet naval activities to the North Pacific and the positive impact of Gorbachev's Pacific diplomacy since his 1986 speech at Vladivostock. United States concern about New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy and the implications of the Treaty of Rarotonga, which established the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, is now much reduced as neither development has proved significant as far as United States naval activities in the Pacific are concerned.

Throughout the Asia-Pacific region there is general concern about the proliferation of chemical weapons and the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile technology. Ballistic-missile technology is more and more freely available. Several States in east Asia and south Asia have a short-range ballistic-missile capability. These systems, armed with conventional warheads or, more disturbing, equipped with chemical weapons or nuclear weapons, could upset existing regional balances. They could contribute to regional arms

races that would be difficult to control because of problems of verification, especially with regard to chemical weapons. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is building a nuclear weapons research capability according to American intelligence reports based on satellite photographs of a nuclear reactor, a plutonium extraction plant and other facilities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Fears have been expressed about the consequences of a possible nuclear arms race in south Asia.

Another regional concern is the proliferation of weapons producers and competition for arms sales from a range of countries.

But generally the security outlook for the Asia-Pacific region at the beginning of the 1990s would have to be described as reasonably good. Threat assessments are, frequently, vaguely defined forecasts which, while acknowledging the current optimism, also warn of unforeseeable threats arising in the future from rapid social and economic change and great-Power re-alignments. For individual countries, the outlook is generally favourable, with a few exceptions, including China, the Philippines, Myanmar and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Their problems are not problems of military security as such. They are, rather, problems of poverty and the struggle for economic development.

In conclusion, however, it is as well to recognize that the central aim of the economic renovation, reform and development under way in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region is to strengthen national power, prestige and regional influence relative to other States. This means perhaps that the present Asian preoccupation with domestic economic development—or orderly regional economic development— may have its limits. At the great-Power level, much will depend on the role that Japan plays. Japan's position in turn will depend on the state of its relations with the United States and its perceptions of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Of equal importance will be the progress or failure of reform in China and the Soviet Union, the role of India and the resilience and strength of regional economic and political groups such as ASEAN.

SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE EAST, SOUTH-EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGIONS: A VIEW FROM THE SOUTH PACIFIC

The South Pacific has been described as the most over-colonised and the most ignored region on the planet. This combination of

colonialism and neglect often leaves the countries of the region puzzled as to what is expected of them by their metropolitan benefactors. Conversely, the ignoring of what islanders themselves consider to be of paramount strategic importance has often proved costly for the aspirations of policy-makers in the West.

Changing strategic considerations have reduced the value of the islands as stepping-stones for the extension of power across the Pacific, but the region remains one of the most heavily armed in the world. Its remoteness has also made it an attractive area for weapons testing.

Decolonisation is far from complete in the Oceanic region, a fact that may very well influence security concerns in the area for years to come. Of the 21 political entities in the region served by the South Pacific Commission (set up by the six Western Powers in 1947 to co-ordinate development in their respective island colonies), 4 are self-governing but in free association with two of the metropolitan Powers, and 8 are still tied to their colonizers. Only 9 are sovereign independent nations. Over one third of the Pacific island political entities remain colonial dependencies—a fact which is little known outside the region. Colonial situations invite a wide array of destabilising influences, which even the most well-intentioned of metropolitan Powers may find it difficult to handle.

Nuclear Test Zone

While the horrors of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima at the end of the Second World War are embedded in the international consciousness, little attention is paid to the fact that hundreds of nuclear devices have been exploded in the Pacific since then.

Many islands of the Pacific have been adversely affected by these nuclear tests. Some islands have had to be evacuated because of radiation fall-out. In addition to the rise in cancer cases recorded in former United States testing sites and current French experimentation zones, the cleanup costs for such islands as Rongelap and Bikini atolls are staggering. The mental and cultural costs for the people are incalculable.

Although two nuclear Powers no longer use the area for their experiments, France persists in carrying out nuclear tests in the Pacific. The efforts by France to define a role for itself in the international nuclear equation have been made at the expense of the people of the Pacific. Following on earlier British and United States test explosions, largely in Micronesia, the French nuclear experimentation has been based in the Polynesian islands of Tahiti.

Despite individual pleas from countries of the region, and resolutions passed in international forums such as the United Nations, France continues, through successive administrations, to detonate test after test. In its determination to counteract the widespread opposition to its testing programme, French government agents in 1985 bombed the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior,* at Auckland, New Zealand, killing a crew member. Notwithstanding the international outcry which followed this act, Paris stated categorically that the nuclear experimentation would continue. Since the peoples of French Polynesia do not yet have their own independent nation, there is nothing they can do to stop the tests on their soil and in their waters.

Another metropolitan Power in the region, the United States, tells Oceanic States that they maintain forces in a high state of readiness in the Pacific to ensure that democratic or friendly nations in Oceania are covered by the United States "nuclear umbrella". Pacific leaders often ponder the effectiveness of a nuclear umbrella which allows scores of nuclear tests in Oceania by a United States NATO ally.

Fishy Business and Dubious Catches

Meanwhile, the traditional NATO adversaries in Europe present a non-martial face to most of Oceania. For the islands of the South Pacific the Soviet Union is seen as just another Power trying to net a piece of the lucrative fishing catch. It offers island governments fees to fish in Pacific waters. The sums are not high by international standards but $1.5 million for a year's fishing access is considerable for Solomon Islands, with a population of just over 280,000. Fees paid by Moscow to Kiribati, for example, amounted to 10 per cent of that island democracy's budget.

This was seen as a rather novel approach by many island nations, which for years had looked on helplessly as trawling fleets from the friendly nations of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States, many of them unhampered by licences and fees, helped themselves to the region's marine resources.

Receptivity to Soviet entreaties was based on economic concerns. Nevertheless, Soviet proposals to the Kingdom of Tonga to expand an airport in exchange for fishing rights worried the Australia/New Zealand/United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty ministers in 1976 and they started talking of limiting Moscow's penetration of the South Pacific through a policy of "strategic denial". With the reservoir of goodwill the Western Powers felt they enjoyed in Oceania, it was considered that adequate economic aid would be sufficient to counter

Eastern bloc initiatives with strategic implications in the area. Through "burden sharing", Australia and New Zealand were invited to pick up most of the financial burden of the policy.

In the meanwhile. Pacific island leaders charged that the United States had turned its back on its friends in the Pacific while granting large aid allocations to other, far less friendly developing countries. Speaking at the Conference on Strategic Cooperation and Competition in the Pacific Islands in May 1989, Paul J. Gardner, a former United States Ambassador to Papua New Guinea, pointed out that five African nations with one-party, authoritarian regimes, most of which adhered to Marxist-Leninist principles, and all of which voted against the United States in the United Nations at least 88 per cent of the time, received much higher aid per capita than Pacific island countries.

For the United States, the major interests are mainly strategic ones centred on the desire to keep the Soviets out of Oceania through strategic denial. For the Oceanic States, however, the security concerns focus on the need to keep their resource-poor island developing nations from sinking in a sea of red ink. These two perceptions of security clashed dramatically in 1984. In June of that year, the Solomon Islands Government, irked by continued unlicensed trawling in its waters, arrested the American super-seiner *Jeanette Diana.* For the Solomon Islanders, such plundering of their basic resource was felt to be a direct threat to their economic security.

By Washington, however, the seizure was interpreted as a direct contravention of the Magnuson Act, adopted by Congress years earlier as a weapon in an earlier fight with Peru over continental shelves. The Act provided for punitive sanctions to be lowered on the imports to the United States of any of the offending country's products. In spite of the fact that it had reacted mildly when mineral-rich Papua New Guinea had seized one of its trawlers a couple of years earlier, the United States delivered a stinging blow to the fragile Solomon Islands economy by imposing an embargo on its exports to America.

Reacting quickly to this gap in perceived strategic interests between a metropolitan Power and a "friendly" micro-State, the Soviet Union offered island States money for fishing access. Solomon Islands declined at the time, but tiny Kiribati accepted what for it meant 10 per cent of its budget. So, with little effort and a very small amount of money, the Soviet Union was able to skirt strategic denial, gain access to a bountiful tuna field—while siding with Oceanic nations unified in their disapproval of the heavy-handed American reaction to a small island nation's attempt to protect its most valuable resource.

It was a simple case of a major Power neglecting to consult with a tiny ally on what was, strategically, really important for both. By ignoring the strategic concerns of Pacific islanders, a major Power lost some of the moral high ground in the fight for the hearts and minds of Oceanic peoples and their Governments. The fishing tussle with the Solomon Islands Government may also have contributed to a loss on the ground for the United States policy-makers, because the 1980s saw an erosion of the ideological fear many Oceanic nations experienced in their dealings with the Soviet Union. As a consequence, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviets, whose initiatives were greeted with hostility and suspicion by the islanders in the mid-1970s, now have commercial ties with Vanuatu, Fiji and Kiribati and have negotiated an agreement with Papua New Guinea to establish the first resident Soviet mission in an independent Oceanic nation.

The Soviet inroads made into the South Pacific on the heels of the *Jeanette Diana* affair also largely obscured the generous United States terms offered Oceanic States in the regional fisheries agreement signed in June 1988, an agreement now used as a model in other regions of the world.

Sino-Soviets Split Region

Competition with a strategic adversary was presumably also behind another major Power's fast entry to the South Pacific diplomatic circuit. Concerned about the Soviet Union's growing ties with the Oceanic nations and, perhaps, the prospect of encirclement in the Asia-Pacific region, China began a policy of cultivating warmer relations with island States in the 1970s.

This was shortly after the United States opened diplomatic contacts with Beijing. Very swiftly, euphoria in the United States at its diplomatic success spread through the West and led to the acceptance of China as an instant strategic ally in the continuing global competition between the two Super-Powers. Chinese support was important to those who advocated the containing of expansionist Soviet designs in the Pacific by strategic denial, and there was little opposition to Chinese foreign-policy initiatives in the area.

In very short order, Beijing set up diplomatic relations with Western Samoa in 1975, and with Papua New Guinea in 1976. By the end of the decade there were resident missions in those two countries, all achieved with little fanfare. Thus it was not surprising that the Chinese decision to cordon off an area to the west of Hawaii to conduct intercontinental missile tests in 1980 was met with very little

international or intra-regional opposition. Contrast this with the hue and cry which followed the Soviet expanded-airport-for-fishing-access proposal to Tonga in 1976.

South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone

The inability of Pacific island nations to have their basic strategic concerns heeded by their major-Power friends is clearly illustrated by the efforts of Oceanic governments to enlist metropolitan government adherence to the region's single most dramatic expression of security concerns, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

The Treaty was the result of years of intra-regional negotiation between the South Pacific nations and international consultations with nuclear-weapon States aimed at forging the world's second treaty requiring military denuclearisation of an inhabited region in perpetuity.

The Treaty of Rarotonga—adopted by the South Pacific Forum in Rarotonga, the Cook Islands, on 6 August 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the destruction of Hiroshima by an atomic weapon—is similar in some ways to the 1968 Treaty of Tiateloico, which set up a nuclear-weapon-free Latin America and the Caribbean. The zone covers an enormous area of the world, from the meridian of longitude 115° west, which is the border of the Tiateloico Treaty, to the west coast of Australia at 115° east, north to the Equator and south to the demilitarised Antarctica. Unlike the Latin American Treaty, however, the South Pacific Treaty explicitly states the right of every nation to decide for itself whether or not to accept visits and transit by nuclear-armed or nuclear-propelled vessels in order to take into account the strategic concerns of the nuclear-weapon State allies of the fourteen members of the South Pacific Forum, primarily the United States. Nevertheless, the United States, the United Kingdom and France have chosen, at least for the time being, not to adhere to the additional protocols of the Treaty, by which they would have undertaken to apply its key provisions to territories over which it has jurisdiction, not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any party to the Treaty, and to refrain from nuclear testing within the zone. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and China have signed the Protocols relevant to them but the Soviet Union has made certain reservations concerning its commitment.

More Arms on the Way

Pacific island States are also concerned with major-Power initiatives in other parts of the Pacific basin. The growing military capabilities of Japan, largely accompanied by highly-publicised urgings from

Washington for Tokyo to pick up more of the defence tabs in the Pacific, make some island nations more than a little nervous. However, islander leaders do take comfort in the declaration by Japanese Foreign Minister Kurunari, in 1987, that Tokyo intended to strengthen its assistance to the region. Because of its sheer economic strength and size, however, a larger Japanese presence, according to the 1988 Pacific Aid Initiative report produced by the Tokyo-based Foundation for Advanced Information and Research, "could have a large and irremediably negative effect on the Pacific islands", if it is not carefully mapped out in advance. In that sense, it added, "Pacific island policy will become a touchstone for Japanese diplomatic policy in general".

As the newly-independent and democratic island States grapple with economic survival and the mending of frayed relations with the metropolitan Powers, the prospect of dealing with yet another military presence in the region is an unwelcome one.

Concerns for the 1990s

In the subregion itself, there are enough problems to cope with. Thanks to the Matignon accords, which among other things allow for independence in ten years, there is peace in New Caledonia, but it is a fragile one in a volatile atmosphere already highly charged with tensions generated by too much bloodshed and a lingering intercommunal mistrust.

While New Caledonia is quiet for the moment, indications are that, to the east, calls for independence in Tahiti may ignite French Polynesia. It will probably become increasingly difficult for France to applaud democratic changes in Eastern Europe while dampening similar calls for freedom in its own territories. Insurrection in both New Caledonia and French Polynesia would place France in very difficult straits indeed.

Other newer actors have bowed onto the Pacific stage as the 1990s begin, sometimes bringing with them conflicts far removed from Oceania. The much-publicised presence of Libyans in Vanuatu and New Caledonia caused an outcry in Australia—which has its own office in Tripoli—and New Zealand. Apart from some training for a small number of Melanesians, however, this relationship has not blossomed.

The Libyan connection, however, may have drawn yet another outsider into the region, Israel. The Israelis came late but they made their mark felt very quickly by setting up an embassy in Fiji accredited to eight other Oceanic States as well. The Israeli President even made the long trek south to Fiji and Tonga.

Indonesia is playing a bigger role in the region, particularly with Papua New Guinea, which lies just a border away from Irian Jaya. Also from the north-west comes Malaysia with offers of military and other assistance to the Government of Fiji, which is reeling from cooled relations with its traditional suppliers, Australia and New Zealand. India was also quick to increase its interest in Fiji following the military coup there which, among other things, curtailed the rights of Fiji's ethnic Indian population.

The Government of Taiwan is an assiduous cultivator of ties with the Pacific States and has succeeded in setting up trade and diplomatic presences in island nations where in some cases functioning offices representing the People's Republic of China are also established—a very rare occurrence in other parts of the world but made possible in the Pacific islands by the fact that many of the island Chinese communities, with their commercial clout, retain strong ties with Taipei.

Thus, the Pacific island States, whether they like it or not, are being drawn inexorably into a volatile diplomatic scene featuring their traditional friends and metropolitan associates and newer outsiders, whose real intentions have yet to be made clear. The metropolitan Powers applauding the fresh breezes of change in Eastern Europe will have to realize that these currents will be felt in Oceania too, and they will feel the need to redefine the meaning of being a great Power. Those major powers will need to resist the temptation to supply arms to island States, as such strategies inevitably produce more costs than profits. Strategic concerns in the Pacific have been formulated mainly with a view to avoiding war: perhaps, it is time to re-focus and look for ways to strengthen the prospects for prolonged peace in the region.

What is clear is that the basis for Pacific security in the next decade lies in independent island nations with strong economies containing productive and engaged societies invigorated by democratic institutions. Now, more than ever, it is important for all players on the Pacific scene to identify and harmonize their shared values and common goals, and to work harder to reconcile, or live with, their differences. Failure to match their various security concerns will result in the metamorphosing of the current, eminently manageable, differences into conflicts with reverberations well outside the region.

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South-East Asian Security Issues and Confidence-Building

SECURITY ISSUES

Security issues in the South-East Asian subregion are both diverse and complex, involving as they do some issues that are bilateral and some that are multilateral as well as some that relate both to States of the region and to external actors. For purposes of analysis, the security issues relevant to South-East Asia will be dealt with at three levels, although each is not exclusive of the others.

Great-Power Linkages

One level of concern in South-East Asia has been the linkages with the great Powers or their penetration into the security problems of the region. In the bipolar world, the super-Power competition at the global level was projected onto the region. Whether for the Vietnam war or the Cambodian conflict, South-East Asia provided the arena for the great Powers' conflict and competition.

Of late, there have been changes in great-Power relations, characterised by a shift away from confrontatkon to co-operation, marked by the Sino-Soviet normalisation of relations in April 1989; the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) held in Paris in November 1990; and, particularly, of direct relevance to South-East Asia, the agreement by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council on the framework for a settlement of the Cambodian conflict.

Catalysed to no small extent by economic imperatives, the improvement in great-Power relations has been accompanied by the drawing down of the military presence of the two Super-Powers. The Soviet Union has unilaterally removed most of its offensive aircraft

and naval vessels from Cam Rahn Bay, in line with its new strategic doctrine, which emphasises a defensive posture. While the United States has announced its intention to remain a major Pacific Power, a reduction of its forces in the area appears inevitable. The prognosis for a United States base in the Philippines is one of phasing out over a period of from five to ten years, and the recent agreement with Singapore would suggest that the future structure of a United States military presence in the region will be in the nature of a diversified and limited use of facilities.

Diplomatically, there have been improvements in relations between the great Powers and the regional States across old adversarial boundaries. Most dramatic has been China's normalisation of relations with Indonesia, which will lead to China's having diplomatic relations with all members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). China's relations with Laos have been on the upswing. The Soviet Union has been pursuing a policy of "constructive engagement" with countries members of ASEAN, the success of which can be gauged by the numerous exchanges of visits by high-ranking officials of both sides. There has been a tentative improvement of relations between China and Vietnam and between the United States and Vietnam.

To all intents and purposes, at the super-Power level, the security environment has become more benign and a further diminution of their penetration into the region's security problems can be expected.

Actors in the Region

Despite the waning of bipolarity, it is expected that South-East Asia will see a greater number of actors in the region, with uncertain security implications. Of the utmost concern for South-East Asian countries is China, whose land and sea frontiers border on the region. China is, without a doubt, part of the South-East Asian "security complex" by reason of its close involvement in the Cambodian conflict through support of the resistance, particularly the Khmer Rouge; its border conflict with Vietnam: and its extensive claim in the South China Sea, which overlaps with the waters of many South-East Asian countries. With its evident readiness to enforce its claim by force and its formidable military capabilities in local offensive operations, as in the case of the Spratlys, a result of its navy's growing blue water capability, China looms large in the threat perceptions of regional countries. While it can be expected that China will be more militarily assertive in the South China Sea in view of its growing capability, this could be constrained in the short and medium term by its preoccupation

with domestic problems and its concern with improving international political and economic relations, including those with ASEAN countries.

Another major actor of note in South-East Asia is Japan, whose predominance in the economic realm is accompanied by a greater readiness to play a political role commensurate with its economic status. With regard to South-East Asia, Japan has evinced a readiness to play a constructive role in the resolution of the Cambodian conflict, which included an offer to help finance peace keeping and the hosting of a meeting among the Khmer factions in Tokyo in 1990, moves that were generally welcomed in South-East Asia. However, the possibility that Japanese may play a military role in the region is proving to be of concern to most countries in the region as was evident in the negative reaction to the Thai Prime Minister's reported—but later denied—invitation to Japan early in 1990 to hold a joint naval exercise with Thailand. The major concern in South-East Asia is not so much Japan's growing military capability as the possibility that Japan might take an independent military role outside of the United States-Japanese security arrangement. Reasons for this concern arise from the growing tensions in United States-Japanese relations and the widening debate in Japan regarding the validity of the United States-Japanese Security Pact. This concern is, however, of a longer-term nature, discounting the possibility of a precipitous withdrawal of the United States forward deployment from the region, which appears unlikely.

India is another actor which is beginning to figure in South-East Asia's security consciousness. With the significant advances made by the Indian navy in the 1980s, and the possibility of India's strategic domain eventually extending to South-East Asia, as suggested by some Indian defence analysts, some South-East Asians are beginning to see India as possibly coming within the region's "security complex". This is supplemented by the continuing Sino-Indian conflict and competition. The growing Chinese capability for the projection of its naval power into the Indian Ocean, as suggested by the 1985 South Asia expedition by Chinese warships, and the recent reported Chinese-Myanmar arms deal, provide grounds for speculation over a possible spill-over of the Sino-India competition and conflict into South-East Asia.

At the domestic level, South-East Asian countries are concerned with threats to their internal stability. At a minimum, governments are concerned that their people should be provided with such economic and social welfare as will continue to provide legitimacy for the government. This task is, however, proving to be difficult despite the successes in some countries in producing high growth rates. With few

exceptions, there is a trade-off between growth and equity, threatening stability with unmet rising expectations. Another economic problem is that of maintaining sustained growth when national economies are integrated into the world economy and subjected to the vagaries of the latter. Yet, another challenge to the sustaining of economic growth has to do with the depletion of natural resources within a country's own borders. This concern is having an effect on relations among States in the region as each becomes more determined to guard its own resources.

Apart from the problem of its shortcomings in economic performance, a government's legitimacy may be determined by ethnic, religious or ideological differences, which may work in combination with economic grievances or be exclusive of them. Most South-East Asian countries are faced with these problems to different degrees, from simmering tension within the society to outright armed rebellion.

Intra-Regional

The third level of security issues is intra-regional, although external actors are also involved directly or indirectly in a number of issues. The most prominent has to do with disputes over boundaries, both land and sea, which have resulted in armed confrontations and conflicts.

Disputes over land borders exist between Thailand and Cambodia, Thailand and Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. The last two disputes have caused armed clashes in the recent past.

More extensive disputes have to do with maritime boundaries. The "new ocean regime", resulting from the Conference on the Law of the Sea, has extended coastal State control over the continental shelf and a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, with a greatly increased incentive for States to establish their sovereignty over islands. Of the 15 possible maritime boundaries in the South China Sea, excluding the Gulf of Thailand, 12 are in dispute. The disputes involve China with Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam; and Vietnam with China, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Disputes also exist among ASEAN members, with Malaysia having disputes with all other members. Thailand has disputes also with Cambodia and Vietnam in the Gulf of Thailand.

However, the dispute that has the greatest potential for armed conflict revolves around the conflicting claims over the Spratly Islands, which include China, Taiwan province of China, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines, all of which occupy a number of islands. Following the violent eruption of conflict between Chinese and Vietnamese troops

in March 1988, disputants appear more ready to protect their claims against future intrusion. For domestic reasons already mentioned, nations are more determined than ever to guard their off-shore resources, which include hydrocarbon, minerals and fisheries. Apart from their existing and potential resources, the Spratlys in particular are also of strategic importance to external Powers, including the United States, Japan and the Soviet Union, as regards the safety of sea-lines of communication. Recently, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng expressed readiness to joint efforts with South-East Asian countries to develop the Spratly Islands, while putting aside for the time being the question of sovereignty. However, Vietnam, which is the main contestant, will not be included until relations with China are normalised. This would leave an important gap in conflict management on the Spratlys.

While off-shore resources and the conflict that they entail may be most threatening to the region's security, other resource-related issues with potential for conflict, namely the use of the Mekong River and the exploitation of timber on mainland South-East Asia, should also be taken into consideration.

A potential for intra-regional conflict related to economic issues could arise from the emerging economic interdependence between the more advanced economies and less developed economies in the region. Conflict could arise if there was an unacceptable inequity in the relationship.

Another security issue at the intra-regional level has to do with external support or intervention in armed rebellions in regional countries for ethnic, religious or ideological reasons. Problems with their Muslim minorities in Thailand and the Philippines have caused concern regarding assistance from their kith and kin in neighbouring countries, particularly Malaysia. Laos and Vietnam have complained about resistance movements allegedly launched from Thailand. Should the Cambodian conflict be settled in such away that the Khmer Rouge continue to carry on an armed struggle against the Phnom Penh regime, problems could arise between Thailand and neighbouring Cambodia.

Much concern has been expressed about the growth in arms procurement in ASEAN countries as a sign of a possible arms race, entailing greater tension and instability in the region. A question that is often raised is why there is this growth while the region's security environment is becoming more benign with the drawing down of the superpowers' military presence and the Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia. A number of explanations may be given. The first is

that of threat perception. The evolving and thus uncertain strategic scenario appears potentially troublesome, with more actors and a lack of clearly defined security threats as well as the felt need to compensate for the perceived drawing down of the United States presence. It is to be noted that the present trend in arms build-up in South-East Asia is characterised by a shift from a doctrine of counter-insurgency to one of conventional warfare. The original impetus to this shift was Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. A more recent one is the threat perception in the South China Sea. Because of the focus on maritime defence needs, most ASEAN countries are in the process of upgrading, in particular, their naval and air capabilities. The past positive correlation between the defence spending and the economic health of the country also helps to explain the upward trend in defence expenditure. Defence spending is following an upward trend also because the existing arsenal of the ASEAN countries is aging and rapidly approaching obsolescence. Further impetus is provided by the existing state of the arms market, which belongs to the buyers owing to a number of factors. It is possible for buyers to diversify their sources of arms supply, to demand easy-payment terms, off-set manufacturing contracts, licensed production of equipment and greater access to technology through co-production and co-development of military hardware. In the case of Thailand, the domestic power equation proves to be an important determinant in the acquisition of arms.

When discussing security issues at the intra-regional level, the existing suspicions that nations hold with regard to one another, derived from historical experience, of the distant or the recent past, will continue to figure in relations among them and shape their security perspective. Thailand's suspicion of Vietnam's long-term intentions and Singapore's experience with separation from Malaysia are some of the cases that readily come to mind.

TOWARDS A MORE PEACEFUL SOUTH-EAST ASIA: SOME POLICY OPTIONS

ZOPFAN AND SEANWFZ

The drawing-down of the two Super-Powers' military presence from the region and the expected diminution of their linkages in the region's security problems can be seen as contributing to the realisation of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN). However, if we were to look at its origin and the reasons why it has remained basically a goal to be achieved since it was declared in 1971, an answer might be

found to the question of its feasibility at present. Originally, when ASEAN was founded, the security of its members was to be attained by the establishment of a regional order in which conflicts among member countries were to be confined and positive co-operation encouraged. In view of its limited resources, protection from external threat was to be provided by the United States. The prospect of the United States moving out of South-East Asia led to the idea of ZOPFAN, which would replace the protection from an external Power by the management of the regional order by the regional States themselves. Underpinning ZOPFAN would be political stability and internal security or national resilience, in Indonesian parlance, which would, in turn, bring about regional resilience by pre-empting external Powers from intervening in domestic or regional affairs.

ZOPFAN's strategy for peace and security through detachment and self-reliance foundered on the reluctance of some members to dispense with external guarantees, and the goal of removing foreign bases was agreed upon without a time-limit being set. The prerequisite of a favourable constellation of external Powers was also lacking. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 soon reflected that Power constellation when South-East Asia became clearly polarised.

The present evolving security environment, both at the super-Power level and at the intra-regional level, the latter with the prospect of resolution of the Cambodian conflict and improving relations between ASEAN and the Indochinese countries, appears to fit into the scheme of ZOPFAN. However, judging by the lack of objection by other ASEAN members to Singapore's agreement with the United States in November 1990 providing the latter's warships and planes with greater access of its facilities, at least once they were assured that no permanent basing was involved, indicates the view that the United States presence is benign and stabilising at the present time of an uncertain and evolving pattern of power.

While ZOPFAN lies in abeyance, an attempt has been made to put a South-East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone (SEANWFZ) into operation. Again, while the United States presence is still seen as beneficial, implementing SEANWFZ will be problematic as the United States has made clear its objection to the plan.

Nevertheless, the idea of SEANWFZ was first introduced as a stopgap measure for the suspended ZOPFAN. It was to provide a forum at which all South-East Asian countries, then polarised by the Cambodian conflict, could have positive interaction. Assuming that the Cambodian conflict will be resolved in the foreseeable future,

consultation on SEANWFZ could provide one venue for integration of Indo-China and Myanmar into a unified South-East Asia. Taking into consideration the United States objection, a piecemeal approach to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) could be chosen over a comprehensive one, which means an agreement in a full-fledged legal instrument that would form the foundation of the denuclearisation of the region concerned. In a piecemeal approach, members could start from one of the three essential elements in a NWFZ, namely non-possession. (The other characteristics are non-deployment and non-use of nuclear weapons.) Non-possession is in line with non-proliferation. This should be easily acceptable, as all except Myanmar and Brunei are signatories of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Non-use would follow naturally, leaving non-deployment untouched for the time being. However, judging from the United States position on the NWFZ in the South Pacific, it is even doubtful whether the piecemeal approach would be acceptable to Washington. None the less, ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ remain on the ASEAN agenda and, at the least, they are useful as guides to the enhancement of regional peace and security over the longer term.

Enhancing and Broadening the ASEAN Process

If confidence-building is defined in a broad sense to mean any measure that builds confidence, then ASEAN has, for a long time, been a confidence-building regime. The formation of ASEAN itself came about with the common realisation that confrontation and conflicts that existed among the countries in the region in the past were counter-productive and that security could best be guaranteed by the establishment of a regional order which promoted conflict avoidance and positive co-operation. In a concrete form, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord of 1976 laid down the rules of conduct for members by which they would refrain from threatening one another and would settle their disagreements peacefully and without outside interference. ASEAN can be described as a "security community" in the sense that these rules of conduct have come to be accepted by members. The practice of consultation and consensus-building has reinforced the process of conflict avoidance. Co-operative efforts in political, economic, social and cultural fields also help build a sense of community. All these add up to confidence-building in a comprehensive sense, apart from the politico-military situation.

However, questions have begun to be raised whether ASEAN's success at confidence-building that has underpinned the "security

community" is chimerical. After all, it has been pointed out that conflicts among the member countries have not been solved. The ASEAN cohesiveness has been the result of the Cambodian conflict, the resolution of which appears closer than ever. Moreover, arms procurement by ASEAN countries is, in fact, creating tension and undermining whatever confidence may have been built over the years. Existing conflicts could worsen, as in the case of conflicts over natural resources, while new sources of conflict are emerging, including, for example, the problem of migrant labourers. For these reasons, the ASEAN process of community-building should be enhanced. The necessary measures could include:

1. Intensification of formal and informal consultations, both official and private, backed by improved mechanisms for decision-making and co-operation. This should include the institutionalisation of the ASEAN Summit, which serves not only as a symbol of ASEAN unity but as a forum that promotes better understanding and empathy for each other's interests and concerns. It could serve also to discourage unilateralism, which appears to be on the rise, and is detrimental to the established norms of consensus and consultation;
2. Institutionalisation of procedures of conciliation to replace the existing practice of *ad hoc* self-restraint between members as the potential for greater conflicts begins to emerge;
3. Greater integration of the members' armed forces. While a number of practices exist on a bilateral basis that count as military confidence-building measures, such as exchanges of visits of military personnel and students at staff colleges, exchanges of intelligence, and joint exercises, more could be done in the way of moving towards such integration, for example through consultation on military doctrine, standardisation of arms, and co-operation in providing services and maintenance.

Peace in South-East Asia should be seen as indivisible, and efforts should be made towards integrating the hitherto divided region. The following measures could be taken:

1. Endorsement of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia by the non-ASEAN members as a first step towards a new intergovernmental mechanism for region-wide conflict resolution and co-operation;
2. Denial of support to foreign resistance forces in one's territory, with possible measures for verification;

3. The introduction of military confidence-building measures, particularly between Thailand and Vietnam, Thailand and Laos, Thailand and Cambodia, and Vietnam and Cambodia. In the case of Thailand and Vietnam, although the two countries do not have common borders, long-held distrust exists because of geostrategic and historical factors. A number of confidence-building measures could be envisaged, including exchanges of visits of military personnel, discussions of military doctrines, visits to military installations, and invitations to observe military exercises. Confidence-building measures for Thailand-Laos, Thailand-Cambodia and Vietnam-Cambodia could include, besides those mentioned above, advanced notification of military manoeuvres within a certain distance from their common borders as well as invitations to observe the manoeuvres;
4. Settlement of border disputes and, pending the settlement, measures to prevent armed clashes, such as the withdrawal of troops from the disputed areas;
5. Promotion of co-operative efforts such as development of the Mekong River Basin;
6. Co-operation among the more developed ASEAN countries in providing aid and technical assistance to the Indo-Chinese countries and Myanmar. In particular, special efforts should be made for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Cambodia to help strengthen the fabric of peace in that country;
7. Promotion of economic interaction in such a way as to ensure equitable benefits.

Negotiated Settlement of Conflict in the South China Sea

As the South China Sea is a focus of multilateral conflict with a high potential for armed confrontation, efforts should be made towards the eventual solution of the conflict. However, considering the tension that has existed especially since the Sino-Vietnamese armed clash in March 1988, confidence-building measures are required and co-operative measures must be promoted to ensure an atmosphere conducive to a negotiated settlement. These could include:

1. The freezing of all activities aimed at the occupation of additional islands in the Spratlys;
2. Renunciation of the use of force and agreement to settle disputes by peaceful means;

3. Follow-up on the Chinese proposal to set aside the issue of sovereignty, with the understanding that it is negotiable, in order to move towards negotiation on joint exploitation of resources by claimant States, bilaterally or multilaterally as the case may be;
4. Bearing in mind the strategic nature of the area as regards the safety of sea-lines of communication, the working out of co-operative measures with regard to surveillance and safety by the nations concerned, both regional and extra-regional.

Sub-Regional CSCE-Style Conference

In view of the changing Power equations, together with the uncertainties and opportunities that they entail, a process of dialogue should be encouraged.

While an Asia-Pacific CSCE-style conference may not be feasible owing to the existing diversity of conflicts, a subregional conference on security and co-operation confined to South-East Asia may well be feasible. Such a conference could consist of the South-East Asian countries and the external Powers that are involved in the region and that are of concern to the States of the region. The external Powers could include the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

As one of the largest countries in the Asia-Pacific region, China attaches great importance to maintaining and promoting peace, security and development in this region. It is therefore interested in the related issues of regional confidence-building measures (CBMs), security and disarmament.

In vast areas such as Asia and the Pacific, the regional confidence-building, security and disarmament issues cannot exist in isolation; on the contrary, they are closely linked to, and influenced by, what is happening globally or in other areas. If, in the global context, it is still necessary to contend with such things as the strong bullying the weak and the great harassing the small, the sovereignty of States being ignored and the arms race running wild, certainly world peace and security, including the Asian-Pacific countries and regions, will be under threat; and as a result, neither CBMs nor security and disarmament arrangements for the Asia-Pacific area can make any real progress.

In recent years, the most fundamental changes since the Second World War have been occurring in the international arena, with the old world order breaking up and the new order not yet taking definite form. Characterised by a reduction in the East-West military confrontation and by the promising prospect of the achievement of a political solution to some regional conflicts, the overall international atmosphere today has improved to some degree.

On the other hand, it is also undeniable that the world still suffers from a number of factors that constitute a threat to peace and security: the practices of hegemony and power politics have yet to be eliminated. In certain areas, political, economic or national disputes tend to deepen and worsen, leading to new tension and turbulence. Several regional conflicts, including the conflict in the Middle East, have a long way to go and have many difficulties to overcome before achieving just and reasonable political solutions. In the field of disarmament, the momentum of the global arms race, though somewhat abating, has not come to an end. Worse still, in some cases, it is claimed that weapons have been reduced, while in fact they have been transferred to other areas, thus causing new threats to peace and security. The proceedings of the multilateral disarmament efforts remain unsatisfactory, partly at least because of those attempts to shift the responsibility for disarmament and change the terms of certain disarmament objectives. There is a recession in the world economy and in international trade. Consequently, the economic situation in the developing countries is becoming increasingly bleak, and, at the same time, the disparity between the developing countries and the developed world is further deepening, and the North-South polarisation is worsening.

Not only are these serious factors affecting world peace and security, but they also serve to confine and curb the emergence and development of regional CBMs and security and disarmament measures. In this regard, the Asia-Pacific region is no exception.

II

Solutions to issues in Asia and the Pacific can be found only in regard to the specific situation and characteristics of the region. This is true also in regard to the arrangements for CBMs, security and disarmament.

An idea has surfaced recently that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) model for confidence- and security-building measures and the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) model for European disarmament are panaceas that

other parts of the world should prescribe for their own problems. I do not think this will work.

Positive though it may be, the progress in Europe was achieved under the particular circumstances prevailing in Europe. Experience gained in Europe can hardly apply to other regions, where the situation and conditions differ from those of Europe. Differences exist at least in the following aspects. First, for many years, Europe was dominated by two clearly delineated blocs that confronted each other both politically and militarily. No such blocs exist among the several dozens of countries in Asia and the Pacific. Secondly, the Asia-Pacific region also differs from Europe in that in this region, and, indeed, in every subregion, there are many unique conflicts and problems that are diverse in source and nature. Thirdly, while countries in Europe may be at different levels of development, they are all, on the whole, developed countries, while in Asia and the Pacific there are developed countries, developing countries and even the least developed countries. Fourthly, the political, social and cultural diversity among the Asian and Pacific countries is also much greater than that in Europe. In view of these major differences, there is no possibility of mechanically applying the European experience and model to this region.

Different regions can only find and adopt appropriate measures to solve their problems in the light of their own specific circumstances. This is a basic principle, a principle that must be followed in exploring arrangements for CBMs, security and disarmament in Asia and the Pacific.

III

Against this backdrop, what approach should we take in our search for CBMs, security and disarmament? Given the situation in our region, the following general approach appears to be reasonable and practicable:

1. In terms of geographical scope, bilateral arrangements should be given priority, followed by multilateral arrangements in small regions, which can then be gradually expanded to encompass larger areas (if needed).
2. As regards the measures to be taken, CBMs should take precedence, and these should be developed into security arrangements and arrangements for disarmament at a later stage.
3. With regard to the nature of the contacts and meetings between different countries, emphasis should first be laid on scholarly

discussions and low-level official contacts, which will prepare the ground for high-level meetings.

4. In terms of time, the institution of the CBMs and security mechanisms should be viewed as a continuous process of gradual evolution, which needs time and patience. Otherwise, we may find ourselves in a situation best described by the proverb "All haste and no speed".

Of course, this is only a generalisation, which does not preclude the adoption of other methods and the occurrence of exceptional cases, so long as the objective conditions and needs exist. However, from the perspective of the overall process and of the steps to be taken, I think that the above-mentioned approach is more logical.

IV

In line with this general approach, it is appropriate first to explore realistic and practicable CBMs. Broadly-speaking, CBMs can be divided into two categories, military and non-military, which are complementary and promote each other. Given the situation in Asia and the Pacific, it would seem that the first step should be taken in the non-military field. This will prepare the ground and lay the foundation for the establishment of CBMs in the military field.

With respect to non-military CBMs, the following are among those undoubtedly applicable to the Asia-Pacific region:

1. Political and diplomatic relations between countries should be established and developed on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and peaceful coexistence.
2. Economic relations between countries should be established and developed on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit.
3. The search for fair and reasonable political solutions to the existing problems of the regional "hot spots" must be expedited.
4. An end must be put to aggression against and occupation of other countries, interference in the internal affairs of other countries and all forms of external expansion and hegemony.
5. International disputes must be settled in a strictly peaceful manner, that is, through negotiation and consultation.
6. No country should seek to impose its social system and ideology upon other countries, much less to interfere in the internal

affairs and violate the sovereignty of other countries under such pretexts.

7. The exchange of staff and the exchange of information in the political, economic, social and cultural fields should be promoted among all countries, especially among those countries whose relations with each other, for whatever reason, are tense.

With regard to military or paramilitary CBMs, the following appear to be relevant to the Asia and Pacific region:

1. Nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.
2. In order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the countries concerned may set up nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace, whose status should be respected by nuclear-weapon States.
3. Military bases, troops and military equipment, especially nuclear weapons, that are set up or stationed on the territory of other countries must be dismantled or withdrawn; no country in the Asia and Pacific region should send military forces overseas.
4. Military equipment retired as a result of disarmament measures to other parts of the world should be destroyed. It should not be transferred to Asia and the Pacific, since such transfers will only constitute new factors of instability in this region.
5. Every country should exercise self-restraint in terms of armaments and military spending and should not seek to achieve a level of armaments higher than that required for its legitimate defensive needs. Every country should also take measures to make its military strategy and the structure of its armed fores strictly defensive in nature.
6. In regions where conditions are appropriate, the countries concerned can and should, through consultations on a voluntary basis, reach arrangements for the exchange and verification of military information and statistics, and for the declaration and mutual inspection of military manoeuvres.

These are only some major aspects described in very broad terms and do not exclude other CBMs.

It must be pointed out that the United States and the Soviet Union still maintain huge offensive armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, including the army, the air force and blue-water fleets, posing a grave

threat to other countries and exerting a negative influence on the political situation and security in this region. They should, first and foremost, take concrete measures to change this situation. In discussing the security of Asia and the Pacific, this ought to be a priority issue.

Certain views and suggestions have been put forward recently by some countries regarding the security of Asia and the Pacific. These ideas are still of a rather preliminary nature and have to be developed further and clarified. We would be willing to give positive consideration to all proposals and suggestions that are conducive to the improvement of security and the maintenance of peace in the Asia-Pacific region, and to make an assessment of all the related ideas advanced by any side in the light of the basic principles mentioned above. Generally speaking, it would not be feasible to establish an Asia-Pacific security mechanism on a large scale overnight. What should be done is rather to let things take their course and give the necessary impetus to this course as appropriate.

The more urgent tasks facing the Asia-Pacific region today are, for one thing, the solution of "hot spot" issues and bilateral disputes; and for another, the strengthening of economic co-operation. The countries concerned should first advance their dialogue and consultations with one another, and take practical measures to enhance trust, reduce tension, put an end to conflicts, and strengthen security. On this basis, they could gradually establish and develop regional security mechanisms, first in small areas, and then, gradually and as circumstances require, extend them to larger regions. This would be a suitable approach in the Asia-Pacific region. Of course, issues concerning the common interest of all the countries in this region should be solved through consultations among the countries on an equal basis. If most countries tend to favour a certain form of consultation, this would certainly deserve serious and positive consideration. I am confident that countries in the Asia-Pacific region can surely find a way to solve their problems that would be appropriate to the conditions prevailing in their region.

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The Korean Peninsula: Security Concerns and CBMs

At the sixth Inter-Korean High-Level Talks, held in Pyongyang on 19 February 1992, the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and the South, an epoch-making event and a milestone in the establishment of peace and the reunification of the country, and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula came into effect.

The North-South Agreement and the Joint Declaration have opened bright prospects for the peaceful reunification of the country and elimination of the threat of war. The commitment of the North and the South to reconciliation and cooperation for the sake of reunification has proved that neither foreign Powers nor differences of ideologies and systems could keep our nation separated. Inspired by the sixth North-South High-Level Talks, our nation has taken a valuable first step towards peaceful reunification. Towards that end, both sides should implement that first Agreement and endeavour to make it fruitful.

Our great leader President Kim Il Sung said:

> "The Government of our Republic regards these historic agreements as precious results of our efforts to achieve the independent and peaceful reunification of our country and will make every effort to implement them."

The most urgent task facing the North and the South is to bring about the reunification of the fatherland and restore peace to the nation. If another war were to break out in Korea, national reunification, not to speak of the very existence of the nation, would be in jeopardy.

Early solution of the problems of peace could save our nation from the threat of a nuclear war, and the elimination of military confrontation could help to bring about national reunification and

unity on the basis of mutual confidence. Now that the North and the South are firmly committed to non-aggression, they have neither a reason to compete with each other nor a need to waste the resources of the fatherland on meaningless confrontation.

In conformity with the spirit of the Agreement, the North and the South should put a halt to the arms race and reduce their troops and military equipment. This would be the most reliable guarantee of non-aggression and of the complete elimination of the threat of aggression by either side.

We have made active efforts in this regard, witness the phased arms reduction proposal put forward in July 1987, the comprehensive peace, package offered in November 1988, and the further detailed proposal made in May 1990 by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). We unilaterally reduced our troops by 100,000 in 1987, and since 1986 we have mobilised 150,000 soldiers of the People's Army to work for socialist economic reconstruction.

The issues of phased arms reduction, confidence-building exchanges of military information and the elimination of nuclear weapons, which are the main elements of the disarmament proposals we put forward, are reflected in the North-South Agreement and the Joint Declaration. The old "armistice" system of the Cold-War era should be abolished in order to make way for the creation of a favourable climate for implementation of the Agreement.

Now that the North-South Joint Military Commission, a new body dealing with military affairs, is to be set up, the armistice-supervising regime has lost its original meaning. Moreover, the United States troops ("United Nations Forces") have no reason to remain in South Korea any longer. It is high time for the United States to put an end to its old policy with regard to Korea and adapt to the changed situation.

Since the problem of Korea's reunification is historically linked with the international relationship, the countries concerned should do their part to create a favourable atmosphere for Korea's reunification. In particular, the United States, the party directly responsible for the situation in Korea, should, albeit belatedly, play the role assigned to it in helping to bring about the reunification of Korea.

Today, however, the relationship between the DPRK and the United States is not in keeping with the current trend and the desire of the people, a fact which indicates that there still exist certain problems on the Korean peninsula that are not in accord with the reconciliation and *detente* of the present time.

The collapse of the Cold-War structure based on confrontation between the Super-Powers helped create the conditions for improved relations between the DPRK and the United States.

If there is to be a change in the international situation the United States should amend its policy with regard to Korea in order to create a basis for lasting peace on the Korean peninsula. It should not lay down preconditions in the process of putting an end to the hostile relations between our two countries. The DPRK and the United States have no reason to remain hostile to each other just because they once fought against each other. Now that the DPRK has become a Member of the United Nations, die United States should reconsider the status of "United Nations Command" and "United Nations Forces" and take appropriate measures. We are pleased with the successful outcome of the DPRK-United States high-level talks held in New York early this year.

It is our consistent stand that the Korean peninsula should be turned into a denuclearised zone of peace. We have neither the intention nor the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. We value independence more than physical life. We do not refrain from doing what we should do because of pressure from others nor do we do things we should not do.

When the main obstacles to our signing the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were removed recently as we demanded, and when propitious circumstances and fair conditions for settling the issue of nuclear weapons were created, we signed the agreement in Vienna, on 30 January 1992, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and we announced publicly that we would accept IAEA inspections as soon as the safeguards agreement was ratified and a written notification of its ratification sent to IAEA in conformity with the relevant articles of the agreement regarding its entry into force.

In accordance with the request of the Deputies of the Supreme People's Assembly, the safeguards agreement between the Government of our Republic and IAEA was examined at the session of the Assembly's Standing Committee held on 18 February, and the Committee decided to submit it to the Assembly for discussion at its session to be held early in April. On 9 April the agreement was ratified.

The North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission, established to implement the Joint Declaration, will make the necessary provisions for the denuclearisation process.

In the future, too, we will carry out our duties under the non-proliferation Treaty in good faith, thereby contributing in a positive way to turning the Korean peninsula into a denuclearised zone, abolishing nuclear weapons and defending the peace and security of Asia and the rest of the world.

The other important thing in ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula is to achieve national reunification. Only when reunification has been achieved can there be enduring peace. With the recent adoption of the North-South Agreement, the necessary conditions have been created between the North and South to put an end to the confrontation that has gone on for almost half a century and to achieve national unity in an atmosphere of reconciliation.

Once a decision has been taken on the formula for reunification, we could say that agreement on the issue of reunification between the North and the South is feasible. Without deciding on the modalities of the reunification, the North and the South cannot, however much they talk about reunification, work together towards the common objective. Now that the North and the South are facing national reunification, they should agree as soon as possible upon the method of reunification and make every effort to bring it about.

Reunification by way of confederation could be achieved peacefully in the present circumstances. The ideologies and systems are different in the North and in the South of Korea. If neither side is willing to make concessions on its own, reunification should be realised by way of confederation on the basis of one nation, one State, two systems and two governments, with neither side the victor or the vanquished.

It would be unrealistic to advocate reunification under one system while ignoring the stark reality that there are different systems in the North and in the South. Moreover, unification of the systems, in any way, cannot be acceptable to either side inasmuch as it would be based on the assumption that one side had won over the other.

Reunification by way of confederation is a very practical and realistic way of national reunification. Our nation is one nation and cannot be divided. Ours is a homogeneous nation, one that has been living on the same territory since olden times, creating a national culture with one blood and one language.

Though there are different ideologies and systems in the North and the South, the nation is still one and its homogeneity still exists. Its heterogeneity related to the different ideologies and systems that have existed for more than 45 years is not a major problem when we

consider the national homogeneity that has been consolidated throughout thousands of years. The differences in ideologies and systems cannot be either a condition for separating a nation into two parts or an obstacle that cannot be overcome on the road to reunification.

Insisting only on the "reunification of systems" without taking account of such practical circumstances and possibilities would indicate opposition to reunification and the intention of protracting the division. Reunification through the victory of one side over the other would only deepen the North-South confrontation and lead to a military conflict and even the national tragedy of a fratricidal war.

Taking these points into consideration, we advocate reunification by way of confederation on the basis of one nation, one State, two systems and two governments. We are convinced that national reunification can be achieved peacefully and most rapidly if this principle is observed.

We have already put forward a proposal for the establishment of the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo as a means of reunification that is in conformity with this major principle. This proposal can serve as the groundwork for a national agreement and certainly as a means of reunification.

The South Korean people and many people throughout the world support our proposal for confederation. Reunification through confederation could be achieved by vesting the regional autonomous governments of the Confederal Republic with more rights on a tentative basis and then increasing the functions of the central government in the future.

North-South dialogue on the process of national reunification should involve a comprehensive negotiation in which not only the authorities of both sides but also broad political forces would participate. The authorities of the North and of the South, all political parties, social organisations and people in all walks of life should develop bilateral or multilateral contacts and dialogues with a view to convening a political consultative conference for national reunification, one which would truly reflect the will of the entire nation and decide on the manner of national reunification.

Through the recent North-South Agreement, the two sides agreed to recognize and respect each other's system on the common understanding that the relation between the North and South is not a relation between States but one within the nation, involving phased

arms reduction and cooperation with a view to promoting national unity.

In our view, the historic documents recently agreed are valuable achievements on the road to independent and peaceful reunification of the fatherland and we will make every effort to implement them.

The Korean peninsula, which has been an area of sharp confrontation, is now joining in the present trend towards *detente* and peace.

The signing of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and South and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, and the recent suspending of the "Team-Spirit" Joint Military Exercises definitely show that a step has been taken towards peace, m any case, the North and the South should neither halt nor reverse this positive trend, but should rather redouble their efforts to remove military confrontation as soon as possible and to achieve a durable peace. The South Korean authorities should stop the "Team-Spirit" Joint Military Exercises not only this year but for good and should take epoch-making measures to discontinue all other large-scale military exercises.

The United States, which has a direct responsibility with regard to peace on the peninsula, should make a practical contribution to the reunification of Korea in conformity with the new reality that the North and the South have committed themselves to non-aggression and reconciliation.

In the future, as in the past, we shall continue to maintain our peace-loving position and make every possible effort to remove the tension between the North and the South in accordance with the spirit of the North-South Agreement and to turn the Korean peninsula into a denuclearised zone of peace.

PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: SEOUL'S PERSPECTIVE

In his annual New Year's address in 1990, President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea, then in the middle of his term of office, stated that the 1990s would be the decade of hope, suggesting a bright outlook for the security environment of the Korean peninsula and inter-Korean relations. Indeed, there have been a series of positive developments on the Korean peninsula over the past two years.

This article examines Seoul's perspective on peace and security on the Korean peninsula in the light of the recent developments affecting

the international environment, security interests, and prospects for arms control between the two Koreas; it also explores the tasks that the Korean Government must tackle in the years to come.

Recent Developments Affecting the Security Environment

Four major developments characterize the recent security environment of the Republic of Korea. First, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Moscow in September 1990 generated a wave of change on the Korean peninsula. Seoul's primary goal in normalising relations with Moscow was to enhance its security and legitimacy *vis-a-vis* Pyongyang. This has been pursued under the name of *Nordpolitik,* a policy which has produced some spectacular successes in the past few years. Seoul has established diplomatic relations with all of the Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union and has set up a semi-official trade office with China. Seoul-Beijing relations have yet to be normalised, but the only question that remains is one of timing.

Seoul's successes in *Nordpolitik* have prompted Pyongyang to begin to adjust to the rapidly changing world, and have facilitated the phenomenon of "cross-recognition" of the two Korean States by the major international Powers. When cross-recognition of the two Koreas is achieved by the major Powers concerned, peace and security in North-East Asia will be further assured and multilateral dialogue on regional issues could develop.

Secondly, the admission of the two Koreas to the United Nations on 17 September 1991 marked the culmination of the changing international environment. In particular, the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to join the United Nations signified a major departure from its long-held position on the issue and could signal other possible changes in the direction of North Korea's foreign policy. North Korea had consistently objected to the granting of admission of the two Koreas simultaneously or to each separately, contending that such admission would perpetuate the division of Korea—even though the two Germanys and the Yemens were unified despite their separate membership in the United Nations.

The simultaneous entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations is an important symbol of the thawing of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula. The parallel membership of the two Koreas could provide a new momentum for the normalisation of relations and the ultimate reunification of South and North Korea. Seoul can help Pyongyang come out of its self-imposed isolation by supporting its membership in

such United Nations-affiliated organisations as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in which the Republic of Korea has already been playing a significant role.

Thirdly, with the emergence of East-West *detente* at the global level, the reduction of the United States forces on the Korean peninsula seems inevitable. In accordance with the Nunn-Wamer amendment to the Fiscal 1990 Defense Authorisation Act, the United States has begun to draw down its ground troop presence and modify command structures to move from a leading to a supporting role for its forces in the deterrence of war on the peninsula. The military presence of the United States in the North-East Asian region will eventually be transformed into principally a substantial air and naval presence.

Since the United States is a maritime Power and the former Soviet Union is a great Eurasian Power, it seems very difficult for them to reach any kind of agreement on arms reduction in North-East Asia. However, the two countries do share the need to keep peace on the Korean peninsula and are taking a common stance in support of the North-South dialogue. In particular, the United States is encouraging the arms control process led by South Korea so as to ensure that the reduction of American forces on the peninsula will not lead to military instability or to a reckless arms race between Seoul and Pyongyang. The United States believes that the one place in East Asia where European-style confidence-building measures—and, in time, arms reduction initiatives—seem relevant is in Korea. With the cooperative relationship between the United States and the republics of the former Soviet Union, there is a growing chance for Koreans to secure peace and solve the unification question.

Fourthly, and most important, there have been two developments on the Korean peninsula widely hailed by the South and the North as major progress in inter-Korean relations: one is the adoption of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North—appropriately known as the "Basic Agreement"—at the fifth round of the South-North High-Level Talks on 13 December 1991, and the other is the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, agreed on the very last day of 1991. Both agreements came into effect on 19 February 1992, at the sixth round of the High-Level Talks.

The South-North Basic Agreement is the first official document governing basic inter-Korean relations consented to by the two Korean Governments. It covers three basic areas of inter-Korean relations:

political, military, and multifaceted exchange and cooperation, overcoming sharp differences in past positions. For its part, the Joint Declaration stipulates, among other things, that neither side would possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities and that a joint nuclear control commission should be established, mandated to carry out inspection to verify that the Korean peninsula is nuclear-free.

The entry into force of the agreements explicitly confirms the opening of an era of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. As an institutional and conceptual starting-point for the inter-Korean system of cooperative relations, the agreements are to transform the present armistice regime into a solid peace structure on the peninsula. Moreover, the significance of the agreements is manifold. Among other things, if they proceed as they are meant to, the agreements will contribute greatly to the improvement of inter-Korean relations, and will lay a firm foundation for the process of peaceful unification of the peninsula. At a subregional level, the agreements will also go far towards making the area a safer and more peaceful place.

Despite these positive and encouraging developments, additional measures have to be taken simultaneously to achieve the ultimate unification of the peninsula, as well as peace and security in East Asia as a whole. Furthermore, striking a balance between the exigencies of local *detente* in Korea itself and those of global *detente* will require careful diplomacy on the part of Seoul. These upcoming diplomatic tasks can be identified by examining Korea's security interests.

SECURITY INTERESTS

The security interests of Korea lie in building peace and prosperity on the peninsula and throughout the globe and in the unification of the peninsula. More precisely, it is in Korea's interests to establish a peace system on the Korean peninsula; non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; regional stability; and peaceful unification of the peninsula.

Establishing a Solid Peace System

Reducing the risk of war and establishing a permanent peace structure are in the vital interest of the Republic of Korea. Since the legacy of the Korean War still remains and since significant military asymmetries continue to exist along the demilitarised zone, there is a real danger of renewed armed conflict and confrontation. In these tense circumstances, nothing is more important than preventing renewed conflict from occurring, and transforming the existing

precarious armistice into a solid peace structure. Against this backdrop, Seoul has vigorously pursued inter-Korean *rapprochement* as was envisaged in the South-North Basic Agreement.

The Agreement, as previously noted, is the most significant step in establishing a peace system between the two Koreas and it could put an end to the four-decades-long inter-Korean confrontation. The Agreement provides that both sides shall recognize and respect each other's system, and endeavour together to convert the present armistice into a durable peace. However, written pledges alone will never bring peace. Sincere and smooth implementation of the Agreement is the key to genuine peace and reconciliation. It should also be noted that the present armistice will continue to be maintained until such a transformation takes place.

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The Immediate Concern

In establishing a solid peace system on the peninsula, the Republic of Korea has some immediate security concerns. The most urgent relates to North Korea's nuclear programme.

For the past several years, Seoul has identified North Korea's nuclear weapons programme as the greatest threat to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula as well as in North-East Asia. According to information from various sources, North Korea is rapidly gaining the capability to produce nuclear warheads. To prompt Pyongyang to end its nuclear weapons programme, President Roh Tae Woo issued, on 18 November 1991, the Initiative for Denuclearisation and Peace on the Korean Peninsula, and one month later, on 18 December, announced that there were no nuclear weapons in South Korea. The two Koreas consequently adopted the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, mentioned above.

Under the Declaration, the two Koreas agreed to ban the possession or development of nuclear weapons and to allow inspections of suspected nuclear facilities. They also agreed to form a joint nuclear control commission to oversee such inspections. In addition to this development, Pyongyang recently signed and ratified its long-delayed safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

North Korea should open its nuclear operations to outsiders and accept not only IAEA inspections under the safeguards agreement, but also South Korea's "challenge" inspections as a complement. Pyongyang should realize that elimination of its nuclear weapons programme will promote peace on the Korean peninsula and in North-

East Asia as a whole. It is the duty of the international community not to allow Pyongyang to acquire nuclear weapons and become a potential source of nuclear-weapon technology for other countries.

Regional Stability

Regional stability in North-East Asia is crucial to Korean security. A balance of power and interests among the four major Powers surrounding the Korean peninsula is indispensable to peace and stability in Korea and the North-East Asian region. As Korea has frequently been a victim in great-Power rivalries in the past, Korean security depends on the emerging of a stable regional environment among China, Japan, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the United States. The presence and forward deployment of the United States troops in Korea, in particular, serves the role of balancing other Powers and especially constraining Japanese military ambitions, for no other Power can play the role of "an honest broker and the final guarantor of security" without threatening Korea.

China and the republics of the former Soviet Union, for their part, as neighbouring countries that have historically maintained interests in the Korean peninsula, can also play an important supporting role in promoting the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula. Their contribution in this regard will serve the interests of all concerned. Seoul is seeking mutually beneficial relations with these countries on the basis of the principle of reciprocity.

Peaceful Unification

Ultimately, Korea's security cannot be ensured without peaceful unification. The two Koreas have ruled out war or "absorption" as a means of unification and are groping for a truly peaceful method of unification. By the term "truly peaceful method" we mean unification through dialogue and agreement between the two sides, as articulated in the South-North Basic Agreement.

Peaceful change in North Korea is also in Seoul's security interests and it is more desirable than violent change as a means to achieve unification. The unification process in this sense must proceed in ways that will not create any instability on the Korean peninsula and in the North-East Asian region.

ARMS CONTROL ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

For achievement of the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula, arms control is imperative. A peace system without any military

confidence-building measures or any arms reduction between the South and the North would be unstable and vulnerable.

Fortunately though, the South-North Basic Agreement contains various measures of confidence- and security-building and arms control with the goal of ending the costly arms race and confrontation between the two parts of Korea. For instance, article 12 of the Agreement provides that the two sides shall "discuss and carry out steps to build military confidence and realize arms reduction, including the mutual notification and control of major movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilisation of the Demilitarised Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction 'and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof.

In addition, the Agreement specifies that a telephone "hotline" shall be installed between the military authorities of the two sides to prevent the outbreak and escalation of accidental armed clashes and a joint military committee shall be established in order to discuss concrete measures for the elimination of military confrontation. To initiate and assure arms control on the Korean peninsula, such measures as those listed above should be implemented as early as possible. On the basis of the faithful implementation of these confidence-building measures, further steps for effective arms control—that is, control of the structure of the military forces—can be explored.

In general, there are three important ways to control the structure of military forces: freeze, limitation and reduction. Freeze is the concept of limiting forces and armaments to current levels or to the levels that existed at a specific date. A freeze can be applied when there is parity in the military balance between conflicting forces. On the Korean peninsula, however, there is a significant disparity in the military balance between the North and the South. Hence, this approach is not relevant for the peninsula.

As for limitations, these are agreed measures that would quantitatively and qualitatively restrict weapons, troops and other supporting activities. The concept is an expansion-oriented arms control approach, allowing certain ceiling levels higher than those that currently exist. Since arms competition can continue even with limitations, however, this concept may be less relevant for the Korean peninsula.

The flaw in the concepts of a freeze or limitations is that arms control on the Korean peninsula should result in reductions, that is, structural control of the armed forces on the peninsula should take a

reduction-oriented approach, aimed at securing a balance through achieving parity in military strength at lower levels. For effective arms reduction between the two Koreas, the following working principles and objectives need to be considered.

1. The final objectives of arms reduction should be the strengthening of stability and security on the Korean peninsula through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of defensive forces at appropriately lower levels.
2. An initial stage of the phased reduction should eliminate disparities on the higher side so that parity at levels substantially below present levels of the lower side could subsequently be established.
3. In the establishment of mutual agreement on the appropriate level of military strength to be maintained in the subsequent stages, the need for self-defence as an independent unified nation should be satisfied, taking into consideration the geostrategic location of the Korean peninsula, the history of foreign intervention, and the changes in the surrounding environment.
4. As a matter of high priority, the capability for hunching a surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action should be eliminated, together with the reduction of weapons of mass destruction.
5. Overall levels of offensive equipment such as tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers, which are verifiable and which are central to the seizing and holding of territory, must be radically reduced in the first stage of reductions.
6. The number of troops may be reduced in accordance with reductions in armaments and equipment.
7. The reserve forces may be reduced in parallel with the reduction of regular forces.
8. Foreign military forces may be gradually reduced and withdrawn in accordance with the progress made in the structural arms control between the two Koreas.
9. Compliance with all agreed measures of arms reduction should be verified through an effective and strict verification regime which, among other things, would include on-site inspection rights and the exchange of information. Appropriate sanctions should be applied to non-compliance and violations of agreements.

10. Towards this end, it is desirable to form and operate an international supervisory group that includes the two Koreas.

CONCLUSIONS: THE TASK AHEAD

As previously noted, there has been a series of developments in recent years that have had a positive effect on the security of the Korean peninsula. It is very important for the Koreans to take advantage of this opportunity in the post-Cold-War era. In this sense, the first challenge for Seoul is to persuade Pyongyang to fulfil the promises of the two inter-Korean agreements. Pyongyang should also realize that written pledges alone will never bring peace or unification. Upon the sincere and complete translation of the agreements into action, the two Koreas can cultivate more areas of common interest, including arms reduction on the peninsula.

At this moment, the most urgent task for Seoul is to solve the problem of North Korea's nuclear weapons programme. As long as the threat of nuclear war persists, it will be impossible to move even one inch towards reconciliation, peace, exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North. Seoul needs to manage its cooperative efforts with the international community effectively so that Pyongyang will eventually be persuaded to give up its nuclear programme.

THE KOREAN CONUNDRUM: PROSPECTS FOR DETENTE AND ARMS CONTROL

Strategic location, rather than wealth, has made Korea the focus of international rivalry since the late nineteenth century. Three of the great nations of the world—China, Japan and Russia—surround Korea. The United States has also become heavily involved in Korea's destiny as an aftermath of the Second World War and the strategic and economic American stake in the Pacific region. The division of the country after the Second World War was a result of super-Power rivalry and ideological differences; it led to the Korean War and the subsequent decades of bitter confrontation.

For the Koreans, resolution of their conflict is virtually synonymous with reunification of the country. For other countries, however, there is no compelling argument for reunification, except as a tension-reducing device; indeed, there is some doubt that the Japanese, for example, want to see a neighbour and potential competitor increase its national power. So far as the international community is concerned, reduction of tension and the avoidance of renewed war are the objectives.

The conflict between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea can be regarded as a surrogate for all of Korea's historic difficulties: the economic and social injustice that the Korean people suffered at the hands of their own traditional aristocracy and then of Japan; the trauma of adaptation to modern industrialised society, with values and styles that are perceived as uncomfortable and foreign; the humiliation of foreign invasion and domination; and the split between the communist and capitalist-liberal approaches to nation-building, intensified by the consequences of the Korean War.

These perceptions have fuelled the accusations of each Korean regime against the other; they have driven the continuing hostility towards Japan, and, more recently, towards the United States as well; they have supported the continuing dedication of the North to communism; they have engendered doubts among intellectuals and students in the South as to the merits of capitalism. Even the dramatic economic success of South Korea in the past thirty years, though it has made Korea economically as well as strategically important, has not yet greatly changed these attitudes.

In the nineteenth century, the misgovernment of a senescent dynasty had engendered poverty and social confusion, much as in China, and the Korean army had declined almost to non-existence. Korea sought refuge in self-seclusion; it was in no position to defend itself against the newly aroused imperialist rivalries of its neighbours, Japan, Russia and China. Japan wanted both Manchuria and Korea for resources and living space; Russia wanted ice-free ports and access to the Pacific Ocean; China wanted to preserve Korea as a buffer zone. All three countries sought hegemony over Korea. Japan's triumph in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars enabled it to take over the country in 1905, and to annex it in 1910.

In forced submission, the Koreans' bitter resentment towards Japan endured and festered. Its most remarkable manifestation was the unarmed national uprising of 1 March 1919, in support of national independence. The Japanese brutally suppressed it. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was perceived by some Korean nationalists as offering new hope for the revival of their nation through revolution. The ideology of communism was added to terrorism as a weapon for national liberation. The resulting split among Korean leaders between communism and anti-communism, left and right, thereafter plagued the independence movement along with factional rivalries.

Liberated from Japan and occupied by Soviet and American military forces in 1945, the Koreans demanded and expected immediate

restoration of their independence. However, they were once again unprepared to organize and defend their country. The Japanese had systematically excluded opportunity for the development of native political leaders or institutions above the village level. Polarisation between left and right made national unity exceedingly difficult. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had the will or the understanding to bridge the gap.

To replace the Japanese, the United States—with the agreement of the Soviet Union—proposed a four-Power, five-year international trusteeship, which was violently opposed by most Koreans as a perpetuation of colonial status. Disavowed by the United States, which had conceived it, trusteeship became a Soviet negotiating ploy. The three-way imperialist rivalry of the nineteenth century was now replaced by the growing confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, which reinforced the existing Korean ideological division between right and left. Despite the universal Korean desire for a united Korea, and the initial commitment by both superpowers to a unified Korean regime, two years of negotiation ended in deadlock.

In 1948, a United Nations commission—denied admission to the North—supervised elections in the South resulting in the creation of the Republic of Korea, led by the ardently anti-communist Syngman Rhee. Subsequently, a Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established on a Stalinist model in the North, led by the communist ex-guerrilla leader Kua Il Sung. Each Government claimed to be the only legitimate one. Both Korean States strengthened their armed forces; both proclaimed their intention to assert control over the entire peninsula; but the United States refused to provide the South with offensive arms. After both occupying Powers removed their troops, the North—trained and equipped by the Soviet Union, spearheaded by Korean troops fresh from battle in the Chinese civil war—mounted a massive surprise attack on the South in June 1950.

The United States, despite earlier indications that it would not intervene, determined to resist the northern aggression, with United Nations support. When the United Nations counter-attack swept into the defeated North, the People's Republic of China came to the North's aid. Two years of negotiations concluded with the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953. The war left both halves of Korea devastated and at least 3 million soldiers and civilians dead, not to speak of millions more mutilated and disabled. It reinforced the enmity between the North and South Korean regimes. The armistice did nothing to resolve the underlying conflict; nor did the ensuing 1954 political conference at Geneva.

After making rapid economic progress with a centrally planned economy for twenty years after the Korean War, North Korea has encountered increasing economic difficulties. Yet, so far, the collapse of the socialist economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe appears to have had little impact on North Korean policies. South Korea, meanwhile, has far outstripped the North on the basis of export-led, government-coordinated capitalism, and seems finally to be achieving political progress as well, after many years of authoritarian rule. At present, the national product of the Republic of Korea is estimated at five to ten times that of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with a per capita ratio of as much as five to one. South Korea is twentieth among world nations in terms of national product, and twelfth-largest international trader.

Despite the enormous military power still deployed on both sides of the military demarcation line, the 1953 truce has held, with only minor violations, for nearly 39 years—probably the longest-lasting armistice in history. Nevertheless, unless and until the basic conflict is resolved, an attempt might be made at renewal of the war if either side were convinced of the vulnerability of the other, with the intention of rapidly seizing enough assets and territory to force capitulation to a unified government of all Korea.

Although political and military confrontation between the two Koreas continues, the last few years have seen significant growth in the dialogue between them, if not in mutual understanding. South Korea formally abjured military conquest in 1960. North Korea, despite its military build-up, its attempts to foment a "people's revolution" in the South, and the attempted assassination of South Korean President Park Chung Hee in 1968, joined m 1972 with the South in a declaration of peaceful unification. The specifics of this agreement were soon ignored and violated, and a number of violent actions by the North in subsequent years contradicted it. Yet, the agreement is still endorsed by both sides.

Both North and South have put forward proposals for reunification through some sort of confederation, and for reduction of tensions. The proposals have differed fundamentally in that those of the North begin with overarching conferences and committees, while those of the South begin with small confidence-building steps such as trade, communication, and reunions of separated families. Nevertheless, sufficient convergence was achieved so that a token exchange of family members occurred in 1985, and a series of conferences at the prime minister level began in 1990. In December 1991, agreements were

initialled on non-aggression, peace and cooperation and on denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula; these were formally signed in February 1992, and joint committees have been established for their implementation.

The military aspect of the inter-Korea confrontation, representing the capability for renewal of the war, is at the centre of concern regarding the tension on the peninsula. The focal points of this concern are the huge number of forces and weapons deployed on both sides; the North's nuclear weapons development programme; the continued presence of United States ground and air forces in South Korea; and the possibility of external involvement, should hostilities resume.

The 1953 Armistice Agreement limited personnel strength and numbers and types of weapons to those present at the cessation of hostilities. However, the restrictions were voided by the unilateral suspension of article 13 (d) by the United States in 1955; the Americans claimed the need to balance violations on the other side. The number of military personnel in the South—Korean and foreign combined—is less than it was at the conclusion of hostilities. In the North, although the number of Korean troops is much greater than in 1953, it is offset by the withdrawal of the Chinese forces in 1958. North Korea has claimed to have demobilised 100,000 troops and to have reassigned 150,000 to civil works; these claims are not accepted by the South or by the United States.

Whatever the personnel levels, the build-up of weapons and aircraft on both sides is huge. The North has a large numerical superiority in artillery, tanks and aircraft, although many of the weapons are of old designs. It has extensive underground fortifications. The South is constantly updating and augmenting its weaponry, as is the United States, which implicitly threatened the use of nuclear weapons to bring about the cessation of hostilities, and introduced them into Korea in the 1950s. According to South Korean authorities, they were removed in 1991 as part of President Bush's policy of eliminating tactical nuclear weapons worldwide.

The four-nation Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission established by the Armistice as a control mechanism still maintains a token presence in the demilitarised zone separating the two sides, but it was deprived of any significant capacity to inspect or verify. The Military Armistice Commission, set up under the Armistice to monitor compliance, has maintained communication between the two commands, although its nearly 500 plenary sessions have served chiefly as a propaganda sounding-board. It has failed to prevent the

remilitarisation, on both sides, of the four-kilometre width of the so-called demilitarised zone. North Korea has proposed the expansion of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to enable it to verify arms reductions; yet it has resisted all proposals to discuss arms control measures in the Military Armistice Commission, insisting rather upon negotiation directly with the United States and South Korea.

Until recently, North Korea demanded the elimination of United States forces as a precondition for discussions of arms control and other tension-reduction proposals. However, the South regards them as important for security. Although the Soviet Union, before its dissolution, and China up to the present have both publicly supported the North Korean position, both countries as well as Japan have privately considered the continued presence of United States forces a useful deterrent to hostilities by either Korean side.

South Korea's capital region, with a quarter of the population and up to half of its industrial and economic strength, lies within two minutes' jet flying time of the front lines. A massive, highly organised North Korean thrust might succeed in moving south of Seoul to the Han River before the defence could hold it, thus greatly altering the balance of power between North and South. The heavily mechanised United States 2d Division, equipped with the most modern weaponry and constantly maintained in peak battle-ready condition, could make the difference in holding the line north of Seoul, and its participation would guarantee that of United States air and naval forces, which would be even more necessary for a successful defence.

The North Korean nuclear weapons programme is currently the most worrisome aspect of the military confrontation. It presumably began some years ago, before North Korea suffered loss of support from the Soviet Union and China and encountered its present economic straits. It must have siphoned off a considerable amount of North Korea's economic resources. South Korea, also, took covert steps towards a nuclear weapons development programme in the mid-1970s, but was dissuaded by the United States: the North Korean programme may have begun in the same time-frame, and may have been inspired by genuine fear of invasion, in view of mounting South Korean military power, and the changing international alignment demonstrated by the United States opening to China, as well as by the quest for power and prestige.

The North has for years called for a Korean nuclear-free zone, and has repeatedly asserted that its nuclear programme is purely for peaceful purposes, but most analysts seem satisfied that this claim,

like other North Korean protestations for propaganda effect in the past, is fake. Objectively, it is hard to see what real advantage North Korea would gain from the development of one or a few nuclear weapons that would offset the financial, diplomatic and moral costs; but the same could be said of North Korea's bombing of a South Korean airliner in 1987.

If hostilities were to resume, both North and South Korea would look to their respective allies for support. Both China and the Soviet Union signed treaties of mutual assistance with the DPRK in 1961. There has always been the possibility that North Korea might mount another attack on its own, then turn to its friends for needed support of a *fait accompli.* This possibility has been greatly reduced in recent years, as the support of both of North Korea's neighbours has declined.

South Korea is linked with the United States through the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and through the presence of American combat forces in Korea. There is also a tenuous link with 15 other nations that participated in the United Nations Command, since a shadow United Nations Command still exists, and a joint statement by the 16 member nations in July 1953 says that in the event of renewed attack, "they would not be slow to resist". Japan would also be involved, because American bases there would be utilised for support; advance consultation with Japan for such use would be required.

The military effort has strained the economies of both sides ever since the Armistice of 1953, with the North apparently putting a quarter of its national product into it, against a sixteenth for the South (although in absolute amount, the annual defence spending of the South has probably surpassed that of the North). The North's military effort must surely be at the upper limit of its economic and human capacity, especially now that concessionary military aid from its allies has largely ceased. The South's military budget is also constrained by newly vocal public opinion. These limits, and restrictions on supply of advanced weaponry imposed by foreign suppliers—chiefly the United States and the Soviet Union—constitute a sort of arms control.

For some years, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has advocated the reduction of forces on both sides to 100,000 persons. In 1986 and 1987, it put forward explicit proposals for a phased reduction of forces, accompanied by verification measures. These proposals, however, did not take serious account of differences in force structures, deployments and weaponry. These and other North Korean proposals have been conditioned in varying degree on the withdrawal of United States forces; recently, however. North Korea has indicated a

willingness to phase the withdrawal along with the reduction of Korean forces.

Neither the Republic of Korea nor the United States has responded positively to the North Korean proposals, nor has either advanced any proposals of its own, except in the area of confidence-building measures. The United States has pointed out that an existing mechanism—the Military Armistice Commission set up under the Armistice Agreement in 1953, which has representatives of both Koreas, China, the United States and other Members of the United Nations involved in the Korean War—could discuss such proposals. The position of both countries has been that North Korea can signal its intention by modifying the offensive deployment of its armed forces and accepting confidence-building steps such as reciprocal observation of military exercises. Offensive deployment, together with North Korea's long record of attempted infiltration, subversion and assassination, and its calls for popular revolution in the South, are taken as evidence that the North's proposals are propaganda rather than substance. South Koreans recall that the surprise North Korean attack of 1950 was preceded by appeals for peaceful unification and offers to exchange political prisoners. In fact, the whole history of inter-Korean proposals and counterproposals aimed at reunification and reduction of tensions is very reminiscent of the long-drawn-out and often fruitless history of arms control and disarmament negotiations between the Super-Powers.

In the Korean peninsula, also, it is probable that arms control measures will result from or accompany, rather than lead to, the reduction of tensions. Economic constraints may also force military reductions, but the lessening of suspicion on the two sides is a key factor. Both considerations relate chiefly to the situation within Korea itself. At the same time, both Korean States are dependent upon outside sources for their most sophisticated weapons, and would also be dependent upon outside sources of resupply—especially the supply of oil—if a renewed war were to last more than three to six months. A United States infantry division, an air wing, and support troops support the defence of the South, and would be involved in renewed hostilities. The international community therefore has considerable potential leverage for bringing about arms control in Korea if the concerned nations agree among themselves upon the levers to apply.

If, as now seems possible, a significant lowering of tensions is achieved, arms control measures will become practicable as well as important for the continuation of the process of *detente.* The obvious first step, as South Korea and the United States have proposed, would

be to provide means of mutual reassurance to both sides against hostile intentions through an exchange of military observers, advance notification of major military movements, and liaison between the headquarters of the two sides by means of an open telephone line ("hot-line"). Such steps were taken in Europe as the beginning of a process of mutual and balanced force reductions, before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. So far none of these proposals has been implemented in Korea, although the Agreement signed between the two Koreas in December 1991 did include establishment of a "hot-line" and notification of major military movements. Like the former Soviet Union, North Korea probably regards secrecy as a strategic asset.

Another category of initial measures would include redeployment of forces in defensive, rather than offensive, positions. The United States and South Korea took a unilateral step in this category by cancelling the annual joint "Team Spirit" military exercise for 1992.

At a later point in the process of *detente,* reductions of forces and weapons will receive serious rather than propaganda attention, in order to lessen the military threat and the burden on the economies of both North and South. The critical factors in reaching agreement, in addition to the building of sufficient mutual trust, are practicability, verification of reductions, maintenance of military balance between forces of different composition and armament, and assurance that Korea—either divided or united—can defend itself against possible future outside attack, however unlikely that may appear at present.

In this category of arms control measures, also, the United States and South Korea have taken the lead by removing American nuclear weapons from the country and by offering to permit inspection by the North to verify their removal. As mentioned above. North and South Korea have signed an agreement to keep the peninsula nuclear-weapon free, and have agreed in principle to an inspection regime, but no specific actions have been taken beyond the organisation of a joint committee. At the same time. North Korea has ratified an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to permit inspection of its nuclear facilities. In addition, the United States is removing 7,000 troops from South Korea, although plans for further down-sizing were suspended because of the nuclear weapons problem.

Other specific categories of weapons could be reduced, if not eliminated, on both sides, as is the case under current United States-Soviet treaties. However, when negotiations between the two sides reach this stage, the need for a balance of forces may necessitate discussion of mutually acceptable mixes of forces and weapons and

means for verifying the achievement and maintenance of agreed limits—in other words, a process somewhat similar to the discussion of mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe.

The role of foreign forces is an important one in the tension-reducing process; they can be both an additional source of security and a potential security threat. Clearly, North Korea regards the elimination of United States forces in South Korea as a major objective. Although the South Korean Government and the majority of its people favour the retention of United States forces for security, many South Koreans, also, would be glad to see United States troops depart if there were alternative means of assuring security. The United States has already pledged to withdraw its forces if the Koreans so desire, although the presence of United States forces in South Korea has been regarded as a significant element in the projection of United States power in the Pacific region.

North Korea has already suggested the expansion of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as a means of verifying arms reduction measures. An expanded NNSC, or some other international peace-keeping force within the demilitarised zone, could reassure both Koreas against attack, as an alternative to United States forces. Such an international force might be less offensive to Korean nationalist feelings than a continued United States presence.

Aside from the United States forces in South Korea, there are other non-Korean forces to consider for the future: the 249,000 members of Japan's Self-Defence Forces, the large armies of China and the Soviet Union, and United States forces deployed in the Pacific area (now totalling about 240,000 outside Korea). While no one of these countries constitutes a military threat at the present time, it would be prudent for Korea not to be defenceless, as it was in the late nineteenth century.

As noted, the North has already put forward a proposal for a phased three-year reduction down to 100,000 troops on each side. The proposal has several unrealistic elements, including the low target force levels; future levels for a unified Korean defence would certainly be no lower than Japanese military strength, and should probably be greater in consideration of Korea's land boundary with China and Russia. However, it would seem useful for the South Koreans to agree to a discussion of the proposal as a test of the North's sincerity in making it, and perhaps as a point of departure for eventual agreement.

To encourage and facilitate movement towards reduction of tensions and arms control in Korea, the time may well have come for a conference among representatives of the four countries chiefly

involved in Korea's security—China, Japan, Russia and the United States—and the two Koreas. Such a conference—which could go beyond a single meeting and become a standing forum for discussion—could deal, not only with the Korean problem, but with other security problems of the North-East Asian region as well.

If the current series of talks between North and South Korea leads to specific, tangible steps towards the reduction of tensions, the resultant atmosphere might be conducive to an international conference. The agenda might include the discussion of transitional peace-keeping arrangements, taking the place of the United States ground forces in South Korea; control of the export of armaments to Korea; and the provision of sophisticated technical means for verification of arms control agreements developed in inter-Korean negotiations. It is possible, also, that the fact of amicable consultation among Korea's neighbours might itself encourage better communication and understanding between North and South Korea.

The deep-rooted confrontation between the two Koreas can be traced in large part to causes a century old. It cannot be remedied overnight. Yet, it must be ameliorated before meaningful progress can be made towards controlling and reducing the military threat. Recent developments offer grounds for cautious hope that movement towards *detente* has begun after decades of freeze, and that regional stability and peace can be achieved. The international community can provide encouragement and support; but it is only the Koreans themselves who can surmount the long-standing differences that block the path to peace in the Korean peninsula.

THE KOREAN PENINSULA: EVOLVING FROM ANTAGONISM AND DANGER TO RECONCILIATION AND SECURITY

The year 1991 was an extraordinary one in contemporary Korean history. Over the previous 46 years, tension, antagonism, confrontation and even war had pulled the Korean people into an abyss of misery and misfortune. An aspiration cherished by 70 million Korean people, both in the North and in the South, has been to remove tension antagonism and estrangement, to prevent the outbreak of a fratricidal war, to achieve reconciliation and cooperation at an early date and, eventually, reunification. Following the Joint Communique proclaimed by the two sides on 4 July 1972 on the principles of self-determination, peaceful reunification and national unity, and after a series of talks

held on and off in secret and in public, the Korean people is about to realize its long-cherished hope.

The United Nations accepted simultaneously the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea as full Members on 17 September 1991. Then, on 13 December 1991, the fifth inter-Korean talks made a significant breakthrough. The Prime Ministers of the two sides signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and the South in Seoul. This wide-ranging pact includes recognition and respect for each other's system, the end of military and political antagonism and confrontation, the conversion of a ceasefire into consolidated peace, the establishment of offices and other specialised committees, a comprehensive exchange between the two sides, and resumed contacts for families that have been separated. On 31 December 1991, the two sides signed another agreement, the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula (see the "Documentation" section of this issue). On 19 February 1992, after completion of their respective legislative procedures, the two Prime Ministers exchanged instruments of ratification of the two agreements at their sixth round of talks in Pyongyang, thereby putting the two agreements into effect. They also signed and exchanged an accord on the establishment of a specialised committee on inter-Korean high-level talks.

During this period, three specialised committees, on politics, on military matters, and on cooperation and exchange, were established. The two sides also agreed to engage in negotiations for the establishment of a joint committee on control of nuclear weapons, a significant symbolic step towards the implementation of the agreements and declarations. The United States and the Republic of Korea stated that they had withdrawn all nuclear weapons in the South and that there were no nuclear weapons left, and they pledged to cancel the annual "Team Spirit" joint military manoeuvre for the time being. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea took a positive attitude on the nuclear issue and signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 30 January 1992, agreeing to accept IAEA inspection. On 9 April 1992, the agreement was ratified.

At the same time, there was considerable progress in the relations between China and South Korea. Following the establishment of trade offices, China and South Korea signed trade agreements, which resulted in an increase in their economic cooperation and in exchanges of staff.

There has been some progress in the negotiations between Japan and the DPRK on the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the DPRK and the United States are both satisfied with the results of their first high-level talks.

All of the above-mentioned events mark a turning-point in North-South relations, indicating that the settlement of the Korean issue has entered a new era. The proposed summit meeting between President Kim Il Sung and President Roh Tae Woo and the results of the meeting will pave the way for full reconciliation and cooperation and for the peaceful reunification of the Korean nation, marking a new epoch in Korean history.

I

There are many reasons for the present favourable situation on the Korean peninsula. With strong national aspirations and the favourable international situation, the two sides have reached an understanding and have made concessions in favour of their national interests, and the leadership has made reasonable decisions. This is the main reason. Moreover, the people on both sides are fed up with military confrontation and the leaders have come to realize that neither side can prevail over or engulf the other.

The military confrontation that has lasted for many years has posed a threat on the Korean peninsula with some 1.5 million well-trained and equipped troops deployed along a military demarcation line of 200 kilometres, in an area of some 220,000 square kilometres.

Both sides have comprehensive armies, navies and air forces. A serious situation such as this, and one which is extremely rare in the world, leads inevitably to the following grave consequences:

First, the Korean peninsula is enveloped in a terrifying atmosphere of an imminent war. The Governments of the two sides are so worried about a surprise attack from the other side that they are engaged in a constant military build-up and are always on the alert. The people along the military demarcation line live in a constant state of anxiety.

Secondly, the protracted military confrontation has resulted in emotional misunderstandings and a lack of confidence. As a result, any gesture, even a goodwill expression of reconciliation, would be suspected of being a malicious provocation or conspiracy.

Thirdly, the situation has resulted in rising military expenditures on both sides. The military expenditure for North Korea constitutes about 15 to 20 per cent of its gross national product (GNP) and South

Korea spends 5 to 6 per cent of its GNP on the military. The increased rise in military expenditures has, inevitably, a negative effect on economic and social development and on the living standard of the people.

Fourthly, the situation on the Korean peninsula endangers the peace, stability and security of the whole of North-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. It has also given rise to complicated, sensitive and abnormal relations among the great Powers concerned, such as the United States, China, the former Soviet Union and Japan, and has affected their relations with the two sides on the Korean peninsula.

The last ice block of the Cold War—the Korean question—has now melted. The thawing of relations indicates the removal of tension, antagonism and distrust. The new cooperation promises economic development and prosperity for both sides. With the forthcoming implementation of the agreements, the two sides are working hard to put an end to the division and the separation of families and to speed up the process of reunification and national unity. Most important, the fuse of military confrontation, which could have become serious at any time, has been removed. What remains now is to become engaged in the task of disarmament. On the other hand, making the Korean peninsula nuclear-free has become a reality rather than a dream. All of these facts are indications of a good beginning in the evolution from antagonism and danger to reconciliation and security. They also show that the Korean peninsula will become a peaceful region, one that will play a significant role in maintaining the peace, stability and security of North-East Asia and of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

II

As the Korean peninsula is being transformed from a precarious element posing a threat to peace in North-East Asia, Asia and the world as a whole, to a positive factor conducive to peace, the Korean people themselves should make a great effort to prevent any possible retrogression. The successful solution to the following important problems has aroused great concern among the people.

First, disarmament. Only when the agreements signed by the two sides are fully implemented and the disarmament is completely carried out can the military confrontation be ended once and for all and overall reconciliation and cooperation be realised. In this regard, the Joint Military Committee formed by the two sides will assume a great responsibility in the future. How many phases should the process of disarmament involve? How many troops should be reduced in each

phase? How to guarantee the implementation of these pacts and carry out effective inspections? These problems cannot be settled overnight.

An appropriate disposition of the reduced troops and weaponry, in particular the weapons of mass destruction, should also be worked out. Nevertheless, disarmament is a trend that cannot be halted. Turning hostile armies into forces engaged in peaceful construction and economic development is a fundamental change and will bring great benefits.

Secondly, transformation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. According to the 1991 Agreement signed by the two sides, the ceasefire will be transformed into a consolidated peace. This is closely related to the abrogation of the Korean Armistice Agreement, and to the positions and functions of the United Nations and of the countries concerned in the process. It is expected that the two parts of Korea will do a good job in solving this problem through negotiations.

Thirdly, military relations with foreign countries. With a change in North-South military relations, the military relations maintained by both sides with big Powers will certainly not remain unchanged. In this respect, military assistance, military cooperation, and agreements on military and security commitments will be affected. The future of foreign troops deployed and of foreign military bases in Korea will be put on the agenda as well.

Fourthly, reunification. The prerequisite for reunification is complete reconciliation and cooperation. Before the current agreement was reached, the two sides had, over the years, put forward their respective proposals as to how to realize peaceful reunification. "The Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" and "The Confederation of Koryo" proposed by the North and "The National Community of Korea" put forward by the South had their own distinguishing features and in some respects shared common ground. However, these versions had not been totally accepted. The main reason was that preconditions for reunification were not ripe. Today, with the pre-conditions established, a version acceptable to both sides will certainly emerge, and in this period certain transitional measures and corresponding approaches are expected to be taken by both sides.

However, because the agreements cover wide-ranging subjects, it may not be easy to implement them. If misunderstanding, disagreements or disputes occur, this will have a negative effect on the development of cooperation and reconciliation. Moreover, some unexpected incidents cannot be excluded.

All of the above indicates that it will take some time to realize reconciliation, cooperation and, eventually, peaceful reunification.

The public statements and actions by the two Koreas indicate a sincere desire on both sides to promote a smooth realisation of reconciliation and cooperation and to prevent any set-back in the way of attainment of their common goal at an early date. People hope that the two sides will cooperate further on the issue concerning the future and destiny of the Korean nation.

III

The fundamental changes on the Korean peninsula will also have important effects on the international community, especially on the relations between the great Powers concerned and the two Koreas, as well as on the relations among the great Powers themselves.

The existing military relationship between the great Powers and the two parts of Korea will certainly not remain unchanged. As already mentioned in the preceding section, in the process of turning the cessation of hostilities in Korea into peace and in eliminating military confrontation and carrying out disarmament, the two Koreas will have to consider the following questions: military assistance and cooperation with the great Powers concerned, the military and security responsibilities to which they committed themselves in the relevant agreements, and the future of foreign troops deployed on the Korean peninsula.

Undoubtedly, external forces played a decisive role in determining whether or not another war would break out on the Korean peninsula in the Cold-War era. It is only because the great Powers concerned wanted to see a relaxed and stable Korea rather than a peninsula fraught with problems that no war erupted after the truce. With the end of the Cold War, global military conflicts no longer exist. A situation of *detente,* reconciliation and cooperation is also emerging in North-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. In these favourable circumstances, especially when North and South Korea have stood side by side, it is impossible for external forces to provoke new military hostilities or war on the peninsula. Besides, the great Powers concerned are unwilling to do so since a stable and peaceful peninsula is in their interest.

From the viewpoint of politics, the development of the situation on the Korean peninsula creates a favourable opportunity for the international community to normalize relations with the DPRK and

the Republic of Korea. In the past, when the two parts of Korea were antagonistic, the relationship between the international community, the great Powers in particular, and the two parts of Korea remained a sensitive and thorny problem. Under the new situation, it is expected that this difficult problem will be solved in the near future. Moreover, as soon as the relations between the two parts of Korea and the international community, in particular the relevant great Powers, are normalised, a new pattern in international relations will emerge which will be beneficial to peaceful coexistence in North-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.

A favourable situation on the Korean peninsula will be conducive to economic cooperation in this region. The possible simultaneous participation by the two sides of Korea in economic organisations and activities in the North-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific regions will round out the membership of these organisations. Effective regional economic cooperation on a wide-ranging basis will greatly enhance economic growth and prosperity in this region.

The international community, especially the great Powers concerned, should also do their best to support and promote the smooth realisation of all-round reconciliation and cooperation between the two parts of Korea at an early date. Undoubtedly, a brand-new, peaceful, cooperative and prosperous Korean peninsula will provide favourable conditions for the maintenance of peace and stability by formulating confidence-building and security measures, including an extensive and effective security mechanism in which all the countries in the region can take part.

As a close neighbour of the Korean peninsula, China greatly appreciates the developments of North-South reconciliation and cooperation and sincerely hopes that the situation on the peninsula will evolve smoothly and that reunification will be achieved as soon as possible. This attitude has been clearly explained in statements by Chinese leaders and in the public declarations of the Chinese Government. Undoubtedly, China will make positive contributions to helping and promoting the realisation of the long-cherished wish of the Korean nation.

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A Perspective from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

With the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, one military bloc became dominant. The Warsaw Pact ceased to exist, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has intensified its role. The process of confidence-building, security and disarmament in Europe was thrown off balance, giving way to intra-national and ethnic conflicts. This is clear proof that nowhere on the planet is there an exemplary regime for confidence-building and security.

Peace, Security and Disarmament in the Asia-Pacific Region

The Asia-Pacific region, still burdened with the legacy of the Cold War, constitutes a threat to international peace, security and disarmament, owing to the actions of certain States poised to fill the power vacuum created in the post-Cold War period.

In recent years, as the economy of the Asia-Pacific region has developed rapidly and its strategic importance has been recognised, powerful countries, supported by their own military strength, have been pursuing policies of domination and hegemony there. Hence military confrontation and the intensification of arms races between countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Another reason for the lack of peace, security and disarmament is the continuation of unjustifiable political and military pressure and threats.

Each country pursues its own interests rather than trying to solve conflicts with its neighbours in a mutually beneficial way. The current situation proves that it is possible to promote regional disarmament and security only after bilateral confidence has been established. As long as one nation is afraid of being victimised by another, confidence cannot be established and, peace, security and disarmament cannot be realised.

Confidence-building starts with dialogue and negotiation, a process that the present situation on the Korean peninsula clearly calls for.

Present Situation in the DPRK

Today our people are grieving deeply over the unexpected passing, in July 1994, of the Great Leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung, whom they hold in higher esteem than any other figure in the 5,000-year history of the nation. They grieve for the loss of their fatherly Leader, who devoted his life to their freedom and liberation, to the prosperity and development of the country and to world peace. We firmly believe that our respected and beloved Leader will always be with us.

Our people could not have transformed their loss into strength and courage had it not been for another Great Leader, Comrade Kim Jong Il, who has been wisely directing the general work of the party. State and army for some time.

Things are going well in the DPRK because the Dear Leader Comrade Kim Jong Il is inheriting what the Great Leader worked for during his lifetime.

Confidence-Building: Key to Peace, Security and Disarmament

The DPRK-United States Agreed Framework

Implementation of the DPRK-United States Agreed Framework is the means at present for establishing confidence and paving the way for peace, security and disarmament on the Korean peninsula.

On 16 June 1994, shortly before his death. Comrade Kim Il Sung met with former United States President Jimmy Carter, who was on a visit to the DPRK, and clarified our position, that the nuclear issue could be resolved through dialogue and negotiations between the DPRK and the United States; confidence-building between both countries was the main approach.

Our Government, honouring the will of the Great Leader, concluded the DPRK-United States talks, which had lasted about a year and half, by adopting the historic DPRK-United States Agreed Framework in October 1994. The adoption is of great significance for giving impetus to peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula and to building peace and security in Asia and the world. The Agreed Framework is an historic document, guaranteed by the two Heads of State, and marks a turning-point in the resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula and in the development of the DPRK-United States relations.

If the Agreed Framework is implemented, hostile relations between the two countries will come to an end, finally leading the way towards confidence, a full resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, and the denuclearisation of that area.

The DPRK Government is making every sincere effort to implement the Agreed Framework. Some forces, however, are spreading rumours which could have a negative impact on implementation and are an attempt to aggravate the situation on the Korean peninsula and to disturb the smooth implementation of the Agreed Framework, which has entered a new stage. Implementation must be encouraged rather than complicated if the nuclear issue here is to be resolved.

A New Peace Agreement

A new peace agreement between the DPRK and the United States would be the principal means of building confidence and defusing tension. It would replace the Korean Armistice Agreement. The Korean peninsula urgently requires legally binding assurances for solid peace.

The Armistice Agreement, as the name implies, is an agreement to enforce a temporary ceasefire, and its implementation mechanism is a supervisory body. The Government of the DPRK proposed 20 years ago that the Armistice Agreement be replaced with a peace agreement, and in April 1994 it renewed that proposal.

The work to build a framework for peace and security on the Korean peninsula through negotiation is already under way with the withdrawal of the Korea-China representation—one side of the signatories of the Military Armistice Commission—and the opening of the representative office of the Korean People's Army, in Panmunjom.

If the new peace arrangement is established, peace and security in this region will be legally assured, since the North and South confirmed their commitment to non-aggression in 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Cooperation and Exchange between the North and South.

Reunification

Reunification of the country is the cornerstone for building confidence, peace, security and disarmament on the Korean peninsula. Last year. President Kim Il Sung took steps that opened up a new phase in efforts towards reunification. The tireless efforts of the respected Leader were geared to the reunification of the motherland and to transforming confrontation into dialogue and negotiation.

Those efforts filled the nation with hopes for reunification. The South Korean authorities, however, took action against the nation and reunification by pointing their weapons at the hearts of their fellow countrymen and taking the road towards a fascist crack-down during the period of mourning for the Great Leader, instead of expressing their condolences as a partner in the reunification dialogue and as a part of the Korean nation.

The policies of our Government are consistent. We maintain the principles of independent and peaceful reunification in great national unity, as set forth by the Great Leader during his lifetime.

The 'Ten-Point Programme of Great Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification of the Country", advanced by the Great Leader in April 1993, constituted a guideline for putting an end to 50 years of division and confrontation. (See Annex for the text of the Ten-Point Programme.) It stipulates that a unified State should be established which would represent all political parties, social organisations and individuals from all walks of life, and would leave intact the existing two systems and two Governments. Furthermore, it is made clear that the unified State—a confederal Government equally represented by the regional Governments of the North and South—should be an independent, peaceful and non-aligned neutral State.

If the pan-national State based on confederation is established, security issues on the Korean peninsula, such as denuclearisation and disarmament, will be resolved as a matter of course. Development of a North-South dialogue would be one of the essential elements in achieving reunification. The main obstacles to the opening of humanitarian exchanges, dialogue and contacts are the existence of the "National Security Law" of South Korea, which labels the members of the same nation as an "enemy", and the concrete walls, symbols of division and confrontation. Therefore, all legal and physical barriers should be removed as soon as possible in order to achieve free contacts, exchange and cooperation between the North and South and to bring about great national unity.

ANNEX

Ten-Point Programme on the Great Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification of the Country

To put an end to the nearly half a century of division and confrontation and reunify the country is the unanimous demand and desire of the whole nation. For the independent and peaceful

reunification of the country it is necessary to achieve the great unity of the whole nation. All those who are concerned about the destiny of the nation—whether they be in the North, or in the South, or overseas, and whether they be communists, or nationalists, rich, or poor, artists, or believers—must unite as one nation, transcending all their differences, and together pave the way for national reunification.

Those with strength devoting their strength, those with knowledge giving their knowledge and those with money donating their money, all should make a tangible contribution to the reunification of the country and development and prosperity of a reunified land, thus putting an end to national division and displaying the dignity and honour of the reunited 70 million fellow countrymen to the world.

1. A unified State independent, peaceful and neutral, should be founded through the unity of the whole nation.

The North and South should found a pan-national unified State to represent all parties, all groups and all the members of the nation from all walks of life, while leaving the existing two systems and two governments intact. The pan-national unified State should be a confederal State in which the two regional governments of the North and the South are represented equally, and an independent, peaceful and non-aligned neutral State which is not aligned with any great Power.

2. Unity should be based on patriotism and the spirit of national independence.

All the members of the nation link their individual destiny with that of the nation, love their nation passionately and unite with the single desire to defend the independence of the nation. They should display dignity and pride in being members of our nation and reject sycophancy and national nihilism that erode the nation's consciousness of independence.

3. Unity should be achieved on the principle of promoting co-existence, co-prosperity and common interests and subordinating everything to the cause of national reunification.

The North and South should recognize and respect the existence of different beliefs, ideas and systems, and achieve joint progress and prosperity, with neither side encroaching on the other. They should promote the interests of the whole nation before regional class interests and direct every effort to the accomplishment of the cause of national reunification.

4. All political disputes that foment division and confrontation between fellow countrymen should be ended and unity should be achieved.

The North and South should refrain from seeking or fomenting confrontation, end all political disputes between them and stop abusing and slandering each other. As fellow countrymen they should not be hostile to each other and, through the united efforts of the nation, they should counter foreign aggression and interference.

5. Fear of invasion from both South and North and the ideas of prevailing over communism and of communisation should be dispelled, and North and South should believe in each other and unite.

The North and the South should not threaten and invade each other. Neither side should try to force its systems on the other or to absorb the other.

6. The North and South should value democracy and join hands on the road to national reunification, without rejecting each other, because of differences in ideals and principles.

They should guarantee the freedom of debate on and of activities for reunification and should not suppress, take reprisals against, persecute or punish political opponents. They should not arrest anyone because of their pro-North or pro-South tendencies and should release and reinstate all political prisoners so that they may contribute to the cause of national reunification.

7. The North and South should protect the material and spiritual wealth of individuals and organisations and encourage their use for the promotion of great national unity.

Both before reunification and after it they should recognize State ownership, co-operative ownership and private ownership and protect the capital and prosperity of individuals and organisations, as well as all interests concerned with foreign capital. They should recognize the social reputation and qualifications of individuals in all domains including science, education, literature, the arts, public debate, the press, health care and sports, and continue to guarantee the benefits granted to people who have performed meritorious services.

8. Understanding, trust and unity should be built up across the nation through contact, exchange visits and dialogue.

All the obstacles to contact and exchange visits should be removed and the door should be opened for everyone without discrimination to

undertake exchange visits. All the parties, groupings and people of all social standings should be given equal opportunities to conduct dialogue, and bilateral and multilateral dialogue should be developed.

9. The whole nation, North, South and overseas, should strengthen its solidarity for the sake of national reunification.

Things beneficial to national reunification should be supported and encouraged in an unbiased manner and things harmful to it should be rejected in the North, in the South and overseas, and all should assist and cooperate with one another, going beyond their own narrow enclosure. All political parties, organisations and the people from all walks of life in the North, in the South and overseas should be allied organisationally in the patriotic work to achieve national reunification.

10. Those who have contributed to the great unity of the nation and to the cause of national reunification should be honoured.

Special favours should be granted to those who have performed exploits for the sake of the great unity of the nation and the reunification of the country, to patriotic martyrs and to their descendants. If those who had turned their back on the nation in the past return to the patriotic road, repentant of their past, they should be dealt with leniently and assessed fairly according to the contribution they have made to the cause of national reunification.

A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The Korean peninsula is a region where arms control and confidence-building measures are badly needed. From 1950 to 1953, Korea experienced a devastating war, and ever since then the arms race between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has continued without any sign of easing. Currently, the peninsula is one of the few areas of acute military confrontation in the world. Along the 155-mile demarcation line dividing the South and the North, about one and a half million heavily armed soldiers confront each other (Table 1). In that situation, there is an urgent need in the peninsula for arms control on a bilateral basis. This need can be explored from four major perspectives.

The Need for Arms Control

First, it is imperative to actualize arms control in order to establish a solid peace system and ultimately to achieve the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula. A peace system without any military confidence-building measures or any arms reduction between the South

and the North would be unstable. Since the legacy of the Korean War still remains, and intense military confrontation exists along the Demilitarised Zone, there are real dangers of renewed armed conflict. The sheer size of the forces arrayed on both sides—a million in the North and 650,000 in the South—is dangerous enough. This military concentration along the demarcation line raises the risk of an impulsive reaction in tense times. The recent downing of a United States helicopter that strayed into North Korea's airspace showed how easily shooting could begin on the Korean peninsula. In those circumstances, nothing is more important than preventing renewed conflict from occurring and establishing a solid peace structure. Arms control will prevent movement towards a South-North war and will enhance military stability.

Second, arms control is needed to release resources for economic development as a long-term strategy for the prosperity of the Korean peninsula. The division of the peninsula and the continued arms race between the two Koreas have brought about a serious security dilemma whereby the more defensive measures one party adopts to increase its sense of security, the more insecure the other party feels. The latter then takes additional measures of its own, which causes the former to take more measures, and so on. That security dilemma has not only undermined political and military stability on the Korean peninsula, but has also adversely affected economic development. There is a need to reduce the military share of the gross national product (GNP) and to enhance the economic well-being of the Korean people.

Third, arms control is needed to overcome the Cold War legacy on the peninsula and to contribute to the stability of the North-East Asian region as a whole. The end of the Cold War has greatly improved the security climate in the region— the immense ideological barrier that gave rise to distrust and hostility among States for decades—has collapsed. While that does not necessarily mean that peace has finally arrived, the improvements in relations between States in the region clearly provide new opportunities for the future. Military confrontation on the Korean peninsula has been a major obstacle to securing peace and stability in North-East Asia. In order to pave the way to a regional security arrangement, the question of a divided Korea needs to be settled first.

Finally, arms control between North and South Korea is necessary to obtain international support in the process of unifying the peninsula. If the two Koreas achieve unification without any arms control measures or arms reduction, a unified Korea will possess enormous

military strength. Among the major Powers in North-East Asia, there is real concern about a *militarily-strengthened united* Korea. No major Power wants a nuclear-armed united Korea. Since Korean unification needs to take place in the context of expanding regional cooperation in North-East Asia, it is desirable to eliminate that negative concern of its neighbours.

TABLE 1: MILITARY CAPABILITY OF ROK AND DPRK

Classification		*ROK*	*DPRK*
	Army	540,000	1,000,000
Troops	Navy	60,000	46,000
	Air Force	55,000	82,000
	Total	655,000	1,128,000
Ground Force			
	Corps	11	16
Unit	Divisions	50	53
	Brigades	21	99
Equipment	Tanks	1,950	3,800
	Armored vehicles	2,100	2,500
	Field Artillery	4,600	10,800
Naval Force			
	Force Combatants	190	434
	Support vessels	60	310
	Submarines	2	26
Air Force			
	Tactical aircraft	520	850
	Support aircraft	190	480
	Helicopters	620	290

Source: Defense White Paper, 1994-1995 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1994), p. 74; and The Military Balance, 1994-1995 (London: IISS, 1994), pp. 178-81.

Recent Security Developments

The Korean peninsula is often described as the "last bastion or glacier of the Cold War", owing to the ongoing acute military confrontation between the North and South. Over the past few years, however, there have been several major developments which have affected the security environment of the peninsula. Three events are worth noting in the exploration of the arms control possibilities between the two Koreas.

First, two important agreements were adopted in late 1991 and early 1992 that demonstrate significant progress in inter-Korean relations: the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Cooperation and Exchange between the South and the North (appropriately known as the "Basic Agreement"), and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Both agreements came into effect on 19 February 1992.

The Basic Agreement was the first official document governing basic inter-Korean relations that was consented to by the two Korean Governments. It covers three basic areas: political, military, and a multifaceted exchange and cooperation—overcoming sharp differences in past positions. For its part, the Joint Declaration stipulates, among other things, that both sides will not manufacture, produce, possess, or use nuclear weapons and that a joint nuclear control commission should be established, with a mandate to carry out inspections to verify that the Korean peninsula is nuclear-free. An additional important commitment is the prohibition of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.

After the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration entered into force, various subcommittees and commissions were established, and a series of subsidiary protocols were adopted in September 1992. Implementation of the agreements and protocols has been delayed, however, by North Korea's unwillingness to develop the inter-Korean dialogue, including its reluctance to be transparent regarding its nuclear programme.

Second, there was a leadership change in North Korea in July 1994, caused by the passing of the North's founder, Kim Il Sung. There has been much speculation about the future of the post-Kim Il Sung North Korea. Although the future of that country, which has been almost impenetrable to outsiders, falls into the realm of speculation rather than prediction, the following assessment seems to receive broad support: North Korea will attempt changes in its economic and external policies, although the nature of change and reform which Pyongyang's new leadership is expected to undertake will be far from wide-ranging.

Third, the United States and North Korea finally adopted an Agreed Framework in Geneva in October 1994 to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. The primary importance of the Geneva agreement is that it provides a framework for the ultimate resolution of North Korea's nuclear issue, which has seriously threatened peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, as well as in North-East Asia,

for the past two years. The Agreement was a compromise and, as such, has received mixed reviews. The centrepiece of the deal is the provision of light-water reactors to North Korea in return for the freezing and eventual dismantling of the North's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities. Complete transparency in North Korea's nuclear activities, particularly its past activities, will not be secured until some time in the future, perhaps as late as five years from now.

Another significant feature of the Geneva Agreement is that Pyongyang has pledged to "consistently take steps" to implement the North-South Joint Declaration of the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and to engage in the North-South dialogue. Pyongyang should re-engage Seoul if it expects rapid progress in implementing those aspects of the Agreement having to do with the overall normalisation of relations and the supply of light-water reactors—aspects in respect to which the ROK will be a major player.

Those three major developments are determining the security environment of the Korean peninsula today and may have a positive effect on arms control in the subregion. If means can be found to reactivate the North-South dialogue, there is a broad agenda for pursuing arms control.

Applicable Arms Control Measures

The types of arms control measures that can be introduced on the Korean peninsula are open-ended. In that regard, the Basic Agreement provides an important guideline. The Agreement, as a road map towards peaceful coexistence, requires the two Koreas to endeavour together to transform the present armistice into a solid peace. It contains specific confidence and security-building measures, as well as arms control measures, the goal of which is to end the costly arms race and confrontation between the two parts of Korea. For instance, article 12 of the Agreement provides that the two sides shall discuss and carry out steps "to build military confidence and realize arms reductions, including the mutual notification and control of major movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilisation of the Demilitarised Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof.

The Agreement and the subsidiary Protocol also indicate that a telephone hot line should be installed between the military authorities of both sides to prevent accidental armed clashes and their escalation,

and a joint military commission shall be established in order to discuss concrete measures to prevent military confrontation.

In addition to the basic Agreement and subsidiary Protocol, existing international arrangements and institutions could also be utilised to facilitate arms control on the Korean peninsula. Currently, various efforts to stop arms proliferation are being employed at both global and regional levels. For instance, coordinated participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which was opened on 1 January 1992, may be useful on the Korean peninsula. The Register asks Member States to provide data from the previous calendar year on an annual basis in respect of import into and export from their territory of seven categories of major armaments. The Register could perform such a confidence-building function if the requested data were provided within the stipulated time-frame by both the South and the North.

The list of arms control measures applicable to the Korean peninsula is clearly open-ended (Annex 1). To initiate arms control, however, measures such as those listed in the annex should be implemented as soon as possible and in good faith. On the basis of their implementation, further effective steps, namely, the control of the structure of the military forces or arms reduction, may be explored. For effective arms reduction between the two Koreas, the following working principles and objectives need to be considered:

1. The final objective of arms reduction should be the strengthening of stability and security on the Korean peninsula through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of defensive forces at appropriately lower levels;
2. The initial phase should eliminate military disparities between the two Koreas and subsequently proceed to further mutually agreed reductions;
3. The appropriate level of military strength to be maintained in the subsequent stages should be mutually agreed. The need for self-defence as an independent unified nation should be satisfied, taking into consideration the geostrategic location of the Korean peninsula, the history of foreign intervention, and the changes in the North-East Asian region;
4. As a matter of high priority, the capability for launching a surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action should be eliminated, together with the reduction of weapons of mass destruction;

5. The overall verifiable levels of offensive equipment, such as tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers, central to the seizing and holding of territory, must be reduced radically in the first stage of reductions;
6. The number of military personnel may be reduced in accordance with reductions in armaments and equipment;
7. The reserve forces may be reduced in parallel with the reduction of regular forces;
8. Foreign military forces may be reduced gradually and withdrawn in accordance with the progress made in structural arms control between the two Koreas;
9. Compliance with all the agreed measures of arms reduction should be verified through an effective and strict verification regime that would include, among other things, provisions for on-site inspection and the exchange of information. Appropriate sanctions should be applied in cases of non-compliance and violation of agreements;
10. Towards that end, it is desirable to form and operate an international supervisory group that includes the two Koreas.

Prospects for Arms Control: Optimism vs. Pessimism

The Basic Agreement and its subsidiary Protocols and the Declaration of Denuclearisation provide meaningful guidelines for confidence-building and arms control on the Korean peninsula. It is important for both Seoul and Pyongyang to fulfil the pledges they committed themselves to in the agreements. Concluding an agreement is only the first step in establishing a peace system. It must also be implemented fully in letter and in spirit.

Over the past few years, however, scepticism has developed about the possibility of implementing the principles and measures envisaged in the agreements. The primary cause is Pyongyang's unwillingness to re-engage in a North-South dialogue. For instance, the DPRK leaders are extremely cautious and reluctant about inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation, as they fear such transactions may have a detrimental effect upon their society. Such concern was reflected throughout the Agreed Framework concluded between the United States and DPRK to resolve the nuclear issue.

DPRK has renewed—most notably since last April— its call for the conclusion of a "peace agreement" with the United States. In the course of nuclear negotiations with Washington, Pyongyang proposed negotiations with the United States on the establishment of a new

peace arrangement on the Korean peninsula. It withdrew from the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), while setting up the so-called "Panmunjom Mission of the Korean People's Army" in the spring of 1994. It has also asked Poland to withdraw from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). Poland is the only remaining member of the NNSC on the North Korean side, as there has been no replacement, since April 1993, for the former Czechoslovakia. At North Korea's request China recalled its delegation from the MAC in December 1994. In fact, the MAC has been virtually defunct since March 1991, owing to North Korean intransigence following the appointment of a ROK general as head of the United Nations side.

The two sides' different approaches to and perceptions of arms control constitute another major source of scepticism. As disclosed in the early stages of the prime ministerial talks, the basic requirements of the DPRK on arms control are threefold: withdrawal of United States forces from the South; denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula; and reduction of standing armed forces on each side to a specific ceiling, such as 100,000 troops. In addition, Pyongyang has viewed arms control as an end in itself, paying less attention to confidence-building and openness in exchanging military data.

In contrast, the Republic of Korea has viewed arms control and its related confidence-building measures as a process of building peace and establishing national partnership with North Korea, working towards the goal of unification. At the heart of Seoul's approach is the belief that arms control and unification cannot be achieved without going through a step-by-step process. As for structural steps, the ROK has emphasised the importance of transforming offensive force structures into defensive ones, reduction of offensive equipment and forces to levels of parity, and elimination of other military asymmetries. Those outstanding differences between Seoul and Pyongyang could be an obstacle in reaching and implementing a further comprehensive agreement on arms control.

There is also room for optimism. That view is based upon recognition of the recent accumulation of positive and encouraging developments in and around the Korean peninsula and a critical assessment of the DPRK's economy.

First, as previously noted, the need for arms control is widely recognised. There is no doubt that arms control is an important means of lessening the risk of war, of curtailing incipient instabilities arising from military imbalances and stimulating an improvement in political relations.

Second, the major trends in the international security climate over the past few years call for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, where the interests of four Powers—China, Japan, Russia and the United States—intersect. The end of the Cold War, the demise of communism, and deepening economic interdependence all compel the major Powers in North-East Asia to avoid military conflict on the Korean peninsula. At least in so far as the peninsula is concerned, they are acting almost as a concert of like-minded great Powers. No major Power wants instability in the Korean peninsula—something which could have tremendous negative impact on the entire North-East Asian region.

Third, arms control makes sense for the DPRK in view of its worsening economy. It is reported to have a GDP of about $US 55 billion, and spends more than 20 to 30 per cent of its GDP on defence. Moreover, North Korea's economy has contracted for four years in a row—down in 1993 by as much as 25 per cent from the 1989 level. The high cost of maintaining the world's fifth largest regular army of approximately one million soldiers has exhausted North Korea, which has one of the poorest economies in the world. Just as the former Soviet Union was stretched to the breaking point trying to match the United States and its allies militarily, so North Korea has suffered *vis-a-vis* South Korea. Hence the pursuit of an arms control policy may appear to be a compelling strategy to Pyongyang.

Conclusion

Arms control on the Korean peninsula requires that both South Korea and North Korea move away from their antagonistic relationship, that they negotiate with each other to provide avenues for resolution of political and military disputes or prevention of miscalculations and misperceptions which could escalate into military conflict. Against that background, enhancing security and stability on the peninsula, achieving peaceful coexistence, and fostering unification become the ultimate objectives of arms control in Korea.

To initiate arms control on the peninsula, the measures envisaged in the agreements adopted by the South and the North should be implemented as early as possible and in good faith. On the basis of sincere and complete implementation of such confidence-building measures, further steps for effective arms control, including arms reduction, may be explored. At the moment, the two sides lack the solid political will to pursue arms control and to investigate mutual interests. Pyongyang should abandon its reservations and re-engage in the Korean dialogue on a bilateral basis. It should recognize that

the key to ultimate unification and the best hope for long-term stability on the Korean peninsula rest in the hands of the Korean people; thus direct negotiation between the two Koreas is essential.

To emphasize the importance of bilateral negotiations between the two Koreas, however, is not necessarily to exclude the role of external Powers in the region. Given the political conditions surrounding the Korean peninsula, any fundamental change in the inter-Korean situation would, in the long run, require the support of the international community, particularly the United States, Japan, China and Russia. The four major Powers in the region could support the North-South dialogue, help in the easing of tensions, facilitate discussion of common security concerns and possibly guarantee the outcomes negotiated between the two Koreas.

ANNEX

Confidence-Building Measures on the Korean Peninsula

The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation is an ambitious document committing North and South Korea to build confidence and improve relations in political, security, trade, and other areas. Among its provisions are:

Reconciliation Measures

- Respect for each other's political and social systems; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; renunciation of propaganda, sabotage, and subversion; and a commitment to cooperate in the international arena;
- Resolution to transform the Military Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953, into a "solid State of peace";
- Establishment of a joint reconciliation commission and a working group to ensure implementation and observance of the agreement.

Non-aggression Measures

- Non-use of force, peaceful resolution of disputes, and prevention of accidental armed clashes;
- Establishment of a joint military commission to negotiate confidence and security-building measures and arms reduction accords on notification and limitation of military exercises; peaceful use of the demilitarised zone; exchanges of military personnel and information; phased reduction of armaments;

elimination of weapons of mass destruction and surprise attack capabilities; verification provisions; and installation of a hot line between "military authorities".

Trade, Exchange, Cultural and Humanitarian Measures

- Increased trade, economic development, and cooperation;
- Increased travel, communication, and educational contact;
- Family reunions and visits.

The Joint Decaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula includes a range of CBMs specifically designed to address the nuclear issue.

- Not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons;
- Not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment;
- To use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes;
- To verify compliance upon the request of one party but agreed to by both;
- To ensure implementation through the establishment and regular meeting of a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

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Security Concerns in South-East Asia and the Pacific: An ASEAN Perspective

The great diversity that characterises the countries of the Pacific region in so many respects is reflected also in the diversity of their perceptions of threats to their security. In terms of security, therefore, the Pacific region is not so clearly divided as Europe, which since the end of the Second World War has been divided primarily between East and West, or roughly between the forces of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact, apart from some traditionally neutral Powers outside either of the two military alliances.

That is not to deny the fact, however, that the East-West relationship of competition or even confrontation over the past four decades has also had its impact on the region, especially since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which marked the beginning of the extension of the United States containment policy against what was then perceived as the world-wide Communist threat from Europe to the Pacific region. This explains the involvement of a certain number of countries in the region such as Japan and South Korea in north-east Asia, the Philippines and Thailand in South-East Asia, and Australia and New Zealand in the South Pacific in security alliances with the United States, whether on a bilateral or a multilateral basis, against the Communist threat, be it the Soviet or the Chinese version or, at some stage, both.

On the opposite side, though less intensive, less extensive, and not on a multilateral basis, we may note the Soviet bilateral alliance with North Korea and Vietnam. While some ASEAN countries have continued to be associated with the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in the five-Power defence arrangement, even though without a well-defined perception of a potential source of external threat, a large majority of the countries in the Pacific have remained

uncommitted or have opted for non-alignment in their defence and foreign policy.

Changing alignments, meanwhile, both among Communist Powers and between Communist and non-Communist Powers in the Pacific, have proved such a perception of the world-wide Communist threat to be over-simplistic for the region. They have also helped reinforce the diversity and complexity of the question of threat perception among the countries of the Pacific, especially as far as external forms of threat are concerned. And when it comes to the point, most of the countries in the region would tend to revert to their more "traditional" perceptions of threat shaped by their historical backgrounds, geopolitical set-up, or other social, political, economic and cultural factors.

Thus, in the light of the Sino-Soviet split in the past some countries have come to make a distinction between the Soviet and the Chinese threat, one more or less real or imminent than the other. Indonesia and Malaysia in South-East Asia, for instance, have been generally more concerned over the Chinese threat, however defined, than the Soviet threat. Since the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1978, however, Thailand, as a "front-line State", has felt more threatened by Vietnam. And the Kampuchean conflict, being in a sense a reflection not only of the Sino-Soviet dispute but, more important, a manifestation of the Chinese-Vietnamese conflict, has encouraged Thailand to seek an alignment with China, whose *rapprochement* with the United States as well as Japan, beginning in the early 1970s, may have helped to make that alignment a lot easier than it would otherwise have been. At the same time, Thailand has considered the Soviet Union a friend of Vietnam, thus a friend of an enemy, more of a potential external threat than China, a perception that has been shared also by Singapore.

The security concerns of the countries of the Pacific region, therefore, do relate to a large extent to the great Powers. But while the atmosphere of the Cold War has had its impact on the security orientation of these countries, their perceptions of threat to their security have not been confined solely to the non-Communist or anti-Communist division of the world. Indeed, China and the Soviet Union both happen to be big and Communist Powers. Even so, some distinction has been made between these two, especially as far as the countries of South-East Asia are concerned, as in the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand referred to earlier. Furthermore, although Japan is an ally of the United States, some countries in east and South-East Asia, including some allies of the United States as well, have continued to

be concerned over the possibility of a future threat posed by the re-emergence of Japanese militarism.

Finally, mention must be made of a perception of threat posed by neighbouring countries, Communist or non-Communist, big or small. The case of Thailand's concern with the Vietnamese threat has been made earlier. Because of past experience, however, there may be some lingering suspicions on the part of such countries as Singapore and more recently Papua New Guinea, of a possible threat posed by their giant neighbour, Indonesia.

Thus, as far as external threats are concerned, there is indeed little commonality of threat perception among the countries of the Pacific region, including South-East Asia. Yet, it is interesting to note that the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), now comprising Brunei Daressalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, was established more than two decades ago on the primary basis of a common security concern over a certain form of external threat to their national security, as well as to the security of the South-East Asian region as a whole. This was a perception, commonly shared by its member countries, of possible external interference in the domestic or regional affairs of South-East Asia, which would threaten their sovereignty, national independence and integrity, and the peace and stability of the region.

Past experience has shown, however, that external interference, particularly by major Powers, has always been invited or at least made possible by domestic or inter-State conflicts in the region itself. Thus, what was in effect a domestic conflict or a civil war in Vietnam involved United States intervention that created the Vietnam War, which, if less directly, in turn involved Soviet and Chinese intervention. Confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia likewise provided room for external intervention by major Powers that came to the aid of their respective protagonists. The most recent case has been that of the Kampuchean conflict, which invited the Vietnamese invasion, and either directly or indirectly Soviet and Chinese intervention.

Thus, ASEAN was established in 1967 out of the awareness on the part of its member countries of their primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and their security from external interference. It was a manifestation of their determination to promote good-neighbourly relations among themselves, and in so doing to prevent inter-State conflicts and thus external interference in the regional affairs of South-East Asia. The Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South-East Asia, which was signed at the

first ASEAN summit meeting in Bali in 1976, was to give expression to their renunciation of force in the solution of inter-State disputes and to provide a mechanism for the solution of such disputes by peaceful means.

Indeed, the threat of external interference has been a major preoccupation of the ASEAN countries since the establishment of the Association. The fullest expression of this preoccupation is the ASEAN proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) for South-East Asia.

The promotion of regional co-operation within the framework of ASEAN can therefore be regarded as a confidence-building measure of great significance. Through ASEAN regionalism the member States would not only be able to prevent or at least to minimize regional conflicts and endeavour to solve such conflicts by peaceful means, thereby reducing the possibility of external interference, but they would also be able to use their resources for national development, which would otherwise be allocated for defence purposes. In this sense regional co-operation would also imply some degree of regional disarmament and arms control.

More important, the pursuit of their national development would enhance their national resilience. This would not only reduce their reliance on external major Powers to ensure their security, but it would also help them to cope with domestic threats to their stability in the forms of subversion and rebellions, to which most of the ASEAN countries, and indeed the countries in South-East Asia and beyond in the Pacific, have been continually exposed. Such subversive and rebellious activities have been motivated by an ideological, particularly Communist background, by religious, particularly Moslem, fanaticism, or by separatist aspirations. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in the ASEAN region, and Burma and Kampuchea in the wider region of South-East Asia, and Papua New Guinea in the South Pacific have all gone through the experience of one form or another of domestic conflict, whatever its motivation. Kampuchea has not been able to solve this kind of problem to the present day. The same is true with Burma. And what has recently happened in Papua New Guinea with the Bougainville affair, as well as the very recent coup attempt in the Philippines against the Aquino Government, has confirmed the common concern among the ASEAN States and other countries of South-East Asia and beyond in the Pacific over the threat to their domestic stability posed by such internal conflicts.

As mentioned previously, not only regional but also domestic conflicts may provide room for external interference. Whether or not they do, of course, would depend on certain factors. One of these is the extent to which a particular country is linked to the strategic calculations of a major Power. Another factor is the developments in the major-Power relationship. The more competitive and antagonistic that relationship becomes, the more strongly the major Powers tend to engage in interference in the domestic or interstate conflicts among the countries of the region in so far as they are capable of doing so and to the extent that such interference serves their own interests at a given time. Indeed, in the latter case a major Power might not even hesitate to instigate such a domestic or regional conflict, in which it could intervene for its own strategic or political ends. And such interference, given the antagonistic nature of the major-Power relationship, might involve the regional States in a wider great-Power confrontation.

Great-Power detente—particularly the Sino-United States *rapprochement* beginning in the last decade, and the current Soviet-United States and Sino-Soviet detente—does reduce the possibility of external interference, at least in the military sense. Such detente helps create a more peaceful international climate favourable to the national developments of the countries of the Pacific, including South-East Asia. It will reduce the possibility of these countries getting embroiled in a great-Power confrontation. That great-Power detente does reduce such a possibility and the threat of external major-Power interference may be attested to by the fact that the recent conflict situation in Burma, the separatist rebellion in Papua New Guinea, and the conflict situation in the Philippines created by the recently rather frequent coup attempts against the Aquino Government have not indicated any signs of external interference, except in the case of recent events in the Philippines, in which the Aquino Government did invite limited United States intervention, and the continuing conflict in Kampuchea, which has continued to involve the might of external Powers behind the warring factions.

It does not necessarily follow, however, that the kind of security consideration or concern that has motivated the establishment of regional co-operation of ASEAN is no longer relevant. For one thing, in spite of detente the great Powers are likely to continue their competitive, if now less militaristic, relationship. This means that the countries of the Pacific, particularly South-East Asia, may continue to be objects of great-Power rivalry for political or economic influence. It

follows that they will continue to be subject to external interference, if less exposed to the danger of entanglement in great-Power armed confrontation.

Indeed, such great Powers as the Soviet Union and China are at the moment preoccupied with their domestic problems, particularly political and economic reforms. But there is still some degree of uncertainty as to their future international behaviour once all these domestic problems are over.

For another, good-neighbourly relations are not something to be taken for granted but to be continuously fostered through the promotion and expansion of regional co-operation and confidence-building measures. Thus, the ASEAN countries, and it is hoped all the countries of South-East Asia and indeed of the Pacific region, should be able to use and benefit from the opportunity provided by the new international climate marked by a reduction of tension through great-Power detente to foster trade and economic relations so as to enhance their national development. In so doing they would enhance their own national, and thus regional, resilience.

The regional co-operation of ASEAN was established, in effect, as an effort on the part of its member States to put their own houses in order. In the light of current developments in international relations, such a motivation continues to be of great relevance, especially now that a greater opportunity has presented itself. It would continue to be a manifestation of their determination to bear the primary responsibility for the creation and maintenance of their peace, security and stability, individually as well as collectively for the region as a whole.

Moreover, given the continued reduction of international tension created by the great-Power detente and, as far as South-East Asia is concerned, given the prospect of the solution of the Kampuchean conflict in the near future, a conflict which has preoccupied the ASEAN and other South-East Asian countries for the past decade, there is no place for complacency inasmuch as another potential source of regional conflicts seems to be looming on the horizon. This is in the South China Sea, where territorial and jurisdictional claims and counter-claims over the islands therein, particularly the Spratleys and the Paracels, involve China and Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines. Indeed, some armed clashes have taken place over the issues between China and Vietnam. It does not seem inconceivable that a future conflict involving the various claimants may eventually invite external major-Power intervention as well.

The growing institutionalisation of confidence-building among the ASEAN member States in the form of continuous interaction, intercommunication and mutual consultations, the renunciation of the use of force, and the employment of peaceful means for the settlement of disputes may be a model for a future pattern by which the possible emergence of conflicts in the South China Sea may be dealt with. Only then will ASEAN and South-East Asia be properly prepared to face the challenges of the Pacific century with the necessary confidence and capability.

COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY NEEDS IN THE SOUTH-EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGIONS

In many countries in the South-East Asian and Pacific region, security concerns have moved further and further away from the more military and defence-oriented perspective to that of the achievement of political, economic and social stability. In the first few years following the Second World War, when many of these countries remained under colonial rule or some form of tutelage by colonial Powers, security issues were primarily viewed as their colonial mentors viewed them. The domination of international relations by super-Power competition symbolised by the Cold War led countries in many parts of the world to view security primarily from this perspective. Consequently, security was equated with defence and military concerns.

Decolonisation and the moderation of super-Power competition through limited detente between the United States and the Soviet Union contributed to a change in this perspective of security. As more and more countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and elsewhere emerged from colonial tutelage, they began to realize that their security concerns related primarily to political, economic and social survival and stability. While it is recognised that a stable external environment, initially guaranteed by a combination of forces conducive to peace and stability, is necessary in order that they may be able to concentrate their efforts and resources upon the solution of these internal problems, nevertheless their primary security concern lies in the achievement of internal political, economic and social stability.

Thus, in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, the consensus is that their primary security concerns are political stability, economic development and social harmony. A politically stable country would not have the virus of instability to spread to its neighbours. A country that is economically developed would have a high stake in the preservation of a regional order

conducive to the sustenance of economic progress and would presumably not engage in military adventurism disruptive of that order. At the same time, social harmony is an important element of political stability.

The same concerns may be said to apply to the mini-States in the Pacific region, States which will never be able to guarantee the security of their population and other resources through military means. Like their ASEAN neighbours they aspire to political stability, economic progress and social harmony as security goals. This does not mean, however, that military and defence concerns no longer enter into their security considerations. They do, but for many of them the primary sources of security concerns remain internal; they are not military or defence in character.

In this consideration of security concerns in South-East Asia and the Pacific, attention is focussed on selected countries. These countries may be divided roughly between the less developed and the developed. Among the former are the ASEAN countries, Indochina, Burma and the Pacific island countries, and among the latter are Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The security concerns of the latter group are markedly different from those of the former, because of their size, degree of political stability, level of economic development, extent of social cohesion, and the scope of their regional and global commitments. In a rapidly changing world, the smaller countries in the South-East Asian and Pacific region continue to grapple with fundamental political, economic and social issues, long since resolved by their more advanced neighbours. These fundamental issues continue to dominate their security concerns.

External Environment: Towards a More Benign Order?

The last half of the decade of the 1980s saw remarkable changes taking place throughout the world. Not only were there significant improvements in super-Power relations in what had been areas of great conflict and tension such as arms reduction, but remarkable internal changes in socialist societies have transformed the context and perhaps even the texture of international politics to the extent that traditional security concerns of even the advanced countries in the region could change. The conclusion of the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—the INF Treaty—in December 1987 provided for the dismantling of all such nuclear missiles and also established the most extensive system of arms inspection ever to be accepted by both States.

There remain, however, several issues that need to be resolved, including the issues of central strategic systems, chemical weapons, conventional weapons and forces, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which the Bush Administration will now have to tackle with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev.

Super-Power detente has been facilitated by the change in Soviet political leadership. With Gorbachev at the political helm, *perestroika* and *glasnost* have become guiding principles of Soviet domestic and foreign policies. These have had spill-over effects throughout the socialist world as old-style political leaders began to be replaced by new ones, either through elections or other processes. These changes were followed by the initiation of more open political and economic systems and wider-ranging foreign relations. A notable exception to this change is China, whose violent suppression of pro-democracy elements in June 1989 led to tighter political control by its conservative leaders.

Super-Power detente influenced the initiation of normalisation processes in the relations between the Soviet Union and China, between India and China, and even between ASEAN and Vietnam. In the Asia-Pacific region, the only major relationship that has, apparently, been little influenced by these general trends is the Soviet-Japanese relationship, which continues to be characterised by caution and suspicion. Part of the reason behind this seems to be the. apparent inability of the United States to develop and initiate a creative and meaningful response to the Soviet initiatives, which inability leads its allies in the region to adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude towards these initiatives.

On the whole, however, these developments could mean the emergence of a more benign external environment, in which super-Power competition and confrontation would no longer be the primary characteristics of the international scene, where regional co-operative efforts could be developed or enhanced, and where the maintenance of a lasting regional order could become a shared aspiration on the part of countries which would now be concentrating their efforts and resources on the achievement of internal political, economic and social stability.

Security Concerns of South-East Asia

As noted above, ASEAN countries consider internal stability to be their primary security concern. Whether called "national resilience", "comprehensive security" or "total defence", the ASEAN countries

believe that military security is a limited kind of security, that genuine security lies in internal stability and strength, and that this can be achieved through the promotion of economic development and social harmony.

The Indonesian doctrine of national resilience was developed after the institution of the "new order" following the ouster of Sukamo in 1965. It seeks to overcome the inherent weaknesses and vulnerabilities of Indonesia due to the vast archipelagic character of its territory, its location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, its ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity, its vast and rapidly growing population, and its increasing income disparities. These vulnerabilities could lead to fragmentation and could invite foreign intervention. Hence, stress is placed on the need to unite the people through the common ideology of Pancha Shila, a strong political leadership with the military, the father of the nation, playing the dual function of military defence and socio-political agent, and a development-oriented, disciplined, nationalist and politically conscious citizenry.

National resilience stresses self-reliance as the key to national security. Building internal strength rather than relying on external support is the preferred Indonesian option. Hence, it pursues a policy of non-alignment, one that has been described, however, as tilted towards the West.

With respect to external security threats, Indonesia considers China, rather than the Soviet Union, to be the major long-term threat to itself and to the region. Consequently, it has been the most cautious among the ASEAN countries in normalising its relations with China, and until the Thai initiatives in Indochina, the most benign in its attitude towards Vietnam.

Malaysia's comprehensive security posits the inseparability of political stability, economic success and social harmony from national security. Military security, accordingly, is viewed as an insufficient basis for the security of the nation. As Malaysia is multiracial, the achievement of social harmony is considered to be a necessary component of national security. Malaysia also views a secure external environment as a requisite of national security. Such an environment is one that is conducive to, and supportive of, its internal political and socio-economic development.

From the Malaysian viewpoint, China also remains a long-term external threat, although to a lesser extent than it is viewed to be by Indonesia. The reason for this is its large and relatively more affluent

and better educated Chinese population, whose advantage is being balanced by Malaysian policies in favour of its Malay majority.

This comprehensive, or total, approach to security, as well as its internal focus, is common among the rest of the ASEAN countries. In the Philippines, where the Communist insurgency remains the main security threat, the multifaceted and comprehensive character of security is well recognised. The Philippines approach to counter-insurgency takes this into account as it involves the application not only of military power, but also of political, socio-economic and psychological resources to the insurgency problem.

In terms of political stability, political succession is a security concern shared by ASEAN countries. As their leaders advance in age, the issue becomes all the more pressing, for while succession mechanisms might be in place, the certainty that they will work is open to question. Even for countries with an overwhelming mandate for the return to constitutional rule, such as the Philippines, the political decay of the previous dictatorial regime continues to wreak havoc upon the political system. Disruptive events such as the six attempts made to topple the Government by *coups d'etat* have characterised the Philippine political situation since the democratic restoration began in 1986.

The process of political succession is a crucial element in the maintenance of stability. Without effective succession procedures, political stability would be seriously impaired as various groups would manoeuvre to gain political power through violent means the moment a power vacuum formed.

Another concern in ASEAN countries is rapid population growth in the face of uncertain economic development. This is true with regard to Indonesia and still more in the case of the Philippines. Wide disparities between the few rich and the majority poor remain a problem and could trigger or exacerbate social unrest. The revolution of rising expectations could inflict further damage on the social fabric, which is already fragile, especially as regards ethnic communities which perceive the inequalities of the system as being loaded against them.

While there is consensus on the comprehensive character of security, ASEAN countries have divergent views on the sources of external threat. As already noted, Indonesia and Malaysia consider China to be the principal long-term threat to themselves and to the region. On the other hand, Thailand remains close to China even as it has revised its policy towards Indochina, while the Philippines prefers to normalize relations with both China and the Soviet Union. Although committed

to ASEAN unity, the continuing problem over Sabah between the Philippines and Malaysia has prevented the two countries from reaching solutions on other issues, such as overlapping exclusive economic zones. It has also blocked the forging of closer ties between them.

On the issue of China, Singapore has moved closer to China faster than either Indonesia or Malaysia, but has maintained its policy of recognising Taiwan *de facto* as a separate country. These differences in the perception of external threats have been an important obstacle to the emergence, not only of a common policy *vis-a-vis* their more powerful neighbours, but also of a common external security strategy among them.

Last but not least, ASEAN countries continue to aspire after a peaceful and lasting solution to the Cambodian problem. Vietnam's unilateral decision to withdraw its forces from Cambodia was a welcome move, just as the ASEAN sponsorship of the mechanism of the Jakarta Informal Meetings was an expression of their collective hopes. With the collapse of the Paris talks and the failure of the second Jakarta Informal Meetings, the eventual solution to the Cambodian problem seemed more remote as the Khmer Rouge launched new offensives late in 1989.

Security Concerns of Other South-East Asian Countries

To a large extent, this perspective of comprehensive security is shared by other South-East Asian countries. While external security concerns continue to remain important, the need to achieve political stability, economic development and social harmony is clearly an important component of national security for other countries in South-East Asia. While Vietnam continues to view China as a principal threat because of the latter's fraternal ties with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, it must nevertheless seek to maintain political stability and economic progress if internal security is to be assured.

To this end, Vietnam appears to be poised to seek economic ties with the West, Japan and ASEAN once again in order to rehabilitate its economy, which had been ravaged by decades of war. Vietnam needs to look elsewhere than to its partners in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance because the latter would not be in a position to extend economic support and assistance inasmuch as they are also in the process of internal economic reform and rehabilitation. Besides, the limiting of economic ties to socialist countries has not led to economic progress in the past. There is also greater security to be had

in diversifying economic ties with as many countries in the world as possible.

Thus, Vietnam welcomed the invitation of the Prime Minister of Thailand to turn Indochina "from a battlefield into a market-place". Vietnam seems prepared to allow the intrusion of free market forces into Laos and Cambodia as well, so long as the process in these two countries does not proceed ahead of that in Vietnam.

In Burma, the immediate task of the military government which succeeded U Ne Win in 1988 was to hold the country together amid political turmoil and violence, a bankrupt official economy and unabated ethnic insurgency. The immediate and main security concerns of the country could only consist of those related to political survival.

The military government has allowed a certain amount of economic liberalisation in order to ease the burdens of a bankrupt economy. It has also allowed the entry of foreign private capital in the exploitation of its natural resources, particularly Thai participation in teak logging and fishing, joint ventures with foreign groups in export and import trading, and oil exploration and regularisation of counter-trade with China.

Whether or not these economic measures would provide a modicum of economic stability to Burma remains uncertain. Equally uncertain is the future of political stability where continued military rule may not be conducive to political reforms, including the holding of fair and honest elections in May 1990. Aung San Suu Kyi, perhaps the most popular opposition figure, noted that the real issue of free and fair elections was whether political and human rights would exist prior to the elections, permitting the free conduct of the campaigns, rather than at the time of the elections.

Ethnic insurgency has also been a security concern since 1949 when the Karens started their revolt. Meaningful sharing of power could be the key to the resolution of the problem of minorities, one which no government of Burma has so far seriously considered. Ethnic insurgency is complicated by the drug trade, reportedly the means of financing these revolts. Their persistence does not augur well for economic development inasmuch as defence expenditures would continue to be high as military power continues to be the enforcer of national unity in Burma.

Security Concerns in the Pacific Region

Japan

While Japan subscribes to the doctrine of comprehensive security, its external security concerns command a great deal of its attention.

The primary source of external threat remains the Soviet Union, largely because of its continuing occupation of the northern territories and its fortification of some of them. However, historic rivalry with China remains an important consideration in Japanese calculations of security. The Middle Kingdom syndrome is thought to be only temporarily dormant, and likely to be revived once Chinese modernisation plans have been achieved.

Because South-East Asia remains one of the most important sources of raw materials and cheap labour, Japan considers the stability of this region to be important to its own security. This region also controls the vital sea lanes of communication through which its oil supplies from the Middle East pass—energy supplies that fuel Japanese industries. Hence, it has maintained an active interest in the economic development and political stability of the region. To this end, Japan has been a major contributor not only to investments, but also to official development assistance and trade for ASEAN and, to a lesser extent, for the other countries in South-East Asia.

A beneficiary of the security umbrella of the United States in the region, Japan seeks continued American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, especially because of its assessment that Soviet military strength in the region remains a force for instability. It is generally believed to be likely that the reduction or withdrawal of American military presence would be followed by Japanese rearmament, a development largely unwelcome in South-East Asia and in the south-west Pacific.

Australia

Contrary to laymen's perceptions, Australia has had security concerns because of its isolation from Western Europe, the place of its cultural and social origins. Japan, China and the Soviet Union had figured, at one time or another, as sources of security threats: Japan owing to its aggressive actions during the Second World War, China because of the fear of communist contagion, and the Soviet Union because of its competition and rivalry with Australia's American super-Power ally.

Among its immediate neighbours, Indonesia was perceived by Australian extremists as a threat, especially after the latter's invasion of East Timor. Australia also views the destabilisation of relations between or among its South-East Asian neighbours as a security threat to itself. The unresolved Cambodian issue continues to be part of its security concerns.

Australia is also concerned about the well-being of its small neighbours in the South Pacific. Lacking in human, economic and material resources, they could be susceptible to big-Power manipulation and exploitation. Consequently, it has developed interrelated surveillance systems to protect island nations from predatory distant water fishing fleets; it has concluded an agreement with Papua New Guinea to consult and act to repel external armed attack; and it has increased ship visits to island countries to demonstrate its goodwill and credibility.

A drastic change in the correlation of forces between East and West is also an Australian security concern. The future of the United States military facilities in the Philippine bases could be perceived as affecting this correlation of forces, where the removal of those facilities could tilt the correlation in favour of the East. Similarly, the alliance with the United States and New Zealand (ANZUS) is viewed as a major component of its security, the New Zealand policy of no nuclear ship visits notwithstanding.

New Zealand

Located between Australia and Antarctica, New Zealand has the luxury of not being faced by any threat of invasion or armed attack in the foreseeable future. As only the two Super-Powers are considered to have the capability of launching such an attack, and as the probability of such an attack by either of them is very low, if it exists at all, New Zealand's security concerns lie rather in low-level threats and in drastic, changes in its external security environment.

The more credible security concerns are terrorism and hijacking, harassment of its sea and air lanes of communication and trade, infringements of its exclusive economic zone, and threats to its agricultural exports.

New Zealand has also adopted a hard-line policy on the issue of nuclear weapons, for which it incurred American displeasure. The effectiveness and viability of ANZUS became open to question as a consequence of this policy.

The South Pacific Island Countries

Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa lie strategically at the geographical crossroads of major ocean routes. Their value lies in this geostrategic location. Although small in area and population and underdeveloped in their economies, their bigger neighbours in the

South Pacific have accorded them the status of equals in the South Pacific Forum, the region's symbol and instrument of regional decision-making.

As already noted, they are small States with small populations, territories and resources. Their inability to protect themselves from predatory distant water fishing fleets and from overt armed attack by hostile external Powers have made them extremely vulnerable and have prompted co-operative action from their larger neighbours. Particularly important is the need to protect their resources from more powerful fishing interests. Many of these States do not possess major resources apart from those derived from the ocean. Hence, they cannot permit the loss of, or injury to, these resources without serious and dire consequences for their people. The most pressing of their concerns is, therefore, in the area of economic security.

One of these concerns is the use of drift-net fishing by foreign fishermen. Involving several vessels in co-operative action, long nets are laid in long lines across the ocean. In many cases they cover thousands of kilometres of ocean where indiscriminate fishing takes place. All kinds of living creatures coming in contact with these nets are trapped and killed, not only depleting fisheries resources, but also depriving small island fishermen of their catch.

At the meeting of the South Pacific Heads of Government held at Tarawa, the members of the South Pacific Forum unanimously rejected this technology in its July 1989 Declaration condemning large-scale drift-net fishing. Many Pacific States have also outlawed this practice in their domestic jurisdiction, including that of their exclusive economic zones.

Another of their security concerns is the need to forge national harmony in their societies divided by racial and ethnic differences. The case of Fiji is illustrative of the difficulty of creating such harmony in a society with substantial ethnic diversity with broad participation in the political and social systems being necessary to achieve political stability. Another example is that of New Caledonia, for which Forum countries are seeking independence. A satisfactory arrangement under which Kanaks, French settlers and others could live together in harmony remains elusive for that Territory.

On the more traditional side of the security issue, the South Pacific has traditionally been considered a Western body of water and island countries generally tend to be pro-Western and anti-Soviet. Global deterrence is an acceptable security doctrine inasmuch as it has

preserved regional tranquillity in the past. China's presence in the region has not been perceived as threatening. China has set up embassies in Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Western Samoa.

The South Pacific has been a site for nuclear testing, and consequently, countries in the region have become sensitised to this issue. In response to this concern, they adopted the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty on 6 August 1985, coinciding with the anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The Treaty of Rarotonga, as it came to be known, is binding for its members in a vast area bordering in the east on the area covered by the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone and to the south on the demilitarised area of the Antarctic Treaty. Under the Treaty each party undertakes not to manufacture, or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device; not to assist or encourage the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any State; to prevent the stationing or testing of nuclear explosive devices on its territory; not to dump radioactive wastes at sea anywhere within the Zone and to prevent such dumping by anyone in its territorial sea.

The Treaty also calls upon the members of the Forum to support the conclusion of a global convention prohibiting the dumping of nuclear waste at sea. Through one of its protocols it also prohibits nuclear testing anywhere in the South Pacific zone.

Further attempts to protect the region's natural resources and the environment included the adoption of the South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme on 25 November 1986. The Programme covers the exclusive economic zones of all Pacific island countries and territories and those areas of the high seas enclosed on all sides by these Pacific exclusive economic zones.

The aim of the agreement is to protect the marine environment from pollution from land-based sources, seabed activities, and the storage of toxic, radioactive and other hazardous wastes. Forbidden substances are listed, and in no circumstance are they allowed to be put into the sea. Although the agreement is not applicable to Powers that carry out nuclear testing, its parties are obligated to adopt sound environmental management with regard to the consequences of such testing. No doubt the co-operation of major Powers such as France, the Soviet Union, the United States, China, Japan and others is a requisite for successful implementation of the provisions of this agreement.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion suggests that countries in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions have varying security concerns ranging from defence and military matters to political, economic and social stability. The focus of concern might be due to the country's level of political, economic and social development, which means that advanced countries tend to stress military and defence concerns while less developed countries tend to stress the importance of the political, economic and social aspects of security.

There appears to be no consensus on the probable sources of external threat among these countries, where the Soviet Union, China and Japan are viewed with varying levels of concern. The development and adoption of a common security strategy would therefore be difficult, if not improbable, at this time.

Dramatic changes taking place within socialist societies and the moderation of super-Power rivalry could lead to the evolution of a more stable global and regional order conducive to the pursuit of the security goals of these countries. To this end, a more creative response to changes in Eastern Europe is required from the West, a response which should take into account the views and concerns of pro-Western countries in the region.

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Openness and Transparency in the ASEAN Countries

Generating greater openness and transparency through specific cooperative measures is neither new nor foreign to ASEAN. Owing to the very nature of openness and transparency, however, it is very difficult for anyone to measure the actual impact of those cooperative endeavours in quantitative terms. Nevertheless, by examining the pattern of cooperation among ASEAN member States, a qualitative albeit subjective assessment could be made that would indicate the state of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and of openness and transparency activities within ASEAN.

In making such an examination, especially in the context of cooperation for the maintenance of peace, security and disarmament, one has to appreciate the purpose for which ASEAN was established and its progress over the last 27 years, the workings of ASEAN, including its institutional framework, and the merit of its approach to regional cooperation, primarily to regional security issues.

Creation and Progress of ASEAN

The concept of regional cooperation for South-East Asian countries was mooted in the early 1960s amid the tension of the Cold War and the rise in military might of both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Leaders of the South-East Asian countries at the time recognised the need to manage their security situations, both domestic and regional, and they believed that the peace and stability of the region could be fostered by promoting economic, social and cultural development through cooperative programmes. They also believed that regional cooperation in the political and economic areas could enhance stability and safeguard the region against the effects of super-Power rivalry. They decided that the region needed an

organisation as a forum for dialogue, to find solutions to intra-regional differences as well as to manage relations with the Super-Powers, whose presence and interest in the region were substantial. These ideas were expressed and eventually incorporated into the ASEAN Declaration (also known as the Bangkok Declaration), signed in Bangkok on 8 August 1967. Hence the establishment of ASEAN could be regarded as the beginning of a process of establishing CBMs and openness and transparency among its members.

ASEAN objectives, as reflected in the Bangkok Declaration, represented the collective will of member Governments to address a major strategic challenge of that time: how to face growing communist insurgencies, internal tensions and civil strife in their countries without being dragged too deeply into East-West conflicts and without disrupting their domestic political and economic agendas. The response to that political, economic and security challenge was outlined in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, signed in 1971. The document reaffirmed ASEAN States' political resolve and shared determination to secure the recognition of, and respect for, South-East Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN), free from any form of interference by outside Powers. ZOPFAN was the first indication that a process of openness and transparency was making some progress within ASEAN. Another interesting aspect of ZOPFAN—an indigenously conceived regional security order—was that it allowed and encouraged non-ASEAN countries to associate themselves with the concept and its objectives.

By that time, ASEAN leaders and officials had already succeeded in establishing a working relationship based on a flexible framework to accommodate diverse opinions and interests. Although the foundation had been laid for regional security cooperation, there were still no clear institutional programmes or plans of action in either the economic or the political security field.

Four years later, in 1975, following the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, the political and security equation changed, dividing South-East Asia into two groups, each with its distinct ideological orientation. The region was plunged into a serious conflict that had the potential to destabilize ASEAN. Socialist regimes ruled in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane. For the first time, members of ASEAN recognised the seriousness of the situation and the urgent need to react to the threat of communism in a more concerted manner. Nine years after ASEAN's creation, its heads of government finally agreed to a summit meeting in Bali in 1976 to discuss, assess and respond to the alarming security situation.

The first ASEAN summit produced two significant agreements, which further indicated the direction of ASEAN cooperation: The Declaration of ASEAN Concord and The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia. The Concord stated the objectives and principles of cooperation, complete with plans of action in economic and social development, incorporated the members' pledges of mutual assistance in the event of natural disaster and reaffirmed their intention to cooperate in regional development programmes and to develop a recognizable ASEAN identity. The Treaty, on the other hand, provided the framework of political cooperation based on mutual respect for one another's sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of others, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The most significant aspect of the first ASEAN summit was the rejection of a military-bloc type of response or a confrontational approach to the threat of communism. The summit highlighted instead the benefits of harmonising views, coordinating positions, and undertaking common and concerted action, in both intra-regional and extra-regional relations. The emphasis was on the need to enhance economic growth and social development, with the specific aims of achieving social justice, increasing the standard of living of the peoples of ASEAN, and strengthening the national resilience of member countries as well as the regional resilience of ASEAN. ASEAN countries have chosen an economic-cooperation model, suggesting that members integrate themselves substantially with the global economic system through trade, finance, investment and other international sectors.

In 1977, at the second ASEAN summit, in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN Heads of Government reaffirmed their commitment to ZOPFAN, the Concord and the Treaty of Amity. From 1977 to 1987, ASEAN countries proceeded to fulfil their commitment to ASEAN cooperation. The scope and nature of their cooperation expanded rapidly, primarily in the political, economic and social sectors. The subsequent ASEAN summit, in Manila in 1987, focussed, *inter alia,* on improving the functioning and extent of ASEAN cooperation and joint ventures in industrial projects.

Progress was also made in regional security cooperation, as indicated by the introduction of the concept of a South-East Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone (SEANWFZ) in 1984. The SEANWFZ proposal was a follow-up to ZOPFAN, with the specific intention of making the region a nuclear-weapon-free zone. SEANWFZ could be considered as ASEAN's contribution to regional arms control and disarmament, particularly in support of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty (NPT). At the fourth ASEAN summit, in Singapore in 1992, it was decided that the ASEAN Foreign Ministers should look into and elaborate the idea of the SEANWFZ.

ASEAN's comprehensive security concept covers not only military deterrence and territorial defence components but trade and commercial aspects, including the issues of market access, industrial development and technology acquisition, and the social well-being of individual members. ASEAN regarded comprehensive security as an interlocking system of political, social, economic and military forces that could result in trade-offs and synergistic effects. From that perspective, consideration of CBMs or measures to encourage greater openness and transparency, should not be confined to military or defence-related programmes alone. A multidimensional approach to managing the challenge of maintaining peace and security and to disarmament should be given consideration and greater encouragement.

It is through that multidimensional approach that ASEAN has been able to keep the peace and maintain stability for its members over the 27 years since its creation. Economically, socially and culturally, ASEAN members have progressed and recorded remarkable growth. The confidence gained and the openness and transparency among the members of ASEAN—owing to their cooperative endeavours in the political, economic and social areas—can be considered the major reasons for its success. The confidence gained by ASEAN was not derived from a previously established structure for negotiating and implementing security and defence-related measures, but from persistent efforts to remain outside the balance-of-power game, watching from the periphery.

CBMs, Openness and Transparency

A major factor that contributes to CBMs, openness and transparency in ASEAN is the fact that all ASEAN countries are signatories to international non-proliferation agreements such as the NPT, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Apart from supporting the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, ASEAN countries also adhere to and strictly observe all export control measures on dual-use materials. ASEAN is confident that there is no danger of nuclear weapons proliferation or an uncontrollable arms race among its members.

The habit of cooperation and dialogue, fostered through regularly scheduled meetings, is well institutionalised in ASEAN. Mechanisms include the regular summit meetings of heads of Government; the

annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting of Foreign Ministers (AMM) and Economic Ministers (AEM); special meetings of foreign ministers or economic ministers as and when necessary; senior political and economic officials' meetings (SOM and SEOM); and a series of other meetings at official and unofficial levels. ASEAN also has a dialogue process with major and medium Powers through ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC), and a series of ad hoc meetings of experts and officials. Those frequent contacts and consultations have allowed ASEAN governments to develop habits of cooperation, to learn to accept one another and to overcome suspicions and years of hostility resulting from their different historical and cultural experiences. The meetings have contributed extensively to the promotion of understanding and have helped to foster goodwill within ASEAN.

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, ZOPFAN and the SEANWFZ have been key concepts with the potential to build trust and confidence among ASEAN member countries. The concept, as explained in the relevant documents, could lead towards greater regional consensus on security matters for ASEAN. Wider acceptance of those concepts by outside Powers, along with CBMs, openness and transparency, would have a political impact, helping to ensure peace and security for ASEAN.

Specific cooperation in the security and defence fields has been bilateral. That format of cooperation has been extensive and regular. Although not regional in character, such cooperation has nonetheless heightened CBMs, openness and transparency between some members. That format of cooperation could be further expanded for border-control, anti-piracy and anti-smuggling activities. Frequent exchanges of visits between senior military officials have afforded the opportunity for military personnel to establish rapport, exchange views regarding threat perception and familiarize themselves with the defence doctrines of neighbouring countries, and have provided the opportunity for training at each other's defence colleges.

In considering the future prospects for truly region-wide ASEAN cooperation in security and defence, perhaps the question some might ask is the following: If, at the height of the Cold War, ASEAN security cooperation was confined to bilateral cooperation among six States, is it conceivable now, after the collapse of the East-West rivalry, that ASEAN as a group could develop a regional security and defence pact? Once Vietnam becomes a full-fledged member of ASEAN in July 1995, there is absolutely no reason for ASEAN to do so.

For the time being, it appears that ASEAN countries prefer informal mechanisms and an informal approach to CBMs, openness and

transparency; informality allows for flexibility and freedom of manoeuvre. For ASEAN, CBMs and transparency measures seem to work well in an atmosphere of informality and cordiality. Such an atmosphere already exists but needs to be nurtured. The challenge for ASEAN, therefore, is to reach consensus on the appropriate mechanism and type of activity to nurture the openness and transparency. Some in ASEAN believe that while the mechanism and activities developed in Europe to address that region's specific geostrategic situation could be useful to ASEAN, others are of the view that Europe's model of CBMs and openness and transparency is not suitable for ASEAN and cannot be applied in an indiscriminate and open-ended manner.

Current Regional Security Concerns

The collapse of the bipolar power structure of the Cold War in late 1989 completely changed the security equation in South-East Asia. East-West ideological antagonism, bloc politics and military confrontation dissipated suddenly and unexpectedly. Erstwhile enemies have mended their relations. Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam have participated in a limited way in some ASEAN events, thus signalling a new peaceful regional order in the making.

Against this promising outlook, however, ASEAN members are being warned of a growing threat and possible aggression from China arising out of overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea. While many view an external military threat to ASEAN as unlikely, the fact that this other perspective exists in the regional grouping underscores the reality that there is no consensus within ASEAN on the issue. Thus if management of potential conflict in the South China Sea revolves around seeking accommodation between ASEAN and China, the achievement of a consensus resolution within ASEAN will be a difficult process. The tendency of analysts and researchers from certain countries to highlight the new security threat in the South China Sea and to emphasize the need to undertake a series of confidence-and security-building measures, as well as weapons-control measures, that resemble the European model, is considered by some to be counter-productive to peace and stability in ASEAN.

Among the ASEAN countries there are various views about how the Association should proceed with China. The fact is that ASEAN members are vulnerable, and there may be a tendency to over react. Experience indicates, however, that systematic effort in opposing a major Power, for example, imposition of an embargo or boycott, does little to promote stability and security in the region. On the other hand, there have been enormous changes in China, making it a very

different country today from what it was. Its open-door policy has made it a much more congenial neighbour, and that is probably the key to the maintenance of peace and stability, open sea lanes, vigorous trade and investment opportunity in the wider Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusion

In summary, definition of a security role for ASEAN would help produce a new strategic landscape, one in which ASEAN issues and agendas would be given greater weight. The creation of a new strategic order in an ASEAN-based military alliance appears inappropriate and undesirable. The absence of a common threat perception makes it unlikely for ASEAN to evolve into a defence community. Instead of focusing on the existence of a security threat to regional peace and security, ASEAN countries prefer to see the evolution of CBMs, openness and transparency, starting with cooperation within the framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In a security environment no longer dominated by Cold-War ideological conflicts and extra-regional alliances, the impetus for regional defence collaboration withers. While ASEAN will continue to discuss security issues at its annual foreign ministerial meetings, it is unlikely that it will become a security or military alliance like NATO or that the ARF will follow the example of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

FUTURE COURSE OF THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM: OPENNESS AND REGIONAL APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT

The launching in July last year of the first ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bangkok generated much interest and high expectations among the members of the Forum and among security analysts in general. Inevitably, the question arose as to why ASEAN members felt the need to set up such a mechanism and whether they intended it to play a central role in the East Asia security regime.

This study will set the ARF in its historical context, examine the reasons for its establishment, review current progress and suggest how it may proceed.

Battleground of Conflicting Interests

In recent history, the Asia-Pacific region could be described as a battleground of conflicting interests among external powers and regional States. It underwent colonisation, when actions were not

always taken in the interests of the region. Settlements of issues and arrangements which affected the countries in the region were concluded mainly by the great Powers of the day. In exceptional cases, regional States were brought in, for example, in the 1954 Geneva Conference or within the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Yet, the efforts were never directed primarily towards giving the region a chance to decide and act for itself. The turmoil of the sixties and seventies further showed that internal problems sometimes provided opportunities for major Powers to intervene in localised struggles and conflicts towards ends which were not necessarily in the interests of the region.

During that uncertain period in South-East Asia, ASEAN was formed in an attempt to offer better prospects for peace and stability. While ASEAN professed not to be security-oriented, the reason for its formation was certainly the instability and insecurity of the period. From its early years, ASEAN has been conscious of the need to address security issues. Indeed, its most noteworthy achievements have been political, especially in terms of improved relations between the ASEAN States and their regional partners, brought about despite the many bilateral problems existing among its members at the outset.

Efforts to establish ASEAN on a firm and lasting basis coincided with the Association's collective efforts to assist in the management of the Cambodian problem. That signalled a future role. The late 1970s and 1980s witnessed the direct involvement of ASEAN members, individually and collectively, in the Cambodian peace process. The conclusion of the International Conference on Cambodia in 1991 was significant inasmuch as countries in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly ASEAN countries, participated for the first time on equal terms in the international settlement of a regional issue. For many countries in the region, that involvement was the first experience in negotiating a peace settlement, participating in peace-keeping efforts and monitoring elections. Perhaps most significant of all, countries in the region, large and small, began to learn to cooperate with one another on matters of common concern.

Coming at the end of the Cold War, the experience of the International Conference showed that it was possible to ensure that the unfavourable conditions under which regional affairs had often been conducted in the past need not be repeated. It also meant that members of the region could seek jointly to address remaining concerns, such as the rehabilitation of Cambodia, the containment of the potential problems in the South China Sea, the nuclear challenge from the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the management of change in the major power relationships in the region.

Although discussions at many ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM) often focussed on political cooperation in matters of mutual concern, ASEAN countries were nevertheless aware that security matters and security policy were still not formally on the ASEAN agenda. It was not only the political momentum gained from the Cambodian undertaking and the conditions prevailing at the end of the Cold War that impelled discussion on-specific security concerns, but the added impetus of the Leaders' Summit in 1992 in Singapore. At that gathering, the heads of government formalised and endorsed a process already under way.

Further momentum was provided by the growing importance of Asia and the Pacific in the global economy. Leaders in the region became aware that regional instability could threaten that growth and could have global repercussions. At the same time, they recognised that rapid economic growth created interdependencies which could result in vulnerability, especially because of reliance on foreign investments and markets. They accepted the fact that, as nations drew together, free access to markets, unimpeded sea lanes and access to resources were indispensable for further economic progress. They also became aware that those factors could be potential sources of conflict.

Increasing economic interdependence through region-wide trade and investment pointed to the need to talk about security with partners. As economic affluence grew, so did the desire of nations to enhance their defence capabilities and to upgrade defense structures through higher state budget allocations. Such moves could worry neighbours.

So, despite reticence on the part of regional leaders to discuss security matters, steps to create a region-wide security process went ahead. For example, the Foreign Ministers of Australia and Canada, in the early nineties, suggested an organisation for Asia along the lines of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which could be known as the "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA)". Though the concept was not accepted at the official level, regional "think-tanks" in the non-governmental sector began to explore the merit of having ASEAN discuss security issues through the established regional forums. Deliberations at the governmental and non-governmental levels kept interest alive in creating some form of regional security system and setting a logical time-frame for such an endeavour.

The perceived decrease in the United States military capability in the region following the termination of the United States-Philippines base agreements, taken together with the new post-Cold War situation and the emergence of other regional powers, impelled the search for a relevant process. In another closely related development, the United States, in a fundamental change of policy, agreed to consider security aspects from a multilateral approach while maintaining its own bilateral arrangements with countries in the region.

In sum, in addition to various intense regional security concerns, the most important factor in placing security issues on the ASEAN agenda was the increased self-confidence of regional leaders, especially ASEAN leaders. That confidence was brought about largely by unprecedented economic growth and improvement in the overall relations among regional countries. Moreover, ASEAN's involvement in the Cambodian peace process, its tackling of other security issues during ASEAN Ministerial Meetings, Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC) and dialogues, meant that security issues were not entirely new to ASEAN discussions. Security matters took on much more prominence in the Declaration issued at the 1992 Leader's Summit in Singapore, which recorded the decision to use existing mechanisms like the ASEAN-PMC to enhance dialogue on political and security matters to promote peace and stability in the region.

Establishment of the Regional Forum

The commencement of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Bangkok last year was therefore logical and can be seen as part of the overall process of regional development. The region had recognised the need to create such a multilateral security process and to provide a venue for the exchange, of views on matters which affect not only South-East Asian countries but also the other Asia-Pacific nations. The ARE is unique in the sense that it was initiated not by the major powers but by the developing countries of ASEAN. Its membership spans three continents, and three permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are members. That adds a certain weight to its regional efforts.

When ASEAN conceived the idea of ARF, its objectives were broad-based. The general feeling was that the Forum should not be seen as a response to any particular threat, real or perceived, nor should it exist for the purpose of identifying enemies. In that same spirit, it was not supposed to become a negotiating or decision-making body for any particular set of concerns or problems. Rather, it should be a process by means of which security could be sought among friends.

Initially, there were certain constraints on the ARF process, such as the political, economic and cultural diversity of the region. Additionally, no security structures existed which could be improved upon. There was concern that ASEAN's own working method of consensus-building might possibly affect the pace of the forum and that differences in perception of what constituted a threat would hinder a common strategy. Some observers were inclined to ask why ASEAN States should take up the challenge of designing a regional security forum and why such a security process was needed now, in the aftermath of the Cold War, since the ASEAN countries, or at least most of the South-East Asian States, had for quite a long time experienced uninterrupted peace, stability and prosperity.

To those engaged in ASEAN affairs, both at the governmental and non-governmental levels, the answer seemed quite straightforward. As the regional States were becoming more involved through business and trade, they hoped to open their markets. Accomplishing that required ASEAN to deal directly with the major powers to attract their trade and investment and to keep them positively engaged in the region. It followed that major Powers and countries with a large economic stake in the South-East Asia region would need a guarantee that their interests would continue to be safeguarded. At the same time, ASEAN had to make sure that in engaging those Powers, its regional interests were equally protected. Some mechanisms to address mutual concerns were therefore needed.

While the constraints on the development of the Forum—the small size as a group, the diversity of the region and the lack of existing structures—should not be underestimated, they are far less dominant than in the past. Above all, economic interdependence was rapidly overcoming historical difficulties and the problems created by diversity. Also, through Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), economic cooperation in the region was already under way.

Substance and Structure of the Forum

Planning the substance and structure of the Forum required two important exercises. The first was to determine its objectives, methodology, intellectual input and number of participants. The second was to decide on the style in which ARF meetings should be conducted.

That has been the main work undertaken since the first meeting. The Forum is now in a position to consider how those tasks are to be undertaken. Discussions on the goals and expectations of the ARF over the last two years have tended to reflect some of the following:

(a) Views converged on the need to find a means for consultations on regional political and security issues that would foster a habit of open dialogue, even when views differed on some issues, and that would encourage patterns of behaviour to reduce security risks (Singapore, 20-21 May 1993).

(b) In a Joint Communique issued at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, in Bangkok, 22-23 July 1994, the Foreign Ministers noted and welcomed ASEAN's increasingly central role in fostering political and security cooperation in South-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, through initiatives such as the inaugural meeting of the ARF (Bangkok, 25 July 1994). They felt that the ARF could become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region. They considered that ASEAN should work together with the ARF to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the Asia-Pacific region.

(c) The ARF should ensure and preserve the current environment of peace, prosperity and cooperation in South-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region and keep the major powers constructively engaged there, notwithstanding the changes which have taken place since the end of the Cold War;

(d) The ARF should adopt comprehensive approaches to security, taking into account not only military issues, but also political, economic, social and other challenges in the region.

In evaluating those observations, I believe the original intention of ASEAN members was that the ARF should offer regional countries and other interested parties a multilateral forum where they could consult on regional political and security matters. I should like to stress, though, that the ARF was established primarily to assist the cause of regional peace and stability so that economic growth could proceed. It was hoped that the process would encourage the idea of regular consultation as an important security aspect in the region.

In implementing the decision of the 1992 Summit to intensify internal dialogue on political and security matters by using the ASEAN-PMC, ASEAN envisaged a future "community of security interests in the region in which a culture of peace" would be fostered. For that reason, I believe it is essential to encourage all regional States and others directly concerned to do their part in realising that vision. It is important for ASEAN member countries to apply the concept of "open dialogue" and to continue working creatively with ARF participants

and other regional States to design a pattern of relationship in the Asia-Pacific region.

I feel that emphasis should be given to ASEAN's special way of working, which has led to many achievements. In the region, matters of peace and stability have always been approached on the basis of respect for international law and norms and peace has been achieved through regional cooperation at all levels. The wide diversity of the Asia-Pacific region requires that even more because not all the ARF members are not all friendly neighbours and partners; some are also long-time adversaries. In addition, the security concerns and interests of members may differ. For the ARF to maintain a sense of security among its regional partners, ASEAN members strongly feel that it should operate—as ASEAN does—on consensus-building, cooperation, the principle of inclusiveness in terms of membership and in the matters under discussion, with pluralistic processes, and at a gradual pace which suits everyone.

ASEAN's cohesion as an association can be attributed to those working principles, which have contributed directly to the security of the subregion. By avoiding too many formal and legalistic requirements in its formation and dealings, ASEAN has been able to maintain subregional peace, stability and prosperity through confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy. It has fostered restraint in the way members deal with each other and has encouraged the observance of international law and principles.

Future Course of the Forum

Based on the ASEAN experience, the ARF planners feel that its present Chairman must, as a first priority, concentrate on bringing all ARF members together to engage in a constructive dialogue on regional security. The first step in the process should be for people to talk to each other frankly with a view to promoting understanding. That will most probably last for a number of years to allow participants to become fully acquainted and confident with each other before moving on to more formal undertakings. ASEAN's evolution in that manner has taken almost three decades.

With ASEAN experience as a guide, the Forum, through discussion and consultation, will be able to create an atmosphere of openness and goodwill conducive to confidence-building, consensus and cooperation. The task is not simple. Flexibility and accommodation may, in the beginning, compromise the substance. In the immediate stages, while the opportunity to resolve problems can never be ruled out, it is not

anticipated that dialogue and consultation will lead necessarily to the resolution of major concerns. Rather, such discussion may act as a form of moral suasion for members not to create problems among themselves. Elements of preventive diplomacy are inherent in the process. The Forum may also serve as a warning system for potential issues or problems.

What I have described is a step-by-step approach and a balance of interests in order to ensure that everyone is comfortable with the pace. Naturally, the controlled pace of the Forum could be frustrating for some. The close identification of the process with ASEAN-AMM and PMC have led some to view the ARF as ASEAN-driven. ASEAN maintains that the entire process is about open dialogue and constructive engagement among regional countries.

The ARF's chances of success appear to be good. That optimistic view stems mainly from the special momentum created following the Cold War. The Asia-Pacific region can make its contribution to the new "United Nations thinking", especially in the resolution and prevention of conflict through peaceful means and its encouragement of global efforts by regional organisations to maintain international peace and security. ASEAN has established itself as a "community of security interests" through the application of quiet diplomacy to prevent numerous inter-state conflicts. Much has already been done in the area of preventive diplomacy and CBMs in the South-East Asian region. According to some analysts, the promotion of ASEAN's ideas or strategic development of the region, such as ZOPFAN (zone of peace, freedom and neutrality) and Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and SEANFZ (Southeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone), are based on efforts to counter Cold War tensions and confrontations. As a small group, ASEAN has no major difficulty in starting some "new thinking" for the region. Initiatives by any of the major Powers in the region could be received with suspicion.

The size of the ARF membership could also determine its character. That is something current participants have to think through and address. In choosing the name, the ASEAN Regional Forum has avoided strict geographical delimitation in terms of membership eligibility. Careful consideration of the membership issuers merited, particularly where it involves countries with potential interests in the security of the region. There is an obvious limit even on those countries if the Forum is not to appear to be a "mini-UN". Even if such a straight-forward criterion as the geographical delimitation of the Asia-Pacific region was used, questions would inevitably arise with the application

of such criterion. Would it correspond to the geographical outline of APEC (with the exception of Taiwan)? Or is it to cover the area loosely defined as East Asia and the North Pacific? Or should the geographical definition reflect the distribution of security interests? For the time being, the eligibility for membership in the ARF has been based on political decisions, that is, eligible members are those that have formal relations with ASEAN.

Proposals before the Forum

During the ARF-Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) and the first meeting of the Forum itself last year, many proposals were put forward. A large quantity were military-or defence-related. Many came from the developed countries and reflected the traditional western approach to security, i.e., rapid movement to transparency measures in sensitive areas. Various proposals reflected the specific security concerns of participants. Their immediate implementation should not necessarily serve as a benchmark of progress made at the Forum.

The proposals submitted could be grouped in five main areas: confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy, disarmament measures, peace-keeping and maritime issues. Rather than being classified in baskets in the western sense, proposals under the aegis of the ARF might be arranged in terms of stages, ranging from consensus-building and CBMs to preventive diplomacy measures. Their implementation will correspond closely to those stages.

While the military and defence-related aspect of security is certainly important, the ARF views security holistically, seeing the military and defense-related component as part of a comprehensive concept. Therefore, proposals brought forward during the Kathmandu meeting will be included among the ARF's matters.

Conclusion

The future of the ARF is open-ended, very much in line with ASEAN thinking. To ASEAN members, the ASEAN Regional Forum is an evolving process. Keeping it going is as important as obtaining specific results in resolving issues of contention or furthering cooperation. The informality of the Forum avoids overly institutional approaches which limit the options of the participants and promote dogmatic attitudes. My view is that, by giving the opportunity for participants to talk over issues and potential problems frankly and without confrontation, the Forum will have a chance, in the long run, to fulfil the needs of its participants for a long-term regional security process.

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Towards a Sub-regional Agenda for Peace in Central Africa

Central Africa has, of late, had the sad privilege of topping the charts in the hit parade of horrors, human bestiality and poverty, an honour that now appears to belong by right to the African continent. The world media giants, which are so fond of bloody images "made in Africa", have been focusing their spotlights on that legendary part of the continent known as the Great Lakes region. Unfortunately, there have been so many of those reports that, in order to express the unique mix of promises and perils implicit in the current situation in black Africa, many of the eminent participants at a first-ever White House conference on Africa were quick to draw parallels between the situations in South Africa and Rwanda. Anthony Lake, National Security Adviser to President Clinton, seeking to illustrate the two contrasting images, spoke of the enthusiasm that South Africa elicits and the horror of the massacres perpetrated in Rwanda. Taking up this Manichean image in his recent message to Africa and to the world on present-day problems in Africa, the Secretary-General of the United Nations concluded by saying that Africa disconcerts us because it is constantly giving us reason to swing from hope to despair. All too often it is the scene of ethnic confrontations and civil wars that compound economic misery and underdevelopment.

While it is representative of the situation in the subregion, Rwanda does not have a monopoly on the perpetration of horrors, or even less so, hostilities in the area concerned. For there is a very real danger that what has happened in Rwanda will be repeated in neighbouring Burundi, and Angola is struggling to overcome the effects of a painful war. The rest of Central Africa continues to be throttled by centrifugal forces that fuel political frustration, economic stagnation and social injustice; all these things are undoubtedly helping to push the prospects

for genuine sustainable development in the subregion even further into the future. Here, more than anywhere else, it is becoming increasingly evident that peace is the vital foundation for the vast process of development.

As the Rwanda tragedy has again demonstrated, now, more than ever, peace must be maintained by mechanisms devised to prevent crises and conflicts. The Rwanda tragedy is typical of the very great challenges to security that exist in the post-Cold War period, and in that respect is a test of the ability of the international community, in general, and of African countries, in particular, to implement strategies to contain simmering conflicts before they boil over.

The objectives of preventive diplomacy, as defined by former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace,* are to prevent new disputes from arising and to ease tensions before they result in open conflict, or, when conflict does breakout, to contain it. Preventing crises and conflicts in the subregion by promoting confidence-building, security, disarmament and development is one of the key elements of the mandate of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.

This Committee—the first institutional African mechanism for preventive diplomacy, consisting of 11 African States, which was established on 28 May 1992 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to General Assembly resolution 46/37 B—will, unfortunately, have been conspicuous by its absence at a time when it might have been expected to give concrete proof of its utility. Unable to draw the international community's attention in time to the disaster of unprecedented apocalyptic proportions, which was brewing in the Great Lakes region, the Committee demonstrated just how sadly lacking it was in creativity and strength at the time of the deployment of the international peacemaking and peace-keeping operations in Rwanda and Burundi. We all know how urgent were the pleas that were emanating from the United Nations and France at that time. Inreply, a few sporadic appeals for common sense were made to the parties involved in the crisis, issued in the form of press releases that were not widely circulated. Furthermore, none of the large-scale collective measures recommended by member States to deal with the situation—participation in international missions to the countries concerned; missions of solidarity to be sent to Angola, Burundi or Rwanda; missions to the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to discuss the crises and conflicts in the subregion—were ever properly implemented.

Should we have expected more from the Committee? As scathing as this criticism of the achievements of so young an organ might appear in some respects, it should be pointed out that this criticism would not have been made, had not the working programme and final recommendations issued by various meetings of the Committee's internal organs been so ambitious.

Undoubtedly, the promises underlying the above-mentioned commitments evaporated when put to the test, owing to the absence or insufficiency of means, including of genuine political will, to act, on the part of the States in question. These questions call for a brief review of the Committee's mandate and of some of the constraints that may have made it difficult to carry out their mandate.

To seek to assess the Committee's role solely in the light of its activities relating to the recent crises and conflicts of the subregion would be to disregard to a large degree the significance of the fundamental work carried out within this organ; the results of this work can only be appreciated over time. One such achievement was the initialling on 8 September 1994 in Yaounde of a Non-Aggression Pact that sought to unite the 11 member States of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Not to mention the rich prospects created by the establishment by the States concerned within their armed forces of units specialising in peace-keeping operations; the establishment of an inter-State general staff committee for crisis management; the commitment of all States in the subregion to refrain from producing, acquiring or transferring weapons of mass destruction; and so on. This illustrates how significant a role the Standing Advisory Committee could play in the extensive restoration, building and consolidation of peace that must occur in the Central African region. Consideration should be given to the possibility of introducing *the Agenda for Peace* at the subregional level. The Committee has the capacity to pave the way for this large-scale undertaking that should transform Central Africa into a zone of lasting peace, security and development. This is far from being wishful thinking since, as we shall see further on, that is central to the global initiative of which the Committee is a part.

A Plan Long in the Making

The idea of establishing an advisory committee on security questions in Central Africa was first raised on 28 November 1983 at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly by the delegation of Cameroon. At that time, Cameroon, which occupied the chair of the Economic Community of Central African States, proposed

the adoption of a series of measures to build confidence and promote security and development in the subregion, and requested the assistance of the United Nations to implement them.

The formal announcement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 28 May 1992 that the Committee had been established was preceded by the convening of two international meetings: the ECCAS Conference on the Promotion of Confidence, Security and Development at the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, in February 1988, at Lome, and a seminar-workshop on conflict resolution, crisis prevention and management for high-level civilian and military officials from ECCAS member States, held in June 1991, at Yaounde. The establishment of the Standing Advisory Committee under the auspices of the United Nations was one of the major recommendations that emerged from this meeting.

Welcoming the initiative taken by the African countries concerned, the General Assembly requested that the Secretary-General establish the body under consideration. As set forth in resolution 46/37 B of 6 December 1991, which constitutes the main legal foundation for the Committee's existence, the latter is aimed at "promoting confidence-building measures at regional and subregional levels in order to ease regional tensions and to further disarmament and non-proliferation measures at regional and subregional levels in Central Africa".

On the basis of this mandate, and with the support of the United Nations, the Committee got down to work immediately.

Ambitious Programme

At the organisational meeting, which was held at the ministerial level, in Yaounde, from 27 to 31 July 1992, the participants (ministers for foreign affairs and/or ministers of defence) established the Committee's rules of procedure and adopted a very ambitious programme of work to be implemented in two main phases. The programme focuses on a series of actions that provide for comprehensive, integrated and dynamic approach to the major challenges that confront the subregion. It covers three areas: peace, sustainable development, democracy and human rights. These areas are central to the issues that justify joint action by a group of States that have understood that "Peace is a prerequisite to development; democracy is essential if development is to succeed over the long term.... Without peace, there can be no development and there can be no democracy. Without development, the basis for democracy will be lacking and societies will tend to fall into conflict. And without democracy, no sustainable development can occur; without such

development, peace cannot long be maintained." In his *An Agenda for Development,* Boutros Boutros-Ghali underscored this interdependence by describing the dimensions of development: peace as the foundation of development; the economy as the engine of progress; the environment as a basis for sustainability; justice as a pillar of society; and democracy as good governance.

This vision is all the more laudable in that it reflects the situation in the subregion, where the threat to peace and security of States is essentially non-military in origin; here "social injustice and the many woes caused by mismanagement of the State and the iniquity of the international economic order" fuel the social explosions that periodically occur in the subregion.

The Committee's programme of work seeks to execute the now familiar canons of the *Agenda for Peace* by providing for a series of measures focusing on preventive diplomacy, peace-building, peacemaking and peace-keeping.

Some of the following measures of preventive diplomacy were classified as needing to be implemented "during the initial stage of activities": adherence by all States of the subregion to international legal instruments on arms limitation and disarmament; conclusion of a subregional non-aggression pact; establishment of hotlines between heads of State of the subregion and increased meetings between them; organisation of regular joint meetings of ministers of defence, of the interior and for foreign affairs, as well as of chiefs of staff of the subregion; establishment and improvement of transparency in military activities, etc.

Among others, the following priorities were mentioned under peace-building measures: strengthening and consolidation of the democratisation process and promotion of respect for human rights in the subregion; establishment of a crisis-management body in each member State; increased involvement of the people and the media in the pursuit of the ideals of peace, security and development in the subregion; elaboration of specific measures for promoting agreement on a balanced and gradual reduction of the military forces, equipment and budgets of the States of the subregion; and assistance in connection with the restructuring of armies and redeployment of the military.

The initiatives to be undertaken in the area of peacemaking and peace-keeping include the establishment of a standing inter-State general staff for crisis management with a view to setting up a subregional peace-keeping force. As regards training, there are plans to develop cooperation with training institutions specialising in the

field of conflict prevention and management of peace-keeping operations, with a view to establishing a subregional centre specialising in training peace-keeping personnel. These were some of the strategic and tactical priorities that the Committee was expected to translate into concrete activities.

Overall Performance

When we assess the Committee's performance, we find that it has made a little progress, but that this is offset by many missed opportunities.

On the Bright Side

Adhered to the Schedule of Meetings

The Committee's first achievement is that it has kept its word and brought together high-level civilian and military experts and ministers of defence and/or foreign affairs of the States of the subregion every six months on average. Those meetings, at which participants consider formal measures to build confidence and strengthen security, provide an opportunity for discussion and the fruitful exchange of views. Dialogue helps States to modify their views, avoid misunderstandings and increase the transparency of their activities. In this case, the members of the Committee regularly exchanged views on concepts ranging from preventive diplomacy to joint defence and, more generally, ways and means of peacefully settling crises and disputes. In addition, the review of the geopolitical and security situation in the subregion, an item that is permanently on the agenda, enables officials to keep one another regularly informed of national issues and to work together to find solutions to shared problems.

That is a significant development in the diplomatic practice of the States concerned: the fact that all parties can more or less freely ask one another how the internal political situation is evolving, without being accused of interference. Thus at its sixth meeting, which took place in Brazzaville in March 1994, the Committee invited the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi to create favourable conditions so as to ensure that refugees would be repatriated and to guarantee their security in their own country; it also noted with satisfaction the significant progress that had been made as regards both the democratisation process and as regards the resolution of internal conflicts: the implementation of the Paris accords as far as Gabon was concerned; the holding of a national forum for the culture of peace in the Congo; the adoption and promulgation of a transitional constitution in Zaire; the review of the constitution in Cameroon and the adoption

of a new constitution in the Central African Republic and in Equatorial Guinea.

Those meetings have proved so useful that the Committee has expressed the hope that sectoral meetings will be organised. The relevant officials of the various countries (ministers of defence and the interior, chiefs of staff and so forth) have therefore been invited to meet as soon as possible in order to adopt or to harmonize policies for combating the illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms both within each State and in the subregion.

Concluded Negotiations on the Non-Aggression Pact

Within two years of starting work, the 11 States of the subregion have equipped themselves with a legal instrument, establishing their determination to outlaw aggression. The text of the Non-Aggression Pact was adopted in Libreville and initialled in Yaounde in September 1994. This led the Secretary-General of the United Nations to renew his support for the Committee. Speaking to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters in Geneva at its January 1994 session, he said that he was "in full support... of the work of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.... Their non-aggression treaty should provide a model of a regional confidence-building measure."

Conducted Studies on Future Activities

In addition, notwithstanding the financial difficulties that they are all facing, member States of the Committee undertook to bear the cost of conducting a number of important studies on: the elaboration of a mutual assistance agreement with respect to defence; the establishment of a model national unit specialising in peace-keeping missions; the typology of crises and conflicts likely to require the intervention of the subregional security mechanism; and a proposal to organize a general staff committee for crisis management in the subregion.

Two of the projects, concerning the typology of crises and the status of national units specialising in peace-keeping operations, were finalised and adopted at the Committee's sixth meeting. Chad, Equatorial Guinea and Zaire have already established those specialised units.

On the Dark Side

In terms of the sort of achievements mentioned above, the Committee has demonstrated commendable farsightedness. However, even though the agreement among the States of the subregion to

renounce the use of force in their relations is rightly considered to represent a significant political change, which deserves the support and encouragement of the entire international community, the Committee has yet to take truly meaningful action in its field of competence. The members of the Committee have themselves recognised this and, at the Libreville meeting, the Committee instructed its Bureau to play a more active and dynamic political role in the future by initiating or associating the Committee with any action designed to promote the peaceful settlement of crises and disputes in the subregion. The Bureau was also called on to undertake missions of solidarity and sympathy to States of the subregion caught in the grip of internal or inter-State crises and conflicts.

Given these early opportunities to demonstrate their ability to discharge their specific responsibilities, the successive Bureaus of the Committee have all largely failed. It was only with great difficulty and tardily that the Committee finally managed to express its indignation (and only in the form of a press release) and to stir consciences in the face of the atrocities committed. The unprecedented human tragedy in Rwanda, a member State, elicited just one or two public communiques from the Bureau of the Committee.

It has proved impossible to organize missions of solidarity to Rwanda, Burundi and Angola, which the Committee has been calling for since the first half of 1994. Accordingly, the recommendations calling for their deployment, which are made at each successive meeting, have become largely symbolic.

Moreover, the Committee has neither sponsored nor initiated any action to assist in the international missions currently under way in the affected countries. Such actions as have been taken have been few and isolated. They included material and financial support from Gabon, the dispatch of military contingents to Rwanda by the Congo and Chad, and the "natural" assistance of Zaire, which, by force of circumstance, has become a place of refuge. Hence there have been repeated appeals to the other States of the subregion to continue to express their solidarity with the Rwandese people in a practical form, to follow suit, or even to participate actively in UNAVEM III in Angola by making troops available to the United Nations and by continuing to support UNAMIR in Rwanda.

There have been Constraints

The human tragedies unfolding in the Great Lakes region have at the same time underlined the urgent need to put in place an effective

preventive mechanism to forestall the recurrence of such horrors in any country of the subregion and highlighted the difficulties that the Standing Advisory Committee has in playing such a role at this stage of its existence.

The cumbersome decision-making procedures in certain national administrations responsible for the follow-up of the Committee's activities, and the inability of the decision makers concerned to manage crises and conflict situations with the requisite speed and effectiveness, are, to a large extent, responsible for this situation and sometimes make one wonder whether sufficient political will exists.

In defence of the officers, it should be pointed out that there are acute communication difficulties between the various capitals of the subregion, and that these have often impeded the flow of information, thereby preventing the holding of certain planned consultations. It is fair to say, however, that the members of the Committee take very little advantage of the numerous occasions for consultations offered by the many international diplomatic meetings.

Grounds for Optimism

One can only hope that the Committee will build on its experience and gradually rise to the challenges posed by the many and varied tasks that it is called upon to tackle in the subregion. There are good grounds for optimism about the Committee's future work. These include, *inter alia,* the effectiveness of certain elements of preventive diplomacy advocated in the Committee's programme of action, the support of the international community for their realisation, the refusal by the young people of the subregion to take a fatalistic attitude and, in particular, the clear emergence of national civil societies and public opinion in the subregion that identify with the Committee's concerns. Thanks to the Committee's efforts, the time is ripe for building peace and security in Central Africa.

Foundations of Tomorrow

In order for the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa to effectively discharge its mandate in the future, a number of important actions consistent with the concept of preventive diplomacy that justified the Committee's creation must be initiated or consolidated without delay. In the views of many, an effective use of preventive diplomacy would be, in the present context, the least costly and most efficient way to build peace in Africa.

Signature and Ratification of the Non-Aggression Pact

It goes without saying that the signature—still awaited—and entry into force of this important juridical instrument would confirm the political will of the States concerned and strengthen the Committee's credibility. The parties' reiteration in a subregional context of their agreement to renounce the threat or use of force in their relations would have significant political consequences. It is therefore very hard to understand why the States in the subregion continue to postpone giving legal force to the Pact.

It is particularly hard to understand since adoption of additional agreements, notably in the field of mutual assistance, could help to temper the appetite for war of certain other African States that share common frontiers with the member countries of the Committee. Thus, mutually freed from the suspicion and mistrust that are due to the current opacity of their defence doctrines and the lack of transparency in their defence budgets, the countries concerned could better tackle the causes of their internal disputes, which are the commonest and bloodiest category of disputes in the subregion. For, although there are only a few countries that are currently in, or just emerging from, a state of open civil war, virtually all the other States in the subregion are experiencing low-intensity conflicts or, at the very least, situations of instability.

The signing of the pact should be complementary to participation by the States of the subregion in the principal international legal instruments on the limitation of weapons, disarmament, peace and security. With this in mind, it would be highly significant to give particular attention to agreements of immediate practical utility for the subregion. These include the Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, to which no State in the subregion is yet party. Here, as elsewhere, it would seem that there is not so much a need to draw up new texts as to get States to become party to those that already exist, and to apply them.

It might thus be possible to get to learn more about the sort of things that give rise to conflicts, which threaten the cohesion of many States in the subregion, and about their impact on the current and future security and stability of the political society concerned. Establishing a mechanism to promote peace and security in Central Africa thus becomes an urgent necessity.

Towards a Mechanism for Peace and Security in Central Africa

The main objective of such a mechanism should be to put in place an early warning system capable of detecting early signs of potential crisis. In Central Africa, as elsewhere, the prevention of crises and conflicts requires a system capable of rapidly and effectively compiling and analysing economic, social and political data, including data on the internal security situation of each State and of the subregion as a whole.

Before the tragic death of the heads of State of Rwanda and Burundi, in April 1994, few Western decision makers had a proper understanding of the forces opposing each other in this part of Central Africa and thus of the potential for disaster that existed. Had there been an appropriate early warning system in the subregion, it might have brought the tensions to the notice of the international community, which, even if it failed to contain them, clearly could have helped to prevent the full scope of horrors that subsequently took place in the subregion.

Such an early warning system should permit the Committee to identify potential conflict situations as early as possible, to analyze them and to propose peaceful measures to deal effectively with them. The resources required to make such a promising project operational would still have to be mobilised so that the regionalisation of crisis prevention (the Committee is one example of this) does not reflect at the security level the general marginalisation of Africa.

Both the media and civil society have a critical role to play in ensuring the success of this early warning system and in consolidating the other elements of the Committee's platform for action within the prevailing sociological realities.

Towards Greater Involvement of the Media and the Peoples of the Subregion

The importance of this task, which the Committee itself has recognised as being a priority, is self-evident, especially when one considers the role of the media in easing or exacerbating conflicts and crises.

This involvement concerns first and foremost the African media and those of the subregion in particular. African media and journalists are best placed to play a significant role within the framework of an overall crisis prevention and management policy in Africa. The Western

media have generally taken an interest in Africa only after a conflict has begun. Moreover, their treatment of information is superficial and usually has little to do with local concerns and realities.

The power of modern instruments of mass communication, such as radio and television, was illustrated with the use of the radio station "Radio Mille Collines" to exacerbate tensions in the Rwandan conflict. Yet, it has also served to demonstrate the inverse of that experience, namely, that, "although the media are capable of incitement to hatred and confrontation, they can also be used (...) to teach the different communities of a country how to live together in peace." The media could thus play a leading role in promoting habits of social peace, peaceful coexistence and democracy, thereby contributing to the development of a culture of peace in the subregion. Initiatives that draw inspiration from such a need could thus easily be pursued within the framework of the culture of peace programme launched by UNESCO in keeping with the recommendations of the *Agenda for Peace.*

Towards a Subregional Culture of Peace Programme

Coming in the aftermath of crises, such a programme would help prevent the recurrence of such crises by creating the conditions for peace both objectively and in the minds of people. Efforts to disarm combatants, restoration of law and order, monitoring of elections and promotion and protection of human rights must be accompanied by the building of peace in people's minds. For there can be no peace without a culture of peace.

Actions that might be envisaged in this regard could involve tackling such crucial questions for peace in the subregion as the problem of the demobilisation of the military. Today, Angola has only recently finished paying the price for its failure to demobilize, even though demobilisation was provided for in the May 1991 Bicesse Accords. It was precisely because the non-governmental forces still had a strong army that it was completely unrealistic to think that a political solution could be found to the Angolan crisis that followed that country's multi-party elections in September 1992. Although today, thanks to the Lusaka accords of May 1995, the spirit of peace seems once more to be hovering over Angola, the Government's army and the UNITA soldiers still have their weapons in hand. In neighbouring Rwanda there remains the risk of rearmament of Hutu former soldiers and' militias among the Rwandan refugees in Zaire. The culture of war is very much alive.

Demobilisation should therefore take account of such diverse aspects as the restructuring of the army and the retraining and

reintegration of military personnel into civilian life, so as to ensure that weapons are exchanged for shovels and hoes.

The culture of peace concerns not only people but also political authorities at the highest level.

The people's involvement should take the form of an extension of the role of the social actors in the decision-making process, for building peace in Central Africa requires the emergence of a new form of citizenship in which the people become ever more active and take over increasing responsibility for the major choices taken by society.

Establishing the foundations of peace also requires a great deal of participation on the part of the highest State authorities, that is to say, first and foremost, the heads of State and Government of the subregion who, as we all know, play a central role in national political systems. Unfortunately, they do not, as yet, seem to fully appreciate the role that the Committee can play in bringing about change. We have yet to see real evidence of any political will to turn the Committee into a real instrument for promoting peace, security and development. The experience with the draft Non-Aggression Pact illustrates this, as does the extraordinary lack of interest shown by the highest organ of ECCAS in the Committee's activities. We therefore understand why, reacting to the scant heed paid to its earlier appeals, the Committee went so far—at its session in the first half of 1995—as to urge its bureau "to bring the matter before the current Chairman of ECCAS in order to organize a meeting of heads of State and Government to encourage them to become more involved in the implementation of its programme".

In the absence of such determination at the highest level, even the boldest initiatives by other actors in the new subregional partnership for peace in Central Africa will be doomed to failure. It is therefore imperative that this situation be reversed. Only in that way will the region cease to be just a repository of myths about happiness and peace and cease to feed the illusions of the peoples of Central Africa. The fate of numerous actions that could help breathe life into the agenda for peace and sustainable development, which the Committee has been trying to promote, depends on such a change in attitude.

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Southern Africa's Security: Six Propositions for the Twenty-first Century

Without tolerance, the foundation for democracy and respect for human rights cannot be strengthened and the achievement of peace will remain elusive.

Aung San Suu Kyi, Beijing, September, 1995

The early 1990s have been kind to southern Africa. After decades of conflict and mindless repression in the cause of minority rule, apartheid was ended and in an increasingly forgotten but near parallel process Africa's last colony, Namibia, was brought to independence.

These developments have made the prospects for peace for me region seem bright. With conflict at an end, the thoughts of the region's 100 million people have turned to new challenges: economic growth and development are top priorities. Meeting these, however, will not be easy. For all the promise of a global village, southern Africa remains distant from established points of economic growth. In addition, its economic base is low and education levels—the primary indicators of industrial potential—are poor. Rising to the challenges of the twenty-first century will therefore not be easy for the region's people, but failing to reach out may be disastrous.

Long-term thinking has not been made easier by international developments. Consider this chain of contradictions. In an era in which the call for a return to colonialism is commonplace, southern-Africa's people are being called upon to meet greater global competition; in an era in which ethnicity is assertive, southern Africa's people are being asked to build democracy upon political formations that have fostered centralisation; in an era in which the cult of political personality is

strongly discouraged, southern Africa's people are being asked to put their hope in a country. South Africa, which is led by one of the century's most charismatic figures, Nelson Mandela.

How will the subcontinent meet these and other twenty-first century paradoxes? Conflict is unavoidable in the tide of human affairs. To pretend that it does not exist is to repeat the mistakes made during the first generation of African leadership, when idolatry and silence meant retrogression and reversal; however, quickly revived enmities first shook, then helped to drag, African countries under.

The present confidence cannot endure. Minority rule has bequeathed a legacy of imbalance—a rich and powerful South Africa, impoverished and weak neighbours: in South Africa itself, white wealth and black poverty did not end with apartheid. These tease and challenge political processes aimed at reconciliation, nation-building and regional integration. Almost more ominously, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire suggest that new world problems—collapsing States, human spillage and despair—stalk the neighbourhood.

Those terms suggest why the region's people should seize the moment to think creatively—to borrow David Mittrany's famous phrase—about a working peace system which will secure southern Africa deep in the next century. That will not be easy: as the region's people know, it took seventy years to end colonialism and forty more to end apartheid. But the problems associated with transition suggest why thinking about the future needs to start today.

The ideas in this essay will not end the region's conflict nor, indeed, automatically promote much needed economic development. They may, however, help to anchor political systems, so that common regional goals can be pursued in an area too often neglected by policy-makers—they may help an increasingly sceptical world understand that a system is being developed in southern Africa.

Proposition One: Use, Don't Abuse, the "New" Security Agenda

For most of the post-World War II years, security in world politics derived from a top-down conception of society and politics. This focussed on the security of States and on military stability. Since the mid-1980s, a growing body of opinion has favoured an expanded concept of security. Through this prism, security is conceived in terms of vertical levels (the security of individuals, relevant groups, States, and humankind as a whole) and in terms of different horizontal dimensions (including a wider agenda of issues—political, economic, societal, gender and environmental, as well as military).

The expanded concept of security is important for southern Africa, where top-down. State-centred and militarised perspectives do not accord with either the empirical character of the region's States or the normative concerns of non-State actors.

While normative impulses can be challenged, few will dispute the inappropriateness of traditional security analyses to a part of the world where the infrastructure is markedly different from European experience that forged orthodox security thinking. Because the "States" of southern Africa do not match the textbook images so loved by orthodox political science, widening and deepening the agenda will help to secure both the governed and those that govern them.

Typical of this is the "threat" represented by the linkage between water and food security in a region with a high propensity for drought. Until the 1990s, such issues were not on the security agenda. The drought and near famine of 1992 brought authorities in the region closer to understanding that, without adequate planning, the provision of a basic need—water—is problematical. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was aware of the problem, but South Africa—the region's most security conscious State— was not prepared, and neither was Botswana—on some indicators the region's wealthiest country, which was to discover an important link between urban poverty and drought.

The threat of food scarcity is, for many, more fundamental than the threat of military violence. Achieving household food security in southern Africa has been held back; this is central both to economic development and regional security. Although, the economies of the region are open, trade within the region is small. At the same time, agricultural performance has been poor in comparison with the growth of population, and has had to be offset by increasing imports of cereals and the provision of food aid. In mid-1995, the link between drought and food shortages was again on the regional agenda as it was reported that the region's maize output would fall by 41 per cent.

When food shortages and water scarcity coincide with mass migration and the breakdown of society, the result may be cholera. This threat is more virulent because of the widespread ignorance about the development and transmission of this and other diseases. In these and other examples—drugs, violence, arms-trafficking to mention only-three—it is evident that security threats in the region are intimately interconnected.

The outcome of the World Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen in March 1995 suggests that the questions of poverty,

development and security are linked. The case for the new security agenda has never been stronger but, it seems, militaries in the region are prepared to use the expanded agenda to press for more resources. For example, the South African National Defence Force issued for public comment a draft White Paper in June 1995. Although, a welcome departure from the apartheid-centred belligerence, the White Paper used the underlying notions of the new security agenda to plead the case for the maintenance of defence expenditure at best and, at worst, the reinvention of a political role for the military.

Of course it is easy to use the increasing sets of security concerns in the region as a means to exaggerate the hypothetical battles much loved by those who draw up military budgets—to use increased migration figures or increased crime statistics as a means to boost public support for increased military spending. But approaching the security problems associated with a changing security agenda through the binary logic of the military is no substitute for the need to think again. Deep-seated social dislocation, the legacy of decades of simplistic security-driven politics, can only be effectively offset with development and empowerment.

Proposition Two: Build Regional Civil Society

Traditionally, security studies have almost exclusively focussed on governments and their instruments of policy. But as the history of civil society in both South Africa and Eastern Europe in the 1980s shows, governments are not the only decisive agents of change. Of course, governments cannot be ignored. They control important levers of power, but State power cannot offer effective anchors for reconstruction if States themselves falter.

This is why the building of comprehensive security requires energetic foreign policy from below, as well as at the inter-State level. Success, however, will require the growth of civil society throughout southern Africa; within individual countries it needs to deepen but, at the same time, be transnational.

Efforts at awakening regional consciousness in southern Africa have been complicated by the experience of the immediate past. Apartheid and colonialism made the development of transnational links difficult. The region's economic development had the opposite effect however; this may become a factor in the search for new forms of regional association.

Looking beyond the State as a way of achieving regional security is only at an embryonic stage. Where groupings in the region have

managed to coalesce, forms of regional solidarity have been expressed. The outstanding example is the draft Social Charter of Fundamental Rights of Workers in southern Africa; this contains a variety of demands, including one on Migrant Workers. Recent suggestions include the adoption of a Charter of Citizenship for Southern Africa and the appointment of a respected individual from the region as a roving ambassador in the region to lower tensions and help confidence-building. The SADC process has also helped to build professional associations across the region.

The region was intensely involved with the struggle of South Africa's majority in a multiplicity of ways; for example, many South African exiles made their homes in the region. The experience in exile may lend itself to effective person-to-person links over the course of time. Without strong civil society across the region it is unlikely that either regional consciousness or the development of a comprehensive and all-encompassing vision of security and its essential partners—development and empowerment—will deepen.

Proposition Three: Use the Opportunities Offered by Porous Borders

Traditional approaches to security have privileged power and order in determining policy; inevitably, this has led to a focus on States, their borders and the preservation of the status quo. Because it has faithfully followed the Organisation of African Unity's dictum on the sanctity of colonial borders, southern Africa has been no exception.

Recent events, however, have opened up the space for a new perspective on this decade's old mantra. South Africa's return of the once contested enclave of Walvis Bay to the people of Namibia has opened footholds for discussion on the geographical integrity of the African State.

At the State level there have already been some debates about the region's geographic future. During a State visit to Lesotho in mid-July 1995, the President of South Africa focussed opening discussion with Lesotho on giving the tiny mountain kingdom access to the sea through South Africa; Lesotho has also claimed parts of South Africa's Free State Province; and the region's other small State, Swaziland, has laid claim to areas of South Africa's Mpumalanga province (the former Eastern Transvaal).

Imaginative responses to the border issue can appear as quite natural to the rhythm of its peoples. This is why the announcement, in May 1995, by the Premier of Mpumalanga, Matthews Phosa, that

he would seek an “economic bloc” with both Swaziland and the southern provinces of Mozambique, was greeted with equanimity. For centuries, the indigenous people of this fertile triangle of African *lowveld* have considered themselves united by the bonds of blood, barter and the search for a better life. They speak a common language; the area engages in a rich exchange of goods, labour and contraband; and as has happened so often in Africa, the border between the States was a strong growth point. In essence, Phosa has reasserted a series of truths that were previously masked by colonialism, apartheid and the search for nationhood. Southern Africa’s people belong together for reasons that go beyond geography; ancient ties of kinship straddle each of the region’s innumerable national boundaries. This confluence of forces has been reinforced by porous national borders that have built a regional economy that recognises no borders. By offering new solutions, the myths that created the region’s current maps are challenged and probing new forms of subregionalism are imagined.

Through the process of re-knitting, a surprising number of everyday problems may be overcome. As people reunite, economies of scale can become effective and small entrepreneurs—increasingly seen as essential for sustainable development—can take root. The creative impulse of border economies has to be harnessed and deepened.

In southern Africa, as in other regions of the world, there is increasing tension between fragmentation and integration. That tension makes the future seem bleak. But is it necessary to see the problem only this way? Why is it not possible, at the end of the twentieth century, for there to be both fragmentation and integration? That would involve moving away from simple patterns of association towards processes that will shift power away from the State level. In one direction, that will deepen regional community institutions; in another, it will strengthen local community bodies.

Many will argue that this approach might deepen irredentism, which is already threatening to tear countries in the region apart: Zanzibar and South Africa’s desperately troubled KwaZulu-Natal province are just two examples.

But challenging questions remain. Should southern Africa’s people support the re-creation of a regional system of relatively homogeneous “States”, seeking to pursue “national interests” relatively autonomously? Or, alternatively, should they seek to develop an identity around a southern African community made up of non-statist States committed to regionalism and human diversity internally and externally?

Proposition Four: Understand that Southern Africa Turns on a Single Economy

All southern Africa's people share in a common wealth. Although joined in a single economy, southern Africa's people have been parcelled into a dozen States, each with an array of formal institutions, each State purporting to represent the interests of its citizens, and each—as a reading of national histories suggest—with the capacity for coercion.

Mine labour has been the backbone of the region's economy since the 1890s. This has drawn millions upon millions of southern Africa's people southwards as generation upon generation of people have followed their forebears in a rite of regional passage. Driving this mix of politics and anthropology was that single unit of wealth generation.

Other examples of the single economy are to be found in the interlinked transport routes, complementary power grids and, as is now abundantly clear, interdependence on water supplies.

In the 1990s, a new wave of economic relocation is under way in southern Africa. While drawing on individual understandings of the region's past, migrants now anticipate an entirely different future for the region than that which was offered by State-to-State orthodoxy.

New trends in regional interaction have been set in motion. Many people have been "pushed" from their own countries by lingering conflict, devastating droughts or deepening environmental decay. There are also micro-trends:

Angolans moving to Namibia, and Zambians moving to Zimbabwe and Botswana. Other trends are less immediately obvious. One such is the migration of skilled professional people from the region to South Africa, the latter's gain representing a serious loss to countries already desperately lacking in skills.

Migration has undoubtedly undermined the viability of States and the integrity of borders. That movement creates crises in the lives of individuals and threatens the fabric of societies. Although South Africa's economy has undoubtedly benefited from the contribution of migrants, the issue itself has traumatised the public in South Africa as elements in the press and elsewhere have drawn simplistic understandings of the challenges that surround regional migration.

Where unemployment is already a problem—as in South Africa—the arrival of migrants exacerbates social tension, resulting in ugly demands for mass deportations of "illegals", for electric fences and for

military patrols. Those are not the images the post-apartheid government, and South Africa's people, want to project.

The issue of migration is, of course, international and has been broadened by global change. In southern Africa the energy unleashed by migration must be made into a positive factor for region-wide reconstruction. Governments and companies must be encouraged to look upon the region as a single labour and economic unit. An incentive towards economic decentralisation should be built into long-term planning, and into thinking on regional resource development.

Only that will save South Africa's Gauteng Province and the region's economic heartland from the water shortages that face it early next century.

In the interim, wise leadership must offset the damage that migrant-phobia has engendered. Nelson Mandela and his deputy, Thabo Mbeki, have been at pains to stress the reciprocity that South-Africans owe their fellow southern Africans. In a visit to the troubled Alexander Township near the region's financial capital, Johannesburg, in mid-August, the President of South Africa reminded his enthusiastic supporters not to forget the generous and philanthropic attitude displayed to South African exiles in African countries during the apartheid years.

Proposition Five: Deepen, Don't Widen, Regional Institutions

Four inter-State regional groupings have been searching for ways to engage the region's people, and the promise of security has played a significant part in this appeal. But there is an obvious and immediate problem. The members of these are States, and as such there are limits to the extent to which they can be involved in the domestic affairs of neighbouring States. In part this will be balanced by efforts to recognize the rights of individuals, but willing the end does not necessarily produce the availability of the means.

That is why, as was urged in the second proposition, the weakness of civil society in the region needs to be addressed. Until that is done, there will be political constraints on securing the rights of individuals.

The security of the apartheid State was pursued by an offensive military strategy designed to keep the African National Congress (ANC) as distant as possible from the country—a strategy that had a devastating effect on the region—and by an attempt to underpin its position by creating a regional economic institution. The latter was the stillborn Constellation of Southern African States, which was introduced in the late 1970s. To counter that, States of the region

engaged in a process of community-building, which was aimed, not so much at security in a military sense, but at asserting economic independence.

Two separate economic groupings were formed—the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Preferential Trade Agreement of East and Southern Africa (PTA). The former is now known as the Southern Africa Development Community and, in 1994, it was decided that the latter be called the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Still another regional economic arrangement—the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)—has linked South Africa to its closest neighbours since the beginning of the century.

To counter apartheid's military offensive, the countries of the region established a security system known as the frontline States. Created with quite distinctive goals in mind, this arrangement was also imbued with distinctive and very personalised mechanisms to resolve inter-State conflict. Its success prompted efforts to prolong its life, and it has re-emerged as the Association of Southern African States. Therein lies a problem in that SADC committed itself in 1994 to the development of a security and diplomacy capacity. Can the region afford two distinct institutions dealing with security questions?

The proliferation of security institutions in post-war Europe offers a useful comparison. The delicate stability that evolved in the West did so as a result of complex institutionalisation, as opposed to any search for a single security regime. Although each had a different weight, the European Economic Community, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Western European Union, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (formerly the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the European Court all played equal parts. It would be difficult to devise any single regime structure to cover the range of functions served by these organisations. Is this the case, by analogy, in southern Africa?

Although it is tempting to believe that is the case, the evidence on the ground suggests that a concentrated effort is needed. The various existing bodies continue to clash over security policy, and the present dual system led to tension at the August 1995 SADC summit in Johannesburg. Efforts to paper-over the existing confusion—as item 16 of the summit communique showed—are clumsy. More important, institutional rivalry weakens efforts at mediation and timely containment. Efforts to rationalize the dual system would be applauded by the donor community which, until recently, had to carry the costs of

institutions of this kind. This clearly seems a rare case where, to use an anthropological image, one hut is better than two.

If SADC is to deepen this role, however, its secretariat will have to be strengthened. By its nature, security cannot be considered as a traditional functional "sector" of SADC's work. That does not mean that the unique features of the front-line system will be lost. Those, like the present Chairman of the Association of Southern African States, Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe—who helped create the first phase of the region's working security system—will have to help SADC become fully effective in the twenty-first century.

As the region changes, SADC needs also to reassess its terms of association and recast itself in the context of democracy. Of primary importance is the need for the SADC heads of State to make clear that membership of the regional "club" is only open to those who have committed themselves to democratic principles and practice.

Proposition Six: Drive, Don't be Driven by the Concerns of Outsiders

Outsiders have a poor reputation in southern Africa. As the record shows, they were often the agents of insecurity. For example, the former Prime Minister of Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher, opposed comprehensive sanctions and, instead, saw investment as the engine for change; in 1994, in contrast, she warned Western business against investment in South Africa. In both cases, policies favouring the profit motive, which were in opposition to what the majority of the population wanted, prevailed. When such positions are espoused by prominent individuals, it is not surprising that suspicion of the North is rife. Outsiders are in a difficult position: they are damned if they try to get involved, and damned if they do not.

If outsiders are to play the opposite role in the future, they must eschew imposing their own ideas and ambitions and, instead, help the region to help itself. There are important things outsiders can do to build this peace system, such as providing finance for the resettlement of demobilised soldiers or for the region's mounting refugee crisis, or providing material support for the lifting of the killer land-mines in Mozambique and Angola. Moreover, as Angola recently showed, outside troops are sometimes more acceptable as peace-keepers than are intraregional forces.

Outsiders can apply a variety of pressures as they did in the case of apartheid. They can take action to try and isolate a conflict, e.g., by helping neighbours and drawing lines. They can help limit the

escalation of conflict by appeals and embargoes. They sometimes have the authority to sway local decisions one way or another in a conflict because of the calculations of the parties about the post-conflict situation. Despite present wariness towards outsiders, the latter's recent record in sub-Saharan Africa is not all negative. But certainly the guiding principle should be for the region to identify what might, or—more important—might not, be helpful.

Southern African governments should know that if people do not want to live together they will not, and outsiders cannot make them do so. The limitations of outside intervention were tragically exposed in the failure of outsiders— including the temporarily deployed French forces—to prevent the blood-letting that has passed for politics in Rwanda.

Making History Work for the Region

Underpinning the propositions, I have just made is, of course, a set of values. Lasting partnership and cooperation— the essential ingredients in the building of international communities—are only possible between democracies. And democracies are only possible when plural choice, transparency and accountability underpin the political process.

In Swaziland, a traditional African kingdom in all but name, there are stirrings of a movement for democracy. In some countries of the region—Malawi and Lesotho are good examples—the move towards democracy has only just begun. In others—Zimbabwe and Zambia—progress has become mired in personality; still in others—Angola, Mozambique and South Africa—the residues of deep conflict periodically stall the democratic process. In Botswana and Namibia—often held to be shining examples of multiparty democracy— social indicators suggest long-term dislocation that could threaten promising records.

The long-term security, which is necessary for both growth and redistribution in southern Africa, must begin by focusing on people, justice and change. The latter can only be made secure through the emancipation that accountable government and a vibrant civil society offers. The only road to emancipation, as Ken Booth has shown, is through (regional) community.

The desire for liberation has been a powerful force in twentieth century southern Africa. There is no sign that its potency is waning.

The most dramatic event in the region's recent history, the ending of apartheid, was achieved as a result of the oppressed majority in

South Africa and the people of southern Africa working together with the global forces that aspire to emancipation from racism. The processes of emancipation take many forms and operate at a variety of levels. The journey into the twenty-first century must begin with an identification of common interests. It must be nourished by the building of common identities and the spread of moral and political obligations. Those will provide the only dependable road-map to lasting security for southern Africa in the coming millennium.

ANNEX

SADCC: In 1980, the frontline States initiated the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference. The other members were Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland. Its primary objective was to reduce its members' economic dependence on South Africa. Owing to the political developments of the early 1990s in Namibia and South Africa, SADCC was reformulated in 1993 to become a regional economic union, the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Namibia and South Africa are now members. The political and economic goals of the organisation are now oriented towards boosting the region's economic independence, building regional integration and mobilising support for national and regional projects.

Association of Southern African States (formerly frontline States): In the late 1970s, five southern African States established a loose political front commonly known as the frontline States in response to apartheid's regional destabilisation. They were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. After its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe also joined. Its main objectives were to resist regional aggression by apartheid and give solidarity to the liberation movements. Political developments in South Africa have rendered this group irrelevant Conflicts are now handled by SADC, as the 1994 political crisis in Lesotho clearly showed.

SACU: The Southern African Customs Union is the oldest economic integration scheme in the region. Established in 1910 and re-negotiated in 1969, the Union comprises South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and, since 1990, Namibia. It provides for free movement of goods and services among members through a common tariff. Customs and excise duties collected are paid into a Common Pool administered by the South African Reserve Bank. Revenues accruing to the smaller States are paid annually in proportion to the amount of goods and services that entered their borders.

COMESA: The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa was established in November 1993. It replaced the Preferential Trade Area for East and Southern Africa, created in 1981. The PTA aimed to liberalize trade, encourage economic cooperation and create a regional common market by the year 2000. COMESA has taken up those tasks. It is expected to bring about complete liberalisation of movement of goods, services and capital and, eventually, a monetary union.

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Strengthening of Political Co-operation in Latin America

The following selections are from the presentations made to the Conference of Experts on the Strengthening of Political Co-operation in Latin America, which met in Lima, Peru, from 6 to 9 December 1988. The Conference was convened under the auspices of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Centre, created in 1987 in accordance with a decision of the General Assembly, functions within the framework of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, and, in particular, in the context of its World Disarmament Campaign activities; it also receives assistance from the Department of Public Information. The activities of the Centre are financed principally through voluntary contributions.

The Conference of Experts gathered 28 participants, among them diplomats, educators and researchers, from 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. During the Conference the participants presented papers on the following subjects: multilateral disarmament; cooperation and confidence-building; peace and security at the regional and sub-regional levels; disarmament, development and security; and the international transfer of arms. Covering all of the papers, an extensive debate and exchange of views and viewpoints took place. In an effort to facilitate an open dialogue, the discussions on the presentations were of a candid, informal character, and consequently were not recorded.

It is hoped that the following articles will contribute to the study of questions of peace, security, disarmament and development at the regional level, and will encourage other continents and regions to take note of the deliberations of the Conference and of the kinds of questions which are of particular interest to the Latin American and Caribbean

region. If that should occur, this publication could contribute to greater understanding of problems and dissemination of constructive ideas.

The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, emphasised the role the United Nations should play in the promotion of disarmament. Paragraph 15 of that document, which was adopted unanimously, reads as follows:

> "It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States."

The World Disarmament Campaign was officially inaugurated on 7 June 1982, at the opening meeting of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In the wording unanimously approved on that occasion, the Campaign was to be carried out "in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner." This led to the establishment, on 24 October 1986, of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, with its headquarters in Lome, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia, established on 30 November 1987, with its headquarters in Kathmandu, and the Regional Centre in Latin America.

This Centre—whose official name is now United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean—was established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 41/60 J of 3 December 1986. In that resolution the General Assembly recalled its resolution 39/63 J of 12 December 1984, in which it requested the Secretary-General to "provide assistance to such Member States in the regions concerned as might request it with a view to establishing regional and institutional arrangements for the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign".

In its resolution 42/39 K of 30 November 1987, the General Assembly welcomed the promptness with which the Secretary-General had taken the necessary administrative measures to ensure the functioning of the Centre in the context of the World Disarmament Campaign, expressed its thanks to the host Member State for its valuable contribution to the functioning of the Centre, and recommended that the Centre should hold, in 1988, the Conference which we are inaugurating today.

At its forty-third session, on 18 November 1988, the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 43/76 H, in which it recalled the Acapuico Commitment to Peace, Development and Democracy signed by eight Latin American heads of State, including those of Mexico and Peru. In the Commitment they emphasised that regional integration was a political commitment of vital importance and an instrument of change and modernisation which must secure the active participation of all economic and social agents, for "integration is an essential tool for ensuring that the region participates more effectively in international relations, expanding its negotiating power *vis-a-vis* third parties."

In the preamble to resolution 43/76 H, note was also taken of the final documents of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Nicosia, Cyprus, in September 1988, in which it is stated that the future of mankind cannot be left to a limited number of countries, however great and powerful they may be, and that if the current detente is to lead to lasting global peace, it has to become wider in scope, content and participation, for disarmament is closely linked to international peace and security and the very survival of humanity, since the present world economic structure based on self-perpetuating inequalities should be transformed through co-operative action on the basis of equity and justice. Efforts should continue "to establish a new international economic order which has not lost any of its validity". In carrying out its activities, the Regional Centre will therefore seek to promote relationships based on mutual confidence and security among countries of the region "in a spirit of harmony, solidarity and co-operation aimed at the implementation of measures that foster peace, disarmament and social and economic development in Latin America and the Caribbean".

In the operative part of the resolution the General Assembly takes note with satisfaction of the holding of the Conference of Experts which we are inaugurating today and which will examine various conceptual and organisational aspects of the Centre to enable it to fulfil its objectives. It also recommends that the Centre hold two meetings during 1989 with a view to reaffirming its role as a centre for documentary collection, diffusion and dissemination, as a forum for the promotion of peace, disarmament and development measures in the context of the World Disarmament Campaign and as an organ for the co-ordination of studies, research and programmes in the fields of its competence.

In the resolution the Assembly once again invites Member States and international, governmental and non-governmental organisations to make voluntary contributions to the Centre. It also requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session on the implementation of the resolution.

It has rightly been said that disarmament and development are two pillars on which lasting international peace and security can be built. The world can either persist in the arms race or turn towards more stable and more balanced social and economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order: it cannot do both. From the contrast between world military expenditure and unfulfilled socio-economic needs there comes a powerful moral incentive to recognize the relationship between disarmament and development.

This is a close and multidimensional relationship, which derives in part from the fact that both development and the continuing world arms race compete for the same finite resources at the national and international levels. The allocation of large volumes of resources to armaments prevents development from reaching its optimum level.

Security plays a crucial role in the relationship between disarmament and development. It is undoubtedly a matter of the highest priority for all nations and indeed fundamental to disarmament and development. By contributing to a more stable and sustainable international system, the development process can strengthen security and thus promote arms reduction and disarmament. Disarmament will in turn directly and indirectly strengthen security by allowing more resources to be assigned to development.

The relationship between disarmament and development has been one of the main concerns of the United Nations ever since its establishment in 1945. The report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of disarmament, issued in 1962, states:

> "The present level of military expenditure not only represents a grave political danger but also imposes a heavy economic and social burden on most countries. It absorbs a large volume of human and material resources of all kinds, which could be used to increase economic and social welfare throughout the world—both in the highly industrialised countries, which at the present time incur the bulk of the world's military expenditures, and in the less developed areas."

Conferences such as this one can make a very useful contribution to this work. The agenda of the Conference includes the evaluation, from the standpoint of multilateral disarmament, of recent

developments and of what they indicate for the future; co-operation and confidence-building measures in Latin America and the Caribbean; the prospects for peace and security at the regional and subregional levels; and international arms transfers in all their aspects. The meeting at which we shall consider the relationship between disarmament, development and security will probably be one of the most important of all our meetings.

The arms race endangers international security and leads to the waste of enormous sums in military expenditures. The resources saved through cuts, however small, in these expenditures and their reallocation for development purposes could provide enormous benefits for civil purposes. The General Assembly was absolutely right when it stated in the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament:

> "... there is also a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realisation of the latter."

Therefore, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner that will help to promote the development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developing and developed countries.

The Action Programme adopted by the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development offers many possibilities for its implementation through the work of the regional centres. The United Nations could use these centres to study the possibility of making, in the context of the World Disarmament Campaign, periodic analyses of the effects of military expenditures on the world economy and the economic system. In closing let me recall one of the conclusions of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development:

> "An improved and comprehensive data base on global and national military expenditures would greatly facilitate the study and analysis of the impact of military expenditures on the world economy and the international economic system. To this end, the broadest possible number of States should provide objective information on their military budgets to the United Nations according to agreed and comparable definitions of the specific components of these budgets. In this connection, the work under way in the United Nations for a systematic examination of various problems of defining, reporting and comparing military budget data should be intensified."

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY AT THE REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL LEVELS

The subject on which I wish to speak today is not a matter of priority concern in Latin America: I wish it were. Nor are the ideas I am going to express necessarily those of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ours is a region of the world in which certain exemplary virtues of fraternal, harmonious coexistence have been evident for a long time and therefore the subjects of security and peace, in regional and subregional terms, have a much lower priority than other matters which pose a direct threat to Latin American society. Nowhere between the Rio Grande and Patagonia is there, to my knowledge, any other meeting today, in any country, that is devoting attention to these questions. By Latin American standards, it is not a matter of high priority. You have already, I am sure, been impressed by the easy atmosphere of this meeting, the concord of our opinions, the naturalness with which everyone speaks, and the absence of tension.

If I came from Central America, or if I were a Cuban, my perception would doubtless be changed by certain relevant circumstances, but our region is, I believe, one of extraordinary harmony and open dialogue, and even our disputes are somewhat outworn. In Latin America, there is a disposition towards negotiation, towards a wait-and-see attitude, in almost everything that has arisen from any dispute or any problem of the past.

Another factor that makes my subject less urgent is that this is a propitious time in Latin America. It is not necessarily the best time for political co-operation, but it is almost that. At no time in the past have we had such a concurrence of views, such affinity, such a comfortable and homogeneous way of speaking with one another.

This is a period in which the democratic process is being strengthened. Meritorious as this trend is, it involves the challenge of difficult economic circumstances. There are no circumstances, in my opinion, that could justify political philosophies that promote the exporting of any ideology to our region or that tend in any way to legitimize any kind of geographical expansionism. There is a diffuse but real perception of a call for democracy, peace and dialogue in the region. Our history is extraordinarily conducive to the building of co-operation and favourable to attempts to find ways of strengthening peace and security. It is far less traumatic than the histories of some other countries. Our traumas have usually come, not from within

Latin America, but rather from outside, or else they have been inspired from outside. There was a time when, in a certain sense, we constituted a colonial common market, but without the freedom in our affairs we know today, without the democratic process. In a way, independence keeps us separate, and now perhaps we shall endeavour in a sovereign and democratic manner to find a way to coexist in relative harmony, as we have done for centuries. Thus, we do not have any identifiable problem of historical resentment or trauma, and the most imitative forms of rivalry, the forms most closely copied from abroad, have not gone beyond a certain kind of rhetoric.

Another element in our favour is that, in a sense, we are something of a backwater of the world's great theatres of strategic operations. There are of course essential interests in the region of Panama; there are more acute Caribbean concerns; but Latin America has never been regarded as a priority theatre of strategic confrontation. Thus we enjoy the benefit of a geopolitical tranquillity, an absence of strong external forces pressuring us to take action. Public opinion in Brazil favours those forms of action that strengthen peace and security, and public opinion in our country does not identify with any supremacist national interest.

It is useful today to mention all these favourable circumstances, since Latin America is suffering at the moment from a certain degree of depression, a loss of its collective self-confidence. It feels that it has lost influence and status in the world, that it has a series of problems, and so it is well for us to "count our blessings".

To the south of us we have an area covered by the Antarctic Treaty, which, with all its imperfections, is a good one. It has guaranteed that an area which would normally have been an arena of confrontation between the Super-Powers has not become one. It is a provisional instrument, but it is the best one possible in the circumstances. I think it protects us well in terms of peace and security. We have also had a good example in the South Atlantic, another area in which we have done what we ought to do as regards peace and security: we have agreed on a well-defined zone of peace and co-operation. It is as yet only a skeleton but it will be fleshed out later, and I believe it will be very good.

In the Pacific there are initiatives that seem very promising, but the Pacific is a more difficult ocean than the Atlantic to deal with. It is bounded not by the easily recognizable wall of Africa but rather by a scattering of islands. Strategically, it is much more difficult to deal with than the South Atlantic but some progress has been made-in the Pacific also.

We have done admirable things with our agreements regarding the three major geographical areas. None of these is an instrument of peace and security, but each is more than a mere confidence-building measure. They are admirable documents for administering large ecosystems: the Treaty of the River Plate Basin, the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, and the Andean Pact. There is a much broader Latin American structure: we have yet to see all of these instruments integrated.

We also nave the great umbrella of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Our attitudes are sometimes different but the Treaty of Tlatelolco and an extraordinary document, one that has given each of us, with our own special features, a great instrument for self-protection and for the creation of confidence, security and peace among ourselves. Thus we have a framework of important instruments that will be very useful.

Another important element is that—with very rare exceptions—our military establishments are not designed for the taking of aggressive action. They have neither the equipment nor the strategy. There have been excessive expenditures, but there has never been any mobilisation or standing army prepared for aggression. None of us feels threatened by the others. We do not have the feeling that within hours or days we may be confronted by some military organisation or by situations that would lead to confrontation. This is another favourable circumstance. There have been abusive expenditures of all kinds, but in my opinion this is not the greatest of sins.

Another admirable process has been the creation of *ad hoc* instruments that are progressing well: Contadora, the Contadora Support Group, the Group of Eight, and in disarmament matters the Group of Six. Today, in Latin America, more than ever before, there is a search for *rapprochement.* For the first time in history, heads of State and the principal figures in international affairs travel a great deal, know one another personally, and are on very cordial terms. This too has created an element of disarmament, in almost personal terms. The great economic and financial setbacks we have suffered during the past 10 years have brought us two good things: first, a certain wisdom and humility, and secondly, a much clearer perception of our own nature as Latin Americans. Because of its language and the vastness of its frontiers, Brazil has been less militantly Latin American; today it regards itself as part of the system and it no longer feels that it must have its own independent destiny. We no longer see any possibility of a national destiny separate from the destiny shared by all of us.

So, with regard to the scenarios one can see in Latin America for strengthening peace and security, disarmament measures in the strict sense are not urgently needed, since there has not been any great armaments race which we would have to reverse. There have been imprudent purchases, but their economic effect on the country making the purchases has been greater than any strategic effect on the general situation. The acquisition of armaments by Latin American countries has been more costly than dangerous. It has been an economic mistake rather than an effective move in foreign policy. A great deal of money has been spent for very little benefit but this is a problem of domestic financial management rather than of a perceived threat to disarmament.

There are two dimensions in which I believe something can be done.

We have no need, in the strict sense, for any regional verification policy, just as we have no need for any regional disarmament policy. First of all, we do not have the instruments for carrying out any verification process with scientific and technological competence, nor, secondly, do we have any establishments with sufficient technological sophistication. What we do have is more or less evident. We are more transparent to one another than is usual today. Latin America is a continent which has anticipated *glasnost* by many decades. There is a *rapprochement* between our military establishments. There is an entire system for training the military personnel of one country at the academies of other countries. These are not very efficient methods, but they are more or less adequate for eliminating any threat posed by one country to the others.

Life in Latin America during the past few years has been a continuous process of confidence-building. There are problems which prevent the quality of this process from being as successful as we should like: in the case of certain regimes complete transparency is impossible, but this is the only thing which for the time being prevents Latin America from speaking more or less with one voice. Much remains to be done, but we are doing a great deal in this area of building confidence among ourselves. This is the broadest concept I know of in diplomacy.

I believe that security, peace and harmony in Latin America are threatened primarily by non-military factors, the most dangerous of which, in my opinion, is the change in the internal order of one or more countries towards authoritarian forms of government. This is a factor which does not necessarily cause any loss of confidence but

which interferes with confidence-building. Thus our first concern is to strengthen the democracies, to make them more effective.

I believe that what also threatens us today cannot be judged as being due to a lack of security measures; rather, today we are facing an acute environmental challenge. More and more, especially in the great forest ecosystems of Latin America, there is cause for world-wide concern; there are circumstances which could lead to the kind of interventionist actions that have been prevalent in the past. We see attempts to establish limits to the exercise of sovereignty. I do not wish to suggest that our physical heritage is about to be destroyed, but I insist that we have the right to determine what is the best way to protect the global environment.

There is the problem of relationships with creditor countries, during what I consider to be the twilight phase of the debt period. There are serious problems relating to human rights and their denial, the denial of social and economic rights in particular. We are facing great demographic challenges and urban challenges. We are facing problems resulting from drugs and drug trafficking. Above all, there is an increasing tendency to identify the North as virtuous and the South as not virtuous. The North knows how to take action in the demographic, financial, ecological, humanitarian and military fields today, and we are supposedly the embodiment of a cumulative inability to act with prudence, wisdom and vision. This meeting and others that will follow it should be part of a learning process that will enable us to recognize clearly the fallacy of this new Manichaeism between North and South which is beginning to take on formal characteristics internationally.

With regard to ideological actions to bring about disarmament, verification and the strengthening of international confidence, there is not much that can be done, except perhaps for Central American areas with very special features. In the case of Cuba, which has extra-continental characteristics, there is a much more complex relationship which is beyond the scope of the analysis I am making here. The problem of the illegal traffic in arms is relevant to the field of arms control. It is the only area in which, in my view, concerted regional action could be effective, significant and realistic. The rest is not, in my opinion, either urgent or *stricto sensu* necessary, and where it is necessary, it is impossible today to take any action.

I believe therefore that the illegal arms traffic would provide us with a very sharp focus, if we needed one, on the area in which we could act more effectively, with more solidarity, with more prudence, but also with a recognition of our limitations. The illegal arms traffic

normally means dealing in small arms which are sold on the world market. There is no need to eliminate the sale of such weapons in Latin America. They are very easy to transport, but transport is not necessary. History shows us that every terrorist or rebel movement has armed itself essentially with the weapons of the regime it opposes. Almost every process of arms supply for insurrections consists more in the capture of the State's weapons than in the acquisition of weapons from abroad, especially in view of the fact that while it is possible to obtain weapons, it is very difficult to obtain ammunition of the same calibre, with the same characteristics. Thus the initial problem is endogenous, but something can be done about it. I believe every country should be prepared to consider this realistically, as it is something in which each country has a vital interest.

I am now speaking at the regional level, because the problem is primarily a regional one, but the regional approach is not enough. If we had regional control over our atmosphere and the outer space above us, it would be different, but both the atmosphere and outer space are beyond our control. If we had control over all the territory in our area of influence, our capacity for regional control would be greater. But our ability to influence regional affairs is imperfect because regional matters are affected, even contaminated, in very large measure by global ones. Thus, if today there are two satellites above Lima looking down at this meeting and listening to us, or if there are certain instruments flying above our heads which we are unable to detect, or if there are operational units in the sea, all of these things are within our area, but our ability to do something about them is nil. The danger in considering regional affairs is that we may think they are the only things to be considered. No, regional affairs are only a small part. We can talk about non-strategic matters, non-global matters, in the regional context, but we must accept the fact that while we have no influence on global affairs, global affairs influence regional affairs and distort them to such an extent as to make our effectiveness very marginal. The history of Latin America during the past century and a half has been one of actions which affected our peace and security but which came from abroad. Obviously, we share some of the responsibility. We became involved in two world wars from which our regionalism did not protect us. We became involved in a series of actions of an interventionist or non-interventionist character from which our regionalism did not protect us.

Thus the illusions of regionalism are that it would create between us and the world a barrier which would be under our own control and that it would afford us complete protection against others. Such is not

the case. There is no such thing as self-sufficient regionalism; there is only regionalism as part of a global approach. I am speaking now somewhat as a Brazilian, since Brazil naturally views itself as South American, Latin American and so on, but also as a country of global importance. We are members of the United Nations as well as of the Organisation of American States. Brazil acts on the global stage as a global actor. We consider exclusively regional salvation absolutely impossible. One of the problems of regionalisation is that it may create an illusion that we would find the elements for a sort of regional police force at the price of not interfering in affairs which are too complex and technologically too sophisticated for our simple nature. There is something very dangerous in all this, namely, the suggestion that we have the competence and the wisdom to keep our own backyards in relatively good order but that in exchange for this we are expected not to meddle in affairs which require technological knowledge, a strategic perception, a vision of power, for which our adolescence, a certain Latin American juvenility, does not qualify us.

For us it is vital to have this perception of regional affairs as a more intimate area but neither exclusive nor sufficient for action in all fields, because, as I said, all of the great traumas we have suffered have come as an echo of certain changes that have taken place outside the region. Thus I believe that, especially in the catastrophic scenarios that one may formulate for Latin America, all of these scenarios originate from outside. I cannot conceive of any catastrophic scenario for Latin America that does not originate in the world conflict, in the use of nuclear weapons against us, in our involuntary and automatic participation in some kind of conflict. So we have no absolute immunity to protect us from the things going on around us. It is absurd, in a world that is interdependent in every respect, to create our own particularism in terms of security and peace. Interdependence in peace and security has the same logic as interdependence in trade and finance. I am strongly against yielding to the temptation to let a certain sphere of responsibility be assigned to us in exchange for a certain discreet discipline in matters which are supposedly beyond our capacity.

I therefore believe that the Regional Centre must be two things. It already has a very clear mandate, and its constitution is very precise. It is designed to enable us to decide for ourselves what is most suitable for us and to serve as a basis for us in considering here what is happening outside. I see the Regional Centre thinking regionally, towards the outside. It is not merely an introspective exercise for Latin America: it is Latin America thinking about itself and about the world. This twofold purpose must be kept very clearly in mind.

Another thing I consider important is that we already have a long history of Latin American positions on these matters. We played a big part in drafting the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and Ambassador Garcia Robles is one of the major architects of that document. A great deal of thinking went into it. A great instrument was created. Latin America is not just starting today to identify its interests in these matters. We have created a great body of principles. These do not, in my view, constrain us; rather they serve as the foundation upon which we must build. We must bear in mind a certain important order of priorities that was established at that time, the central feature of which is the supremacy of the nuclear over the conventional. This supremacy must be a central consideration for us: the only thing that can destroy the world and prevent it from functioning is its nuclear capacity.

The Latin American action already taken at Tiateloico does not stop there. The pressure for effective action to bring about nuclear disarmament must continue. Tiateloico marks the limit of what can be done regionally. If by adopting the Treaty of Tiateloico we could have guaranteed that we would not become the victims of nuclear weapons, that would have been enough, but it is obvious that although Tiateloico gave us ample guarantees of not becoming the instruments of nuclear aggression, it did not provide us with absolute protection against a conflict that would go much further. Thus, the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session had a certain orthodoxy: we should not invent a new direction for our ideas regarding the broad terms of peace, security and disarmament, especially at the regional and subregional levels.

I do not believe that any urgent priority exists on this score. I believe that this is a matter of constant concern, but there are other, more urgent, priorities for Latin America. I believe that we possess the most effective forms of co-operation and understanding among nations. In both absolute and relative terms, our military expenditures are fairly low. We have an extraordinary record of coexistence. This should not be taken as a reason either for inaction or for self-congratulation: it is a springboard for us to use as a basis for influencing global affairs. Obviously, we shall not entertain the idea of being an island of security in a world that is becoming more and more insecure.

The Centre therefore is a centre for understanding among ourselves, with one another, and above all, the place where we shall find a common language for telling others—those who are indeed more aggressive, more responsible for the great conflicts of the past century, more dangerous because they are the possessors of large nuclear

arsenals, large chemical arsenals, large conventional arsenals—that Latin America will make its own contribution, as it has been doing for a long time, and that it cannot agree to attend only to its own affairs without exerting any influence on what happens in the world at large.

CO-OPERATION AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

It is a generally accepted belief that there is strength in numbers, whether than strength lies in the almost unlimited resources of one super-Power or in the pooled resources of many smaller countries.

In his address about co-operation among small States, Lloyd Searwar, former Secretary of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), emphasised that "in the absence of significant power and resources, the small State must rely on multilateral diplomacy to assist in the creation of a new order or in promoting change in the existing international system so as to make it more supportive of its natural objectives".

We may therefore assume that one of the reasons that developing countries meet in regional and subregional groupings is to try to strengthen their bargaining position in the international system.

For example, CARICOM represents the subregional group through which English-speaking countries of the Caribbean endeavour to formulate positions and policies that would be of benefit both to the subregion and to the national interests of the country. Having a unified position within the subgroup on, for example, security matters ensures broader support in the larger regional body, in this instance the Organisation of American States (OAS) or the Commonwealth.

CARICOM States, like others in the region, also participate in several interregional multilateral organisations, such as the Group of 77 and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, which function within the context of the United Nations. In all cases, there exists, so to speak, a parent body to which the child can turn for assistance.

In this complex global society, small developing countries need the support of multilateral organisations in order to advance their cause. They realize that a certain degree of concerted interaction is necessary. In international parlance this process is called negotiation, which is possible only when the parties involved are willing to deal with one another directly. Regional States would be remiss if they did not try to maintain good relations and foster positive interaction, which are the pillars of any power base.

Regional and interregional alliances serve another purpose also. In multinational organisations there is a danger that a few influential States may misdirect the work in favour of their own interests, thereby sabotaging the work of the organisation as a whole.

The availability of a forum for regional negotiations—in the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, the OAS—provides an opportunity for systematic discussion and dialogue, which can help prevent regional conflicts. Some believe that the highly flexible way in which the OAS carries out its work contributes greatly to the avoidance or peaceful settlement of conflicts. That premise may not be accepted by all States, but the region can point to some success in this regard.

Needless to say, the effectiveness of any organisation depends on the level of commitment of its members; and in order to achieve worthwhile objectives, the participation must always be at the highest level. Disregard for this has often been the bane of efforts of developing countries.

There are some who consider co-operation and integration more feasible or more possible in homogenous groups of regional or subregional States. I do not wish to refute that theory, but heterogeneous bodies that are not regional in their composition have often been able to display a sense of togetherness. This view is substantiated by the fact that the majority of the States of Latin America and the Caribbean have membership in the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and CARICOM nations of the region are also members of the Commonwealth.

The nations of the Commonwealth, for example, are linked by common traditions, habits, working methods and language. Together they encompass a wealth of different perspectives and sufficient flexibility to allow for an exchange of ideas, which cannot help but enhance co-operation and confidence-building.

The Group of 77 and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries are heterogeneous bodies which strive for co-operation among regional blocs. Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal, former Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference on Disarmament, wrote an interesting book on the Movement, entitled *Non-Alignment: Origins, Growth and Potential/or World Peace,* in which he pointed out that although many of its policies remain unimplemented, the Movement has succeeded in preventing countries from joining great-Power alliances in the course of the last 26 years. Like other multilateral bodies, the Movement serves a preparatory function in the hammering out of draft resolutions and communiques on behalf of the members for presentation to

committees and the General Assembly. This combined action increases the chances for the adoption of such texts by consensus or by a large majority. The Movement also serves as a "bridge of understanding" between the Super-Powers in urging the maintenance of universal peace and security.

Ambassador Jaipal maintains also that the effectiveness and credibility of the Movement have been hampered by its insistence on decisions by consensus out of fear for the consequences of taking sides in the settlement of disputes among Member States.

Let us broaden our perspective and see the Latin American and Caribbean region as a subgroup of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Commonwealth. On that assumption, my earlier comments may serve as a catalyst for promoting co-operation and confidence-building measures in our region.

While it may be relatively easy to understand the significance of co-operation, many questions have been raised about the definition of confidence-building. One of the most acceptable characteristics of the term is found in the "Guidelines for Appropriate Types of Confidence-building Measures and for the Implementation of Such Measures on a Global or Regional Level", adopted by consensus at the session of the Disarmament Commission in May 1988.

> "Confidence-building is a step-by-step process of taking all concrete and effective measures which express political commitments and are of military significance and which are designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security to lessen tension and assist in arms limitation and disarmament..."

If we stopped here we might be tempted to think that confidence-building applied principally to political and military matters; but the definition, by going a step further, introduces elements that embrace the social, cultural and economic spheres:

> "At each stage of this process States must be able to measure and assess the results achieved. Verification of compliance with agreed provisions should be a continuing process.
>
> Political commitments taken together with concrete measures giving expression and effect to those commitments are important instruments for confidence-building."

It stands to reason then that co-operation among States is a prerequisite of the establishment of any confidence-building measure. The association of States brings mutual benefits and discourages conditions and/or actions that might lead to hostilities.

It is especially important for Latin American and Caribbean countries to seek to apply confidence-building measures, for, as stated in the guidelines, they could serve "to reduce or even eliminate the causes of mistrust, fear, misunderstanding and miscalculation with regard to relevant military activities and intentions of other States."

Here again the importance of the concept of strength in numbers is very relevant. For instance, while the two Super-Powers might not be inclined to heed the voice of one small nation crying for an end to the arms race, the clamour of many voices would produce different results. The same would apply to abuses of human rights and to other societal disorders.

I referred earlier to subregional groupings such as CARICOM. I now add the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Caribbean Development and Co-operation Committee (CDCC) and the Latin American Economic System (SELA) to emphasize the need for, and power of, interdependence. As John Donne said, "No man is an island, entire of itself". It is clear that this region has missed some opportunities to co-operate in the past but recent initiatives have been encouraging and Governments seem to be looking for avenues of co-operation and means of confidence-building. The convening of this Conference supports that view.

Despite the fact that there are several groupings within the United Nations system, it is my conviction that global circumstances dictate that, in the not too distant future, there would have to be two significant groups only: developed and developing countries. Of course there would still be degrees of divergencies even within these two categories, but for all practical purposes the emphasis would have to be placed on the needs of the whole. In this way, Governments would be unable to ignore the imperative call for interdependence. Nations would have to accept the fact that difference need not invoke confrontation and would see the wisdom of establishing better communication and promoting greater understanding among themselves. This may of course sound like a naive thought and idealistic dream, but upon close evaluation, there is a good deal of realism in the idea.

Most important, under this plan each of the two groups would experience similar problems regarding economic and territorial security. I am further convinced, however, that unless regions accept differences of opinion and disagreement as a part of mankind's existence and survival there can be no meeting of the minds on the arms race or on any other issue of political, social or economic significance.

It is important to remember that no regional plan can take account of all interests. There has to be some give and take. I referred earlier to the importance of negotiation but what is even more significant is that during the negotiating process certain conditions must be present for the attainment of effective results. Some of these are:

(a) Clarity of objectives;

(b) Common information and interpretations of that information;

(c) Care to see that the issue is being dealt with in the appropriate body;

(d) Flexibility in trade-offs;

(e) Perception of the fact that non-co-operation with proposals will result in loss;

(f) High-level representation;

(g) Perseverance.

I realize that in specifying these measures I am also creating some barriers, but if confidence-building is to follow the step-by-step approach, a glimpse of the fall programme should help to minimize disagreements.

It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the whole theme of cooperation and confidence-building has to be based on trust, for even before we can arrive at the point of establishing the mechanisms for the confidence-building process we must trust one another. In the arms race, for example, we cannot vacillate between the chicken-or-the-egg question of trust and verification. On the issue of disarmament and development we cannot let our natural instinct for self-preservation cause us to opt for selfishness, which must inevitably lead to regional disaster. On the question of human rights abuse we have to be fair. It is the element of trust that builds confidence and co-operation.

Further, in pursuit of confidence-building measures, the regions should observe strictly the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations:

(a) Refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State;

(b) Non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States;

(c) Peaceful settlement of disputes;

(d) Sovereign equality of States and self-determination for all peoples.

It is my hope that greater and more effective national and regional channels of communication will be established in order to convince States in the region to unite their efforts to ensure that our interests and concerns are being heeded in the international community. Similarly, States in developed regions must know that paternalism is no longer acceptable and that equitable representation has to be given a chance. The gaps in understanding among States on how to effect proposed changes still remain to be bridged. One of the best ways to do this is for all States to engage in honest negotiations and display political will towards implementation of those measures that would promote confidence and trust and discourage isolation and suspicion. This conference in itself represents another unique step towards regional co-operation and confidence-building.

There is an apt Chinese proverb that says, “If we don’t change our direction and are not careful where we are headed, we may get there.”

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Co-operation and Confidence-building Measures in Latin America and the Caribbean

Co-operation and joint political action in Latin America are important themes both in theory and in the political and diplomatic practice of the countries of the region.

While there is no indication that they have the same priority in all these countries, or that the same opportunities to implement them exist among all the States or various groups of States, both discourse and deeds appear to be motivated by a strong intention to move beyond rhetoric to joint action.

At the same time, and because of various difficulties, there is also a desire to proceed slowly, but steadily, towards a distant objective: a Latin American community of nations. For this it will be necessary to take advantage of every available opportunity to establish different forms of interrelation among the countries in the region.

The economic, political and social crisis that affects practically all the countries of the area, the perceptible advance of other regions in relation to Latin America, the disenchantment with armed conflict that seems to be indicated by the outcome of various recent confrontations, the frustration resulting from the slow pace of the integration processes, the survival of perceptions of hostility and the enormous difficulty of going beyond rhetoric in the search for unity: all these elements give rise to endeavours to change the situation.

The purpose of these endeavours is to present the concept of confidence-building as a versatile, effective and practical means of promoting regional co-operation, and to show that there are already in Latin America political trends and activities that can be labelled "confidence-building". There appear to be certain possibilities for

increasing the significance of this concept on a regional basis, and for making better use of it in relation to peace, co-operation, the limitation of military expenditures and equipment, and eventually, the design of subsystems of security.

It is clear that not all of the area designated "Latin America and the Caribbean" can possibly implement such "confidence-building" measures, at least in a way that would offer the same opportunities to all of its components. The special circumstances in Central America and the Caribbean can make it more difficult, albeit more necessary, to establish such a political and military framework.

The purpose of confidence-building measures, or in general of confidence-building, is to make increased security possible. The object is, first of all, to lessen the possibility of conflict and to create the conditions necessary for initiation of the processes of arms limitation and disarmament, or of the reduction of military expenditures, or both. In a broader sense, this also touches upon inter-State relations and the possibility of harmonising them.

This concept, which has been discussed extensively in Europe, is one in which there is growing interest in Latin America. Although if has not participated decisively in the conceptual debate or in substantive political negotiations, our region is not unfamiliar with a certain practice of confidence-building, one that has particular and highly significant characteristics.

Antecedents and Conceptual Aspects

The concept of "promoting confidence" was specifically mentioned in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki in 1975. It appears in a section entitled "Document on confidence-building and certain aspects of security and disarmament", which establishes an obligation of prior notification of military manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops. The document also mentions the possibility of voluntarily exchanging military observers for the manoeuvres, as well as the voluntary notification of smaller manoeuvres or major military movements.

Earlier than this, the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed on the establishment of direct communication: in the case of a crisis, in 1963; to prevent "accidental nuclear war", in 1971; and to avoid incidents between naval units, in 1972. At the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe a study was made of systems of "related measures" or "collateral measures" clearly related to confidence-building.

Paragraph 93 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the first special session devoted to disarmament, stipulates that in order to facilitate the process of disarmament "it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security, and to build confidence among States".

The Stockholm Conference introduced provisions of major significance, which could be related to concrete measures for the limitation of military deployment.

Beyond the European context, which is characterised by a high level of confrontation featuring troops and military equipment of all types, including nuclear armament, there exist other regional contexts in which the concept of confidence has been treated differently, though not with less significance. For example, the concept of confidence in Latin America necessarily transcends the military dimension. It is set in a complex network of elements ranging from the regional agreements that established legal principles and norms to diverse areas that include the military as well as the political, economic and social processes of integration and co-operation.

Latin America is already bound by disarmament agreements such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, various agreements relating to the peaceful resolution of conflicts and substantive political declarations such as the Ayacucho Declaration of 1974, which was followed by concrete negotiations.

Similarly, some agreements regarding diverse forms of co-operation and integration as well as significant military exercises are considered important for the promotion of confidence in the region. Thus, for example, the navies of Brazil and Peru developed a joint medical-dental programme catering without distinction of nationality to the population living along the Amazon. There are also agreements at various levels between military commanders in the border zones with a view to serving common interests. Exchanges of visits, information and invitations of various types take place in Latin America more frequently than may be generally thought.

The question of confidence-building has been examined at some length within the framework of the United Nations. It has been dealt with at three special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as at various regular sessions, and more specific work has been done on the subject in the Disarmament Commission. In 1981 a group of experts produced a "Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures".

There are diverse views on confidence-building. Concerned countries have indicated that confidence is a result of various factors such as: whether or not an arms race exists; the concentration of forces and military equipment, or the relative moderation of troops in the border zones; the historical behaviour of the States involved; types of strategic planning; compliance with international agreements; the disposition of these States towards more, or less, open military policies; the possibilities or difficulties of international co-operation in the domain of economic and social development; similarity of political approaches; and the absence of dialogue.

In some cases, more specific conditions have been included, such as: the agreement on notification prior to major military manoeuvres; agreement not to expand military and political alliances beyond earlier levels; the reaffirmation of the principle of the inadmissibility of territorial acquisitions by force; compliance with past agreements; peaceful resolution of conflicts; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal and external affairs of States; the establishment of a new international economic order; and the signing of a treaty renouncing the use of force in international relations.

The challenges to confidence are many and they vary from one region to another. In any given region they reflect the nature of bilateral relations. The challenges to confidence originate in historical experiences, and a combination of factors including geographical realities, strategic concepts, doctrines, military potential and deployment, perceptions and political systems, and economic and social circumstances. All these factors, which are integrated into dynamic processes made up of both past experiences and expectations for the future and which are conditioned by current perceptions, determine the level of confidence that can be achieved in a specific situation. This level will probably determine the decisions that will in turn feedback into the system permanently, in a positive or negative way.

In a complex and diverse world, the challenges to confidence are not the same for all and do not have the same origins. They may come from the possibility of nuclear war or from the possibility of a bilateral conflict; from the concentration of forces and military equipment, or from acts of coercion. One may be based on ideological-political disagreement; another may be nurtured by underdevelopment and international economic injustice. One may be based on military confrontation at the borders, another on the implementation of policies by States which are not necessarily neighbours, such as terrorism, destabilisation and intervention. Yet, another may be motivated by

the continued existence of unjust situations, general or specific, all-encompassing or localised, historical or recent.

Certain specific kinds of threats to security can be met with "measures"—precise, concrete and specific actions. Other threats require "policies", which rather represent attitudes, perceptions and propositions that translate into a diversity of actions over a considerable period of time.

"Confidence" may be defined as a relationship embodying a firm belief in the trustworthiness of the other party. It involves assurance of the truth or of the factual reality of a situation. Confidence-building implies an increase in trustworthiness. In the international sphere, it is confidence that enables States to conclude that their fundamental rights and interests— independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and development—are not threatened. It is conducive to constructive policies of peace, co-operation, understanding, goodwill and dialogue. These considerations can be very similar to those generally formulated in relation to security.

There are two basic components in the concept of confidence. One relates to perception; the other is objective and concerns verifiable and provable facts that confirm or deny the observer's perception. Perception is conditioned by, among other things, the historical experiences fixed in the collective memory of peoples.

In the priority area of security, the aim of confidence-building is to increase the possibility of confident prediction of the counterpart's intentions through a satisfactory correlation between declaratory defence policies and concrete military activities.

While confidence-building is not, in itself, intended to alter the correlation of forces—at least initially—its aim is to regulate their use in a way that appears to be non-threatening. Thus confidence-building is not a substitute for arms limitation or disarmament, although it is obvious that few things promote confidence more than appropriate agreements in these fields. This is not meant to imply that proper treatment of the objective and subjective factors mentioned above guarantees confidence and makes it possible to overcome conflicts. Obviously, not all conflicts are rooted in differences in the interpretation of verifiable conditions and situations, or in a lack of convergence in the perception or interpretation of them. Many conflicts result from contradictory interests, and in such situations the relevance of confidence would be only marginal.

In Europe there is a high military concentration of political and ideological systems which perceive themselves to be antagonistic, while

in other regions the perception of threats to security depends upon more complex factors, encompassing not only military but political, economic and social dimensions.

In a narrow concept of security, members of military alliances seem to believe that confidence-building measures are actions of a specific character, fundamentally aimed at removing suspicion in the domain of military strategy, and specifically at avoiding, or limiting, the possibility of a surprise attack. According to this perception, confidence-building measures are not only distinct from disarmament as such, but also differ from arms limitation or the limitation of military deployment. The classic example would be the notification of military manoeuvres, the intention of which is to avoid the possibility of their being converted into a surprise attack.

There is general agreement, however, on the need to endow the concept with maximum effectiveness. This implies an effort to direct the political actions of States towards an objective that is more specific than general harmony, by giving priority to the direct bearing of the concept on the problem of arms and disarmament. This is important, for failing to do so implies a risk, not only that the concept will not be understood but also that it may be misused. This risk is not negligible inasmuch as it relates directly to the strengthening of a concept that is essential to a proper attitude on the part of States. Measures not based on solid grounds, on verifiable behaviour, and in general on political will expressed in specific, consistent and meaningful action would be of little value.

Clearly, there are policies that lower confidence, such as those of aggression, domination, arms buildups, and colonialism. In the face of such policies, it would be inappropriate to ignore the significance, in terms of confidence-building, of policies of good-neighbourliness, cooperation or integration.

Whereas, on the one hand, in the military and security areas, confidence-building measures aim at preventing violations of international law, thereby protecting the inviolability and sovereignty of States against the use of force, on the other hand, in international relations, there is no general rule that prohibits the use of economic power for political ends. None the less, it is well-known that under the provisions of various agreements—the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organisation of American States, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States—certain uses of economic and political power are illegal.

Consequently, there must be a will to examine the ways in which the general principles inhibiting the application of political and economic means, in violation of international law, may be translated into measures to safeguard the rights and interests of developing countries, a will to endeavour to make these measures specific, relevant and verifiable.

Confidence-building in Latin America

In Latin America, confidence-building must be understood in its broader sense, not only because perceived threats to security go beyond the military sphere, but also because in the countries of our region the level of "confidence" that may exist is the result of formal agreement, accepted practices, expressions of political will, and a new awareness of the fact that it is impossible for each State to deal with these issues in a strictly individual and exclusive way.

For many years, Latin Americans have put emphasis on their attempt to define their own identity, but for various reasons, including their ties to the United States and Europe, no priority has been given to the elements of problems shared by all countries, and the need to establish joint measures to address these problems has received even less consideration. Now, however, a change is taking place. The consciousness of shared interests and common concerns was most emphatically expressed by the heads of States members of the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Concerted Political Action in the Acapuico Commitment. This document deals with questions of the utmost importance, such as the need for political co-operation, recognition of a community of interest in Latin America and the Caribbean, a shared democratic vocation, an appeal to integration, the position of Latin America on the international scene, regional security, including peace and political and economic vulnerability, the- principles of international law that must govern the relations among countries, zones of peace, and the need to prevent the introduction of nuclear arms into the region.

The heads of State members of the Permanent Mechanism made a commitment to co-ordinate action:

- To encourage initiatives in favour of international disarmament and security;

- To foster mutual trust and our own solutions to the problems and conflicts affecting the region;
- To contribute, through co-operation and consultation, to the defence, strengthening and consolidation of democratic institutions;
- To promote and broaden political dialogue with other States and groups of States, within and outside the region;
- To co-ordinate positions in order to strengthen multilateralism and democracy in international decision-making;
- To promote the establishment of zones of peace and co-operation;
- To encourage processes of integration and co-operation in order to strengthen the autonomy of the region;
- To embark on an active, co-ordinated endeavour to eradicate extreme poverty;
- To reinforce co-operation against drug trafficking and also against terrorism.

There has been no lack of significant attempts to promote Latin American co-ordination. We may recall, in particular, the case of the Special Committee on Latin American Co-ordination (CECLA), which in the first half of the 1960s displayed dynamism and imagination in trying to define regional economic interests. There have been other efforts in different fields, but on the whole they have been temporary or have not received political or popular support and have gradually faded away.

In recent times, we have seen the creation of dynamic Latin American institutions, set up to address issues of common interest to the countries. However, there is no single Latin American "political" organisation comparable to the Organisation of African Unity. Nevertheless, an impressive increase can be seen in the number of mechanisms and institutions of regional co-operation, ranging from political processes of considerable importance for peace and security—such as the Contadora Group and its Support Group for the resolution of the crisis in Central America—to professional associations at the sectoral level.

In addition, consideration must be given to economic integration procedures, which show that, despite difficulties, Latin America is capable of designing ambitious projects and agreements to promote cooperation in other fields. A case in point is the Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (the Cartagena Agreement), which generated agreements in the sectors of health, education and culture, labour,

communications, agriculture, trade and development funding, and reserves, and gave rise to the establishment of a court of justice, a parliament, an advisory council, and meetings between heads of State.

The Latin American Economic System (SELA) has been consolidating its institutional capacity and significance as a political-economic regional entity. Various action committees have been established to deal with specific aspects of interest to its members or groups of members. Other agreements accord priority to joint development and conservation efforts, as in the case of the Treaty of the River Plate Basin and the Treaty for Amazonian Co-operation.

It has taken the Latin American Parliament two decades to achieve institutional consolidation, but political parties are now showing a desire to join the process through the creation of associations such as the Permanent Conference of Latin American Political Parties (COPPAL).

The most influential institution to date is the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Concerted Political Action (the Group of 8), established in Rio de Janeiro in December 1986 and based on the Contadora Group and its Support Group, although different from them. It was the forum for the aforementioned meeting of eight heads of State in Acapuico in September 1987. Even apart from the substantive Agreement signed on that occasion, the meeting was hailed as a historic occasion: for the first time a group of Presidents of Latin American democracies met to discuss political, economic and security matters of the utmost importance without an invitation from, or participation by the United States.

Finally, there has been an increase in co-operation among institutions, centres, and professional, educational and research associations. The research associations are promoting an interest in the study of international and Latin American relations from a perspective which challenges confrontational perceptions among the countries and peoples of the region.

The regional approach to the arms limitation issues is certainly among the most promising. In the particular case of Latin America, it would be more appropriate to consider arms limitation as part of a world security system. In practice, however, it has merely served the strategic interests of the dominant Power in the hemisphere.

It is usually noted that, in the South American subregional context, threats to security must include: elements such as those contained in the conflict situations in the Malvinas and in Central America;

ideological differences as well as differences between political regimes; military presence and extraregional strategies in certain countries; territorial disputes and border tensions; subversion and other forms of internal violence; drug trafficking; and the status of military denuclearisation in Latin America.

In addition, factors such as extreme poverty, scientific and technological backwardness, ambiguous relations between military and civilian sectors, external debt, ecological accidents, and the weight of military expenditures in relation to expenditures in the basic social sectors pose threats to security.

The most critical characteristics of the region in the past four decades are the poverty that prevails in most of the countries, the growth of military expenditures, and the increase and sophistication of armaments.

The first condition for confidence is the conviction that force will not be used in trying to resolve international issues. The use of force would not only violate law and create new sources of tension but, in the case of Latin America and in particular of South America, it would not serve any purpose inasmuch as there do not appear to be any political objectives, no matter how legitimate they may be, that can be resolved by means of force.

Proposals for Joint Action

Latin America does not have to specify whether it will adopt a broad or a restricted confidence-building concept. Its historical responsibility is the preservation of peace and the promotion of development and integration, the preservation of its security, and the implementation of the policies required to overcome the conceptual divergences that separate its countries, as well as the implementation of all the measures needed to preclude the possibility of conflict and to promote co-operation, including military co-operation.

To that end, some proposals are set out below, classified where possible by sectors with special responsibilities. Some overlapping is, of course, unavoidable.

A. Military Sector

1. Information

General exchange of publications; possibility of reaching agreements on prior notification of military activities, including movements and manoeuvres, and invitation of military observers;

2. Training

Student exchanges between military schools; preparation of special courses or seminars for foreign and national students on matters of common interest; establishment of courses on disarmament and arms limitation, as well as courses in defence economics, in military schools; participation at various levels of cadets and officials in special activities such as summer courses on rescue at sea, on land and in the air; in medical and sanitary programmes, and in general in as many related activities as possible;

3. Contacts

Increase in the number of official visits and/or military delegations at various levels; establishment of basic procedures in order to avoid incidents, as well as systems for direct communication, including emergency lines and other convenient channels for dealing with accidental situations and misunderstandings; contacts in certain institutional sectors, such as the academic, military, athletic and other areas, with a view to decreasing perceptions of hostility or confrontation; and the organisation of military exercises involving only South American countries, as has been done in the past;

4. Institutionalisation

Consideration of a periodic South American conference at an appropriate level to manage the activities mentioned above;

B. Political Sector

1. Co-ordination

Political co-ordination at appropriate levels for the handling of matters of common interest, such as external debt; parliamentary participation in scheduled meetings and visits to discuss questions relating to security in the broad sense of the concept, and to promote the limitation of military expenditures and armaments;

2. Reaffirmation of Principles

Individual or joint political reaffirmation of the solemn commitment to peace, the non-use of force in international relations, and the resolution of differences by pacific means;

3. Establishment of Procedures and Projects

Mechanisms of joint action in the struggle against the drug traffic, including procedures for joint police and/or military operations by two

or more countries to fight these transnational forms of crime; promotion of the study of new security concepts; inclusion in the platform of political parties of plans for the promotion of peace, security for all, and the limitation of armaments and military expenditures; creation of a programme of co-operation in the event of natural disasters; establishment of government priorities for development projects concerning two or more countries, in particular in border zones; continuation of co-ordination of the mechanisms and opportunities for the implementation of the limitation of military expenditures and for the gradual integration of the military sectors of industry;

C. Diplomatic Sector

1. Courses

Creation of courses on disarmament, arms limitation and related subjects in diplomatic schools;

2. Support for Activities

Commitment of the diplomatic missions to celebrate Disarmament Week and support the United Nations World Disarmament Campaign; support of the activities of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean;

D. Academic Sector

1. Courses

Creation of courses on defence economics, arms limitation and disarmament;

2. Research and Studies

Promotion of peace research, studies on disarmament and development, including research on the economics of arms production; studies and research on the relation between democracy in Latin America, arms build-up and external debt;

E. Civic Sector (Including Non-governmental Organisations, Churches and Media)

1. Seminars

Periodic seminars on responsibility in the forming and guidance of public opinion in the sphere of democratic security;

2. Support for Activities

Participation of the Latin American media in the United Nations World Disarmament Campaign.

THE TRANSFER OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TO LATIN AMERICA

In the last few decades, Latin America has witnessed an increase in military expenditure, uniformed personnel and arms imports (table 1). Defence expenditures have increased in real terms by 45.3 per cent over a ten-year period, going from $US 8,600 million in 1975 to $US 12,500 million in 1985. The number of men and women in the armed services has likewise increased by 39.87 per cent, from 1,297,000 uniformed personnel in 1975 to 1,814,000 in 1985. It can be deduced from these trends that the dynamic factor in Latin American military expenditure over this period has been arms imports. These rose by 46.4 per cent in constant terms (table 2), from $US 2,287 million in 1977 to $US 3,348 million in 1985, and then dropped to $US 2,510 million in 1986.

These trends have undergone important changes in the period under consideration. First, they have taken place against the background of a conjunctural decline in the gross national product (GNP). Secondly, military expenditure rose substantially in 1982 and, although it fell in the following years, it has tended to stabilize itself at a higher level than that observed before that year, owing to the fact that the number of military personnel increased significantly from 1980 on, driving military expenditure higher, particularly—as we shall see later—that on weapons. For these reasons, from 1982 on, the proportion of military expenditure to the total fiscal expenditure of the region and military expenditure per capita increased significantly.

Although the increase in military expenditure during the period 1975-1985 was due to the increase in weapons procurement, this in turn, was due to the earlier increase in military personnel. Thus, after the increase in personnel, an increase in arms imports took place in 1981. In 1982, the relationship between arms imports and exports favoured the latter, indicating the new importance of the procurement of domestic arms supplies, that is, those produced by the Latin American arms industry.

More than half of the Latin American countries have high levels of military expenditure in proportion to GNP. The common element among them is the pre-eminence of the armed forces in the political, economic and social life of the country. Each of them, for different reasons, has experienced a hypertrophying of the military institution within the State and society.

Thus, in Argentina, the armed forces have unexpectedly recovered some institutional autonomy despite the efforts of President Alfonsfn's

TABLE 1

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND ARMS IMPORTS IN LATIN AMERICA, 1975-1985

(Costs in billions of 1984 US dollars)

	Military expenditures	*Armed forces (thousands)*	*Military expenditures/ GNP*	*Military expenditures/ Total budget (per capita)*	*Military expenditures*	*Armed forces (per 1000 in habs.)*	*GNP (per capita)*
1975	8.6	1297	1.6	7.3	27	4.1	1662
1976	9.8	1328	1.7	8.0	30	4.1	1709
1977	10.5	1438	1.8	8.0	31	4.3	1755
1978	10.2	1478	1.7	7.4	30	4.3	1785
1979	10.1	1491	1.6	7.2	29	4.2	1843
1980	10.8	1561	1.6	6.9	30	4.3	1883
1981	11.0	1617	1.6	6.1	30	4.4	1849
1982	13.7	1687	2.1	7.0	36	4.5	1756
1983	12.3	1746	1.9	6.5	32	4.5	1665
1984	12.7	1798	1.9	7.0	32	4.6	1677
1985	12.5	1814	1.8	7.5	31	4.5	1696

Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987* (Washington, D.C., March 1988). This source was chosen, in spite of its time-lag and under-valuation of total military expenditures, because it makes possible the broadest comparisons.

Administration to curb both military expenditure and the armed forces' political influence in the aftermath of the conflict in the South Atlantic and following the imposition of sanctions for their massive human rights violations—which they resisted. In Chile, as a consequence of long military rule, the armed forces have exercised control and have been a significant presence in the life of the nation. Cuba's extra-continental strategic projection and defensive orientation have given the military considerable weight within the State. The military component is clearly visible in El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, countries engaged in "low-intensity warfare". Guyana is in the process of developing the State and is seeking to progress within a militaristic framework. Panama's relationship with the United States has been the cause of its militarisation. In Peru, the critical situation resulting from terrorism has now been added to the traditionally prominent role of the military. In democratic Uruguay, the military presence is still too large, both politically and socially. These are the countries in which a comparatively greater share of resources is being diverted to defence purposes—both internally and externally—than the respective economies can afford. On the other hand, countries of such diverse size as Brazil and Costa Rica, or with differing internal emergency situations, such as Guatemala or Mexico, richer or poorer, like Colombia or Bolivia, are allocating a smaller part of their gross national product to defence as a result of the armed forces' relatively smaller part in decision-making at the governmental level.

TABLE 2

ARMS IMPORTS TO LATIN AMERICA, 1977-1986 ***(CONSTANT 1984 BILLIONS OF US DOLLARS)***

	Arms imports	*Proportion arms imports to total imports*
1977	2.287	2.5
1978	2.967	3.1
1979	2.884	2.6
1980	2.445	1.8
1981	4.022	3.1
1982	4.011	4.0
1983	3.451	4.6
1984	4.145	5.6
1985	3.348	4.7
1986	2.510	3.5

Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 1987* (Washington, D.C., March 1988).

A first conclusion to be drawn from this brief survey is that military expenditures are basically dependent upon the position of the armed forces in the respective States. Thus, the ability to curb military expenditures and arms supplies in Latin America will depend upon the state, the development and the direction of the domestic system of military and civilian relations' towards more significant civilian control. It is the ruling elite's decisions, made in accordance with the prevailing domestic circumstances, that determine the high level of expenditure or the decision to reduce it. This trend is once again evident in the case of Latin America in those countries where the armed forces play a conspicuous decision-making role.

Transfer of Military Technology

If we compare import figures for arms and military technology of the countries of the region (see table 3), we find that Argentina, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela have been the principal recipients of defence technology in the years 1982-1986, representing 82.6 per cent of total transfers to the region.

This situation may be attributed, first, to the role played by the armed forces within the State, as has been indicated earlier, and secondly to the availability of national resources. Thus, those countries which, compared to the rest of the region, have a relatively high GNP, such as Venezuela, or which have an economic surplus resulting from oil production, such as Ecuador, and which do not have a significant arms industry, are net importers. It may be attributed, thirdly, to the fact that there are countries with a low per capita GDP which are net importers, such as Nicaragua and Peru, as they are facing tensions and conflicts that require military actions.

Cuba may be considered a typical example. In 1984 it combined all three of the above conditions: the armed forces occupied a central position in the political scheme, a large share of the country's resources was allocated to defence, and there was a perceived threat of conflict and confrontation with the United States.

Thus, the role of the armed forces, the economic availability of resources and the presence of conflicts are the principal factors stimulating Latin America's imports of military technology.

It is important to note that the type of weapons being transferred to the region has increasingly modern technological components. Table 4 shows a substantial increase of delivered arms, particularly combat weapons and missiles. However, it is important to note the differences among suppliers. The United States has somewhat increased the

TABLE 3

VALUE OF ARMS TRANSFERS BY PRINCIPAL SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENT COUNTRIES: CUMULATIVE 1982-1986

(Millions of current US dollars)

Country	*Total*	*USSR*	*USA*	*France*	*United Kingdom*	*Federal Republic of Germany*	*Others*
Argentina	1960	0	60	80	0	1,400	420
Bolivia	20	0	5	5	0	0	10
Brazil	330	0	140	60	10	0	120
Chile	550	0	0	300	60	130	60
Colombia	900	0	110	0	5	675	110
Costa Rica	20	0	20	0	0	0	0
Cuba	7300	6400	0	0	0	0	900
Dominican Republic.	30	0	10	20	0	0	0
Ecuador*	630	0	50	70	20	0	490
El Salvador	345	0	310	0	0	0	35
Guatemala	85	0	5	0	0	0	80
Guyana	20	10	0	0	0	0	10
Haiti	20	0	5	0	0	0	15
Honduras	180	0	110	0	0	0	70
Jamaica	10	0	10	0	0	0	0
Mexico	345	0	140	20	0	10	175
Nicaragua	1590	1400	0	20	0	0	170
Panama	35	0	20	10	0	0	5
Paraquay	30	0	0	0	0	0	30
Peru	880	310	120	170	0	110	170
Uruguay	30	0	5	5	0	5	15
Venezuela*	1275	0	575	30	0	40	630

Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* 1987 (Washington, D.C., March 1988).

*Member of OPEC.

transfer of tanks and self-propelled cannons, all types of aircraft, helicopters and missile launchers. The Europeans have specialised in the sale of personnel carriers, aircraft and missiles. Finally, the USSR has increased its sale of tanks, helicopters, and, notably, anti-aircraft missiles.

TABLE 4

NUMBER OF ARMS SOLD TO LATIN AMERICA, 1982-1986

(Billions of current US dollars)

	Total	*USSR*	*USA*	*Others*
Land armaments				
Tanks	560	525	—	35
Anti-air artillery	280	170	—	110
Field artillery	1099	600	244	255
Armoured personnel carriers	1000	350	—	650
Naval craft				
Major surface combatants	42	3	2	37
Other surface combatants	72	34	10	28
Submarines	7	1	—	6
Missile attack boats	4	4	—	—
Aircraft				
Combat aircraft: Supersonic	176	85	36	55
Combat aircraft: Subsonic	54	—	34	20
Other aircraft	296	30	41	225
Helicopters	352	115	112	125
Missiles				
Surface-to-air	1675	1170	—	505

Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987* (Washington, D.C., March 1988).

The transfers of more sophisticated and combat armaments are limited to a fixed number of military links between the countries of the North and Latin America. Thus, the USSR's clients are Cuba, Nicaragua and Peru. Those of the United States are Mexico, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador, among many others. France has Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Peru as its main customers. The United Kingdom had Argentina among its regional clients and now has Chile and Ecuador. The Federal Republic of Germany has four important clients: Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru. Lastly, Italy has Argentina, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.

The Military Industry

Even though there are many reasons for the growth of the arms industry on the continent, international tensions give rise to a specific

response, namely, enhancement of the industry's own capabilities of research, development and arms production. The will of the respective armed forces to acquire, by their own efforts and from resources generated locally, the means for deterrence and defence is thus reinforced. This reflex action of self-sufficiency serves as an added stimulant to all other contributing factors, and together they explain the history of the creation and development of the local arms industries.

This decision is bolstered by the growth of a non-military industrial plant already in place, which in turn affects and determines the limits that the respective military industries must observe in their development. An analysis of several countries which currently have a military industry of some importance will illustrate these statements.

Argentina is one of the Latin American countries that has shown military industrial activity over a number of years. The first decisions to manufacture weapons date from 1920. However, the Direccion General de Fabricas Militares (DGFM), established in 1941, strengthened government activity in this sector by linking it to the overall industrial effort. From 1945, the DGFM co-ordinated the manufacture of arms of all of the armed forces. In this regard, the air force, with the assistance of German engineers, began the design and manufacture of planes such as fighter-bomber and transport aircraft. Their production began in 1956. Likewise, the navy has designed and built vessels since 1938 at the Rio Santiago shipyards, where patrol boats and frigates were later built. The army, with German assistance, produced heavy artillery, machine-guns and various types of ammunition. In 1940, the Rosario plant developed and manufactured a series of machine-guns, which are still in use today.

With the initial impetus provided through German collaboration, a relatively modest research and development (R and D) entity was established, which was able, to supply the military industry. Although no more than 1 per cent of the GNP was ever allocated for R and D, from 1958 the Consejo de Investigaciones Cientificas y Technologicas was the principal source of subsidies for this kind of research. Likewise, the Institute Nacional de Tecnologfa Industrial, the Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica and the Comision Nacional de Investigaciones Espaciales have made the development of Argentina's military and nuclear industry possible and, with the help of foreign technical assistance, this industry is among the largest in Latin America. R and D activities have been linked to the industrial sector, encouraging the development of the State steel, aluminium and motor vehicle industries. Together with the DGFM, the Direccion Nacional de Industria e

Investigaciones Aeronauticas designs and manufactures aircraft equipment under Air Force supervision. While it attempted to produce combat planes in the 1950s, in the 1970s manufacture concentrated on the production of transport and counter-insurgency aircraft such as the IA-50 Guaranf II and the IA-58 Pucara models. This has led to the design of combat aircraft such as the IA-60 Pucara fighter and a helicopter, the "Cicare CH-11 Colibri." DGFM itself has produced civil aircraft and assembled the French AMX-13 tank. Argentina is developing light and medium-sized tanks and armoured personnel carriers under a co-production agreement with the firm of Thyssen-Henschel of the Federal Republic of Germany. The government shipyards, Astilleros y Fabricaciones Navales Estatales, have the capacity to produce locally designed naval equipment such as frigates and missile launch boats. They also arm submarines with parts provided by the Federal Republic of Germany. All this domestic R and D activity has led to co-production agreements with extra-continental firms, which offer excellent prospects for the development of the Argentinian military industry.

For example, it planned to build a training jet of limited capacity for tactical support missions in collaboration with the German firm of Dornier. This plane would be manufactured by the Direccion Nacional de Industrias e Investigaciones Aeronauticas in the province of Cordoba. This aircraft, designated the "LA-63", was mass-produced in 1985. With the support of its own R and D facilities, the Argentinian military industry has the capacity to raise its technological level, and it would not be surprising to see the co-production agreements for aircraft and tanks followed by agreements with Spain to construct ships, with the Federal Republic of Germany for submarines, and with France for coastal craft. The Argentinian example shows the extent to which its military industry was stimulated by increased tensions with the United States and the circumstances of its isolation on the international scene. The impetus given to the military industry during the Second World War was maintained in the post-war period as a result of the politics of Peronist populism in its first phase. Later, and especially during the rule of General Videla, Argentina developed its military industry in political isolation from the United States as a result of the attitude taken by the Carter Administration in respect of human rights. This last period, of course, coincided with the heightening of tension with Chile in the Beagle zone. However, Argentina provides for its own defence needs by stimulating and supporting the local manufacture of arms. Although it has complemented these manufactures with substantial purchases abroad, amounting to $US 210 million in 1978,

local production of light and heavy weapons nevertheless became one of the pillars of its defence policy. The manufacture of the Condor II medium-range missile is a case in point.

The Brazilian aeronautical industry is another example of the way in which the expansion of the local arms industry was helped by adverse international conditions. Towards the end of the 1970s, Brazil was still unable to resume its international alliances. This is clearly seen in the arms import figures, which went from $US 18 million in 1966 to $US 70 million in 1969. The response to that situation was the development of what is today Brazil's strongest industry, its aeronautical industry. On 19 August 1969, the President signed a decree establishing the Empresa Brasilena de Aeronautica (EMBRAER) (Brazilian Aeronautical Company), which began its activities in January 1970. This represented the culmination of Brazil's effort to develop its own technology in the military and civil aviation sector. Indeed, in 1965, the Institute de Investigacion y Desarrollo del Departamento de Aviacion (the Aviation Department's Research and Development Institute) decided to replace the old "Beech C-45" of the Brazilian Air Force. For this purpose, the Centro Tecnico de Aeronautica (Technical Centre for Aeronautics) (now the Centro Tecnico Aeroespacial (Technical Center for Aero-space)) requested the assistance of the French engineer Max Holste and decided to re-equip the air force's "North American T-6", a project later abandoned. The replacement of the "C-45" was effected with the development of the twin turbo-prop "IPD-6504", which later became the "EMB-100". Development of this plane began in June 1965 and the first prototype was built in 1966. Outfitted with Pratt & Whitney PT-6 engines, its first flight occurred on 26 October 1968.

The Brazilian Air Force ordered 80 of the EMB-110 Bandeirante version. This achievement of the military aeronautical industry made it possible for EMBRAER to develop civilian aircraft such as the EMB-200 Ipanema for agricultural use. It made its first flight in July 1970 and five versions were built, amounting to a total of 400 units. Between 1973 and 1974 the energy crisis forced Brazil to develop its aeronautical industry more aggressively and, under contract with Piper, five different types of one and two-engine planes were produced. The modified version of the Bandeirante alone—the EMB-110P—was extremely popular with local airlines and air forces in and outside the region. In 1976 EMBRAER developed three versions of the Bandeirante: the KI, for military use; PI, a modified civilian version of the KI; and the P2, strictly for passengers. Orders for the last three models were obtained from American, British and other foreign airlines.

The Brazilian aeronautical industry is supported by the Centro Tecnico Aeroespacial, around which are grouped the institutes of Tecnologia Espacial, Investigacion y Desarrollo and Investigaciones Aeroespaciales (Space Technology, Research and Development, and Aerospace Research). The Centre, a collaborating entity of EMBRAER, permits the use of aerodynamic tunnels and physical laboratory experiments. As a result of these developments, EMBRAER meets the needs of the Brazilian Air Force in the following areas: basic trainers with capacity for ground attack; twin turbo-props, pressurised or unpressurised, for personnel and utility transport; maritime patrol aircraft, search and rescue aircraft, and special photogrammetric and calibration types. With the installation of these capacities, EMBRAER functions as a sub-contractor and co-producer.

The Chilean example also serves to corroborate our statements. From 1973, its military Government encountered serious difficulties in obtaining arms supplies. The situation became more acute with the increasing tensions in the north with Peru and with Argentina in the Beagle zone. While the first tensions tended to disappear, the second increased steadily. In 1976, Chile earmarked $US 120 million for arms imports, pushing military expenditure beyond the limits required for economic stability. From then on, in an international climate hostile to the regime, the armed forces encouraged the development of a local arms industry, contradicting all the economic postulates of the regime. These stated that without an industrial base, Chile would be reduced to the status of net importer of such products. Nevertheless, the needs arising from international isolation and the traditional State-oriented ideology of the Chilean armed forces resulted in a substantial effort of "arms import substitution".

Chile had a limited production capacity and did not export military equipment. It produced the 7.62 mm FN-FAL rifle and a heavy 7.62 mm FN machine-gun. All other rifles, machine-guns, sub-machine-guns, anti-aircraft cannon, mortars, recoil-less rifles and howitzers were manufactured in Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and the United States. Likewise, naval equipment was imported, whereas the air force and the navy had the capacity to maintain and repair aeronautical and naval equipment. Thus, while Chile was a net importer, it possessed the minimum capability required to develop a larger military industry. This was made possible as a result of the particular domestic and international political conditions it has faced over the past seven years. In 1960, Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada (ASMAR), the navy's shipyards, were established as an independent governmental entity, and are now

able to repair warships, merchant ships, fishing vessels and factory ships. ASMAR is also able to build ships and landing craft of up to 50,000 tons and oil exploration rigs. ASMAR currently employs 4,500 people, including electronic engineers and naval propulsion technicians. It also has its own foundry and laboratories. The Navy, within the framework of its collaboration with France, began manufacturing under licence two BATRAL landing craft (light transport craft) with capacity to transport an infantry company, five combat vehicles and other equipment. BATRAL is equipped with two 40 mm cannons, two 81 mm mortars and a helicopter landing-track.

Las Fabricas y Maestranws del Ejercito (FAMAE) (the Army's factories), the Logistics Air Command and a private firm, Sociedad General de Comercio (SOGECO), jointly developed a high-precision machine-gun. This weapon, designated "Crane One", includes a carrier which is connected to a vehicle, has two 20 mm tubes, and fires nearly 1,000 projectiles per minute. A similar agreement was made between the army and a private firm in 1978 "when the Chilean Government ordered some private firms to produce weapons as a means to circumvent the freeze imposed by the traditional suppliers". Cardoen, an explosives plant, is currently manufacturing "Mowag" armoured cars "under Swiss licence, for the transport of troops and to support combat action once they are equipped with light armament." The air force, for its part, has assembled the first Mirage 50 purchased from France and has gone on to build a Piper Dakota plane wholly armed domestically, with 50 per cent of the parts from the United States, a percentage which will be reduced in the years to come. This aircraft, used for instrument flight training and liaison, will prepare the way for a more ambitious project, namely, the manufacture of the Spanish Avio-jet CASA-101 jet aircraft for advanced training and combat. These developments demonstrate that, in response to the chronic international political situation originating in 1973, the Chilean armed forces have given priority to their own arms research, development and production.

Lastly, the example of the budding Mexican military industry serves to demonstrate the connection between problems deriving from the new international situation, hemispheric alliances and the armaments industry itself. Mexico has made rapid progress in the development of its local arms industry. It is now able to manufacture armoured vehicles through Diesel Nacional (DINA), a State-controlled enterprise, and is striving to manufacture the HK-53 sub-machine-gun assault rifles for the Army. It is building corvettes of the Aguila type and Azteca patrol boats. The Mexican Government is encouraging the development of its own scientific and technological research capability, which will in time

establish close links with the growing Mexican arms industry. The Consejo Nacional de Ciencias y Tecnologfa (the National Council for Science and Technology) has made various plans for the development of the country's scientific and technological capability. It is interesting to note that for the period 1978-1982, a third of the funds allocated went to the industrial sector for projects directly related to military use, such as those directly connected to the chemical industry; telecommunications; transport; metallurgy, ferrous and non-ferrous; electronics; metal works; the motor vehicle industry; instruments, and investments in technology. The Ministry of National Defence is among those which are deeply interested in obtaining funds for these purposes. These facts explain why the Mexican industry is competent to plan the co-production of the Argentinian TAM tank in the near future. Likewise, according to international sources, Mexico is planning to produce under licence the Brazilian counter-insurgency aircraft EMB-326 Xavante and the EMB-110 transport. The same sources state that there is a licensing agreement with Israel to co-produce the Arava aircraft. These warlike developments in a country hitherto committed to continental disarmament demonstrate how important political factors, such as the exploitation of Mexico's huge oil riches, have helped to bend an intransigent pro-disarmament posture in favour of a local armament industry.

These examples, presented in brief, show that the military industry has developed in Latin America in the last few years as a specific response to problems with which the countries are confronted in their international relations in general, and at the hemispheric level in particular.

The development of the Mexican military industry arises from the particular character of its relations with the United States, which lead it to seek some autonomy with respect to its arms supplies. In the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, there is a demonstrable link between the effects of international isolation and the decision to increase the capacity of the local war industry. This is what is taking place rather than the strengthening of a process by which conflicts are resolved by peaceful means.

Despite the obvious link between the development of local armaments industries and the vagaries of international relations, this is valid only as long as the conditions under which it originated continue to exist. While afterwards these industries may become a source of foreign currency savings and substitution of war material imports, they jeopardize the future use of an important proportion of tax resources and are not an adequate response to new international

circumstances. As a consequence, it is legitimate to question these diversions and their medium- and long-range effects on the allocation of tax resources. In Chile, for example, the Fabrica Nacional de Aeronaves (FANAVE) (National Aircraft Factory), founded in 1953 and closed down in 1960 for purely commercial reasons, is a case in point. While its establishment was encouraged in the context of that Administration's industrial policy, its economic viability became a valid argument for the subsequent Administration. The latter operated in a framework of international relations in which the supplying of the armed forces did not present major problems. With the armed forces subjected to civilian rule, alternative cost criteria became a primary consideration and the idea was abandoned.

This example shows that, while the impetus to create an arms industry is assisted in various ways distinct to the international situation, its development possibilities are dependent upon the external framework in which it operates and the possible alternative uses of such resources. This is a crucial factor, and one which calls into question the development of the arms industry in the countries of the region.

To the extent that defence capabilities are closely related to a country's ability to establish international alliances, the problem of national defence appears fundamentally to be a political issue. Nevertheless, in conditions of isolation a need for self-sufficiency arises, which in turn entails future financial commitment. Thus, to the extent that the international circumstances of the region's countries are temporary, the creation and development of a local armaments industry jeopardize resources which might later meet domestic needs.

Leaving aside the political problem implied in the formulation of development objectives and goals, and once the moment of international "emergency" has passed, the principal limitations of the arms industry become evident.

First of all, there is the economic problem of developing an industry that operates at much higher technological levels than the national "technological average". This disparity results in a lack of "pull" of this more modern sector with regard to the whole national industrial sector, which lags behind and is unable to profit from the investment. The arms industry generates few demands on the overall economy and has no other sub-products to offer; its workers are highly specialised, and inputs are produced locally only in part. Thus, the industrial war industry withdraws active resources from one sector and allocates them to others which, dynamic as they are, have no effect on the rest of the economy in terms of technology.

Secondly, even though a local military industry is highly profitable and productive, it is based originally on a country's high military spending. Subsequently, the industry may focus on export, but it will continue to depend largely on the local armed forces' consumption, which was the reason for its creation in the first place.

Lastly, the development of a military industry does not present the same characteristics as an industrialisation process based on import substitution. To the extent that defence activities consume capital that would otherwise be available at the local level, such expenditures affect national productivity as a whole, both economically and ideologically. In relieving a relative capital glut through the development of a local defence industry made solvent by high military expenditure, basic political imbalances are obscured and the means of correcting them are confused.

Thus, defence spending used to maintain a local military industry helps obscure social disparities and the unequal distribution of resources. To the extent that military spending for this industrial effort is presented as an urgent and immediate national task, it justifies the fact that existing economic resources for public investment in industry are not used to meet basic needs. This leads to the creation of a socio-economic structure which allows investment in areas that supply those sectors that constitute an effective market, that is, the high-income and luxury-oriented market. Such available capital can be created only in a more egalitarian socio-economic environment, oriented towards the satisfaction of the basic needs of the majority of the population.

To sum up, the military industry in Latin America has arisen as a consequence of international conditions resulting from exceptional political situations and its development enhances the unequal domestic social conditions characteristic of the region.

Social Cost

This situation becomes critical if we consider that there are no protective social mechanisms in the region to balance military spending. Spending on health and education suffers greatly with each increase in the allocation of funds for defence. The absence of a social welfare "cushion" is a factor which gives military spending a negative weight. As can be seen in table 5, the developed countries allocate a much larger proportion of their GDP to defence spending (18.7 times more), but their per capita GDP is 4.7 times larger than that of Latin America and, what is more important, they assign almost seven times more of

their resources to social spending than Latin America. Thus, military expenditure for the purpose of paying for growing numbers of military personnel, as well as that which is assigned to arms imports or their local production, constitutes a significant burden for Latin American countries. This is especially onerous in times of economic slump.

TABLE 5

COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF GDP, MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND LATIN AMERICA, 1986

(US dollars)

	GDP	*Military*	*Education*	*Health*
Developed countries	9.417	524	490	454
Latin America	1.897	28	67	26
Proportion	4.9	18.7	7.3	6.7

Source: Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures, 1986* (Washington, World Priorities, 1986).

In conclusion, it is apparent that the options in Latin America for the solution of national defence problems and regional peace are dwindling and that the role of confidence-building measures and of arms limitation and disarmament is becoming increasingly important.

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Nuclear Non-Acquisition and Confidence-Building: Argentina and Brazil

It is clear, even from a superficial review of the history of the relations between Argentina and Brazil that, except in certain periods, they were never very cordial and that, on the contrary, they were frequently characterised by rivalry and distrust. Each saw the other as a competitor in "leadership" of Latin America and as the most likely enemy in any international situation affecting it. In the conflict scenarios of the Military Staff of each country, a clash between them always seemed the most likely possibility.

This relationship lasted for a century and a half, from the time the two nations began to exist independently early in the nineteenth century. Both had inherited a centuries-long conflict between Spain and Portugal in this part of their colonial empires, with the epicentre in the zone of Rio de la Plata. In 1826, Argentina and Brazil joined in the war over this issue, which ended with the independence of Uruguay.

In the 1950s and 1960s two attempts were made to heal the breach, first with President Juan Peron and President Getulio Vargas, and later with President Arturo Frondizi, and President Juscelino Kubischek and President Janio Quadros. These efforts, which were not successful, were evidently premature. Nonetheless, it was anachronistic that the two largest States, which were, in many fields, the most advanced and powerful in South America, remained divided by resentment and suspicions, which were for the most part inspired by prejudice and preconceptions rather than actual facts.

By 1980, the situation had changed. Factors that called for cooperation rather than separation were becoming stronger and the obstacles of many years appeared less and less sound. The factors of *rapprochement* were becoming evident in various fields.

Curiously enough, one of the first contexts in which a policy of *rapprochement* took shape was the nuclear field—, "curiously" because, in 1980, Argentina had a military government and the President of Brazil was an army general. The new policy also drew attention because world opinion had always held that there was a race between the two countries to see which would develop a nuclear weapon first, as a further manifestation of the rivalry and competition so often evident.

Two of the main impressions held abroad about the existing situation in Argentina have no basis in fact. First of all, the Argentine nuclear programme had never been under the control of the armed forces. The post of President of the National Atomic Energy Commission had for a long time been held by admirals, usually already retired. Only one was an active naval serviceman (at a time when the Government was in direct charge of the armed forces and active servicemen held many public posts). The fact that the National Atomic Energy Commission was directly under the President of the country and never under the navy was not taken into account, just as the staff of the Commission comprised mainly civilians and received no instructions or directives from any sector of the armed forces. Furthermore, the naval personnel who were in charge of the Commission had technical and scientific titles and several of them later served as consultants to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or to foreign Governments.

Secondly, the lingering suspicion that Argentina was engaged in developing a nuclear weapon or taking steps towards that objective was groundless. That accusation was reported again and again but never could a single concrete fact be adduced to prove that affirmation. The most that could be done was to mention suspicions or rumours or technical or scientific advances inherent in the peaceful use of nuclear energy or the fact that Argentina had not ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco or the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It was forgotten that Argentina had never denied the possibility of ratifying the Treaty of Tiateloico (which it is now about to do) and that the non-proliferation Treaty deserves criticism and has errors and omissions which more than justify a country's refusal to accede to it. Moreover, all of the development of nuclear weapons in the world has resulted from a programme specifically intended for that purpose and was never a result of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

The first Agreement on Cooperation for the Development and Application of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy between Argentina and Brazil was signed on 17 May 1980. That Agreement outlined the

subjects and procedures through which the two countries would channel the cooperation which it would be desirable to establish in a field as delicate as that of nuclear energy.

The 1980 Agreement did not produce the benefits expected and there were no positive changes in the earlier situation, perhaps because, in that particular period, the two Governments were concerned with the many problems that arose from the transition from military to civilian government and the authorities had to give their attention to other priorities.

Not until there were democratic civilian governments in Argentina and Brazil was it possible for the first specific steps to be taken in this field, however much they might have been outlined in 1980. On 30 November 1985, the Heads of State of Argentina and Brazil issued a vitally important Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy in the city of Foz do Iguacii. Five years later, on 28 November 1990, two subsequent presidents signed another highly important Joint Declaration. It adds to the title "Nuclear Policy", already used to indicate its content, the word "Common", clearly showing that the two countries do not have separate nuclear policies on which they must cooperate, but that they have the same nuclear policy, a joint nuclear policy.

One significant element must be taken into account. The step from rivalry to cooperation in the nuclear field was not an isolated phenomenon that occurred while antagonism prevailed in other sectors. That was not so. The atmosphere was right for a greater and more comprehensive *rapprochement* like the one, on 31 July 1986, when the two Presidents signed the important Act for Argentine-Brazilian Integration, together with 12 protocols of cooperation on the most diverse subjects, including the nuclear issue. The number of protocols kept on increasing and new documents were being added until, on 26 March 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay drew up a Treaty for the Constitution of a Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) to be established by 31 December 1994. There is no need to underline all that the establishment of a common market involves, or to recognize that Argentina and Brazil were the nucleus and driving force for it.

The presence of the nuclear element in the Argentine-Brazilian *rapprochement* is not therefore an exclusive or isolated fact. It is part of a wider process. It should be emphasised, however, that the nuclear field did not seem the most propitious one in which to initiate this process nor—as in fact happened—one of the most advantageous as regards the magnitude and speed of the advances achieved. Without

the influence of public and private economic and commercial interests, which sometimes impede and delay integration, the speed at which work has been accomplished on nuclear matters demonstrates the genuine spirit of cooperation that prompts the authorities of the two countries.

The Declaration of Foz do Iguacu on nuclear policy was followed by four others, always the result of visits of the Head of State of one State or the other: Brasilia (10 December 1986); Viedma (17 July 1987); Ipero (8 April 1988) and Ezeiza (29 November 1988). The sixth, of Foz do Iguafii (28 November 1990), will be the subject of a special commentary.

It is not the intention of this study to analyse all of these declarations, but it can single out some elements that are common to all of them:

(a) Constant reaffinnation of the peaceful purposes of the nuclear programmes of Argentina and Brazil;

(b) The strengthening of mutual confidence-building as one of the principal objectives of Argentine-Brazilian cooperation;

(c) Use of the technical advances derived from the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the benefit of the peoples of both nations;

(d) The possibility of extending cooperation in nuclear matters to other countries of Latin America;

(e) Coordination of a common external policy on nuclear matters; and

(f) Concern for peace and security throughout the region.

The impact of the successive joint declarations was not reduced to mere statements of good intentions or the reiteration of well-intended phrases. There emerged—or at any rate there accumulated—a steady exchange of visiting specialists and students, of industrial cross-fertilisation, of information exchanges, of joint projects which, while sporadic in the past, were now increasing and becoming continuous. The Heads of State themselves led delegations which went through the sensitive installations of each other's country. Very specifically, a joint working group (later upgraded to the level of a standing committee) was established under the authority of the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs and with the participation of national commissions and nuclear enterprises "for furthering the relations between the two countries in that area, promoting their nuclear technological development and the introduction of mechanisms for guaranteeing

the higher interests in peace, security and development of the region", as stated in the Declaration of 30 November 1985.

The Standing Committee, which met from time to time in Argentina and Brazil, served as a forum for analysis of the successive steps which the two countries were taking in order to make collaboration in the nuclear field as genuine as possible. It was there that the international instruments which were being concluded were negotiated. It is no exaggeration to say that the Committee depended on the ministries of both countries, which ensured, at least in principle, a high political vision, which on occasion prevailed over one-sided interests or points of view. It is now current practice, in various international forums, for the delegates of Argentina or Brazil to speak on behalf of each other. It has even happened, in some technical meetings, that the same person represented the two countries, which is certainly unusual.

Although the influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been basic, it should not be thought that the cooperation of the technical authorities, that is, the National Atomic Energy Commission, was lacking or, what would have been more serious, that they frequently opposed the measures advocated. Regardless of the logical and understandable differences on certain points, which were overcome without problems, the speedy headway made would have been impossible without the constant goodwill of the competent officers. Nor can it be said that the Argentine armed forces impeded or rejected the duly adopted governmental policy. In the previous decade, their subordination to the democratic governments had been total, and as mentioned above, the military authorities never formally advocated the acquisition of nuclear weapons or participated in the management or guidance of the Argentine nuclear programme.

The work of the Argentine-Brazilian Standing Committee culminated in the preparation of the Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy issued at Fbz do Iguacu on 28 November 1990, which became the keystone on which important international instruments signed in 1991 were based, leading to further negotiations with a view to ratification of the Treaty of Tiateloico in 1993.

The Joint Declaration of November 1990 is of particular significance, not only because it heralds specific objectives but also because—and this is unusual in this kind of instrument— the promised steps have in fact been taken with unusual speed. The first step involved the establishment of a Joint Accounting and Control System (SCCC) to be applied to all the nuclear activities and installations

existing in the two countries, for the purpose of verifying that the nuclear materials are not diverted to nuclear weapons and other explosive nuclear devices. This Joint System was adopted on 18 July 1991 in Guadalajara, Mexico, when the Presidents of the two countries signed an agreement which also established the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), situated in Rio de Janeiro, for implementing the Joint Accounting and Control System. This Agreement was ratified by the parliaments of both countries.

Under article I, paragraph 3, of the Guadalajara Agreement, the two countries waived the possibility of carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions, even though the Treaty of Tiateloico permits them and both countries had always defended the right to carry out such explosions.

The second step provided for in the Fbz do Iguacu Declaration included entering "into negotiations with IAEA with a view to the conclusion of a joint safeguards agreement based on the Joint Accounting and Control System". That purpose was fulfilled in Vienna on 13 December 1991 with the signature, on behalf of the two Heads of State and the ABACC and IAEA authorities, of a quadripartite agreement to apply full-scope safeguards against the nuclear activities of the two countries for the purpose of verifying that the said materials are not diverted to nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices. The speed with which the action took place is remarkable, given the complexity of the political and technical issues covered and reflected in a document of 117 articles and more than 40 pages of text, which, in addition to being approved beforehand by a collective body such as the Governing Board of IAEA, usually requires negotiation much longer than the few months taken in this case.

It should be remembered that the Argentine Government had always been in favour of negotiating with IAEA the safeguards agreement provided for in article 13 of the Treaty of Tiateloico prior to its ratification, and had tried to do so, but the discussions had been bogged down by IAEA's insistence on keeping to the model agreement based on the non-proliferation Treaty. Argentina wanted an agreement adapted to the provisions of the Treaty of Tiateloico and not to those of an instrument which it had rejected. The long-drawn-out deadlock was overcome with the conclusion of an *ad hoc* agreement satisfactory to all the parties concerned.

The third and last step provided for in the Declaration of Foz do Iguacu, the only one still awaiting implementation, is contained in the

undertaking: "after the conclusion of the safeguards agreement with IAEA, to take appropriate action to permit the full entry into force for the two countries of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tiateloico), including action to update and improve the wording".

The full entry into force of the Treaty of Tiateloico for Argentina and Brazil thus appears to be the culmination of a process which passed through various stages, but I believe it would be a mistake to look on the regime of that Treaty as the final and paramount purpose of this joint effort. There are reasons for thinking that *rapprochement,* cooperation and reciprocal confidence-building between the two countries were the primary motivation for this undertaking. The steps now agreed upon and those which may emerge in the future under this same procedure would probably be sufficient to provide both countries with security and progress in the nuclear field, but at the same time it would be senseless to remain outside a regional agreement which, in the main, does not involve any commitments for the two countries greater than those already acquired bilaterally and with IAEA. The decision to adhere to the Treaty of Tiateloico must then be seen as a contribution to regional and also world-wide peace and security, and simultaneously as an effort to enhance the international perception of both countries as sincere and trustworthy partners in the common undertaking to prevent the use of nuclear energy for hostile purposes.

Argentina and Brazil have said that they wish to update and improve the text of the Treaty of Tiateloico. Thus far, no one has said publicly which provisions of the Treaty might be modified. Suffice it to say that one paragraph of the Joint Declaration which the two countries issued on 14 February 1992 to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of Tiateloico (see the "Documentation" section of this issue) indicates the kind of improvements and amendments envisaged. The Presidents of the two countries said that as soon as possible they would submit to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) some amendments to the text of the Treaty of Tiateloico, *of an eminently technical nature and having nothing to do with its principles and objectives.* They asked all the countries of our region for the support needed for this initiative, which is intended to facilitate implementation of the Treaty. It seems likely that the amendments desired apply to certain articles relating to the control system. It is more than probable that the work of amending the Treaty of Tiateloico will be tripartite, as Chile has also

expressed an interest in joining in the effort. Whatever the amendments advocated may be, the text will of course have to be considered by all the parties to the Treaty. Not until agreement is reached by all the participants will it be relevant to convene a special conference to consider and formally adopt the proposed changes. It is worth noting that the parties to the Treaty of Tiateloico have already decided, on two occasions, to introduce separate amendments to the text of the Treaty.

The process is not likely to be simple or rapid but, as long as there is evidence of goodwill, it will not be difficult. In Argentina it is hoped, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs has said, that the new text of the Treaty will be submitted for parliamentary approval in the course of the current year. With ratification by Argentina, with the immediate and full accession of Brazil and Chile, and with the well-founded expectation that in the near future Cuba and France (in respect of Additional Protocol I) will follow suit, the requirements set forth in article 28, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Tiateloico would be met for its entry into force with full effect for the immense zone of application set forth in article 4.

A journey on the road opened up in 1967 will thus have been completed. The nuclear-weapon-free zone of Latin America will be a reality. Over the years, many countries and individuals have worked intensively towards this goal. That it was possible for the final steps to be taken is due, to a large extent, to the joint enterprise of Argentina and Brazil, the two Latin American countries most advanced in the nuclear field and, precisely for that reason, the ones most affected by whatever regional instrument is devised for controlling nuclear activities.

The two countries decided to reverse the attitude that had predominated in their bilateral relations, uniting and, more often, separating them. It is noteworthy that one of the areas in which this new spirit was first able to express itself was that of nuclear activity, one of the most delicate and sensitive. This is a clear expression of the sincerity and energy with which both Governments, even though their highest leaders changed, are facing this process. Obviously, although no two situations in the world are the same and the similarities are not always notable, it has often been stressed that the activities carried out by Argentina and Brazil may very well set an example for other cases, not as a model to be copied—which is often neither good nor productive—but rather as a guide for efforts directed towards the same purpose.

Such activities transcend the national interest of the countries involved. They often make a particularly important contribution to the peace and security of an entire region and to the strengthening—as in this case—of an international instrument in which the world community as a whole has an interest.

BEYOND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING: BRAZILIAN-ARGENTINE NUCLEAR COOPERATION

Brazilian-Argentine cooperation in the nuclear field is widely viewed today as a textbook case of a confidence-building process. The concept of a confidence-building measure itself, however, created in the context of progressive *detente* in East-West confrontation, has seldom been mentioned by the two States themselves. This reflects both the fact that the whole process developed without outside inspiration or sponsorship and the different logic it expressed, which values cooperation over confrontation, the economic over the military aspects and what we might roughly call the "idealistic" over the strong "realistic" point of view prevailing elsewhere.

Brazil and Argentina went beyond confidence-building, as currently understood, as "a modest—some would even say cosmetic—technique for improving the atmosphere for East-West negotiations on arms reduction" (Akashi, 1991). They launched an ambitious programme of nuclear cooperation as a central part of the move to integrate the two economies. It is not a coincidence that the model for the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control was EURATOM, and not any of the institutions developed in the course of East-West *detente.*

The process that developed between Brazil and Argentina has been presented by many authors as a model for other regions of the world and deservedly so. We must not, however, neglect the specific conditions present in the case in point.

The process of nuclear cooperation has to be seen in the light of the overall evolution of Brazil's relationship with Argentina. It would go beyond the limited dimensions of this article and its specific scope to discuss their historical background. Suffice it to say that it was traditionally characterised by the need for external stability derived from internal political requirements and by the inheritance of Portuguese-Spanish colonial rivalry, which in the nineteenth century gave rise to a dispute for regional supremacy. While not witnessing, after the mid-nineteenth century, any disruption, the bilateral relations underwent pronounced oscillations. In the 1960s and 1970s, they were

marked by the delicate question of the Itaipu hydroelectric power plant and the legal dispute over the use of fluvial waters. This had a direct bearing on all other aspects of the relation between Argentina and Brazil and made it very difficult to enter into a process of cooperation in such a sensitive area as that of nuclear policy.

In spite of a bilateral situation which rendered cooperation difficult, both countries maintained similar positions in relation to restrictions imposed by nuclear suppliers and to the non-proliferation regime supported by the great Powers. It is true that they chose different types of reactors for electric-power generation: Argentina's, based on natural uranium and heavy water; Brazil's on enriched uranium and natural water. Nevertheless, there had always been an interchange of scientific information and material.

After the Itaipu question had been aptly solved in the late 1970s, the tendency towards cooperation was immediately followed by both countries. Increased understanding and cooperation in the nuclear area were perceived as a necessary pre-condition for the implementation of other policies. Two important factors made this feasible:

- the level of coincidence in the appreciation of matters concerning nuclear policy in the international scenario and multilateral forums; and
- the comparable level of industrial and technological capacitation of the two countries.

Main Characteristics of the Process

The first distinctive characteristic of the Brazilian-Argentine process is that the logical, chronological sequence was roughly cooperation, transparency, confidence-building, verification, in contrast to the approach advocated in intetnational forums—according to their historical experience—by northern countries: verification, transparency, confidence-building, cooperation. We may say that the different approaches reflected not only different conceptual frameworks, but also different realities. In addition to never having been an area of frequent inter-State violence, if we take military expenditures as an indication of the general level of threat perception in a region, the Southern Cone of Latin America presents relatively modest levels expressed as a proportion of gross domestic product (see Schmitter, 1991). The most remarkable fact, according to Schmitter, is that "when Argentina entered info a military buildup prior to the Malvinas, Falklands War, Brazil did not seem to feel threatened and did not increase its expenditures".

This particular reality hinders comparisons with other regions of the third world, where both the former levels of mistrust and the levels of weapons-stockpiling are considerably higher. At the same time, it shows the inadequacy of comparisons made by some authors with the French-German project of the mid-1950s of finally "burying the hatchet", for the former levels of conflict between the two European countries since 1870, including central involvement in two world wars, bear no comparison to the situation in the Southern Cone.

We could say, thus, that the second characteristic of the Brazilian-Argentine process is that the incentives to cooperate and face together outside pressures on their national nuclear programmes were clearly greater than the incentives to pursue individual, parallel or, even worse, confrontational paths. This was made possible by the absence of a deeply ingrained conflict mentality, that would have made cooperation and accommodation unacceptable to domestic public opinion.

Another characteristic of this process is that, contrary to the "idealistic"—Kantian—assumption, it was launched while the two countries were still under military regimes, namely by the governments of General Figueiredo and General Videla. The fact that these regimes "opened the path to the redefinition of the nature of the relations between the two nations, gradually replacing premises directed to conflict or rivalry by interests favourable to political cooperation and economic integration" (Hirst, 1990) only gave more solidity to the process when civilians came to power. It could be presented and seen, not as a reaction against the former decision-makers, but as an acceleration of their initial thrust. If prestige considerations declined as motivators (see Selcher, 1989), it was reassuring to observe that the institutions most attached to notions of prestige and military might shared the awareness that national power would be better served by economic development than by traditional ways of acquiring international prestige. At the same time, the sensitivity of the issue indicated that the military regimes were well placed to shift the course of action from mutual suspicion to cooperation.

Another characteristic (see Bocco, Hector Eduardo, 1989) was that the nuclear theme acquired increased visibility while the economic aspects had to address the inherent difficulties of any process of integration. The nuclear area presented itself as the ideal topic on which to promote integration at a fast pace. First, the central position occupied in this field by State bureaucracies and State enterprises made it easier to implement political decisions, in contrast with the

trade, investment and other sectors in which Government has to wait for private business to follow; or to the areas of "complex interdependence"—investment, migration, tourism, "social communications"—which, albeit well developed and developing in the case of the Southern Cone, ultimately depend on the decisions of private individuals.

Furthermore, if most analysts agree that, like other processes of integration, the impulse of the Brazilian-Argentine programme of integration was mostly political, the nuclear area acquired high symbolic value because of its effects on the overall security perceptions at the national, regional and international levels. The nuclear area made possible positive comparisons with the regional past—the time of a "wary rivalry" (Selcher, 1985)—and even more so with the present state of the world elsewhere.

Still on this point, it is fair to say that while the will to coordinate diplomatic initiatives is strong on both sides, differences in the economic structure of both countries and the parallel projects of recuperating full international credibility can lead to separate agendas of negotiation. The nuclear issue is again the area where the similarity of conditions and perceptions makes coordination both natural and useful as a role model for other areas.

First Stages of Cooperation

The first political approaches of relevance were undertaken during the first year of President Figueiredo's mandate (1979). These led to the signing, in 1980, of an agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which marked the beginning of formal cooperation in the nuclear fuel cycle between government institutions on both sides and the international coordination of nuclear policy.

Nuclear cooperation was intensified when both countries reverted to civil democratic governments and the process of economic integration began to be implemented. The Act of Foz do Iguacu was signed on 30 November 1985. At that time, a Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy was also signed. It established a working group which would lay the basis of future nuclear cooperation. The Group consists of members of the Foreign Ministry and the National Committee of Nuclear Energy of both countries. By a subsequent agreement, the Group was formalised, becoming the Permanent Argentine Brazilian Committee on Nuclear Policy. Other joint declarations on nuclear policy followed (Brasilia, 1986; Viedma, 1987; and Ipero, 1988).

When the present administrations assumed office, they found the institutional mechanisms with which to further nuclear cooperation

already available. In the first meeting (June 1990) of the Permanent Committee after President Collor took office, the preliminary ideas relating to the future initiatives were already formulated. The suggestion of harmonised systems of internal national safeguards was ventilated, as was the possibility of a common effort towards a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

These two ideas were picked up in subsequent informal meetings under the aegis of the Permanent Committee. In August 1990, it was decided that the two Nuclear Energy Commissions would set up working groups for the establishment of common procedures of reporting, accounting and control of nuclear material. This laid the foundations for the Joint Accounting and Control System of Nuclear Material (SCCC). The SCCC, in turn, would be used as a basis for a joint safeguards agreement with IAEA. Early in November 1990, a high-level Brazilian mission was sent to Buenos Aires. It negotiated the proposal for a meeting of President Collor and President Menem, to be held in Fbz do Iguacu, where they would issue an important Declaration making public the new orientation of the nuclear policies of the two countries.

Foz do Iguacu Declaration

The meeting of the two Presidents was held on 28 November, and the Joint Declaration of Foz do Iguacu on Nuclear Policy contained a three-step initiative designed to make the nuclear policies of the two countries transparent and their peaceful objectives verifiable:

- the establishment of the SCCC and the beginning of bilateral inspections;
- the negotiation of a joint safeguards agreement with IAEA; and
- the adoption of measures which could lead to the full implementation of the Treaty of Tiateloico, including the improvement and updating of some of its clauses.

Guadalajara Agreement

The SCCC was to be formalised in a bilateral agreement—the "Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy"—signed at Guadalajara, Mexico, on 18 July 1991. This Agreement essentially reproduced the political undertakings of the Treaty of Tiateloico, with the important difference that both countries renounced peaceful nuclear explosions as long as no technical difference between nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes and those for warlike purposes could be established. The abdication of this right had already been

enunciated by President Collor, when he addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1990. The bilateral Agreement also created an Agency, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), to execute and administer the SCCC, thereby verifying effective observance of the basic undertaking. Both parties were also eager not to limit or hamper any peaceful application of nuclear energy or research on it. This was explicitly included as an article in the Agreement, as was the definition of propulsion or operation of any type of vehicle as a peaceful application of nuclear energy. This was important in order to preserve the nuclear-propulsion programme of both countries. The Guadalajara Agreement came into force on 12 December 1991.

Joint Safeguards Agreement with IAEA

The Iguacu Declaration presented an initiative that was to be taken in three successive steps. Both Governments decided, however, to enter the second step (negotiations with IAEA) before the conclusion of the first (ratification and entry into force of the bilateral Agreement, conclusion of the SCCC, making ABACC fully operational). The first meeting was held in Vienna, early in March 1991. Brazil and Argentina had opted for the EURATOM Agreement (INFCIRC/193) as a model for their joint safeguards agreement with IAEA. The Agency had no objection to that, reaffirming only that its ability to reach its own independent conclusions was an indispensable requirement for any safeguards agreement. Argentina and Brazil insisted on having the requirement for the preservation of technological secrets included as one of the guiding principles of the agreement.

Agreement on the final text was reached in November 1991. President Collor and President Menem went to Vienna to witness the signing of the agreement on 13 December 1991. The agreement includes all of the relevant elements of other comprehensive safeguards agreements, such as the basic undertaking to accept safeguards "on all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities within the territories of the States Parties", the special procedures to be used in certain activities, such as nuclear naval propulsion, and the requirement to restrict exports of safeguarded material only to recipient countries that keep it under safeguards. In this respect, Brazil and Argentina went even further, since they do not discriminate in favour of nuclear Powers.

These initiatives were perceived in the international community as breakthroughs in both Argentina's and Brazil's nuclear policies. How was this process perceived from within? What were the political

motivations that led to this profound alteration in both countries' approaches towards the prevailing mechanisms for non-proliferation? This question has to be seen in the light of the three dimensions in which the question evolved: internal, bilateral and international.

Internal Dimension

In the case of Brazil, the single most important internal factor was the new constitutional requirement (1988) for the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. Here, it might be useful to have a general description of some of the key aspects, often perceived as controversial, of the Brazilian nuclear programme. Brazil's nuclear programme relied very much on external cooperation. Nevertheless, there had always been internal autonomous research. In 1975, Brazil signed an important agreement on cooperation with Germany, through which it would acquire German equipment, technology and know-how in several areas of importance, such as nuclear enrichment and power generation. Initially, the agreement was to include the transfer of ultra centrifugation enrichment technology. Since Brazil was not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and did not accept full-scope IAEA safeguards, there was strong international pressure against the transfer of such technology. Germany therefore reconsidered and decided not to proceed with the original proposal. The final agreement included the transfer of the "jet nozzle" technology for enrichment, a much less proven one.

When, in the early 1980s, it became evident that this technology would not be industrially or commercially feasible, the Brazilian Government determined that the ultra centrifugation enrichment technology be developed internally. This reinforced the autonomous nuclear programme, which was to be dubbed by the press as the "parallel" nuclear programme. There have been several assertions that the real objectives of the autonomous nuclear programme were not clear. At no stage was there a government directive to build nuclear weapons in Brazil. The sensitivity of the programme, the central role played by the armed forces, the absence of an internal safeguards system and the relative independence of several subprogrammes, however, were elements that gave room for speculation.

These uncertainties and grey areas were to cause serious concern internally, especially in the scientific community. Concerns were kept under control under the military governments, but surfaced when President Samey took office and even led to a congressional investigation. When President Collar took office, he determined that the Brazilian nuclear programme should be fully transparent and

accountable to civil supervision. This reflected a very perceptible aspiration of Brazil's civil society. All nuclear activities should be accountable to the National Nuclear Energy Commission. This was carried out with the establishment, for the first time, of an internal safeguards system applicable to all nuclear activities.

Bilateral Dimension

The bilateral dimension evolved as a concatenation of natural steps. As we have seen, the initial steps were taken by military governments (under President Videla and President Figueiredo). They were pursued and strengthened by the first democratic governments (President Alfonsin and President Sarney) and brought to full conclusion by their successors (President Menem and President Collor). A uniform motivation was maintained throughout the whole process, but specific interests and objectives were behind each stage. In the initial stage, the main goal was to consolidate the new cooperative process into which both countries entered after the Itaipu question was solved. Cooperation was, however, limited and both countries pursued their sensitive programmes independently.

During the period of the first democratic governments, the decision to enter a process of economic integration and political harmonisation was taken. It was evident to several observers of this process that the latent misgivings and suspicious perceptions of each other's nuclear programmes had to be overcome if the economic integration was to have any meaning. It was at that stage (1987 and 1988) that the first reciprocal visits to each country's most sensitive nuclear facilities were undertaken. These reflected the determination to dispel the dispute and the competition for supremacy in nuclear technology. But this was exclusively a restricted bilateral opening. Only in the third stage was there an effective opening to the international community by the process of cooperation. The objective here was to convey to the international community the message that Argentina and Brazil were reliable countries and presented no threat to regional or international peace and security. Only at this stage was the decision to accept IAEA safeguards taken, since both countries realised that safeguards were the only effective means of providing the international community with the assurances it wanted.

External Dimension

The external factors were primarily related to the perception of the new international scenario that emerged with the end of the Cold War. A new framework of convergence of political interests among the

dominant Powers, clearly enhanced by the war in the Persian Gulf, concurred for a greater concentration of power. The war in the Gulf also redirected security concerns and policies. In this context, both countries were interested in avoiding being perceived as potential regional menaces and destabilising factors. This was especially true in the nuclear area, where Brazil's and Argentina's programmes had been identified, together with those of India, Pakistan, Israel and South Africa, as potential threats of proliferation. Furthermore, there has always been the Treaty of Tiateloico, which Brazil signed and ratified. Although it is not in force, Brazil has committed itself to abide by its principles and objectives.

Some observers believe that external pressure from nuclear suppliers and countries with which there were traditional ties of cooperation was an important factor leading to the establishment of the new Argentine-Brazilian policy. It seems to us, however, that when the process took off, the imperative requirement for continued external cooperation had considerably declined in the two countries, both on account of the technological and industrial levels they had reached and on account of the relative loss of importance of the nuclear lobbies internally. On the other hand, there was a general perception that the decision not to accept international verification of the peaceful objectives of their nuclear programmes was having an adverse effect on their ability to obtain access to advanced products and technologies outside the nuclear area, such as high-speed computers.

Combining the internal and bilateral developments with the new external environment, the policy adopted by Brazil and Argentina seems to follow a very natural course. In other words, if you are internally committed to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, why not give your neighbour and partner assurances to that effect and obtain reciprocity in the process? Thus, you dispel the latent anxieties and suspicions in this area and pave the way for economic integration and concerted political action.

The extension of this process to the global level represents a larger step, on account of the traditional position of both countries (with widespread internal support) as regards the prevailing non-proliferation system and its built-in inequities. The issue had to be approached cautiously, both on account of internal repercussions and on account of the concern that the presence of international inspectors would actually represent an intrusion into Argentina's and Brazil's most sensitive and valued facilities, which had been developed in spite of severe constraints imposed from abroad.

The course of action followed provided satisfactory solutions to all of these problems. The joint safeguards agreement did not represent the acceptance of the political guidelines of the non-proliferation system, more specifically of the non-proliferation Treaty, but of the verification of internal and bilateral commitments by the qualified international agency. In short, both countries accept to provide assurances fully equivalent to those required by the NPT, without having to endorse the political elements of that Treaty, which they consider discriminatory. In the case of Brazil, it might also be argued that the concept of a safeguards agreement with IAEA had already been accepted, since article 13 of the Treaty of Tiateloico, which it signed and ratified, calls for such an agreement. The question of intrusion was also given much attention and the fact that the agreement was a joint venture gave a better negotiating position to both States, which as already mentioned, insisted on and obtained a specific clause stating the preservation of technological secrets as one of the principles of the safeguards agreement.

Relation with Other Security Issues in the Region

The process of nuclear cooperation between Brazil and Argentina has already produced an offspring, the "Mendoza Accord", of 5 September 1991, first signed by both countries and Chile, and adhered to by Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia. The signatories commit themselves not to develop, produce, acquire in any way, stockpile or retain biological and chemical weapons and engage themselves to be among the original parties to the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, now in the concluding phase of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. This initiative complements the process in the nuclear area and grants to the subregion the status of the first inhabited area to be declared free of weapons of mass destruction.

Some authors have speculated on the possibility that the economic integration process (the Common Market of the South) may give birth, at a later stage, to some sort of security arrangement. At the present stage, however, this does not seem probable, taking into account the already high degree of mutual confidence; the absence of both intra- and extra-regional security threats; the low levels of military expenditures and conventional weapons stocks; and the common perception that the subregion faces its major challenges in the areas of economic and social development.

Conclusions

If we agree with the assumption that in a process of regional integration expectations are that the universe of "high politics" will have decreasing importance on the agenda of the partners and, even more, that premature emphasis on defence and strategic themes can minimize the chances for success in such an experience of integration (Hirst 1991), we can conclude that after playing a necessary role as a bilateral confidence-building measure, nuclear cooperation between Brazil and Argentina in the future will probably concentrate both on the more concrete area of bilateral cooperation and on the more "politicised" area of "common nuclear diplomacy" in the international arena. In this last capacity, it will still function as a confidence-building measure, only turned outwards, and not towards each other. Thus it will contribute to assuring unimpeded and regular access to advanced technology for both countries, in the nuclear and other fields. It can also be perceived as a step towards a broader non-proliferation system, where regional arrangements must play a major role, always with a view to reaching a non-discriminatory system.

As Schmitter has observed (1991), this part of the world is so atypical that the usual realistic assumptions do not apply. Some idealistic assumptions do not seem to apply either, such as the one that tends to attribute—since Kant—the monopoly of cooperative, non-conflictive, approaches to international relations to republics or democracies. Cither idealistic premises, nevertheless, seem to be the case in the Southern Cone, such as the one that attaches high value to cooperation and integration as emerging forms of international behaviour which can progressively supersede power politics and military competition. In this the Brazilian-Argentine process of cooperation in the nuclear field is a good example and, with due attention to its specificities, can be of help as a prototype for other regions of the world.

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Confidence-building Measures in the Maritime Domain

New Opportunities

Confidence-building measures at sea, whether man-, time (MCBMs) or naval (NCBMs), should be viewed against the perspective of initiating naval arms control in general. The evolving international situation provides new evidence that the focus of arms control may, in the foreseeable future, be turned to naval forces and naval activities. Several recent developments support such an expectation:

- Changes in global political thinking and democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe are driving the world from a state of military rivalry and confrontation to mutual confidence and co-operation. In such circumstances, it should be possible to accommodate the legitimate concerns of all parties to the traditional security equation. As fears related to naval threats are not one-sided, there could be acceptable ways of dealing with naval arms control on the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity.
- Navies now remain the only military forces still excluded from the arms control process. As naval forces are not independent of other legs of the military strength of nations, further consideration of force reductions in Europe without including naval components may become a risky exercise for at least one of the negotiating parties. Overlooking this factor may substantially slow down future security and disarmament negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America and between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
- Naval forces and activities may, and sometimes indeed do, present a serious source of risks and potential threats to national

security and international stability. If the naval arms race continues unchecked, it may negate the security-building effect of important measures in other fields of disarmament.

- The Vienna Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the negotiations on the reduction of forces in Europe are expected to alter the whole force structure in Europe, which would offer new opportunities for naval arms control in full agreement with perceived needs to maintain reliable naval capabilities to sustain military operations on land. Starting preparatory work for such naval talks, first within the military alliances and then between the alliances themselves or between the two leading naval Powers, has been emphasised by high-ranking representatives on both sides.
- Drastic reduction of the level and offensive capabilities of the European land forces will probably change also the basic naval force planning requirements.
- Both of the major naval Powers appear to be encountering economic difficulties, which may prompt them to reverse further their naval build-up programmes. Significant changes and reductions in United States and Soviet naval forces have already been made. As in START, the restructuring of navies could be better managed in an arms control manner, making it more predictable and acceptable.

A key question in the international debate on naval arms control is how to begin this process in a manner that would both involve all major naval Powers and ensure steady progress without jeopardizing the security interests of any of the States concerned.

The purpose of this study is to outline the possible role and security objectives of NCBMs in such a perspective. The approach is not meant to be exhaustive but rather selective as expectations of quick progress at the initial stage of naval arms control could not be high.

Role of Naval Confidence-building Measures (NCBMs)

Discussions on naval arms control have provided a clear indication that naval arms control would be not only inherently difficult but also highly controversial. Those who see merit in advancing this process would have to face a challenge in determining which possibilities are worth pursuing and how to pursue them. Some important dimensions of this challenge result from the following:

- Differences in the United States and Soviet naval security situations;

- Divergent views of the two major Powers on naval arms control;
- Insufficient mutual trust in the genuine objectives of naval doctrines of the two sides;
- Lack of full knowledge about the naval forces, activities, procurement programmes and contingency plans of the other party;
- Practical difficulties in designing acceptable measures of naval arms control, owing to: (a) existing asymmetries in objectives, requirements, strategies, force structures, capabilities, patterns of deployment and operation of the navies of East and West; (b) the nature of the legal regime of the seas; (c) the mobility and global scope of operation of naval forces;
- Differing United States and Soviet approaches to verification at sea, reflecting some differences regarding the policy of neither confirming nor denying the transport of nuclear weapons;
- Insufficiency of information on likely common interests in naval arms control measures of the two major Powers in the new international setting of the 1990s.

In such circumstances, it is difficult to imagine quick, across-the-board developments in naval arms control.

As more sweeping suggestions would seem to be bound to quick failure, focusing on modest proposals might give credit for seriousness in the whole approach to naval arms control. Small steps in which States could find some common ground can help modify doctrinal thinking in a manner that might later make far-reaching measures feasible. There is also a need to eliminate some of the reasons for mutual distrust that prevent even discussion of the naval disarmament issue on its own merits. At the initial stage of naval arms control, therefore, it might be appropriate for the international community to deal mainly with the confidence-building dimension of this process. NCBMs could, and indeed should, play such an ice-breaking role as precursors of progress in arms control covering the naval environment.

In a wider security context, a basic role of NCBMs is to serve as an instrument for achieving specific results associated with improved confidence and enhanced security at sea. These results could be identified with the security objectives of the NCBMs.

Security Objectives of NCBMs

Useful guidance with regard to possible security objectives of NCBMs could be found in agreements having a confidence-building

value. Such agreements—old and new, global and regional—do exist. Some of them have been widely recognised as a contribution to international security and stability. Recent precedents in negotiating and implementing bilateral NCBMs with a global application are regarded as a success. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) also contains important confidence- and security-building provisions. The 1936 Montreux Convention is another example of a regional measure in force that contains important operational and confidence-building elements of naval arms control, corresponding to the security interests of a number of zonal (the Black Sea coastal States) and extra-zonal States.

Some confidence-building objectives at sea may be considered as peacetime security benefits following from any CBMs in the field of disarmament. Apart from such general security objectives, an effort might be made to seek results that would accommodate specific security concerns related mainly to the sea, which could be construed as specific naval confidence-building objectives. The rationale of dealing with such specific objectives comes from the different legal regimes of sea and land areas. While the State jurisdiction on land separates ground and air forces of different nations from each other in peacetime, naval units of various nations may freely mix all over the sea.

The security objectives of NCBMs could be global or regional, depending on the scope of application of the respective measures. It is only natural that the causes of mistrust to be removed by NCBMs may vary from region to region, thus giving a somewhat regional flavour to some of the efforts to build confidence and security at sea. It is easier also to reach an agreement among a limited number of States in a region or a subregion than to find measures that can be agreed upon and applied world-wide.

Both global and regional NCBM objectives should be considered as equally important. A situation must be avoided, however, in which a system of regional naval arms control regimes could spread over the world in a way that might give rise to an ambiguous overlap of different legal norms. In introducing new global NCBMs, care should be taken to ensure compatibility with the established regional security regimes at sea, including the arrangements of regional NCBMs. Clear success in this regard is to be found in the elaboration of the global regime set forth in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which in the case of "straits in which passage is regulated in whole or in part by long-standing international conventions in force specifically related to such straits", has recognised the precedence of the already existing

regional arrangements such as the Montreux Convention. An easy way to acquire compatibility of global and regional NCBM regimes is to take the United Nations Convention as a point of departure in designing new measures.

A cautious approach in listing all NCBM objectives might be required to avoid possible misunderstandings. Any specific NCBM objective reflects a natural desire on the part of a State or States to eliminate or partly accommodate a security concern relating to the naval environment, with a view to increasing mutual confidence between nations. If such a "sea-oriented" concern is recognised by many or even by all states, this might imply a great degree of support for NCBMs that seek to accomplish such an objective. Other NCBM objectives could have limited credibility if they reflected security concerns of individual States or groups of States, without duly taking into account the legitimate security interests of other nations. Changes in the naval environment and modifications of maritime doctrines could slowly bring about a wider recognition for such NCBM objectives as well. The degree of support for an NCBM security objective should be another criterion guiding the selection process of the respective measures for negotiations.

Maritime CBMs (MCBMs) which hold the promise of serving the interests of international security and stability at sea may be guided by the general objectives of:

- Reducing the causes of mistrust, fear, tension and hostilities, related to naval or other military activities, all of which may be significant factors in the continuation of the naval arms race or the arms build-up in general;
- Removing the elements of fear and speculation, thus helping achieve a more accurate and reliable reciprocal assessment of naval activities or other matters which may cause mutual apprehensions and increase the danger of a conflict at sea;
- Achieving a better understanding of reciprocal naval concerns and fostering co-operation in the field of security-related communication;
- Reducing the threatening character of naval exercises;
- Providing enough warning time to counter a surprise attack against or by naval forces;
- Reducing the chance that a naval incident could start a war;
- Limiting the risk that naval operations could lead to escalation from conventional to nuclear war;

- Strengthening national security of States by lowering their vulnerabilities to naval threats;
- Facilitating settlement of international disputes and conflicts in areas covering or adjacent to seas;
- Advancing the process of naval arms control and of disarmament negotiations as a whole, in particular verification measures of a more intrusive character;
- Creating a political and psychological climate in which the impulse towards a competitive naval and other arms build-up will be reduced and the importance of military factors will be diminished and finally eliminated;
- Adding to greater rationally and stability in international relations and contributing to avoidance of the use or threat of use of military force at or from the sea, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
- Creating or improving conditions for co-operation in the maritime domain.

Specific Security Objectives

Specific security objectives of NCBMs are worth discussing in more detail in view of their direct relevance to the initial stage of naval arms control. Each such objective may relate to a whole category of possible NCBMs.

Lowering the Risks of Naval Incidents: Lowering the risks of naval incidents and confrontations in peacetime is a primary security objective of several existing bilateral agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea. Although provisions of such agreements usually regulate the behaviour of naval vessels, in practice they enhance security also for non-military activities at sea.

The NCBM objective of avoiding incidents is probably the one most widely shared. A number of States favour the idea of negotiating a multilateral convention on the prevention of incidents at sea, having global coverage. Such as agreement should be considered complementary to the existing ones, not a substitute for them. Individual coastal States may find it in their national interest also to conclude regional (either bilateral or multilateral) agreements on the prevention of naval incidents with a view to reducing the risk of military conflict, particularly in areas in which such incidents are frequent or regional tensions are high. Regional arrangements stand better chances of avoiding some of the political, military or technical problems that

usually accompany a global accord. To achieve the security objectives of such an NCBM, it might in some cases be important for the major naval Powers to join the regional agreement, even if it covers a sea area far from their own shores.

It has been suggested that NCBMs with the security objective referred to above should not only clarify rules of behaviour for preventing dangerous naval collisions but should also contain provisions on:

(a) crisis management procedures;

(b) separation of naval forces during a crisis (as military incentives for pre-emptive actions may grow stronger if naval formations remain in close proximity to each other);

(c) establishment of a consultative body (above the operational level of the maritime units directly involved) to consider the modalities of such a separation when tense situations develop;

(d) inclusion of the operation of general-purpose submarines as well.

Ensuring Safe Access: Ensuring safe access to the seas and oceans for ships and aircraft of States which are not involved in on-going crises or armed conflicts seems an important security objective in view of the historical experience acquired by the international community. The harmful effects of naval activities that curtail free and open use of sea lanes can hardly be over-emphasised. Such actions contain great risks also of expanding regional hostilities to more States.

The idea behind NCBMs of this type is to distinguish vessels of States involved in a conflict from those of nonbelligerent States, with a view to offering to the latter a general priority for shipping, fishing, off-shore industry or other peaceful activities at sea. The ultimate purpose is to provide crisis security to all types of non-military activities in the maritime domain. Such NCBMs would seek to make it difficult to violate the freedom-of-navigation right on the high seas with respect to States which do not partake in a conflict covering a sea area. Naval activities such as mining, covert submarine operations in coastal waters, blockades, restrictions on the use of certain areas in disputes, and establishment of maritime exclusion zones as a result of conflict may constitute interference with the peaceful uses of the sea. In this context, the United Nations study on the naval arms race noted the applicability of the 1907 Hague Conventions in time of war. Both the United Nations study and Disarmament Commission documents emphasize the need to modernize the law of naval warfare (outdated because of technical

developments) in order to enhance security at sea and protect civilian maritime activities.

Related to the safe-access NCBM objective is the more comprehensive suggestion with regard to the elaboration of rules for the guidance of naval activities when these are in conflict with civilian activities, in accordance with the current law of the sea. Similar in their objectives are proposals providing for the conclusion of agreements not to expand naval activities in areas of tension or armed conflicts or, in cases where such activities are already under way, agreements to withdraw foreign naval forces of individual States to specified distances from such regions.

Depending on their scope and nature, some NCBMs could play an important deterring role with respect to possible maritime activities denying the right to freedom of navigation. One of the measures suggested in such a context is that United Nations naval forces, acting under the auspices of the Security Council with the participation of a number of maritime Powers, should be entrusted with the task of policing the safe access of all nations to all maritime areas. Such a step, if implemented, would signal a transition from unilateral or alliance reliance on naval strength to global security arrangements to ensure free access to the high seas. Collective guarantees of the safety of international shipping lanes could also be provided in view of the growing extent of terrorism and piracy at sea.

Safety of International Lines of Security Communication: Similar to the “safe access idea” seems to be the “safety of international lines of security communication” objective of NCBMs. It reflects strongly expressed security concerns that vital maritime shipping lanes may be interrupted in times of high tension or military conflicts of a larger scale. Such fears may have given rise to the introduction of maritime military doctrines containing elements of an overtly offensive (if not aggressive) nature, which aim at destroying the other side’s strategic ballistic missile submarines (having a recognised stabilising role in strategic relations) or general-purpose attack submarines, early in a conventional war between the major naval Powers or their military alliances. The possible intention to cut the safety lines of communication (SLOCs) and such doctrinal elements seem equally destabilising for the naval security environment: hence, the arms control value of a possible trade-off between the two kinds of threats at sea. The safety objective may also become part of another trade-off between the maritime military planning for the “adjoining sea area” to Europe and the arrangement for conventional land forces in Europe.

In terms of confidence-building, the two major maritime Powers could consider the possibility of concluding an agreement to offer appropriate guarantees for the safety of the shipping lanes or SLOCs. Such an agreement will possibly have to provide for some restraints on anti-submarine warfare activities of both sides (for example, military exclusion zones of safe operation of submarines or sanctuaries for nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which would enhance strategic predictability and reduce the risk of unintended escalation).

Improving Understanding of Security Concerns: Improving mutual understanding of security concerns and concepts that shape military planning, including naval components, is a widely acceptable NCBM objective which is of a more general nature but when applied to the maritime environment may acquire a specific naval flavour. The first positive results in trying to achieve such an objective on a bilateral basis have already been strongly felt in the strategic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. NCBMs having the above security objective are: (a) joint discussions of the interrelationships between military planning involving land, sea and air forces in all parts of Europe; (b) multinational East-West maritime seminars or symposia among senior naval leaders, diplomats and scientists; (c) regular contacts among naval and defence officials to discuss doctrine, security and arms control. Such measures could be pursued both at a global and at a regional or subregional level.

Discussions of military doctrines in East and West at the Vienna negotiations have already illustrated the confidence-building potential of measures guided by the objective of "improved understanding". Talks on the specific elements of maritime doctrines seem to be an indispensable supplement, which still have. to become part and parcel of the ongoing process. Joint discussions may give rise to better understanding of military rationale and lead to early modifications of the most troubling provisions of maritime doctrines. Such discussions could also cover the parameters of sufficiency of naval armaments and deployments that would be enough to protect national and allied assets but not enough to carry out offensive operations successfully.

Increasing Openness and Predictability: Increasing the openness and predictability of naval activities of States through exchange of information, observation and verification procedures is another NCBM objective of growing relevance in the light of the expected results of the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces and on a new generation of CBMs in Europe. In a maritime environment, this general confidence-

building objective acquires an important "seaboard security" dimension. Ways to achieve it have often been referred to as "extension of CBMs to seas and oceans, especially to areas with the busiest sea lanes."

Relevant elements of NCBMs having the "increased openness" objective could be: (a) exchange of static information on naval forces inventory (including numbers of naval vessels and aircraft by classes and armaments they carry, size of crews, etc., naval base facilities and capabilities); (b) exchange of information on naval force activities, future procurements and retirement plans for naval vessels, major weapon systems, equipment or technologies of maritime warfare; (c) prior notification of naval exercises, transits and deployments; (d) constraints on naval exercise activities; (e) presence of observers during exercises or manoeuvres; (f) notification of passage of submarines, aircraft carriers or other large vessels, especially in regions of high international tension; (g) mutual port visits of warships; (h) exchange of information on safety and control measures to prevent accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons; (i) exchange of information on planned warships trade transfers; (j) provision of data to maintain a United Nations catalogue on naval arms trade.

Both global and regional NCBMs along these lines could turn out to be useful (as either formal or unilateral steps) if introduced in an appropriate political context and agreed mixtures. In view of the existing disparities and asymmetries between Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO naval strategies and forces, parameters of possible agreement related to Europe may need to cover both naval operations and ground and air force operations.

The present regime under the Document of the Stockholm Conference covers naval activities in the sea area adjoining Europe only if they are "functionally linked" with military activities on land above agreed thresholds.

In this context, suggestions have been put forward to extend the established CSBM regime for prior notification and observation of amphibious landings to encompass not just the actual landing but also other phases of amphibious assault operations as well. CSBMs would thus cover amphibious operations "from where and when the landing-ships form into assault formation and the amphibious vehicles are being launched up". Such proposals draw greater attention to a potential threat of a surprise invasion launched from across the sea, which, owing to the specific characteristics of the areas concerned, may be essential elements of any large-scale offensive military actions in areas outside Central Europe. As the terrain in northern Europe

and in some areas of south-eastern Europe is considered more accessible by sea, transportation of military forces through the air and over the sea may have greater relevance than in the central European part. Hence, the confidence-building effects of NCBMs addressing such naval threats.

Other NCBM proposals also providing for "seaboard security" of States have more far-reaching scope. The rationale for extending the scope is that absence of complete and timely information about naval (and air) activities in the adjoining sea (ocean) areas to Europe would feed misunderstandings or possible miscalculations, involving risks of provoking armed conflicts. Such measures seek to extend the existing CSBM regime to cover not only "functionally linked" but also relatively independent naval activities. "Relatively" here reflects the understanding that any naval activities can hardly be completely independent from possible military operations on land. The value of prior notification of force concentrations at sea should be similar to the importance of prior notification on land. Should a serious international crisis, for instance, coincide with a major maritime exercise, States that may be concerned would have good reason to assume that the coincidence was arbitrary when the exercise had been notified well in advance. The actual scope of these suggestions for NCBMs, however, may make them more appropriate for consideration at the next stage of the CDE.

NCBMs along these lines could envisage: (a) notification of naval exercises, transfers of naval units, marine forces, naval aviation above certain levels, which may progressively be lowered (information might cover time of commencement, duration, purpose, classes of vessels and aircraft involved, and on-shore facilities used); (b) invitation of observers to naval exercises and manoeuvres; (c) limitation on the number, scale and duration of major naval exercises in specific regions; (d) prohibition of notifiable naval exercises in zones of intensive shipping and fishing, as well as in straits used for international navigation; (e) inclusion of information on naval activities in annual calendars; and (f) sharing of information gathered through observation by satellites or other observation means over international waters.

Suggested parameters of NCBMs in this category currently envisage mainly naval capabilities of the existing military alliances, thus reflecting the post-war political division. The evolving situation in Europe, where the modalities of an all-European security system are being widely discussed, may suggest that States should turn their attention also to NCBMs which directly address the security concerns

of individual coastal nations rather than those of large groups of States. Small and medium-sized coastal nations may particularly appreciate NCBMs aimed at increased openness, which could limit the possibilities for use of a "gunboat diplomacy" in local armed conflicts close to their shores and could also reduce the risks of naval escalation where subregional tensions exist.

Following such an approach might be relevant to security concerns expressed, for example, in the Balkans or in northern Europe. In this context, prior notification of national naval activities may have to cover: (a) large exercises involving different types of naval units (guided-missile equipped cruisers, destroyers or frigates, amphibious assault ships and marine forces, attack submarines, fast attack ships, anti-submarine warfare ships, etc.); (b) exercises of a certain type of naval units which are numerous enough to give rise to serious security concerns; and (c) joint operations of land, air and naval forces. Thresholds indicating the large scale of independent naval exercises or the notifiable mixtures of forces should be a matter of joint elaboration by the regional States concerned. Parameters triggering notification will probably depend both on the type of ships involved and on their combat capacity—for instance in the case of individual naval exercises: cruisers, destroyers or frigates (3-4 units); amphibious assault ships (5-6 units of an average loading capacity); missile-equipped destroyers or frigates (2-3 groups with 3-4 units each); and attack submarines (1-2 units).

The reason for requiring notifications would be to inform that the naval activity was a training exercise rather than an act or threat of aggression. When amphibious assault operations take place, the invitation of observers to naval ports of embarkation could also be envisaged. To help verify the number of marine troops, a capacity threshold may be applied to amphibious assault activities instead of a personnel one. Inclusion in the notification clause of a distance formula (amphibious assault activities taking place, for example, within a given number of nautical miles of a country) has been suggested as a supplement to such a capacity threshold.

Notification or mission regulation of movement of seaborne tactical nuclear weapons may be of particular importance to coastal States having established special rules with respect to port visits and could have a wider confidence-building effect. A major obstacle to introducing such special NCBMs would be the long-standing policy of neither confirming nor denying, in its present form. Certain modifications or abandonment of this policy may make it possible not only to impose

confidence-building restrictions but also to grant additional navigational and immunity privileges.

Eliminating Some Offence-Oriented Elements: Eliminating some of the extremely offence-oriented elements of certain provocative naval exercises or manoeuvres through reciprocal constraints may be regarded as another "seaboard security" objective of NCBMs.

The concept of mutual restraints on certain exercises on land has already been recognised as a valid approach to confidence-building. As it is difficult to judge or verify intentions, the purpose is to exclude from the peacetime military activities, especially in times of tensions or crisis, extremely offence-oriented elements that could hardly be distinguished from actual aggressive preparations. It should be possible to apply this concept also to the naval environment, thus giving a specific maritime substance to such a more general CBM objective. Some preliminary discussions on exactly which naval exercises contain highly provocative elements may be needed on a bloc-to-bloc and regional or bilateral basis.

Naval exercises of this kind are often carried out in the scenario of a strategic offence intended to destroy in wartime the military forces or occupy the territory of other States. Although such activities are planned to enhance deterrence postures, they cause serious tension and in certain circumstances may create pre-emptive incentives. Relevant examples are: exercises simulating attacks on shipping lanes or SLOCs; offensive operations in close proximity to strategic units (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines or SSBNs) or their naval bases; amphibious assault landing operations of a massive scale; and deploying attack submarines to forward naval areas, such as the North Atlantic, the Norwegian and the Barents seas, the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea basin.

Naval exercise constraints by individual small and medium-sized coastal States on a bilateral or regional basis may also contribute to building confidence and security, particularly in areas of tension where the risks of local conflicts are high. In addition to prior notification and observation of large-scale national naval exercises, agreements to limit the annual number of notifiable naval exercises and the number of amphibious assault ships involved in such exercises (for instance, up to 14 to 16 units) may serve as a useful regional NCBM. Measures of this type could, for example, be applied to coastal States in the Balkans and possibly in other areas as well.

Improving Ocean Management Policies: Improving ocean management policies related to the peaceful uses of the world's seas is

a specific maritime CBM security objective. Such an objective is not related to naval activities but rather tries to meet some non-military security concerns of States in the maritime environment. Effective international ocean management could contribute to the promotion of social progress and to better standards of life in larger freedom. As the United Nations Group of Experts on the Naval Arms Race points out in its report:

> "... without development there will be no peace, and without peace there will be no development. Security in the maritime environment is therefore not just military in nature but includes such other facets as food security, resource security, job security and ocean management security."

LAW OF THE SEA, OCEAN MANAGEMENT AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

Eighty-five years ago, Jane's *Fighting Ships* listed 44 navies of various shapes and sizes; nowadays it lists over 150 navies and coastguards. This is due essentially to the sheer proliferation of sovereign States but it is also due to the increased responsibilities that the evolving law of the sea places upon littoral States for the management of large areas of sea, ocean floor and continental shelf. These increased responsibilities are themselves a reflection of the continued importance of the oceans as a transport medium and the increased importance of the sea as a source of useful resources. This has given the ownership of coasts and islands a new importance as these now give monopolistic rights to huge areas of sea and sea-bed. Although, sadly, the precise legal regime for the world's oceans remains in dispute, the enclosure of large tracts of sea and ocean has already taken place. Nations large and small need the means to assert their rights and carry out their duties in their territorial seas, contiguous zones and exclusive economic zones.

Although this is essentially a constabulary role, not all States have limited themselves to patrol vessels of limited military capability when acquiring the naval power to assert their sovereign rights. There are currently more positive signs in this regard. Resource constraints are now forcing most African navies to concentrate on offshore patrol vessels of various shapes and sizes. Guns are being removed from patrol craft to make space for rather more useful boarding dinghies; combatant corvettes that proved impossible to maintain are being converted to operational patrol vessels. Nevertheless, the temptation to utilize the available "equalizer" weapon technologies offered by the world's arms exporters is still strong. In my recent study *The Future*

of Sea Power, I identified five African, four Latin American and four Asian "offshore territorial defence navies" with combatant frigate/corvette vessels and/or a capable submarine force. To take one example, Ecuador has two late-1970s 1,300-ton submarines, a gun-armed destroyer and frigate, six powerful Exocet missile-armed corvettes, and six missile-armed fast-attack craft.

The proliferation of sophisticated hardware is in part due to the possibility for dispute and even for armed conflict opened up by law of the sea/ocean management issues. Back in 1978 Barry Buzan analysed the sources of dispute that could arise from legal/management issues. These involved: (a) disputes over jurisdictional boundaries and ownership of islands; (b) disputes over exploitation or navigation rights within areas of accepted national jurisdiction; (c) disputes over rights in the ocean beyond accepted boundaries; and (d) disputes resulting from problems ashore, internal or international.

It is encouraging to note how many of these disputes, even those that have led to incidents such as cable-cutting, arrest and exclusion, have been settled without resort to armed force. In cases where forces have actually come to blows there have usually been ulterior political motives, as for example in the case of the clashes between the United States and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Yet, if Ken Booth is right and "technology, interest and the will to govern seem set to fill out large chunks of the map of the sea with appropriate forms of national and international administration," this may well draw well-armed small nations into conflict with each other and with the larger naval Powers. It might also bring the large naval Powers into conflict with each other.

How can we deal with this problem? It is easy to decry "the naval arms race" at all levels and call for "naval disarmament". There is, in fact, good evidence that the former, if it ever existed, is coming to an end and that quite a lot of the latter is taking place all over the world. Yet, this may not solve the problem. States with varying degrees of dependence on the sea will retain the legitimate right to deploy the necessary military and constabulary force to protect their perceived interests. As those interests vary, so will the level of military power. This, coupled with the difficulty of assessing overall force capabilities when like no longer fights like and all types of platform—surface, subsurface and airborne—have to be taken into account, makes classical arms control very difficult, if not impossible, in the naval context.

My own work at the East-West level has brought me to the conclusion that the key to practical conflict prevention at sea lies not in arms control but in confidence-building measures of various types.

These might well be relevant to conflicts which have their root in legal and ocean-management issues.

A confidence-building measure that commands almost universal praise, even from those who usually shy away from naval arms control, is the incidents at sea (INCSEA) agreement. The first such agreement was signed in 1972 between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and since 1985 most of the major naval Powers members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation have signed or begun negotiating similar agreements with the USSR. These agreements regulate dangerous manoeuvres, restrict various forms of harassment, and improve communications between the navies of the nations concerned. An important part of the improved communications is the convening of annual meetings to review the implementation of the agreement. These navy-to-navy contacts seem always to have been carried out on a businesslike basis, with few if any political points being scored.

The success of the bilateral INCSEA agreements has led to suggestions for a multilateral agreement as put forward in the United Nations report on *The Naval Arms Race* in 1985. The idea has been taken up by Sweden, which has drawn up a draft agreement. Such an idea has attractive features. Effectively, as Sean Lynn-Jones has pointed out, a multilateral INCSEA agreement might create a useful set of international norms of naval conduct—but there are drawbacks. Multilateral conferences held to discuss problems might well become highly politicised and would not be suitable forums for frank exchanges of views. Lynn-Jones has suggested that incidents might actually be provoked to provide an excuse for discussion in such an international context. My own view is that a network of bilateral agreements would be best, with the possibility that area agreements of a more multilateral nature on an ocean/sea or continental basis could be a possibility in certain areas, for example the Baltic or South America. The latter would not replace but rather parallel bilateral agreements—which might well not just be the monopoly of major naval Powers. Bilateral agreements might be concluded by two relatively small Powers with potential areas of disagreement at sea but with the desire to stop possible naval clashes that might otherwise get out of control. Multilateral arrangements with a limited number of members based on the concept of a crisis-control centre might also be considered if a particular area faced special problems.

Navy-to-navy discussions could be used as a basis for a more general confidence-building process. Nations might notify their neighbours

about naval manoeuvres or even operations that might otherwise seem to constitute a threat. Such notification is based on my "principle of non-constraint", that is, the separation of the concept of notification from that of constraint. In these circumstances one might be concerned not only with the freedom of the high seas but with the right to operate in one's "own" waters, so it is even more important that normal navigation rights should be safeguarded. There are understandable concerns that an agreement to notify might translate into a ban on certain activities if they are not notified. This need not be the case. The commitment to notify would be a commitment to *do* something, not a commitment *not to do* something. The notification regime is designed not to prevent any activities from taking place but rather to prevent routine non-threatening naval manoeuvres and movements from being misinterpreted or even just disconcerting.

The same principle covers confidence-building measures suggested by the neutral and non-aligned countries in Vienna, the prior notification of innocent passage through the territorial sea. If it could be made clear that the right to such passage was not being compromised. States might consider such notifications as a positive gesture where, otherwise, hostile or illegal intent might be construed or misconstrued by the sovereign Power. The potential for unfortunate incidents was clearly shown (even between States with an INCSEA agreement) by the United States-Soviet confrontation in the Black Sea in 1988. Such voluntary notifications might be used where States claim special management rights in an exclusive economic zone or straits regime.

Such notifications would help address the significant issue of what constitutes activity that prejudices the security of coastal States. Modern warships can carry weapons and electronic surveillance equipment of very long range. Some of those weapons have nuclear warheads, a fact which raises concerns regarding pollution as well as other security concerns. A warship superficially exercising innocent passage in the territorial sea or even international waters might therefore actually be operating in a manner that could be perceived as provocative or even threatening. Banning long-range land attack weapons will be impossible—although limited or total bans on sub-strategic nuclear weapons at sea might be rather more practical. Long-range electronic surveillance equipment is part of the stock-in-trade of modern maritime warfare. The best way of dealing with this problem is to reassure littoral States which might otherwise be disturbed by a system of "courtesy" notifications.

Other kinds of confidence-building measures that have been suggested in the forum of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe might have some relevance elsewhere. Data on naval forces and planning might be exchanged on a regional basis. This would help prevent threat inflation and genuine over-insurance based on misunderstanding of the capabilities of the other navies, present and expected. Information exchange might be verified by a system of visits to bases to check on numbers and characteristics. Reciprocal visits to bases could be confidence-building "rituals" in themselves to demonstrate trust and openness. Discussions on doctrine and force structure might also be held. Such suggestions rest largely on the assumption that the participants in this confidence-building process do not wish to threaten each other. If they really are implacably hostile, then no amount of confidence-building measures will do any good; indeed increasing the level of transparency will just make the hostility more obvious. Confidence-building can work only if the participants in the process want it to work.

Information exchanges and seminars on doctrine and structure are pure confidence-building measures. They do not *limit* structure or operations in any way. They are thus neither arms control nor disarmament. The three concepts— confidence-building, arms control and disarmament—are often confused. They are however distinct, if overlapping, concepts based on different logical premises. Disarmament rests on the assumption that weapons are wrong and that the fewer there are the better. Arms control assumes that weapons in limited agreed quantities and deployed in certain agreed ways can maintain the peace between rivals who regard themselves as potential enemies but do not wish to fight each other.

Confidence-building is however a dynamic concept, for the creation of a situation in which a State no longer regards another State as threatening. This is especially important in a situation such as that at sea when interests and therefore force levels may well remain highly asymmetrical and where there is scope for genuine disagreement over rights of sovereignty and exploitation. A regime of maritime confidence-building that prevents misunderstanding and, if necessary, prevents dangerous incidents from either happening or getting out of control might help lead, not just to the peaceful regulation of international conflicts, but to full-scale co-operation between States in the application of an agreed set of legal rules that would allow the seas to be managed for the benefit of all.

APPLICATION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO A NUCLEAR NAVAL ENVIRONMENT

The term "confidence-building measures" (CBMs) was introduced in the early days of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and meant measures designed to provide more openness and more predictability in military matters. Their purpose was to decrease the tension and mistrust that prevailed in Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s. A set of such measures, relating primarily to the exchange of information between States, was agreed among the 35 CSCE States and codified in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.

Today the concept of CBMs has been further developed into the confidence- and security-building measures laid down in the 1986 Stockholm Document.

More general in nature are the "guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional scale" endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1988. These concepts will have to be developed further, however, for the purpose of considering naval applications. In particular, the CSCE provisions do not address naval activities except when these are explicitly linked to military activities on land.

It is also important to note that current international law, including the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, includes many provisions which are intended to have, and which do have, a considerable confidence-building effect. One example is the rule that a submarine using its right of innocent passage in the territorial sea of a foreign country shall navigate on the surface and show its flag. Considering the long tradition of applying international law to activities at sea, it could thus be said that a solid set of CBMs was in force at sea long before that particular term was coined.

However, both the law of the sea and many other CBM provisions applicable at sea make no distinction between vessels with nuclear weapons on board and those without. A variety of old and modern treaties thus apply to nuclear and non-nuclear ships alike. Among the old ones, agreed before the invention of the atomic bomb, are several of the 1907 Hague Conventions, the 1920 peace treaty on the demilitarisation of Spitsbergen (Svalbard) in the Arctic, and the 1936 Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits concerning access to the Black Sea. Among the more modern ones are the agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea that a number of NATO States have concluded with the Soviet Union and the more general agreement

between the United States and the USSR on dangerous military activities concluded in 1989. There are also the Helsinki and Stockholm accords mentioned above, which were negotiated within the CSCE process and which include provisions for advance notification of amphibious activities and the exchange of observers at such activities. There are no references to nuclear weapons in these agreements.

There are however a number of treaties concluded since 1945 which specifically refer to nuclear weapons, including relevant maritime applications. Among those are:

- The multilateral 1963 partial test-ban Treaty prohibiting nuclear explosions, *inter alia* under water;
- The multilateral 1971 sea-bed Treaty prohibiting emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed;
- The 1971 Agreement between the United States and the USSR on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, prescribing advance notification of planned missile launches extending beyond the national territory "... in the direction of the other Party";
- The SALT I and SALT II agreements, of 1972 and 1979 respectively, including rules for verification and consultation with reference to strategic submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs);
- The 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement between the United States and the USSR prescribing at least 24 hours advance notification, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established the year before, of launches of SLBMs.

Three nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established: in Antarctica, Latin America and the South Pacific. The Antarctic Treaty does not, however, restrict any rights under international law on the high seas in the zonal area. The Treaty of Tiateloico, on the denuclearisation of Latin America, will, once the Treaty enters fully into force, apply to large areas of the Atlantic and the eastern Pacific Ocean, but the corresponding provision of denuclearisation in these areas is ineffective because of reservations by the nuclear-weapon States. The South Pacific zone encompasses very large areas, but the relevant Treaty of Rarotonga does not limit any existing freedom of the seas.

Among the CBM provisions in force, only some apply specifically to naval nuclear forces. Some apply generally to naval forces, including nuclear forces, while many apply to the extension of land activities into the maritime domain.

Scope of Maritime Nuclearisation

It was estimated in June 1990 that about 14,560 nuclear warheads were earmarked for naval and maritime deployment. About 9,360 of these were used for SLBMs, while about 5,200 were non-strategic weapons such as cruise missiles, depth charges and air bombs. In the non-strategic category, the United States deployed about 2,500, the USSR 2,610, the United Kingdom 50, France 36, and China none. There were 747 deployed nuclear-capable warships: 138 by the United States, 565 by the USSR, 34 by the United Kingdom, 8 by France, and 2 by China. The number of naval nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable ships had been declining for more than a year.

Confidence-building Measures at Sea

It should be made quite clear that designing confidence-building measures for the maritime domain is quite different from doing so for application on land.

First, land and sea forces are subject to different legal regimes. Adversary military forces on land are geographically separated from each other in peacetime. Naval forces of different States may on the other hand mingle all over the sea, on the surface, in the water, on the sea-bed, and sometimes under the ice. Indeed, they frequently do so. This in itself provides for considerable transparency.

Secondly, there can be two approaches to confidence-building at sea. One is negotiation of effective measures related to nuclear and conventional arms; the other would be to make naval forces and capabilities actively contribute to effective ocean management for the peaceful uses of the seas.

Thirdly, while some CBMs of the Stockholm type may be adjusted for application at sea, the general approach should be to design measures for naval application designed to fit the maritime environment. The law of the sea could then become a point of departure as important as the Stockholm Document. An example in point is the recent agreement between Argentina and the United Kingdom on CBMs in the South Atlantic.

As indicated above, strategic nuclear weapons are subject to agreed limitations and negotiations on further limitation while tactical nuclear weapons are not. Therefore, at present two roles could be assigned to naval nuclear weapons in support of the agreements on their limitation or reduction: one, collateral to the SALT and START agreements; the other as independent measures related to non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed at sea. The prime objective of both categories of

CBMs would be to reduce the risk that nuclear weapons would be released by accident or misunderstanding, to avoid unnecessary nuclearisation of incidents, and to provide improved seaboard security to coastal States.

On the strategic level, proposals put forward at START include advance notification of the dispersal, within a specified period of time, of ballistic-missile submarines and of exercises involving the launching of SLBMs. Also proposed from time to time has been the establishment of anti-submarine-warfare-free zones to promote strategic stability by providing sanctuaries for ballistic-missile submarines.

NiCNoD Issue

On the non-strategic level, very few proposals have been made. One obstacle is that ships carrying nuclear weapons may be very difficult to identify, at least in the legal sense, because of the current practice on the part of the nuclear-weapon flag States of neither confirming nor denying (NiCNoD) the presence or absence of any nuclear weapons on board a given ship at any particular time. This principle has become controversial in relation to port visits by nuclear-weapon-capable ships in certain countries. Such controversies have in recent years led to the suspension of some of the co-operation within the ANZUS Pact and to an extraordinary general election in Denmark in 1988.

While mutual port visits by warships have a long tradition and a recognised confidence-building value that such controversies threaten to reverse, the problem of a few annual port visits of a few ships in some countries is limited, compared to the wider implications as a general obstacle to any serious discussion of confidence-building measures applied to the thousands of nuclear weapons on the move at sea.

It is sometimes proposed that more far-reaching arms control, such as taking ashore all non-strategic nuclear weapons from surface ships, would obviate the port call and NiCNoD issues. That is no doubt so. And such measures may indeed have their independent merits. But it is not likely that they will come about simply to get rid of the port call problem.

It would be more straightforward to remove the current mystique in the perception of nuclear weapons entertained by both nuclear-weapon flag States and coastal States. Such a change in attitudes may take some time, but that could pave the way for the creation of a special legal category of warships having nuclear weapons on board or

being nuclear-weapon-capable, that could distinguish themselves by flying an agreed special flag or bearing some other external mark—whichever would be more feasible.

In the same way as ships with the given status of warships are subject to certain restrictions—for example in relation to innocent passage—and enjoy certain privileges such as immunity, nuclear warships could be made subject to agreed special CBMs and could be given navigational privileges and immunities in addition to those that ordinary warships already enjoy.

One possible nuclear CBM improving the seaboard security of coastal States could be—as was proposed long ago—a rule complementary to the law of the sea that passage of a vessel through the territorial sea of foreign States with nuclear weapons on board would not be considered innocent, implying the need for prior notification and the consent of the coastal State as a condition for the passage. Between countries members of the same military alliance, standing procedures for such passages could be worked out. The transit passage regimes of international straits would not be affected.

Finally, while the safety record regarding the handling of nuclear weapons is extremely good—about 50,000 nuclear warheads were handled over several decades without a single unauthorised nuclear explosion—the record of nuclear reactor operation at sea includes a few accidents. The current number of nuclear reactors used on naval vessels is 575, outnumbering nuclear power stations on land by more than 100. The issue of nuclear weapons deployed at sea should not be confused with nuclear propulsion of ships.

There are good reasons to institute measures to improve the safety of naval nuclear reactors and measures for reporting in the case of accidents resulting in the release of significant amounts of radioactivity. Measures of this kind were proposed by the Government of Iceland in 1989.

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Necessity of Including Naval Armaments in Disarmament Negotiations

Introduction

Naval forces should be included in the disarmament process for the following reasons.

First. In the military field there should be a comprehensive approach to overcoming military confrontation, working towards disarmament as well as a process of confidence-building covering all the major services.

Naval forces possess great fire-power, including nuclear; they are mobile, independent, capable of concealed operations, have a high level of survivability, are universal in terms of their uses and serve as an important means for offensive activities, including land-assault operations.

If this important area of the arms race, as well as those of strategic offensive arms, conventional armed forces in Europe and chemical weapons, is not eliminated, this would inevitably transfer the arms race, and above all its qualitative aspects, into the world ocean. In other words, the transition from overarmament towards reasonable defence sufficiency will not occur without taking naval forces into account as an integral part of the overall military balance. We are not referring here to some links between the limitation and reduction of armaments in the naval forces and those in other services (the Soviet Union does not establish such links), but rather to the objective military and strategic reality in the world.

Second. The exclusion of naval forces from the process of arms reduction and limitation would have a destabilising impact. The share and the role of naval forces in the total military potential of States and alliances have already increased in the light of the aforementioned

advantages of those forces, especially because they are equipped with sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and other efficient offensive means. But following the implementation of radical cuts in the armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) and the removal of imbalances between the two Alliances, there will occur a dramatic increase in the weight of naval forces in the European military balance.

Though the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation agreed not to discuss the naval forces at the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, NATO naval forces are an integral part of that Organisation's military potential, which is designed for operation in Europe, since they are integrated with those of the other services and equipped with sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), deck-based aircraft and amphibious forces; these make them capable of delivering deep strikes against enemy territory and participating in its seizure. The Soviet Navy, with its extremely limited capabilities for entering the world ocean in the case of conflict, is unlikely to be a component of the Soviet Union's military potential in a European war, even if its strength were increased to the aggregate level of NATO's naval forces.

If the implementation of the Vienna agreements is not accompanied by negotiations on naval forces, then the NATO advantages in that area will bring about a massive military pressure on us. (We believe that neither side should be interested in undermining the security of the other or in making it feel vulnerable, which is equally dangerous for both.) This would not only be a violation of the principles, recognised by both the Soviet Union and the United States, of undiminished security of either side and of enhanced stability in the course of reductions, but would also lead to the upsetting of the balance of the entire military and strategic structure which has taken shape in the world.

MECHANISM FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON NAVAL FORCES

First. Although naval forces are closely integrated with those of the other services, they represent a separate issue, which has its own specific features. This issue must be considered at separate negotiations.

Second. As to the mechanism and format of such separate, future negotiations, we take a flexible approach, which may be outlined, roughly, as follows: the negotiations could be held either on a

multilateral basis with the participation of all States concerned, including, of course, the major naval Powers, or on a bilateral basis between the Soviet Union and the United States with the prospect of other States joining the agreements reached initially between the two. Some combination of bilateral and multilateral negotiations would be an optimal variant. The task of reducing naval confrontation requires the solution of many complex problems. Although they are interrelated, they could be resolved separately within the framework of various negotiating mechanisms, depending on the substance of the problems—in other words, within whichever mechanisms they can be resolved best. We propose various alternative approaches to the mechanism for the future negotiations on naval forces, and it is up to our partners to choose among those variants or to propose their own solutions.

For example, the discussion of problems of naval forces could be started at special consultations with the participation of all States concerned and, first and foremost, of the major naval Powers. During these consultations the participants could consider mutual concerns in the naval sphere, and exchange views on mechanisms, final goals of the future negotiations, and ways of achieving gradual progress towards those goals.

Through such consultations, the parties could exchange the necessary data on naval potentials, and discuss and compare the structures of naval forces, the purpose of certain types of armaments, the relationship between different functional components of the navies, principles and plans for uses of naval forces of major military States and naval strategies in general, the purposes of military exercises and manoeuvres at sea, etc.

Given the differences that exist between States with respect to geographic location, military and political concepts and, correspondingly, military-technological policies, such broad conceptual discussion is considered to be a useful and perhaps necessary stage for transition to substantive specific steps which would go beyond the framework *of confidence-building measures,* that is, to measures to limit and reduce naval forces and their armaments and activities.

During such consultations the participants could take stock of regional and global problems in the field of naval arms control, consider certain proposals, define the priorities of the tasks addressed and their possible solutions, consider a combination of multilateral, inter-alliance, bilateral, global and regional approaches and, finally, outline the format, stages and framework of the future negotiations.

First Stage of the Negotiations

Taking into account the fact that our Western partners are not ready for full-scale negotiations on the limitation and reduction of naval forces, as well as the political and psychological difficulties the United States finds with regard to the discussion of naval problems in general, we would be ready, "without overloading the boat", to move strictly on a stage-by-stage basis to the final goal of negotiations (which is yet to be jointly defined), starting with the simplest confidence-building measures, wherein elements of mutual understanding exist.

Confidence-building Measures

Such confidence-building measures would touch neither the structure and combat composition of existing naval forces or advantages of one Alliance over another, nor their construction and modernisation programmes. At the same time they would enhance stability and predictability at sea, eliminate mutual suspicions, and reduce to a minimum the danger of a misperception of the other side's actions and hence of an inadequate or wrong reaction to such actions.

The working out of such "traffic regulations" or "legal norms for the navies" could begin at the first stage of negotiations. This could take place in parallel with consultations on *rapprochement* between the two sides' conceptual approaches to naval issues, since such consultations do not require common understanding of the situation in naval affairs and are not related to the implementation of the Vienna agreements. Agreement on regulations, norms, and conceptual approaches to issues would not change the military balance.

The simplest of confidence-building measures—the bilateral agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea—have clearly shown their effectiveness. The practice of negotiating such agreements should continue in the future. It would be desirable if all coastal NATO States concluded such bilateral agreements with the USSR.

The idea of concluding, in the future, a global multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea (including, of course, the air space above) seems interesting enough. On the other hand, such an agreement will not be concluded in the near term, as it should clearly be preceded by appropriate subregional arrangements in the third world. Furthermore, their effectiveness notwithstanding, such agreements determine the rules of conduct for individual ships rather than for navies as a whole.

Among naval confidence measures, I should first of all mention notification of major naval manoeuvres, concentrations and transfers

of forces; the presence of observers at naval exercises and manoeuvres; the setting up of "hot lines" between the opposing fleets' commands; contacts between navies, including regular mutual visits of ships and naval aircraft and other measures to overcome the "enemy image"; and exchanges of naval information; and other measures of openness.

Considering its priority concerns in the naval sphere, the USSR is especially interested in extending confidence-building measures to exercises and manoeuvres designed to perfect naval participation in ground operations as well as to major transfers of naval forces, including movements of marine forces, which have a potential for surprise attack.

At the same time, proceeding from the need to find a balance between the interests of the two sides, we are willing to include regular exchanges of static information, in particular, that which pertains to manpower, naval deployments, construction programmes, etc.

Owing to the specific character of naval activities, there is a need to find an approach to defining methods and implementation procedures for confidence-building measures as well as a need to reach agreement on their territorial framework, which would be different from the Stockholm one.

Confidence-building measures could be worked out either for the world ocean as a whole, which would clearly be difficult, or for application in individual sea regions (for example, in the North Atlantic).

While the question of limitation and reduction of armaments at the regional level is quite controversial by virtue of the global nature and high mobility of naval forces, the application of confidence-building measures at the regional and even subregional levels where the number of actors is limited seems to be more practical. This approach would facilitate the reaching of agreement and would allow for the effective testing of the forms and methods of these measures, first on a limited scale. Thereafter, the most adequate and adjusted forms and methods of application could be extended to other areas of the world ocean.

An effective step to prevent accidental hostilities at sea could be made through an agreement on the non-expansion of naval activities in areas of tension or in crisis situations, and on the establishment of principles and rules for obligatory withdrawal of fleets from regions where armed conflicts break out. There should also be arrangements for special consultations at the level of the tactical commands directly or indirectly involved, in the event of situations of tension at sea.

An agreement among the nuclear powers to declare the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board their ships entering foreign

ports would be an important measure of openness. In order to assure non-intrusive verification of such an agreement, it would be useful if the interested countries were to engage in the joint development of technical means for verification of the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board ships.

Co-operative Measures in the Naval Sphere

Agreement upon and the commencement of the implementation of measures of mutual understanding could create prerequisites for transition to the second aspect of the first stage of negotiations, that is, to the elaboration of measures of interaction between the fleets of the relevant States, first of all between those of the major naval Powers. The main subject of these talks could be the preparation of rules and procedures for joint actions by the navies in responding to non-traditional threats beyond the framework of the East-West military confrontation, for example, drug trafficking, terrorism, environmental disasters and threats to the uninterrupted operation of international sea lanes. The setting up of *ad hoc* naval forces under, for example. United Nations or Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) auspices, could become one of the forms of such co-operation.

Simultaneously, a security guarantee system for international trade routes could be elaborated at the global level or, initially, at regional levels.

Denuclearisation of Naval Forces

At the same time as the negotiations on confidence, transparency and co-operative measures were being carried out, parallel bilateral consultations with the United States could begin on first steps, to be followed by talks on radical reductions and then the total elimination of naval nuclear weapons (other than SLBMs which are being dealt with within the context of the United States-Soviet nuclear and space talks).

Of course, this step would not be in line with the general context of stage-by-stage negotiations. However, this step is made mutually beneficial by the objective interest of both sides in establishing a meaningful increase in the threshold of nuclear war at sea through removal of the key-link in the chain of escalation of military activities (between conventional weapons and strategic weapons for "deterrence"). Moreover, this step would create a drastically new military and strategic situation at sea, which would be propitious to further reductions. It could lead to the elimination of all nuclear charges at sea, including those of both carrier- and land-based naval aircraft.

Taking into account the complexity of verification problems, we could start with the elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons on board surface ships and then, at the next stage, deal with those carried on submarines.

At the same time, it would be necessary for France and the United Kingdom to join in the elimination of non-strategic naval weapons during the final stage of implementation of the agreements reached in the aforesaid negotiating process.

Second Stage of the Negotiations

At the second stage, which could start in the course of or upon the completion of deep cuts in conventional armed forces in Europe, we could agree upon a number of measures limiting especially dangerous naval activities, reducing the threat of launching surprise attack from the sea and large-scale offensive actions on the sea.

This could be done by introducing both quantitative and geographical limitations. The best way would be to combine these, as follows.

1. Geographical or spatial limitations could have the following goals:

(a) Limitation of navies' capabilities to participate in operations on land, through the withdrawal, of sorts, of the relevant components of naval forces beyond the scope of potential ground warfare. Such measures could include, for example, an agreement providing that ships carrying non-strategic nuclear weapons (if such weapons are not eliminated by that time), SLCMs and aircraft carriers could not approach, except with prior notification, the coasts of other nations to a distance shorter than the range of their onboard nuclear or conventional armament systems or their deck aviation.

(b) Strengthening strategic stability by increasing the survivability of retaliatory weapons. A restriction of antisubmarine activities could be in line with this goal and, first and foremost, limiting SSBN (nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarines) destruction-training operations (which cannot really be called a response-measure), as well as the creation of zones for each side where anti-submarine activities of the opposite side would be totally banned.

(c) Strengthening the security of international sea lanes and of peaceful activities in the world ocean as a whole, including

enhancing military stability at sea and promoting the United States strategic connection with co-operating countries by means of across-the-ocean communication lanes.

For the last-mentioned goal, an agreement could be reached to ban manoeuvres and exercises in areas of intensive non-military activities, such as navigation for trade, fishing, extraction of resources and scientific research. Another aspect would be to prevent large concentrations of naval groupings by specifying agreed upper limits. An agreement on the dispersal of confronting navies in the areas of their largest concentrations (for example, in the Norwegian Sea, the Greenland Sea and the Sea of Japan), the creation of offensive-weapon-free zones and, perhaps, of completely demilitarised zones in the world ocean, could also be of great stabilising importance.

It appears that such limitations on areas of operations, on the most destabilising types of activities, and on their scale, under conditions of verification and transparency, could largely devalue the significance of the relevant forces and means, and would render a large part of those forces unusable and superfluous. By so doing they would facilitate their reduction, either on the basis of agreements, or even unilaterally.

2. Quantitative limitations and reductions of naval forces and means could be aimed at objectively decreasing naval capabilities to carry out certain operations, primarily offensive ones.

In the first place we could discuss limiting and reducing forces and means for striking on-shore targets and capturing territories, including aircraft carriers and aircraft-carrying vessels, ships carrying cruise missiles, amphibious forces, and naval-deck and land-based aviation.

From the point of view of adhering to the principle of undiminished security, such reductions should be carried out together with the numerical limitation of multipurpose submarines, primarily of nuclear-powered submarines.

On this new basis it would be possible to proceed to the final stage of the negotiations, provided that the second stage were successful in establishing effective verification over any proliferation of naval armaments or related technologies, that is to say, if a kind of naval armaments non-proliferation regime were created.

Third Stage of Negotiations

It seems that this stage would be the most difficult one, since the negotiation of measures to make the level of naval armaments of States

and alliances correspond to requirements of purely defensive strategies would demand close conceptual approaches, not only in naval strategic, operative and technical areas, but also in the foreign-policy philosophies of the partners in general.

The Soviet Union, with its contemporary foreign policy platform, measures its defence requirements basically by the capability of its naval forces to defend the national territory and shore communications from the sea. (Its philosophy and policy are devoid of projecting its military might to far-away shores; it does not have naval strategic allies across the ocean, etc.)

Such criteria would not be likely to be acceptable to the United States and some of its allies, even if there were a very high degree of mutual confidence and co-operation, because of both their geo-strategic positions and their fundamental foreign-policy philosophy, which is different from the Soviet Union's new political thinking.

We believe that under such conditions the following approach would be most appropriate:

(a) To move towards the final goal of the dialogue, which would be agreed during pre-negotiation consultations, on a step-by-step basis without defining precise dates for its achievement;

(b) While differences remain in the understanding of defensive and offensive goals and capabilities of naval forces (although these, apparently, will diminish gradually as the structure of world relations evolves), to agree upon specific steps to strengthen the agreements reached during the first and the second stages of the negotiations. These could, *inter alia,* include:

- Balanced numerical reduction of military vessels of major classes of major naval forces in accordance with ratios to be agreed;
- Complete elimination of destabilising naval components and their armaments, which would be defined jointly;
- The strengthening of interaction between the navies, transparency, etc.;
- Verification of the introduction of any new, militarily dangerous technologies in navies and the strengthening of a non-proliferation regime over such technologies.

Naturally, realisation of radical naval disarmament measures will depend on a process of general stabilisation in the world situation and

progress in other areas of disarmament, with the understanding that this broad, objective interrelation would not mean direct linkage of this specific issue to other negotiations.

Moving Towards a Dialogue on Naval Forces

Reaching agreement at the Vienna negotiations on confidence-building measures in the field of naval forces for the sea regions adjacent to Europe could be an important factor in bringing naval forces into the process of confidence-building and disarmament.

As noted, NATO's naval forces in the sea regions adjacent to Europe are an integral part of its military potential, and are intended to be capable of carrying out military activities on the European continent. Under such conditions, if the new generation of radical measures on transparency of military potentials and military activities were applied to one part of the military potential (conventional armed forces), and the other part were "left in the dark", that would lead not to the strengthening, but rather to the undermining of confidence.

NAVAL ARMS CONTROL: THE BURDEN OF PROOF

As history continues its accelerated pace, the subject of naval arms control is attracting increasing attention. In some respects, it is coming to be seen as a hopeful answer to a diverse array of concerns on the part of the Soviet Union, certain North Atlanctic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies, and various other countries. These concerns run the gamut from enhancing security to reducing defence expenditures to protecting the environment. For the most part, though, the imperatives are political in nature. While Norway and Sweden are concerned about increased military activity on the northern flank, the Soviet Union wants to offset the debilitating aspects of disproportionate cuts in its land forces, Iceland wants to protect its fisheries, and the Government of Denmark wants to placate its opposition party. Whatever the reason, such a context suggests the need for a comprehensive examination of the costs associated with specific naval arms control measures (the benefits having been amply addressed by numerous other authors), with a particular eye towards the assumptions underlying the general debate. It will be the purpose of this study to examine certain of these measures and some of the assumptions and, in the process, to help simplify what is becoming an increasingly complex web.

The United States Position

The first general assumption is that the United States is opposed to naval arms control in all its forms. The record suggests otherwise.

To date the United States is party to no fewer than 18 treaties or other formal or informal agreements that bear either directly or indirectly on naval activities or force structure. These range from the Antarctic Treaty (concluded in 1959) to the widely heralded incidents-at-sea Agreement with the Soviet Union (1972) to the recent pledge from Secretary of State Baker to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that the United States no longer intends to conduct innocent passage with its warships in the' Black Sea.

The precedent for United States participation in naval arms-control measures has thus been firmly established, and the United States Navy more than a year ago indicated its willingness to examine naval measures relating to European security once a CFE regime has been implemented. It is also engaged at present in reciprocal port visits and exchanges of high-level officials with the Soviet Union. These facts belie another assumption that is widely held, that is, that the United States Navy is holding its Government hostage to its own unwillingness to move ahead. Let there be no doubt, the United States position on naval arms control is a governmental position. If the President wants it and the Congress approves, it will happen. However, because naval forces have been the military instrument of choice in the majority of contingencies that have arisen since the Second World War (50 in the last 10 years alone, with none of them involving the Soviet Union), there should be little doubt that any United States President is going to be critically aware of the capability and flexibility which such forces offer and be disinclined to embark on a course that could conceivably constrain important future options.

By now most participants in the naval arms-control debate are familiar with the classic arguments relating to freedom of the seas and the like which the United States has been advancing to justify its present position on naval arms talks. The specific concerns at the operational level, however, are also important and worthy of review, particularly when one keeps in mind the burden-of-proof argument.

Very briefly, with respect to certain of the key proposals to date:

1. *Information exchange.* Such measures are seen to be of questionable utility in the light of the ready availability of voluminous and reliable detailed data on all aspects of the United States Navy, including ships, aircraft, weapons systems, command arrangements, home ports, etc. Among the private sources are Jane's, Brassey's, and the United States Naval Institute's publications, the International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS)-*Military Balance,* the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) publications and countless other books

and journals. On the public side, there are (1) the annual National Strategy Reports of the President; (2) the annual posture statements of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the individual services; and (3) the Congressional authorisation and appropriations bills with their accompanying reports and testimony.

The advent of *glasnost* and parliamentary institutions in the Soviet Union is likely to result in a greater flow of reliable data from that direction as well, so there appears to be little need to negotiate formal exchanges of such information. Most other information that might be of interest is generally available through national technical means.

2. *Pre-notification of exercises.* Providing advance notice of exercises deprives a country of its option of deploying forces to trouble spots under the guise of conducting exercises. This deliberate ambiguity provides useful leverage in crisis situations, as was attempted at the time of the initial Iraqi threat to Kuwait, when the United States Joint Middle East Task Force began conducting an exercise with the United Arab Emirates.

3. *Observation of exercises.* Naval activities, unlike those on land, are already quite transparent, given the ability to track events from one's own vessels and the ready availability of the overlying airspace to observer aircraft of any nation.

On-board observation of naval exercises would impose operational limitations on the forces being observed. As contrasted with land-force activity, from which observers can readily be excluded if military needs so require, it would be much more difficult to do so in the case of naval exercises that take place far from shore. Moreover, operational requirements may necessitate the deployment of these forces to new areas of operations, an evolution that would be made all the more difficult by the presence of on-board observers. Since the ability to deploy naval forces promptly can add to stabilisation, observers could in this sense detract from stability.

There is also the question of how much is to be gained from having an observer on board a host-country ship in the first place. An aerial reconnaissance unit provides a much better picture of what is actually taking place in so far as the execution of the exercise is concerned.

4. *Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs).* Because NWFZs are fundamentally unverifiable, they add little to stability where vital interests are at stake. The real issue is not what weapons are in the zone, but what weapons can be brought to bear within the zone from outside the zone (ballistic or cruise missiles, aircraft, etc.).

5. *ASW-free or ASW-standoff zones.* Because they are unverifiable and largely unenforceable during time of crisis, such zones become a source of instability. Violations by submarines are often undetectable, and the nationality of the transgressor may be unknown as well. On a related note, because anti-submarine-warfare forces are an important component of one's strategic defences when being used against the other side's SSBNs, any attempt to affect their use should be pursued as part of a balanced strategic forces agreement, not on a piecemeal basis.

Not only do such zones promote instability and impinge on freedom of the seas, but they make as little sense as, for instance, not targeting ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) fields bounded by given co-ordinates.

It is also the case that today's agreements can easily become tomorrow's headaches, especially where vital interests are involved. For example, the proposed Indian Ocean limitations that were derailed at the last minute by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would clearly have interfered with later operations in the Persian Gulf, both during the Iran/Iraq War and during the present confrontation with Iraq.

6. *Naval force reductions.* Effecting naval reductions under an arms-control regime is an inherently difficult undertaking because of the integrated, multi-dimensional nature of war at sea and the innumerable asymmetries involved. Furthermore, the same nomenclature often means different things to different countries (and sometimes within the same country). For example, the Soviets call their aircraft carriers "cruisers"; and the USS Bainbridge over the course of its lifetime was variously labelled as a frigate, a destroyer, and a cruiser. Just as submarines were used to circumvent the intent of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, so might some other vehicle or advanced technology platform be used to skirt a future agreement.

In summary, the United States position is that none of these initiatives is cost-free and that the burden should be on the arms-control advocate to demonstrate that his or her proposal (1) is equitable and verifiable, (2) reduces the risk of war, (3) strengthens global stability, and (4) enhances the national security of the United States and its allies. The argument that a specific measure is "harmless" (such as information exchange) is simply not sufficient.

The "Slippery Slope"

An added concern that has sometimes been characterised as the "slippery slope" has been the subject of some criticism by a number of

observers, and understandably so. Perhaps one of the harsher criticisms to date has been that offered by Rear Admiral James Winnefeld, USN (ret.), of the RAND Corporation:

> "A myopic focus on 'slippery slopes' leads to a paralysing caution and negativism that surrenders the initiative to others and conveys as much distrust of our own form of Government as of those of our adversaries."

He is right, of course, but there is a difference between a "myopic focus" and proceeding with one's eyes open. The assumption that such a phenomenon does not exist is simply incorrect. The most recent description of the reality that often attends protracted negotiations on any issue was offered by Dr. Donald Daniel of the United States Naval War College in a presentation to a conference on arms control and confidence-building in northern waters, held in Iceland this past August. He described it as a concern that making concessions "only invites further, truly unacceptable demands. Concessions made become pocketed, and a new baseline for concessions is thus put forward, thereby making the conceder wish he had never made the original concessions in the first place."

The extensive pressure that has existed—and continues to exist—in the ongoing negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) to capture independent air and naval activities not functionally linked to land-based exercises (but as an extrapolation of that requirement) is an example of the kind of problem the United States is seeking to avoid. To illustrate the point more graphically, it doesn't take much imagination to envision a sequence in which agreement on pre-notification of major exercises leads to the on-board observation of those exercises, which, in turn, eventually leads to limitations on their number and duration. The next phase would then be one of requiring notification of ship transfers of a specified size between "zones of naval groups". Each of these proposals has already been separately advanced by the Soviet Union or its Eastern European colleagues and in terms that were clearly advantageous to their side. One can dismiss the concern by noting there is no law of nature that requires one to accept the other side's conditions or that makes such a sequence inevitable. In a context where asymmetries abound, however, one can easily get caught up in damage-limiting trade-offs born of intense political pressure (especially from one's allies), that lead to an end result one would have preferred to avoid.

The East-West Imperative

Yet, another assumption derives from the East-West confrontation that has prevailed since the Second World War. The assumption is

that continued improvements in United States-Soviet relations will require the United States to agree to constraints or limitations on its naval activities (beyond those that already exist) as *a quid pro quo* for the substantial and disproportionate concessions the Soviets have been making in land forces. The logic here is understandable, although the United States can rightfully point to the fact that the massive buildup of Soviet armour on the Central Front over the past 10 years (according to some, the fire-power equivalent of 30 additional divisions) and the introduction of their SS-20 arsenal were unwarranted initiatives that deserve to be reversed on their own merits. Beyond any visceral resistance the United States may have to responding to earlier Soviet policies by reducing its own capabilities in other important areas, the assumed need to do so is becoming increasingly suspect.

There can be no greater confidence-building measure between would-be adversaries than for them to start co-operating in areas of mutual concern, much as the United States and the Soviet Union are doing at present with respect to Iraq. As cited on the front page of the *Washington Post* (27 August 1990) with reference to the United Nations Security Council's decision to enforce trade sanctions against Iraq:

> "It is perhaps the most dramatic illustration to date of how the long Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies has been replaced by a determination to work together against threats to peace."

But even prior to Iraq, the winds of change were beginning to blow within the Soviet camp on the subject of naval arms control. At a conference on naval arms limitations and maritime security, held in June 1990 in Halifax, the Soviet representative. Dr. G. M. Sturua, presented a paper entitled "Naval arms control: An idea whose time has passed". In this paper. Dr. Sturua makes a number of points in support of naval arms control, but at the same time indicates that the subject itself has become something of an obsession within Soviet policy-making circles, primarily because it is the only United States concession that could be thought of to balance a long list of Soviet concessions. He personally feels that Moscow should cease considering naval arms control as an obligatory part of any future deal with Washington on the basis that no initiative on the naval front can protect the Soviet Union as effectively as its commitment to rejoin the community of democratic nations. He goes on:

> "The inescapable conclusion one ultimately arrives at is that events since the beginning of *perestroika* and especially of the last two years have reduced the strategic significance of all United States advantages at sea or any other military advantages enjoyed by either side. The Cold War is

> over. Now comes the time for healing the inflicted wounds. If healthy processes now evolving in the East continue, sooner or later a joint East-West security structure will replace the outdated alliance system we have known since the 50s. Under this structure, we may opt to rely on the synergistic effect that will be ensured by a combination of the best military characteristics each State possesses. In that sense, we should be aware of the positive contribution the United States Navy has to offer for the benefit of all covered by the security umbrella. The guiding principle will not be parity in whatever form, but specialisation and division of labour."

In other words, it is Dr. Sturua's opinion that changes in the political and strategic environment are overtaking and rendering moot the naval arms-control debate. While it is possible that he was only expressing his personal opinion, there is reason to believe that he represents at least the Yeltsin point of view on these matters. Dr. Sturua himself is known to be in the Yeltsin camp, and his point of view was confirmed in a personal conversation with Dr. Andrey A. Plontkovskly, a chief foreign-policy adviser and confidant to President Yeltsin, a couple of months later. So at least one important stream of Soviet political thought is rethinking the necessity of naval arms control.

Perhaps of equal significance is the joint Soviet-American statement of November 1989, which announced co-sponsorship of a new United Nations resolution (resolution 44/21) on peace, security and international co-operation. The draft text, the sponsors stated, was intended to reflect "a commitment to a renewed relationship in the United Nations based on enhanced consultation and cooperation to find multifaceted approaches to implement and strengthen the principles and system of peace, security and international co-operation laid down in the Charter." Working in co-operation, particularly at the operational level, will inevitably subsume any concerns relating to information exchange, pre-notification and the like.

Other-Country Considerations

Even if the United States-Soviet relationship continues to develop along the above lines, however, there will still remain the question of allied and other-country interests. Assuming the total removal of the East-West dimension, implementation of a naval arms-control regime would continue to present major problems. Because naval forces are inherently mobile, diverse, and difficult to compare and because national vulnerabilities, levels of dependence on the sea, and reasons for wanting naval constraints vary so dramatically from one country to the next, a global approach to naval arms control will not confer

equal security on all of the participants. This would therefore seem to argue for a regional approach in which individual differences could be addressed at a more meaningful level. Yet, as one of the leading and most thoughtful spokesmen on these matters, former Norwegian Defence Minister Johan Jorgen Hoist, recently pointed out, "regional naval limitation regimes are likely to prove unstable as they would be inherently vulnerable to disruption by naval forces from outside the region."

Beyond the issue of global versus regional negotiations, there is the question of whether to proceed on a bipolar or "multi-polar" basis. Multi-polar agreements are inherently difficult in that they usually require a consensus to achieve. Working through the different interests and agendas of multiple States is a highly complex undertaking, with no guarantees of success. The fact that China and France are still not signatories to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is indicative of the difficulties one faces. While many countries are supportive of arms-control initiatives between the Super-Powers, few are anxious to place limitations on their own "regional" forces.

Although bipolar agreements are easier to achieve, they too present difficulties. As was recently pointed out by a representative of one of the smaller NATO countries, not only do such agreements not address the Nth country problem, but they can leave the junior partner, that is, the smaller naval Power, vulnerable to future coercion as in due course the larger Power begins to demand concessions in other areas. This would hold true particularly in situations where agreements contain a dimension of ambiguity, as might be the case, for example, in a hypothetical agreement between Denmark and the Soviet Union in which the differences surrounding whether or not the Danish Straits are territorial waters or international straits are either finessed or glossed over.

In addition to the above generic concerns, there are the realities of an untidy world. While further improvements in United States-Soviet relationships could eventually address most of the security concerns of the Northern European States, arms control in the Mediterranean would seem to be a non-starter from a Western point of view, given the concerns that exist with respect to the North African littoral. At a different level, one is faced with similar concerns in the East Asia-Pacific region. Security in that region is the product of a number of overlapping bilateral and multilateral alliances, many of which depend on a United States naval presence for their cohesion. That same presence is also looked upon as a check on future Japanese rearmament

and an expansionist China. In its absence, it is very likely that naval activity would intensify as the littoral States raced to fill the security vacuum. It goes without saying that effecting a multilateral arms control regime in such a context would probably not be possible.

Even with a continued United States naval presence, though, Japan and South Korea are already on record as opposing naval arms control in the region, even at the super-Power level. Of course, this opposition may vanish if the Soviet Union relinquishes the northern islands on the one hand and ceases providing military hardware to North Korea on the other, but it does illustrate some of the difficulties one faces within regions where there are so many competing interests. Because arms agreements generally flow from a context of political accommodation, it would seem that a prerequisite to effective regional arms accords (naval or otherwise) would be the need to address and/or resolve to the extent possible existing regional concerns or disputes.

Creative Unilateralism

A recitation of the problems and obstacles associated with naval arms control does not relegate one to doing nothing. The concerns of friend and foe, though varied, are very real and deserve a thoughtful response. As the United States looks ahead to the challenges of tomorrow's multi-polar world, it will be leaning even more heavily on its naval forces to provide the flexibility and capability that will be required. Its reluctance to go much further in the area of naval arms control is understandable, if not fully appreciated by those who would like to do more.

It is possible, however, that certain actions can be taken on a unilateral basis by either the United States or the Soviet Union (preferably both) that would go a long way towards addressing much of the present concern without relinquishing one's future options. Perhaps, the most significant such move would be to remove all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and confine their deployment to submarines. If either side could see its way clear to taking such an action, it would defuse much of the debate and create significant pressure on the other side to follow suit.

Because the Soviet Navy has yet to respond to the United States Navy's decision to eliminate a sizeable fraction of its seaborne tactical nuclear arsenal, the next move is probably theirs. By the same token, the United States Navy has less far to go. As the East-West relationship continues to improve and the respective confidence levels increase (particularly as a result of the verification procedures associated with

already implemented arms-control measures), the time may soon come when the United States will be able to eliminate the requirement for its sea-based nuclear strike bombs and nuclear depth bombs. If it is thought that either might be required at a future date, they could alternatively be stored in shore-based facilities.

The requirement to deter third world countries from using nuclear weapons could be handled by either threatening retaliation with submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles or threatening massive destruction with conventional weapons, in much the same way that we are presently seeking to prevent Iraq from using chemical weapons. Because the need for conventionally armed cruise missiles on surface ships will remain intact, a unilateral approach to eliminating their nuclear-armed counterparts effectively finesses the verification problems that have prevented (and would continue to prevent) implementation of an arms-control agreement along these lines.

With this approach, the Navy's "neither confirm nor deny" policy could be left intact for both surface ships and submarines and, along with it, the opportunity to reverse the decision should it ever be felt necessary to do so. Although it is possible under such a policy that nuclear submarines could become even more discriminated against by foreign Governments than they are at present, to some extent they are already tainted by dint of their nuclear propulsion plants. It would thus become a matter of degree.

Creative unilateralism of the type described above would build effectively upon the considerable progress already achieved by both sides, progress that some fear could actually be slowed by engaging in naval arms talks.

UNITED NATIONS AND NAVAL POWER IN THE POST-COLD-WAR WORLD

Risk and Opportunity Arising from the Persian Gulf Crisis

The United Nations focus on confidence-building measures in the maritime environment in 1990 could not be more timely. On the one hand, the crisis in the Persian Gulf triggered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 had, by September, led to an assemblage of formidable naval forces with a United Nations mandate to impose a naval blockade upon a country—one which, given its dependence upon oil exports for foreign currency earning, is peculiarly vulnerable to the application of such pressure. In short, the naval blockade of Iraq presents the first occasion since the rise of modern sea power, following

the Anglo-German naval arms race of the late nineteenth century, when a naval blockade has had any technical opportunity to be decisive. On the other hand, the imposition of this blockade has occurred in the middle of a more general military buildup in the region with the limited mandate simply to deter further aggression by Iraq. The risk would be that an escalation of military action under a United Nations mandate in this crisis would introduce problems of politico-military control that could not be effectively handled by the existing organisational and operational structures of the United Nations, and that military action might exceed an unambiguous reading of that mandate.

Chapter VII of the Charter provides a framework for action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. To date, the detailed provisions within Chapter VII have remained embryonic. In consequence, as was the case with the Korean intervention but for different reasons, the United Nations may be wounded through inability to stand apart from the dispute in the eyes of all parties concerned. It is probably impossible in the midst of this present crisis to develop all those operational and organisational structures which ideally need to be in place. However, the Persian Gulf crisis which' started in August 1990 has, for the first time since the San Francisco Conference adopted the United Nations Charter on 26 June 1945, directed attention to many articles within the Charter which offer a framework within which the necessary detail can be constructed to give the United Nations that full sweep of power—judicial, moral, economic, social and military—which in 1945 it was (correctly) considered that the Organisation should possess.

The two first contributors of naval forces to the Persian Gulf blockade, the United States and the United Kingdom, had signalled this opinion in strong terms in the eighth point of the Atlantic Charter, during the war against Hitler. It is instructive to recall the text of that point now, for its exact applicability to the situation of August 1990 illustrates graphically two points: that we have collectively failed to heed the advice, set out in the Charter, to prepare for such eventualities and that we are given the opportunity, galvanised by the present crisis and facilitated by the ending of the Cold War, now to do so. In the Persian Gulf crisis, the USSR has urged strongly that a role be given to the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council, a course which may be impractical in the short term but which has everything to commend it for the future.

The Military Staff Committee is established under Article 47(1) of the Charter "... to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions

relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal..." Article 47(2) stipulates that the Military Staff Committee "... shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives". Further provision is made for the co-option of any Member of the United Nations, "... when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work". As a consequence of the Cold War, the Military Staff Committee has remained a dead letter, meeting monthly in New York for two minutes in order to adjourn, rather as the Four Power *Kommandatura* meetings in Berlin used to wait a theatrical two minutes for the Russians to arrive, which they never did for forty years, until the 1989 European "Spring in Winter" melted the Cold War and the division of Germany. Now, as a consequence of the great transformations in super-Power relations of recent years, the opportunity also exists to replace the Military Staff Committee charade with substance. Recognition of the need to do this must be considered to be one of the benefits to arise from the Persian Gulf crisis.

The Military Staff Committee is given two types of task within the United Nations Charter. Article 26 gives to the Security Council responsibility "... for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments". This role is indeed repeated in Article 47 (1), which concludes by laying upon the Military Staff Committee responsibility to advise and assist in "... the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament". The Soviet Union and the United States continue to approach the question of maritime arms control from fundamentally different premises—premises understandably different because of the different geopolitical perspective of a great continental, as distinct from a great maritime power.

These differences can be seen in the other two papers in this chapter. Granovskiy's paper explained that, from the Soviet perspective, the need to include naval forces in the disarmament negotiation process stands upon three fundamental concerns: that naval forces may "serve as an important means for offensive activities including land assault operations"; that failure to include naval forces in comprehensive arms control would have a destabilising impact by shifting the arms race and above all its qualitative aspects into the world oceans; and that the strategic nuclear weapons carried as well as the ships are sources of Soviet concern. This line of reasoning leads to the Soviet tendency

to view arms control homogeneously, focussed upon weapons rather than platforms and based on a dominating concern with nuclear capacities.

Johnston's paper presents the widespread American view that confidence-building measures could become a "slippery slope" leading to structural naval disarmament, against which the United States has set its face. He further observes that the American naval tradition would be resistant to more than marginal constraints upon its autonomy of command. He therefore advocates a "creative unilateralism" that would go "a long way towards addressing much of the present concern without relinquishing one's future options". This conforms well with Charles Osgood's GRIT (graduated reduction in tension) procedure, whereby, in a situation of high mistrust, reciprocal unilateral steps can lead towards subsequent bilateral negotiation. Indeed we saw just such a manoeuvre in the successful negotiation of the INF Treaty.

It must be asked whether we do not now have—following the Washington summit of December 1987 and in the unprecedented accord at the Helsinki meeting on the Persian Gulf crisis between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev on 9 September 1990—a sufficient record of substantive reduction in Soviet-American mistrust to enable us to move forward more confidently in two ways. The first is to draw the benefit of establishing in naval arms control at least some multilateral verification and control procedures. Although a delay in setting up verification procedures is one of the costs of unilateral action that one has to accept in return for starting the process, now the process has started. We do trust; therefore we can more fully verify. The other way is to consider seriously where structural disarmament is already appropriate. The answer is that it is with respect to those naval platforms whose missions are least flexible and least appropriate for the post-Cold-War situation, pre-eminent among which is the nuclear-powered hunter/killer submarine (SSN).

The SSN has the capability of destroying ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs), whose numbers could now be reduced by an acceleration of strategic nuclear-arms reduction. While the SSN has speed and underwater endurance that make it a principal vehicle for offensive action at sea against a wide range of targets, prized by naval strategists, these very capacities call into question the balance of gain and loss in possessing it.

It threatens the non-proliferation regime by placing fissile material outside safeguards. A crisis looms with respect to Brazilian and Indian ambitions to acquire SSN nuclear-powered submarines, and one was

narrowly avoided over Canada's plan—which it has since dropped — to build or purchase some. The SSN menaces the natural environment. "How much longer should these mobile nuclear power plants, for that is what nuclear submarines are, be permitted to cruise round the world's oceans partially blind, at speeds of up to 30 knots, and not infrequently at close quarters?", asks Admiral Sir James Eberle. He suggests that it would be foolish not to expect increased "green" public pressure to reduce the use of nuclear power at sea. Meanwhile, no one has any really satisfactory way of decommissioning these things: like the sorcerer's apprentice with the brooms, mankind invented the SSN technology without knowing how to control it.

Furthermore, continues Admiral Eberle, removal of, the SSN as a naval target might permit substantial savings of money by removing the need for anti-submarine warfare capabilities to have the wide-area coverage necessary to hunt it, quite apart from the question of whether anti-SSBN operations would enhance or decrease crisis stability under a regime of deep cuts in strategic nuclear forces. "There are few fields where the potential 'peace dividend' is higher", he writes. Therefore, he advocates design of a multilateral "build-down" regime for SSNs, linked to a size constraint on any submarine which would effectively preclude nuclear propulsion and confine submarine missions to coastal defence. Emerging non-nuclear technologies, such as fuel-cell technology, may significantly enhance the performance of the conventionally powered hunter/killer submarine SSK in the future, and therefore it is sensible to begin to think about the arms-control implications of this now, before the event. However, at present, here is one area where structural naval disarmament can be wisely and swiftly entertained, for the SSN at sea is peculiarly resistant to the application of CBMs and CSBMs, which, I shall shortly suggest, are the instrument of choice to constrain surface forces at this time of political flux.

These ideas are still in advance of the formal negotiating agenda. There, it is with regard to certain weapons that an interesting convergence of conclusions in the Soviet and American positions may now be observed, despite originating from wholly different premises. In Granovskiy's and Johnston's papers, support is to be found for specific action on tactical nuclear weapons at sea. Momentum appears to be building behind Paul Nitze's proposal of a zero option on naval tactical nuclear weapons. Beyond that, a striking feature of the papers presented at the two United Nations seminars in Helsingor and Varna was that those contributed from non-aligned and regional Powers as well as from the central naval Powers show convergent agreement upon the desirability of confidence-building measures.

Pushing Out the Boat for Naval CBMs

At the Varna seminar. Admiral Goren Wallen provided a framework for the definition of a naval CBM. It had to be "sailor made", in his view. That is to say, it would be a fundamental mistake to try to export to sea concepts for confidence-building measures developed on land. In particular, this meant that naval CBMs would not and probably should not be structural in their impact upon naval forces. Admiral Wallen, like other naval experts, was not convinced that naval force was inherently destabilising and did not believe that structural naval disarmament could, in any event, be successfully imposed. Secondly, he observed that naval CBMs could not be spatial. Exclusion zones infringe the Grotian principle of *mare liberum.* The fact that international law does permit such exclusion zones for certain purposes and that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea proposes very substantially to enlarge them—for example for sovereign economic activity—constitutes part of the problem to which I shall turn later in this paper.

Encouraged by the success of the bilateral Soviet-American 1972 incidents-at-sea Agreement there is now in the expert community general support for the idea of information exchange as a naval CBM. Some prescriptions remain very cautious. Others explore more creatively ways in which the principles established in the Stockholm phase of CSCE could be extended, adding security-building to confidence-building, and making possible CSBMs as well as CBMs. In this connection, proposals by Commodore J. J. Blackham of the Royal Navy Staff College are of note. He suggests that it would be appropriate to investigate the basis for challenge inspection of ships of all descriptions in territorial waters in the context of the notion of the right of innocent passage. He also proposes extension of the Stockholm regime of notification of land exercises to sea exercises, and he would investigate the emplacement of sea-riding observers on warships engaged in exercises on the high seas. This, the Commodore suggests, is a logical extension of the concept of on-site inspection now established in recent agreements, notably the INF Treaty.

Commodore Blackham's argument is predicated upon an important inversion of the reflex naval dislike of interference with putative freedom of action, mentioned in connection with Johnson's paper, above. First, the "freedom to act" is only of value in the context of concrete options, and viewed thus, the hypothetical freedom to act must be weighed against palpable gains to be secured from surrendering it. So let it be freely conceded that there will be constraint upon one's own

actions from embracing CBMs and CSBMs; but let it also be remembered that under the types of measure shortly to be discussed, other parties will be equally constrained. Therefore, the savings in cost and the gains in demilitarisation of relations may be obtained without risk, while the freedom of action to return to higher levels of forces and readiness should things go sour remains always open. To this, the objection can be made that potential enemies might be able to win a "remobilisation race" against us. To that it may be responded that the risk is minimised by adoption of a "stringency of effect" approach.

The difficulty with most of the current proposals on naval CBMs is that they centre upon information exchange and do not offer different conceptual lines of approach. Following Commodore Blackham's lead, I propose that one might usefully distinguish three different lines of approach (of which information exchange is only the first), which together enable us to construct a spectrum of stringency of constraint.

The second line of approach addresses weapons loadings. Some endeavour has been made to discover whether weapons loadings may be verified by remote sensing; but this is inefficient and costly, and in the much changed international environment may in any case not be necessary, for two other ways of approaching the same issue are available. These would be to extend the concept of on-site inspection to naval base arsenals and replenishment-at-sea capabilities so that inspectors would know in general terms what range of weaponry was available for embarkation.

Given that naval weapons could be as well stored in other than naval arsenals, a base arsenal inspection regime would, to command confidence, probably have to be part of a comprehensive verification regime; and, given the paradox of the times, the moment when a regime of such rigour is feasible is also likely to be the moment when sufficient confidence exists for deeper reasons to obviate the need for it. Another approach to the problem of knowing what a particular vessel was carrying could be through a system of portal monitoring, whereby inspectors would verify the loading and unloading of ordnance on warships. If this were to be combined with on-site inspection of replenishment vessels, a manageable and useful middle course could be steered, available and appropriate to a time of transition, such as we are now in.

The third and potentially most stringent form of CSBM would involve constraint not upon the fighting ships themselves but upon their logistic train. A main lesson of the history of warfare since

Napoleon is that of the decisive importance of logistics to the victory. Campaigns are won less by tanks than by tankers. The attraction of logistics constraint measures as CSBMs—if they can be implemented effectively and enforced—is that they can be tailored very precisely to the political situation of the moment: thus there can be constraints upon the supplies within a given time-frame, which can, as opportunity permits, be extended to physical constraints upon the capacities and range of replenishment vessels. This in turn may lead to a "three quarter way house" between constraint measures and structural disarmament of the fleet as it is now. Another attraction of the weapons loadings and logistics constraint approaches to naval CBMs and CSBMs is that it becomes possible without difficulty to include minor navies and regional Powers within a global regime that contains such measures, because these measures can be made proportionate.

A further and powerful type of naval CSBM can be developed from the activation of the Chapter VII Articles of the United Nations Charter. Indeed, movement on the Article 46 (Military Staff Committee planning) tasks of the Security Council combines in a virtuous circle with movement on Article 26 (regulation of armaments) obligations. To the Article 46 undertakings I now turn.

Giving Substance to the Chapter VII Provisions of the United Nations Charter in the Naval Sphere

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter—the inherent right of individual or collective self defence—has been repeatedly cited by nations engaged in armed activity since 1945 both to legitimate a use of force and, somehow, to claim exemption from international interference. It is popularly represented as being a blanket legitimation of the unilateral use of armed force although that was not the intention at the time of drafting; nor is it what the wording of the Article actually states. Article 51 has tended to be represented in the international environment rather as the second amendment to the Constitution of the United States has tended to be- represented. The right to bear arms is remembered, whereas the conditional sub-clause which precedes it and legitimates it is set aside. Similarly for Article 51, the sub-clause "... until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security" and the explicit reaffirmation of the subordination of Article 51 actions to the authority and responsibility of the Security Council tend not to be cited. Until 1990 this has been for the good reason that the Security Council has not taken the measures prescribed elsewhere in the Charter which would relieve individual nations of the need to act in the way that the

United Kingdom and the United States stated that they had to in the Atlantic Charter in 1941. Indeed, the scope of Article 51 will shrink in inverse proportion to the expansion in scope of the other Articles in Chapter VII of the Charter.

The responsibility for inability to act upon those Articles lay, of course, with the Cold War which is now coming to an end. Admiral Eimo Zumwalt, formerly Chief of Naval Operations of the United States Navy, famously characterised the military risks of the Cold-War world as being a "hi/lo" mix. By this he meant that during the super-Power confrontation there existed situations of high probability of occurrence but low levels of absolute destruction (either because there was a low risk of escalation to super-Power warfare, or because the actions themselves were of a relatively low intensity of violence).

The Gulf crisis of 1990 has swiftly shown that Zumwalt's "hi/lo" mix is no longer applicable; for here we see a situation under Zumwalt's "hi" definition which also involves "hi" risks. These are not so much risks of horizontal escalation (meaning the firing of the powder-keg on the European East/West battlefield by a Middle Eastern spark via the powder-trail of super-Power confrontation), which are remarkably low by the standards of the last fifty years, but risks of "bogging down" by the external forces and risks to the maintenance of any regime of international law. Such a threat drives to the heart of the principles and purposes of the United Nations and, as such, appropriately demands a response in the terms of those principles which are under attack rather than in the terms which attack them.

To date, no Member of the United Nations has negotiated with the Security Council under the provisions of Article 43 (1) any special agreement for the provision of forces to the Security Council. The Security Council is therefore unable to respond in physical terms in the present situation. How might that state of affairs be transformed? The question takes on added urgency. For analytic reasons and because military establishments make this case from self-interest, there is increasing discussion of the probability of regional tensions after the end of the bipolar Soviet-American confrontation. These might, in the course of their resolution, at some point require the application, by threat or by use, of armed force.

Frequently in recent times navies have found themselves in periods which Sir James Cable has characterised as times of "violent peace." In such a period, general tension is low and navies exercise their influence by "presence". As Commodore Blok has pointed out at the Varna seminar, "ships can be deployed, thanks to Grotius, without

crossing borders and violating the sovereignty of other States". In the exercise of "presence", forces remain tightly under national control: indeed, Commodore Blok makes a point of stressing how improvements in communications make the discriminate use of naval presence easier. Rules of engagement are drawn narrowly (and of course, improvements of communication are vital if political control over military forces at a distance is to remain positive). Such national flotillas act independently or as part of bilateral or multilateral exercises *ad hoc.*

Two improvements to this situation could readily be made. The first would be to increase the flow of information between and about national and alliance flotillas. Such information, which intersects closely with the confidence-building measures proposed in this area, includes positional information and what might loosely be called "tactical" information. Such information is routinely exchanged as part of normal operations. For example, Royal Air Force Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft have been communicating with Soviet warships in the Persian Gulf using marine band radio: the sort of contact which, at a higher level of intensity, occurred during the naval policing of the Persian Gulf during the Iran/Iraq war by the Royal Navy's Armilla patrol and ships of the United States Navy, the Royal Netherlands Navy, the French Navy and the Soviet Navy. Such contact outside existing channels could be extended and formalised. The next step in development of this form of information exchange would be the exchange of liaison officers between flotillas.

At a wider geographical scale and on a more permanent basis, the proposal to establish regional crisis monitoring centres in the next phase of the CSCE would integrate well. The exchange of information between national command authorities would be a natural and prudent development, harmonising with several of Commodore Blackham's ideas on the advancement of naval CBMs up the scale of relative stringency to become CSBMs.

The second improvement which would provide an essential underpinning to the development of sub-sequent levels of United Nations operations would be the creation of a United Nations standing naval force (UNSNF). Such a force would stand in a symbiotic relationship with the command and control systems and procedures which the United Nations needs to develop.

A UNSNF is essential as a test-bed for the successful development of United Nations standard operating procedures (UNSOPs), and the successful operation of UNSOPs is essential for the effective operation of UNSNF in its other roles. Its nature would be in this sense similar

to NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic. The over-arching objective of UNSNF would be political, of course; but one of its second-order objectives would be to develop and maintain up-to-date code books and procedures for collective operations at higher levels of military alert. The UNSNF might also fulfil a second practical role, proposed in Commander Blok's paper, of providing a symbolic and permanent United Nations flagged "Ocean Guard" to police international waters (for example, in pursuit of polluters and those in breach of marine conservation and environmental protection laws). The "Ocean Guard" role has the potential for substantial development.

As important as the allocation of vessels to UNSNF would be the construction of a United Nations command centre with which the force would exercise. The capacities of the command centre (UNCC) would considerably exceed those required for the relatively small size of the UNSNF flotilla because it would also have the mission of working out and exercising communications liaison with the national command centres of those countries which would contribute forces to UNSNF at times of crisis. The entire operation would be conducted under the provisions of Article 43 (1) Nations would negotiate special agreements as stipulated under Article 43 (3), which would then be ratified by signatory States through their normal constitutional procedures.

Article 43 (3) also makes provision for the negotiation of such agreements with groups of members. The way is therefore open for existing appropriate regional alliances to take over part of this role on behalf of Member States within those alliances. It may well be that, at the same time that thought is being given to the location of new instruments for European security through the context of the forthcoming CSCE round, thought should also be given to the use of redundant facilities for these United Nations purposes. Important new roles for the principal maritime alliance, NATO, may exist here.

The use of the word "flotilla" should be stressed. UNSNF could be composed of single ships, and probably should be in order to maximize training experience with UNSOPs, and probably would be, in that experience shows that even large navies are reluctant to contribute more than one ship to multinational standing forces of this sort. However, I would suggest that, throughout the activation of the Chapter VII Articles, national contributions should be made in national packets, in order to equalize the opportunities of contribution open to smaller as well as larger naval Powers: flotillas of more or less equal size and of complementary composition would enable the Netherlands, Spanish, Canadian, Pakistan or Australian navies (to take examples of navies

which have sent forces during the 1990 Gulf crisis) to play balanced military roles, with the political advantages thereof.

Tension is medium and military forces are at a level of "military vigilance". Rules of engagement are broader than at times of low tension, but are still constrained. In such a situation, how might the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee plan under Article 46?

In the first place, distinct "triggers" set out in the United Nations Charter would have been released to authorize this course of action. Such triggers could be activated by a Member State making a complaint under Article 2 (4), or reporting to the Security Council that it had taken action to defend itself under Article 51. This in turn might lead to an attempt at conciliation under Article 40, but equally might lead directly to an Article 39 debate by the Security Council to determine the extent of the threat to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. The outcome could be a recommendation by the Security Council under Article 41 to initiate sanctions applying measures not involving the use of armed force, or it might lead directly to the deployment of force under Article 42, identifying blockade and demonstration (the specified activities within the Article) or licensing any form of operation.

Armed with this authorisation, the Military Staff Committee would interpret its responsibilities for strategic direction under Article 47 (3) in two ways: first, it would inform the Security Council through the Secretary-General of its assessment of the situation and, secondly, it would nominate a regional co-ordinator, most probably a ranking officer from one of the national flotillas present in the crisis area. The responsibility of the regional co-ordinator would be to ensure that national flotillas were acquainted with and operating under UNSOPs for purposes of liaison and co-ordination. This is an important point to stress because the line of command to these national flotillas would remain from their national command authorities. The line of political communication from the United Nations to those national authorities would be through requests directed to national authorities by the Security Council, on the basis of information provided to it by the Military Staff Committee and through the agency of the Secretary-General.

Vessels in such flotillas would signal their status by flying United Nations pennants in addition to their national ensigns. Were it to be in existence now, such a structure would be appropriate to the management of the naval dimension of the 1990 Gulf crisis.

The level of military alert is high; command structures and units would be prepared for "military action". The rules of engagement would be widely constructed and would most probably be associated with a declaration by the Security Council of exclusion zones within the area of crisis.

The "triggers" within the United Nations Charter must be as unambiguous as possible to legitimate such action as the United Nations would have to take. Under Article 39, the Security Council might apply the tests of Article 2 (4) and 2 (3). Article 2 (4) would be the expected test. A General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1974 adopted a detailed definition of aggression which is used to sharpen the Article 2 (4) test. In addition, I propose that Article 2 (3) has virtue here, and should be exploited, because it contains three different, explicit and germane categories, enabling the question to be asked whether the infringing party is behaving "... in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice..." are endangered. These terms should be enlarged in interpretation. When added to the three tests in Article 39, which distinguish between acts of aggression, breaches of the peace and threats to the peace, this approach gives a matrix of six precise criteria by which to judge.

If the Security Council concluded that one or more United Nations Member State had failed to settle a dispute by peaceful means and was acting in breach of these fundamental Articles of principle, the Council would then explicitly resolve upon an unqualified application of the provisions of Article 42: "Such actions may include demonstrations, blockade, and *other operations* [emphasis added] by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations."

At this point, acting under Article 48, the Security Council, advised by the Military Staff Committee, would decide whether all or only certain United Nations Members should be invited to act, and would request the requisite forces to compose the United Nations task force. In making its invitation, the Security Council would be mindful of Article 53 (1), which observes that "the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority". Here bodies such as NATO may find operational roles under a United Nations remit (which is entirely consistent with reference to the Charter in the North Atlantic Treaty).

The Military Staff Committee would in such circumstances assume its full powers under the widest interpretation of "strategic direction" (Article 47 (3)). The regional co-ordinator would become a regional

commander. The power under Article 47 (4) to create regional sub-committees of the Military Staff Committee might be employed. Crucially, the lines of direction of command to national flotillas would change. Units would, in military jargon, "chop command". They would switch from their national command authorities to a United Nations command centre (UNCC). They would operate under UNSOPs only.

The arrangements for the "chopping" of command would have to have been negotiated earlier under Article 47 (3). The Charter intends that the highest degree of military efficiency be assured by the Military Staff Committee, and registers this in Article 47 (2) by designating the chiefs of staff of the permanent members of the Security Council and other necessary co-opted officers to be its members. The objective is important and is to be endorsed; but it is not clear that placing chiefs of staff on the Committee in this way is the correct course for achieving it. Nor is the NATO system of senior officers designated as national representatives necessarily right. This is therefore a problem identified for which the goal is clear but the means are not, and it is in need of exploration.

Emerging Threats in Maritime Environment

But we recall that this is only one of the six conditions of threat which may satisfy an Article 39 test applied through Article 2 (3). In this final section I wish to suggest that, while no change to the wording of the Charter is required, a modernised gloss upon Article 2 (3) is valuable in order that a realistic test of threats to international peace, breaches of that peace, and threats to security and justice may be made.

War sharpens that sense of the interconnectedness of issues which may be obscured in more fortunate times. The fourth principle established in the Atlantic Charter stated that, with due respect to their existing obligations, the United States and the United Kingdom would endeavour "... to further enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity". This sense that the definition of international peace and security had to extend beyond the legal and military realm was reflected in the drafting of the United Nations Charter. The Chapter IX provisions (Article 55) commit the United Nations to the promotion of higher standards of living, full employment, conditions of economic and social progress and development, the solution of international economic and social, health and related problems, international cultural

and educational co-operation and universal respect for and observance of human rights.

The reality of the period since 1945 has been much at variance with those proud aspirations. With respect to the Atlantic Charter vision, in fact, terms of trade have moved consistently against primary producers from a benchmark in the period 1950-1954. The burden of debt repayment following the lending campaign after 1972 resulted in 1989 in a $44 billion net outflow of resources from the poor world to the rich: a perverse but real contradiction in the face of advice proffered by the Brandt and Brundt-land Commissions.

By the 1970s it had become bitterly apparent to many newly independent countries that Kwame Nkrumah's famous advice, "Seek ye first the political kingdom", in most matters gave no commensurate control over their economic or social affairs. It was especially galling for poor countries along whose shores sailed the factory fishing fleets of the great Powers, vacuuming the sea with little or no benefit to the littoral State. It appeared that one area in which possession of political sovereignty might be turned into economic benefit was by extension of control over living assets in and mineral assets upon or under the seabed of the adjacent continental shelf.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 reflects many of those concerns. Its provisions are summarised authoritatively by Gudmundur Eiriksson in his Helsingor paper and in the United Nations report on the naval arms race. Relevant to note here are the two contradictory tendencies within' the Convention. On the one hand, it attempts to provide a regime of international control and revenue-sharing covering exploitation of the deep ocean bed (for example, by mining of manganese nodules); on the other, the Convention exhibits a consistent bias towards the enlargement of the interests of littoral States. The ragtag history of different sizes of claims to fishing and territorial rights is tidied up. Under the Convention, littoral States are provided first with a 12-mile territorial zone, then with an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of up to 200 miles in extent and beyond, with sovereign rights to explore and exploit the continental shelf on a revenue-sharing basis with the international community up to a limit defined by both geomorphological and distance criteria agreed by a commission on the limits of the continental shelf. Sovereign rights beyond the 200-mile limit are proposed without prejudice to the freedom of navigation in international waters.

The priority accorded to States' rights when the two tendencies in the Convention come into potential conflict is well illustrated by the way in which the United Nations endorsed the statement on the principle of the common heritage of mankind adopted in 1970. This resolution declared in unqualified language that areas said to be the common heritage of mankind "... shall not be subject to appropriation by national means or to any claim of sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part thereof. The resolution then curtailed the principle, stating that the exploitation of the sea-bed should be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole yet "... taking into consideration the interests and needs of the developing countries".

The Convention on the Law of the Sea cannot come into force until there have been 60 ratifications or accessions. As of 29 May 1990 there were 43. Deep-seated objections by industrialised nations to the proposed internationalised legal and fiscal regime for the sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction are the fundamental reason for this failure to produce an early entry into force of the Convention. It is seen as an affront to the Grotian principle that "the seas belong to no one".

The law of the sea Convention, particularly by its proposals on EEZs and sovereign control of assets in the continental shelf, proposes that very substantial parts of the sea belong to somebody.

A global security regime must be predicated upon the proposition that the seas belong to everyone and, in particular, that the continental shelves must, under scientific direction, fall under international regulation: exactly the reverse of the tendency embodied in the States' rights bias of the law of the sea Convention. While in one sense this proposal develops the "internationalist" strand in the Convention, it only travels on the same track for a limited distance, for the interpretation of the word "belong" employed in the Convention derives from property notions, whereas the sense of "belong" required for a global security regime derives from the concept of stewardship.

In international politics, environmental security is marching steadily to the top of the agenda. However, in the public mind it does so in what remains still an undifferentiated concern about "pollution". But advances in environmental science make it increasingly clear that we should distinguish between *polluting* activities that are a consequence of all activities—such as living—that increase entropy by the by-products of their primary functions, and *planet-modifying* activities.

The scientist James Lovelock has been instrumental in promoting the fruitful hypothesis that certain areas of the planet may be more important than others in the maintenance of life on Earth—maintenance which depends at root upon retention of the amazing stability in the chemical composition of the Earth's atmosphere. Three environments on the planet appear to be particularly important in the maintenance of life: the humid rain forests of the tropics, the wetland margins of the land, and the continental shelves of the sea.

The law of the sea Convention was drafted at a time when "marine resources" was shorthand for problems over the control of fish and, to an extent, oil. Although not yet put into full effect, plans continue to be entertained for mining the deep sea floor and the intensive farming of the 200-mile EEZs. While the deep sea proposals have elicited the most opposition to the Convention, by planet-modifying criteria they pose little problem. In contrast, the environmental damage emanating from intensive fish-farming in enclosed sea lochs, for example, should stand as a warning of the difficulty of predicting the consequences of focussed interference in such sensitive and ill-understood ecologies. The Convention offers little support to planetary versus State interests here.

The waters inside the 200-mile limit and over the continental shelves are crucial for the reproduction of phytoplankton, whose myriad, tiny star-like bodies stand behind many functions of climate regulation through their ability to absorb C02, and quite possibly behind the salinity regulation of the oceans. The synergistic consequences of ignorant interventions in complicated chains of being have been repeatedly and unpleasantly demonstrated to mankind. If it proves to be the case, as is now suggested with increasing strength, that the waters of the continental shelves play a critical role in planetary control, then mankind will interfere in such areas at its peril. The blunt truth is that the Convention on the Law of the Sea is a dated document not conceptually framed to provide the basis of a legal regime controlling access to the global commons in the light of such knowledge.

It is not beyond possibility, although unlikely, that a substantial review and renovation of the Convention could be achieved. An important precedent has been the success with which the international community moved from the initial discovery of the ozone hole over the Antarctic by Joe Farman of the British Antarctic Survey in Cambridge in 1985 to the negotiation of the 1988 Montreal Protocol on the atmosphere, to the sharp and fruitful exchanges at the July 1990 Review Conference held in London at which, for the first time,

significant technology transfer from the rich to the poor countries was proposed and agreed. Given the threat of skin cancer from the increased amounts of UV-B reaching the Earth's surface through a damaged ozone shield, the rich suddenly saw the free gift of expensive technology and equipment to the poor to enable them to manufacture alternatives to chlorofluorocarbons as important in, quite literally, saving their own skins.

The lesson of the spectacular development towards a regime for management of the atmospheric global commons is clear. First, there is the appearance of shocking and easily visualised evidence of damage in the form of the ozone hole. In politics, people normally demand a "Show Me" crisis before being willing to take decisive action. Secondly, the July London Conference demonstrated a willingness by the rich to offer substantial compensation and assistance to the poor to enable them to escape from the trap of dangerous technology to which they were condemned by their poverty.

By the same token, the difficulty of producing a similar regime for the management of coastal waters is evident. "Show Me" crises are unlikely to occur in the manner of the ozone hole, and the existence of the law of the sea Convention paradoxically may, in fact, serve to complicate and slow down the formulation of an environmentally sensitive legal regime. The law of the sea regime is based on premises of economic growth and sovereign right. A new environmentally sound regime will need to stand upon foundations which read the Article 2 (3) definition as one of global security. In the maritime environment, this will necessitate a modernised reading of Hugo Grotius's Mare *liberum* as "the sea belongs to everyone". A fourth law of the sea conference, based on global security criteria, is now required.

One cannot be optimistic that such a regime will be in place before the first challenges occur. This is because, on the one hand, a "Show Me" crisis of sufficient power is unlikely and, on the other, the national interests of States to seek to exploit their sovereign advantage in EEZs may prove too strong.

What then could be done if an individual State decided upon a course of action in its coastal waters which scientific evidence concluded was likely to have so deleterious an effect upon the planet-management qualities of that environment that the action had to be discontinued? Plainly, under an Article 39 inquiry, the Security Council could find, on the enlarged definitions just offered, a breach of international security embracing Article 2 (3). The Secretary-General could then convey requests to the State or States concerned to desist in the action,

offering all relevant scientific support and consultation from the relevant expert agencies of the United Nations and of the world academic community. But we must assume that the State would persist. It would cite the formidable powers reserved to sovereign States within the Convention on the Law of the Sea and argue that the scientific evidence was inconclusive.

At some point in this new type of resource conflict, the moment might come when the United Nations would be obliged to invoke sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. In such a circumstance, the availability of a "global policeman", such as that described earlier, would be essential. Military readers will now appreciate that I do not envisage that the proposed structure would be necessarily or, indeed, even probably forced to engage in highly complex integrated and large-scale operations at high tempo or intensity. Rather, it would be required to deal with intractable but distinct violators of the principles of global security.

In the basement of Helsingor Castle, one comes upon a statue of a slumbering warrior. He is Holgar Dansk, the legendary hero who sleeps until Denmark is endangered, and then wakes to wield his sword and shield in its defence. The central thrust of this study has been to portray the Chapter VII powers of the United Nations Charter in such a light. I have explained why I think that the warrior in the United Nations basement may now awaken and be asked to suggest how he might best act in the naval field. But in describing how the Chapter VII provisions of the United Nations Charter may, at long last, be activated, a paradox will be apparent.

At the beginning of this study, I located one of the catalysts which make it now possible to open this process in the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990. Yet, it, as indeed much else in the transformed international environment, is bound up with the great transformations in train as the Cold War ends. As we move from bipolar and military ideas of security towards a new regime of global security, the declining role of armed force as a principal agent in the international system—despite regional crises—becomes steadily more apparent and the paradox is now plain.

While still locked in the iron claws of the Second World War, the Allies sought, with increasing precision, to define a vision of how things might be different,"... to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind ...", in the plain and powerful words of the Preamble to the United Nations Charter. Such a vision was first articulated bilaterally

by the Americans and the British in the Atlantic Charter. Almost exactly three years later, joined now by the other major party in the grand alliance against Hitler, the issue was resumed in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations of August and September 1944, from which arose the document which formed in large part the basis of the Charter adopted at San Francisco in June 1945.

All these hopes lay chained during the Cold War, or, worse, activated in Korea and the Congo in ways which did the United Nations great harm. Now, when for the first time these provisions could and should be activated in the spirit of their inception, the role of such forces within the whole spectrum of the powers of the Security Council appears to have diminished.

It may be observed with justice that of all the military services, navies have historically shown themselves to have the strongest traditions of autonomous control and to be the most resistant to interference by arms-controllers and politicians; and that therefore this study is perverse in planting its wider proposals for the United Nations in such notoriously difficult ground; that it would be better to start with air forces, for instance (as indeed the Charter does in its description of a never-yet-realised United Nations rapid-intervention air force).

I prefer the alternative view, which is that if one can successfully conceptualize the maritime and naval aspects of the powers of Chapter VII in the post-Cold-War world, the other parts will benefit from it and be easier. Furthermore, the sorry history of United Nations ground intervention means that it would be far preferable to do the new thinking elsewhere—out to sea—before returning to shore afresh. This is especially so because I find the challenges posed by the mismatch between the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the environment which it is supposed to address to be so clear and so worrying. This concentrates the mind.

The naval military options here described are clearly last resorts, when the world community has to deal with an obdurate aggressor against an area vital to planetary control. These are the new "lo (low) probability/hi (high) risk" options on a revised, post-Cold-War version of Admiral Zumwalt's "hi/lo" spectrum. Both for this reason and because fulfilment of the Article 46 requirements will actively assist the Security Council in the pursuit of its Article 26 obligations, early action is desirable.

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International Seminar on Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

From 28 to 30 March 1989, the International Seminar on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace was held in Sochi, USSR. The Seminar was organised by the United Nations Department of Political and Security Council Affairs and the United Nations Association of the USSR, with funding support from the Trust Fund for the World Disarmament Campaign. The Seminar brought together a group of eminent experts including representatives who are participants in the United Nations *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean as well as researchers from academic institutions and executives of non-governmental organisations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations conveyed his wishes for success to the Seminar in a message in which he stated:

"Peace in the Indian Ocean is of great importance to all the States in the region as well as to the international community. At a time when, with the active assistance of the United Nations, the threat of a global war is receding, international tension is abating and regional conflicts in virtually all regions are gradually being settled, the establishment of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean could only contribute to further general relaxation". The Seminar was organised under the following four major subjects:

- Confidence-building measures and zones of peace;
- Impact of regional tensions and peace and security issues concerning the regional littoral and hinterland States regarding the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean;
- The goals of major Powers and concerns of the regional States;
- Proposals on a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and its implementation.

The Sochi Seminar was the first meeting of its kind, at which experts of various geographical and political backgrounds exchanged views in an informal setting on a wide range of issues relating to the establishment of the Indian Ocean region as a zone of peace.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE *AD HOC* COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN

About a year ago the States represented on the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, in their consensus-adopted special report to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament (SSOD III), referred to encouraging developments in international relations and noted that these had a favourable impact also on the Indian Ocean region.

Recent developments, notably the Fourth Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), the Indo-Chinese top-level talks, the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan, the Jakarta Informal Meetings for a Kampuchean settlement and contacts between the parties to the conflict at the Horn of Africa, confirm the perception that, although the issues which remain to be solved are diverse, complex and contentious, a new situation is beginning to emerge in the region of the Indian Ocean. I share the view that this trend offers a more favourable environment for stepped-up efforts to reach the objective of converting the Indian Ocean region into a zone of peace.

As testified by policy documents of the Non-Aligned Movement and regional organisations, statements and far-reaching proposals of statesmen, and the constructive role of the United Nations, in particular the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, implementation of the peace zone project for the Indian Ocean would be an important move towards greater security on the oceans and seas. We may say it would constitute a move towards fulfilling a dream of mankind and meeting a highly topical concern of nations: global maritime peace.

The international community has been insisting for years on convening an international conference for converting the Indian Ocean area into a zone of peace. And rightly so, for in the framework of the United Nations there is no other comparable peace zone project for which so much multilateral organisational and substantive preparatory work has been done. Admittedly, no decisive, substantive breakthrough has been achieved as yet towards the practical implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The reasons for that are well-known to all participants in this Seminar and therefore need not be examined more closely.

None the less, we have to be responsible enough to answer the question, "What can and must we do to make further progress on this issue?" That is to say, how may we take advantage of the positive changes towards a healthier international climate in the sense of ensuring that confrontation, tensions and distrust will more and more be replaced by co-operation, good-neighbourliness and mutual trust to determine the political and security situation in the region?

The concept which the non-aligned littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean developed at the dawn of the 1970s to create a peace zone in this ocean challenged from the outset the strong naval presence of major Powers, chiefly the United States, the buildup of foreign naval bases in the region, and the military influence brought to bear on Indian Ocean countries.

Since the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, held in New York in 1979, the tenth anniversary of which is going to be observed this year by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, the following aspects of the matter have been in the foreground of an extensive exchange of views: the geographical limits of the peace zone; the foreign military presence; the question of nuclear weapons; the question of a security regime; the peaceful settlement of disputes; and the use of the Indian Ocean by vessels and aircraft of all States.

Both a *rapprochement* of views and subsisting divergencies have been discernible in the process. Now that there are new trends in international relations, our efforts should be concerned first and foremost with those points which express common interests of the actors in the region of the Indian Ocean.

In the context of intensive international discussions about the settlement of regional conflicts, about regional and global aspects of disarmament, including the limitation of naval armaments and activities of naval fleets, there have been increasing calls for the extension of confidence-building measures to maritime areas, including to the Indian Ocean. Indeed, this seems to be an area where early consensus could be possible.

While the general purpose of confidence-building measures is to aid and stimulate solutions to the problems relating to lessening the danger of war, attaining real disarmament and strengthening peace and stability in inter-State relations, the immediate objective of such measures is to reduce the danger of military conflict and the misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities. The measures should improve predictability by covering to the extent possible the

features of military deployments and activities which may be perceived as potentially threatening.

The following confidence-building measures, particularly in the military field, may be regarded as applicable:

- principles, norms or rules for restrained, non-provocative and non-destabilising military behaviour;
- information on and notification of military activities, and communication, consultation, observation and verification;
- restraints, constraints and disengagements with regard to military activities.

As the envisaged Indian Ocean peace zone will cover large sea areas, confidence-building measures at sea which would be in harmony with international law, in particular with the current law of the sea, will be of great significance.

As discussed and reflected in various documents submitted by States to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and SSOD III, the objectives of naval confidence-building measures should be, among others:

- peacetime security with regard to activities by the military forces of the many States operating at sea so as to avoid incidents and confrontation;
- security, for non-military activities at sea, such as shipping, fishing, offshore activities;
- seaboard security, i.e., security of coastal States against threats and the projection of military power from the sea;
- wartime security at sea of vessels belonging to States which are neutral to a conflict.

Altogether, naval confidence-building measures should contribute to creating favourable conditions for enhancing security and political stability and for making progress in the field of naval disarmament. Such objectives could be promoted through effective and relevant measures.

With regard to the Indian Ocean, a number of specific proposals, including some by socialist countries, were submitted in 1987. They could be further elaborated. Based on the relevant discussions, in particular those in the framework of the United Nations, I should like to suggest that confidence-building measures in the Indian Ocean should be both militarily significant and politically binding. They should include arrangements for providing and obtaining information on

military activities as well as various kinds of measures establishing appropriate procedures for verifying compliance. Taking into account the security concerns of States, their different maritime interests and their different naval capabilities, the specific objectives of confidence-building measures in the Indian Ocean should be to increase security by diminishing the risks of confrontation and incidents on the sea lanes, in the water straits and the sea area of the Indian Ocean as a whole as well as in the airspace above it. They should enhance the safety of non-military activities at sea and promote peaceful co-operation in the Indian Ocean region.

Proceeding from this, particular attention could be paid to the following set of naval confidence-building measures, regarding which States could find some common ground:

— First, conclusion of a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents in the Indian Ocean and the airspace above it. A multilateral agreement on this subject should be negotiated in addition to the existing USSR/United States and USSR/United Kingdom agreements on the prevention of incidents on and above the high seas, which were concluded in 1972 and 1986. The experience gained from these bilateral agreements is encouraging; they provide a good example of naval confidence-building measures. The feasibility and possible ways and means of initiating negotiations in an appropriate forum on a multilateral agreement in the Indian Ocean should be explored without delay. A multilateral agreement on this issue should be formulated in such a way as to respond to the needs of all interested States for enhancing safety at sea without diminishing the traditional freedom of navigation;

— Secondly, prior notification of major naval activities and observation of such activities. This type of confidence-building measure could include, *inter alia,* provision of information about the time of the commencement of exercises, their duration and purposes, the region in which they are to be conducted, the States participating, the number and classes of vessels and aircraft involved, and the onshore facilities used for the purpose; and

— Thirdly, exchange of information and greater openness concerning naval matters. Data on major naval activities and military presence in the region of the Indian Ocean could be submitted regularly to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on a mutually agreed basis.

These and possibly other confidence-building measures could be agreed upon as a first step. It is understood also that existing maritime measures designed to build confidence should be strictly observed.

The following measures of constraint would be highly important for security and stability in the Indian Ocean region:

- Quantitative restraints on the present naval vessels, amphibious forces and military aircraft of extra-regional States, including the establishment of limits on the presence of warships of different classes in the region;
- Measures to reduce nuclear weapons existing in the region of the Indian Ocean, with the final goal of their complete withdrawal;
- Agreement on step-by-step limitations and restrictions on large-scale exercises or manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean region;
- Multilateral agreement on safety assurances for international sea lanes and air communications in the Indian Ocean which would include, *inter alia,* a ban on any exercises and manoeuvres in international straits, adjacent areas and air spaces above them within agreed limits and configurations;
- International agreements on safety guarantees for sea communications, including in the Persian Gulf and Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, and a corresponding agreement on the safety of air communications.

Implementation of these and other confidence-building measures would not only promote peace and stability in the region but also promote additional measures with a view to radically improving its political and security climate.

I believe that, next to restrictions on naval activities, confidence-building measures in respect of foreign military bases in the region would be most valuable. It might be conceivable to start by discussing such measures as:

- Renunciation of the installation of new military bases;
- Non-expansion and non-modernisation of existing military bases;
- Non-deployment of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction at existing military bases;
- Non-extension of the validity period of agreements on bases, accompanied by commitments not to transfer to the region of the Indian Ocean additional troops or to take other "compensating" steps.

These are some suggestions and observations I thought fit to present to you today. I am convinced that the dialogue, the perceptions and the fruitful exchange of views on the various, highly important topics of our Seminar during the next few days will contribute to the substantive work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, which will resume a few days from now in New York.

I also hope that this international gathering at Sochi in the USSR will encourage research institutions and non-governmental organisations both within and outside the region to raise the subject and to work actively for the implementation of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. By so doing, they would support the completion of the preparatory work and enable the Conference on the Indian Ocean to be convened at Colombo at the earliest possible moment.

I wish the proceedings of our Seminar full success.

DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION

I

The proposal to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was made by Sri Lanka in 1971. The events that commenced at the end of the Second World War, or even before that, and gathered momentum with the gaining of independence by many countries in the Indian Ocean region led to those countries' search for ways and means of establishing conditions to ensure peace, security and stability in the region. Some of the developments which have influenced the thinking of the political leaders of the newly liberated countries in the region are their colonial experience, fresh memories of two world wars, the division that led to the bipolarisation of the allies that fought the enemy in the Second World War, the international efforts aimed at avoiding a repetition of another holocaust, and the establishment of the United Nations and adoption of its Charter with the objective of achieving lasting international peace and security.

The first gathering of the highest level of Asian and African leaders at which these points were formally discussed was held in April 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia. At that meeting not only was non-alignment conceived, but an attempt was made to give expression to the policy it involved. In the context of the policy of non-alignment, the Asian and African leaders who had gone through the decolonisation process and were witnessing a growing power rivalry in the region declared their

desire to keep their territories and regions out of that competition. The Indian Ocean eventually formed a part of their claim.

The concept of oceans free of nuclear weapons goes back to the Cairo Summit meeting of the non-aligned countries held in September 1964. The concept was further elaborated at the third summit, held in Lusaka in September 1970.

Since its adoption by the United Nations in 1971, the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace has received the overwhelming support of the international community. This is evident from the increasing interest of member States, the support which the annual resolution on the Indian Ocean has received over the years, and the large number of States seeking membership in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean since its establishment in 1972. With the enlargement of the membership of the Committee, the permanent members of the Security Council, major maritime users of the Ocean and some other important member States joined the Committee, increasing its number from fifteen to forty-nine.

The validity of the peace zone concept was further endorsed by the United Nations at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978. The Final Document that was adopted by consensus at that session declared that the establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole. The aims of the Declaration on the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, *inter alia,* included the gradual withdrawal of all forms of military presence of the extraregional Powers from the Indian Ocean region, pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances and the strengthening of international security through regional and other co-operation. At the second and the third special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament too, overwhelming support for the implementation of the Declaration was evident in the discussions on the subject.

The scope and the objectives of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean have been significantly broadened over the years, having taken into account various views expressed and positions taken by individual States and groups of States that are engaged in the discussions on the process of its implementation. Particular reference should be made to the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, held in 1979, at which agreement was reached amongst those States on a set of principles for the implementation of the Declaration. One

significant factor enunciated in that set of principles is the necessity of adhering to a code of conduct; such a code of conduct is regarded as a compelling prerequisite in the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

Looking at the progress made in the work connected with implementation of the Declaration since its adoption in 1971, one begins to wonder whether the international community as a whole has been able to appreciate fully the importance of the peace zone and the contribution it could make to the strengthening of regional and international peace and security. In spite of the overwhelming support extended to the peace zone concept and the objectives of the Declaration, there seem to be differing views with regard to its implementation. A closer examination of these views shows that they do not arise from any inherent drawbacks in the proposal itself, but from a set of preoccupations of a small number of member States who are indeed considered important to the successful implementation of the Declaration. It is not my intention to sit in judgement on the merits and demerits of these preoccupations. However, I would like briefly to submit some of them to you, together with counter-claims, so that we may seize this opportunity to examine them further.

An area of disagreement is the holding of the Colombo Conference on the Indian Ocean, proposed in 1979 with the decision that it would be convened in 1981. The agreement to hold the Conference remains at present a consensus decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations. However, the convening of the Conference has been postponed several times over a period of nine years, and it is now scheduled for 1990. The reason adduced by a small number of States for the postponement of the Conference is that the prevailing political and security climate in the region is not conducive to the holding of such a Conference.

The majority of member States, however, do not agree with this reasoning. Their claim is that the prevailing political and security climate in the region, whether positive or negative, should not in any way constitute a barrier to the holding of the Conference. They argue that if the political and security situation in the Indian Ocean region is considered to be volatile, that is the very reason to hasten the holding of the Conference, which they regard as an important step towards the implementation of the Declaration. Their reasoning is that the whole purpose of the Declaration and establishment of the zone are aimed at removal of such impediments to regional peace and security. It is argued that the suggestion that countries in the region

have to wait until all political and security questions are resolved to establish a zone of peace makes no sense, as it was these very questions that compelled the regional States to agitate for the establishment of a zone of peace.

These countries have taken a further step recently by drawing the attention of those who have objected to the holding of the conference on grounds of the political and security climate in the region to the point that they should not now have any difficulty in agreeing to it, as the main reason cited by them has been removed—that is, the situation in Afghanistan. Considering recent developments in the international scene, and in particular in the Indian Ocean region, it is my view that there are very compelling reasons to reassess some of the positions which have prevented the desired progress in the convening of the Colombo Conference and the eventual implementation of the Declaration.

In our desire to establish a zone of peace, we have to be realistic and recognize that such endeavours are arduous and highly complex, and should be done in an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. They demand great understanding and the co-operation of all parties involved. They require re-examination and suitable adjustments of national and group interests. How best and how soon an agreement on the establishment of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean could be reached will depend, to a great extent, not on the prevailing conditions in the Indian Ocean region or elsewhere, but on the political will of member States to promote international peace and security.

In this context, the most encouraging development we are witnessing is a policy of co-operation which seems to be replacing the policy of confrontation which had immeasurable ill-effects on the conduct of international relations. All of us are well aware of the positive developments that have taken place in the political, military and security scenes, at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. Some of these developments have a direct bearing on the Indian Ocean region. The signing of the INF Treaty between the Super-Powers, their declared intention to work towards a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, the unilateral decision of the Soviet Union to reduce its conventional forces in the European continent, the new-found desire for the resolution of regional conflicts including the question of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war, the announcement by Vietnam of its intention to withdraw troops from Cambodia by 1990 and the proposed summit meeting between the Soviet Union and China are some of the developments that should have a definite positive

influence on the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean region. The new-found co-operation between the two Super-Powers has already generated a valuable momentum in many efforts aimed at establishment of international peace and security. This is a welcome development, and the international community should seize the opportunity and continue to encourage its advancement.

In achieving the objectives of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, one positive way of benefiting from the co-operation between the Super-Powers would be to urge them to list the Indian Ocean as an item on their agenda for bilateral talks. As you are aware, such a dialogue was initiated in the late 1970s but was not pursued to a meaningful end.

Our preparedness to have an objective and realistic look at our own behaviour should also assist us in the formulation of policies that may ensure the peace and security of the international community. I am aware of the fact that such a simplistic and philosophical view often sounds absurd. It is often said that philosophy encourages us to run away from reality. However, it is also true that philosophy comes closer to us when we are prepared to embrace the truth and morality of the issues we are confronted with. What are we fighting against today? Are we fighting with such might and vigour anything foreign to us? The answer is no. We are only fighting man-made, self-inflicted barriers, which have entangled us in a vicious circle. Our own creations have overpowered our capacity to see reason and control our conduct in the larger interest of mankind. We have become prisoners of our own deeds. The question we should ask ourselves is, "Have we completely lost control of our destiny?" Again, the answer is no. With the requisite will-power and purpose and a clear understanding of the consequences, the human being is still capable of exercising partial, if not complete, control over his own affairs.

This should be the spirit in which we handle most contemporary issues. This principle should very much apply to the subject we are discussing. The establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean will not only bring relief to millions of people in the region, but also contribute to the enhancement of international peace and security. As the first experiment of this nature, it will also encourage the establishment of similar zones in other regions, thereby extending the message of peace and security to peoples of various regions of the globe, thus generating a new wave of hope.

In their desire to preserve their independence and live under conditions of peace and tranquillity and free the region from the influence of the extraregional Powers, the littoral and hinterland States

have called for the withdrawal of all forms of military presence in the region and for others to refrain from any act of interference, including the use or threat of use of force, that may jeopardize their political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The States concerned claim that the mere presence of extraregional Powers in the region constitutes a threat to their political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The counter-argument to the above is that the presence of extra-regional Powers-is warranted, *inter alia,* by the strategic and other interests of those extraregional Powers. According to them, the mere presence of a competitor or competitors in the region creates the "enemy image" and has promoted their continued presence and the escalation of military activities. In this context they claim that their presence in the region is legitimate and in conformity with the freedom of the high seas and of navigation provided for in international law and custom.

The littoral and hinterland States, supported by a majority of the international community, argue that the concepts of freedom of navigation and the freedom of the high seas do not exclude the inadmissibility of the permanent presence of military forces in the Indian Ocean region, as such permanent presence goes beyond the concept of free passage in international waters. It is argued that such activities should be brought under international regulation and responsibility once the freedom of navigation and the freedom of the high seas are interpreted as reasons to justify a permanent presence.

In demanding the withdrawal of extraregional Powers, the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean claim that the prevailing circumstances in the Indian Ocean, as distinct from the other zones of the world, are especially conducive to the application of a regional peace zone policy. The absence of any major maritime nations amongst the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, and the fact that all the outside Powers present in the area are geographically separate from the Indian Ocean and have no reason to consider it as critical or vital to their security and strategic interests, are some of the arguments cited by the countries in the region and their supporters.

While advancing such convincing arguments, the littoral and hinterland States have also recognised the right of all States to freedom of navigation as stipulated in international law and custom. As mentioned earlier, that right is recognised to the extent that such freedom will not in any way destabilize the littoral and hinterland States or the Indian Ocean region as a whole.

The harmonisation of views on the holding of the Colombo Conference and the overall implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean have been considered extremely important by the international community. As mentioned earlier, no issue facing the contemporary world can be settled in isolation, be it the political, military or economic and social interests of States. This is particularly true of complex issues confronting the world which have far-reaching repercussions beyond regional boundaries. This reality has been accepted by the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, and they have recognised the necessity of universal endorsement of the concept of the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean region.

The failure to appreciate this peace zone proposal, in the view of some schools of thought, is in part due to the fact that certain States tend to look upon the whole effort as a narrowly defined disarmament exercise. It has been pointed out by the initiators of the proposal, however, that it should be seen in the larger context of the maintenance of regional and international peace and security. The validity of this position is strengthened by their pointing to the relationship between the objectives of the zone of peace and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The concept and the operational aspect of the peace zone, as determined by these States, are based on major provisions of the Charter such as the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States, non-use of force or non-threat of the use of force, collective security aimed at peace and tranquillity of the region, etc. On these grounds, they call for the undivided support of the international community for the establishment of the peace zone.

II

Having commented on some of the important aspects and preoccupations influencing the present status of the Declaration, I also would like to make a few suggestions that may accelerate progress towards its implementation:

(a) The most important amongst them, as mentioned earlier, is the need for increased co-operation between the Super-Powers. A positive contribution to that end would be to list the Indian Ocean as a subject for discussion between them. It is no secret that the key to the solution of many issues before the international community lies in the hands of the Super-Powers. This gives them greater responsibility for initiating appropriate

action aimed at the resolution of such issues. They should engage constructively in examining ways and means for application of concrete measures that would bring about a greater degree of stability and contribute eventually to the establishment of lasting peace and security. The establishment of a zone of peace is well within this category. Needless to say, the active co-operation of other extra-regional Powers and other States would also be of immense value.

(b) Almost equally important is the firm commitment of the regional States to policies and concrete measures that would promote the prospect of early establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. These measures, *inter alia,* should include:

(i) Non-interference in a direct or indirect manner in the internal affairs of any State in the region and firm commitment to full respect for political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of these States.

(ii) Non-use of force or threat to use force against any State in the region.

(iii) Commitment to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes.

(iv) Promotion of greater co-operation in the field of economic, social and environmental activities, etc., in the region. The Association of South-East Asian Nations and South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation are welcome developments in this respect.

(v) Firm commitment to non-acquisition of nuclear and other forms of weapons of mass destruction.

(vi) Respect for and compliance with international treaties, conventions, covenants and other agreements that may strengthen the peace, security and stability of the region and the international system as a whole. Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a good example.

(vii) Commitment to the establishment of other forms of zones that may be complementary to the realisation of a zone of peace. The proposal for establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia is a good example.

(viii) Initiating precise and meaningful action aimed at the promotion of speedy implementation of the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. At the national and international levels,

priority should be accorded to policies and actions required to achieve this goal. In their bilateral relations with the extraregional Powers and like-minded countries, the regional States should seek active support for the implementation of the Declaration.

(ix) Determined efforts towards gradual dismantling of foreign military bases and other facilities in the territories of the regional States and in the Indian Ocean.

(x) Greater reliance on multilateral arrangements, particularly on the concept of collective security in the resolution of political, economic and social problems in the region, with the aim of ushering in a greater degree of stability. The establishment of a zone of peace should form an important part of this overall policy.

(c) There are also some important general measures that may be complementary to the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. These measures should be taken by the international community as a whole or by individual States outside the region, as applicable. Such measures may include:

(i) Greater injection of development-oriented assistance into the region, including the provision of favourable terms of trade and removal of other economic barriers that have retarded the economic and social development of the States in the region.

(ii) Accession to international treaties, conventions and covenants and other agreements that may create an international and regional atmosphere conducive to the realisation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean region. For example, strict compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and its international legal regime would provide a very healthy atmosphere for establishment of peace zones in various regions of the world.

(iii) Acknowledgement of the fact that bilateralism and multilateralism should not compete with each other but should be complementary and should work in parallel in the search for solutions to regional and international issues.

(iv) Commitment to the validity of the widely accepted view of the establishment of zones of peace as measures that could contribute immensely to the maintenance of international peace and security. In this respect. States should lend their

active support to efforts for the establishment of such zones, in particular for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean region.

III

Action aimed at the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean has been confined by and large to the United Nations. Very little has happened outside this forum. The time has come to examine what other action the community of nations could initiate to generate greater momentum for the efforts of the States directly concerned to bring into focus the importance of the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

As mentioned by the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, the United Nations is now engaged in the consideration of procedural and substantive matters that are connected with the holding of the Colombo Conference. The Committee has been able to agree on most of the procedural aspects in the course of its preparatory work and is now engaged in identifying and elaborating a set of issues and principles that may eventually get into a Final Document that could be adopted by the Colombo Conference. These issues and principles attempt to address the political, military, economic, social and other interests of the countries within and outside the region. Thus, they are issues and principles which directly or indirectly influence the self-interest of States and the implementation of the Declaration.

This gathering may wish to seize the opportunity to comment on these issues, as such comments will be of immense value in future efforts for their elaboration.

PEACE THROUGH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING: PROSPECTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

It is a truism to say that peace cannot be built without generating mutual confidence and trust. There is, however, no certainty that confidence-building will necessarily lead to the establishment of stable peace. Confidence-building as a concept, also as a practical measure, stands at the lowest rung of the peace process in any given region. It may or may not lead to the subsequent steps in that process, such as arms control or limitation, arms reduction, general and complete disarmament and eventually a viable structure of peace. Jorgen Holst defined confidence-building measures (CBMs) as "arrangements designed to produce an assurance of mind and a belief in the

trustworthiness of States and actions they undertake.' This implies that the need for confidence-building arises in situations where distrust, divergence or even antagonism is well entrenched between the subject States. In this respect, CBMs have a tendency to stabilize, freeze and even legitimize such divergence and antagonism. In their practical manifestations, experience so far shows that CBMs involve issues of advance information, "code of conduct" or "infrastructure" of procedures and constraints that could enhance the predictability of military activities of the States concerned. These arrangements help to avoid the possibility of surprise attack launched from one side on the other. They may also help one side better to understand the military movements of the other, thereby reducing the element of fear and apprehension and, hence, of conflict. But avoidance of conflict is not equivalent to securing peace. The CBMs may, by their success in avoiding conflicts, breed complacency about the ultimate goal of peace; in the process, they may display a tendency to become substitutes or alternatives to peace and disarmament.

The predictability of military activities achieved by the CBMs creates "transparency" of rival military movements and buildups. A large number of Western Powers favour such transparancy because, in the name of peace, it allows military buildup. For this reason, the non-aligned and socialist groups of countries in the United Nations have opposed such openness as being illusory, all the more so if the procedural and regulatory mechanisms are not backed up by political understanding and certain kinds of behaviour on the part of the concerned States.

The mechanical and illusory nature of CBMs in the peace process can be seen in the European experience, where CBMs have invoked considerable enthusiasm. The Helsinki process has been overly long and arduous. Conceived in 1954, the idea took almost twenty years to take shape and then only after a series of conferences in the mid-1970s. The implementation and monitoring of the CBMs agreed to at the final Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975 has not been easy. That is why, in less than ten years, it was found necessary to open another series of such conferences, at which the scope of CBMs was enlarged to cover security as an essential part of such measures. Accordingly, at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the exercise was described as one of evolving confidence and security-building. It was realised in the course of the deliberations on and analysis of the issues at stake that care had to be taken to ensure that CBMs did not underwrite the hegemony or special privileges of

the strong in the given region. That could lead to the consolidation of asymmetry. In such a situation, peace would remain a hostage of the powerful. CBMs also have to be directly linked with the perception of threat which, more often than not, is a product of military imbalance and asymmetry.

Notwithstanding the conceptual fragility and practical difficulties associated with CBMs, they have been vigorously pursued in Europe. The results yielded by the CBMs in maintaining peace and enhancing understanding have been found satisfactory. Encouraged by such experience, attempts are also being made in East Asia to institute CBMs in that region. Although there are qualitative differences in the two situations, the fact remains that in both regions there are well-defined ideological and bloc divisions. Such divisions are characterised by the entrenched linkages between the regional and the global (East-West) divides. CBMs in both regions are aimed at stabilising the divisions and making them more manageable in the changing parameters of global and regional security situations, since the assumption is that these confrontations and divisions cannot be eliminated.

The security situation in the Indian Ocean is very different from that in both Europe and in East Asia. The East-West divisions have been superimposed on the regional and subregional divisions in the Indian Ocean, but these linkages are not as entrenched as in Europe. The structure of great Power rivalry and competition in Europe is neatly bilateral with the clear dominance of the two Super-Powers. As a result, the mutual consent of those Powers on any particular measure is both a precondition and a conducive factor.

In East Asia and in the Indian Ocean region, and elsewhere in the third world, this is not so. Unlike in Europe, there are deep-rooted and long-standing bilateral conflicts and disputes that have been a source of wars and insecurity in the various subregions of the Indian Ocean. In some cases, the pattern of such intraregional conflict goes beyond the bilateral framework, such as in the case of Indo-China and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN); Iran, Iraq and the Gulf;

South Africa and the African front-line States; and Israel and the group of Arab countries. Roots of many of the intraregional conflicts can be traced to colonial legacies, lingering shadows of imperialism and the impact of global economic and strategic imbalances. The last but not least source of insecurity and conflict in the third world, including in the Indian Ocean region, is the widespread internal turmoil and disorder which get stimulated, intensified and complicated by the

impact of the other two factors, namely, intraregional conflicts and great Power rivalry and competition. The matrix of these three sources of conflict and insecurity varies from one subregion to another and one situation to another. Like Europe, the Indian Ocean region has had no major experience of stability and peace.

Notwithstanding the fundamental differences between the security situations of Europe and the Indian Ocean region identified above, the temptation to extend the positive elements of the European process, namely arms control and confidence-building measures, has always been on the agenda of some of the European countries and leaders. This is partly because of the Eurocentric nature of strategic thinking in the world today and partly because the European experience in confidence-building a la Helsinki and Stockholm Conferences is the only concrete example to fall back upon. In replying to the widespread Asian criticism of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reference to Helsinki-type conferences for initiating a peace and security process in the Asia-Pacific region, he said a year later in his Vladivostok speech of July 1986:

> "I suggested a sort of working hypothesis, or better to say, an invitation to discussion. And the only reason I referred to Helsinki is that so far the world community has no other experience of the kind. This does not mean, of course, that the European experience can be automatically transplanted to Asia and the Pacific. However, at present, any international experiment contains global features that are common to all mankind. This is only natural, as we live in an interdependent and largely integral world."

Gorbachev was not, however, the first leader to see a wider applicability of Helsinki-European experiences. Brezhnev had stated at the final stages of the Helsinki Conference in 1975 that its results could be used outside Europe. Since the early 1980s, the Federal Republic of Germany has been proposing guidelines for CBMs in the wider context of peace and disarmament efforts in the United Nations on the basis of the results of the Helsinki and Stockholm Conferences. Since 1986, the German Democratic Republic has brought forward specific proposals for CBMs in the United Nations deliberations on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, which are discussed below.

Most of the third world countries are not enthusiastic about endorsing assertions on the applicability of the European experience in other parts of the world. And yet, in principle, anything apparently positive must be given a sincere try in the peace-building process. Accordingly, instead of rejecting the idea of CBMs in the process of institutionalising peace in the Indian Ocean they should be given a sincere chance. In doing so, however, two things must be kept in mind.

One is that there should be no attempt to apply the European experience in CBMs mechanically to the Indian Ocean situation. The desired measures should be based upon a realistic evaluation of the security situation in the Indian Ocean region. Secondly, the exercise of evolving and implementing CBMs should not be at the cost of the ultimate objective of securing the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as defined in the United Nations Declaration on the subject incorporated in General Assembly resolution 2832(XXVI) of 16 December 1971.

The emphasis in that Declaration is on the elimination of the military presence of the extraregional Powers and the establishment of a system of "universal collective security without military alliances" in the Indian Ocean region. Caution in this regard is necessary because, as we noted in the previous section of this paper, CBMs have a tendency to become an end in themselves. Furthermore, the need for caution arises from the fact that since the mid-1970s, particularly following the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in 1979, there have been constant attempts on the part of some of the countries to dilute the thrust and substance of the 1971 Declaration. The possibility of these countries trying to use the CBM exercise to divert attention from the main issues of the Zone of Peace and weaken it cannot be ruled out. Such attempts to subvert the Declaration must be resisted.

Within contraints and cautions identified above, we may draw our attention to the CBM approach to advance the ultimate goal of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

There are three levels in the context of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace where CBMs may be envisaged. The first is at the level of great Power relationships. There have been several confidence-building initiatives and arrangements between the two Super-Powers at the wider global strategic level. Many of these may have a direct relevance to the Indian Ocean, or may be extended to the Indian Ocean for their benign and positive implications. For instance, in 1972, soon after the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, the United States and the USSR reached an understanding to prevent accidents or incidents of conflict between naval vessels and military aircraft overflying the high seas. A specific code of conduct was drawn up to ensure this. The abortive Naval Arms Limitation Talks (NALT) of 1977-78 between the two Powers may also be recalled. These talks were not successful not because the two did not want to establish confidence-building arrangements but because the phase of detente between them had come to an end and new areas of competition and

rivalry had cropped up. Now, in the present detente (shall we call it the "second detente"?), the Soviet leader has taken several bold initiatives. In his Vladivostok (July 1986) and Krasnoyarsk (September 1988) speeches he repeatedly underlined the issue of confidence-building in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In doing so, he recalled the experience of the understanding already existing with the United States in this respect. In his interview for the Indonesian paper *Merdeka,* in July 1987, he spelt out some of the specific proposals in this regard. These included: (a) restricting the movement of vessels carrying nuclear weapons; (b) curbing anti-submarine warfare (ASW) activities in specified zones; (c) limitations on naval exercises, etc. In the context of confidence-building between the Super-Powers on the high seas, the joint United States-USSR study entitled "Requirements for Stable Co-existence in United States-Soviet Relations", released in May 1988, may also be mentioned. Some of the recommendations of that study are pertinent in relation to the security concerns of the third world, such as the non-use of combat military forces and proxy volunteer military forces in regional conflicts. Above all, the subject of confidence-building on the seas is being debated in the United Nations deliberations on disarmament.

It is true that the unfolding detente between the Super-Powers has relaxed the international security situation and enhanced prospects of peace in the various regions of the third world. But the fact that the underlying principle of the super-Power detente is management of conflict rather than its complete elimination dampens the hope aroused by this detente. As such, one can occasionally discern elements of convergence, as evidenced in the United States-USSR work on the question of developing a list of sophisticated weapons which they would agree not to transfer to any third world nation. Concurrently, they could use their joint influence to ban similar transfers by other major arms exporters, such as France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Sweden and the United Kingdom." This would amount to establishing a suppliers club which could have far-reaching adverse implications for the security of the third world countries. It is intriguing that China has not been included in the proposed suppliers club even though it has emerged as a major exporter of arms. Elements of Soviet-United States convergence may also be seen in Gorbachev's Merdeka interview referred to above, when he said, while talking about the concept of "double zero": "We do not link this initiative in this case with the United States nuclear presence in Korea, the Philippines, or Diego Garcia. We would like to hope, though, that it will at the least not grow". His Krasnoyarsk speech was a welcome advance on this

position. As is obvious, United States bases, like the one in Diego Garcia, are a major factor to be eliminated in establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. Any concession by the Soviet Union or by any other country, extraregional or regional, in helping the perpetuation of such bases is antithetical to the very objective of the United Nations Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Any CBM that ignored this reality would be incompatible with peace in the region and fall into the category of such feared CBMs as those as those that seek to legitimize hegemony and special privileges of the powerful.

A further point to be noted with regard to CBMs among the extraregional Powers of the Indian Ocean is that other nuclear Powers and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council should join with the Super-Powers. In the CBMs concerning nuclear arms control and naval military activities these countries, namely China, France, and the United Kingdom, must also participate. The first and last of these countries have significant naval presence in the Indian Ocean, while China is a potentially powerful actor. The recent movement of Chinese naval vessels up the coasts off Karachi, Colombo and Chittagong indicate the dimensions of China's role in the Indian Ocean power balance. It is unfortunate that the other nuclear and naval Powers are not joining the two Super-Powers in the process of evolving detente and the reduction of armaments levels. Without their doing so, CBMs in the Indian Ocean may not become viable.

The second level of CBMs in the Indian Ocean, and in some ways it is more important than the first, is the one pertaining to relations between the extraregional nuclear and major naval Powers on the one hand and the countries of the Indian Ocean region on the other. The military presence of the Super-Powers in the Indian Ocean is only partly aimed at each other. A large part of their military presence in the region is equally directed towards protecting their perceived interests and promoting their desired objectives in relation to the countries of the region. For instance, it has been made known that the setting up of the Rapid Deployment Task Force by the United States in the Indian Ocean was motivated by the missions aimed at the Ocean's actors with or without the backing of the rival greater Power. Perhaps the Soviet Union is aware of this, and that could be why it has been more modest and hesitant in its various arms control initiatives pertaining to the Indian Ocean in recent years. The contrast between the Soviet position in this respect on the issues affecting East Asia and the Pacific on the one hand and the Indian Ocean region on the other is too stark to be missed.

One of the vital steps towards CBMs between the extraregional Powers and the regional countries could be initiated by the convening of an international conference on the Indian Ocean. This conference was to be hosted in Colombo—in the early 1980s—in pursuance of the decisions taken in 1979 by the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. The convening of the Conference has been persistently frustrated by the Western Powers under the excuse that it would not serve any purpose unless improvement in the security situation in and around the Indian Ocean took place and there was some harmonisation of the security perceptions of the regional countries. The efforts of the non-aligned and the socialist groups of countries to counter these moves have not succeeded so far. The faint hope of this conference taking place in 1990 or 1991 lies in the prospect of the rest of the countries deciding to hold the Conference even without the participation of the United States and some other Western countries. This may not be all that undesirable because only such a decision could compel the opponents of the Conference to change their strategy. Further, the international Conference on the Indian Ocean could be a continuing one, like the Helsinki and the Stockholm Conferences, or even like the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea. In that case those countries which did not join the conference on the Indian Ocean at the beginning could do so subsequently.

The Western Powers' opposition to the holding of the Indian Ocean conference is in reality not on the basis of what is being argued. It is a tactical posture to cover the steady growth of their military presence in the region which has been taking place while attempts have been going on to hold the Conference to advance the objective of the zone of peace. The fact that the United States military presence in the Indian Ocean has been considerably augmented is too obvious to have to be evidenced in detail here. The expansion of the Diego Garcia base, the increase in the number of bases and facilities to which the United States enjoys access, and the growing number of its naval vessels with or without nuclear weapons in the region clearly underline this fact. A careful reading of United States strategic thinking for the coming years and decades suggests that there are no prospects of this presence being reduced, all the more so because it is linked with its space programme." It is perhaps the Soviet Union's awareness of the strong United States stakes in such a military presence that makes it soft on Indian Ocean issues. Moreover, the Soviet Union's military presence in the Indian Ocean has also grown noticeably over the same years. The presence of the Soviet Union is also linked with its space programme. The multidimensional stakes of the Super-Powers in the

Indian Ocean are reflected in their fervent desire for safe and smooth right to passage through the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean.

No CBM is possible at the second level without me holding of the conference on the Indian Ocean. In fact, the holding of the conference in itself may be considered as a CBM. When it is held, one of the major issues under debate will be that of the presence of nuclear arms on the naval vessels of the extraregional Powers. On that issue, a Soviet proposal pertinent for consideration as a CBM is the restriction of the movement of naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons so that the coastlines of the littoral countries would remain outside the range of such weapons *(Merdeka* interview). The non-buildup of naval forces—both conventional and nuclear (Krasnoyarsk speech)—is another idea. There is however, scope for the Soviet Union to move farther in this field and come up with a proposal that would actually ask for the reduction of the naval buildup. The Western response to some of these ideas from the Soviet Union has been rather disappointing. If they want to instil any confidence among the littoral countries in the region, they must at least come forward to change their policy of not disclosing the identity of naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons. There is an urgent need for the Western extra-regional Powers to let the Conference on the Indian Ocean take place. At that conference, they should come up with concrete measures to make clear their nuclear intentions in the region. All this is equally applicable in the field of conventional naval buildup rights of the extraregional Powers and their basing facility arrangements with the Indian Ocean littoral States.

The third level at which CBMs could be introduced is that of the littoral and hinterland countries themselves. It was clearly stipulated in the 1971 Declaration that the countries of the region, for the establishment of a "universal collective security system", will initiate ventures of regional co-operation and adhere to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations in their mutual dealings. The littoral countries have generally done their best to maintain mutual confidence except in the cases where the subregions of the Indian Ocean were deeply penetrated by the dimensions of the second East-West Cold War. This has been the case in spite of the fact that there have been many persisting unresolved issues.

Many new issues of mutual antagonism and conflict have either been kept within manageable limits or even resolved satisfactorily, such as the question of Indo-Sri Lankan differences on the ethnic problem. Not only this, but in the period when the extraregional Powers

were augmenting their military presence in the Indian Ocean, particularly since the breakdown of NALT in 1978, the littoral and hinterland countries have brought into being viable structures for regional co-operation. Mention may be made here of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), the Southern African Development Co-ordination Committee (SADCC), and the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) in the Persian Gulf. ASEAN, which was established in 1967, has grown in strength with the addition of Brunei in 1986. Its organisational cohesion has also increased, and it has now reached a stage where it can actively pursue its original objective of being declared as a nuclear-weapon-free and neutral zone. After the resolution of the Kampuchean issue, the prospects of the Indo-Chinese States joining ASEAN may also improve. These subregional organisations in themselves may be seen as manifestations of CBMs, as they have indeed contributed positively towards the improvement of the subregional—and hence regional—environment for peace and greater understanding.

Without taking much positive note of the subregional groupings in the context of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, the interested extraregional Powers have mostly highlighted the negative aspects of sub-regional security situations in order to delay the holding of the conference on the Indian Ocean. They have also encouraged divisive moves, like the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia proposed by one of the close Western allies, Pakistan, and a single-country peace zone idea, moved by Nepal. While the second proposal is conceptually fuzzy, the first is incompatible with the guidelines laid down by the United Nations on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The mischief component in the United States position on the whole question of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the context of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace becomes clear when we compare its stand on the ASEAN and the Pakistani proposals. While the first, which has the endorsement of all the subregional members, is rejected, the second, which does not enjoy unanimity, is enthusiastically supported. The best approach to confidence-building at the level of the littoral and hinterland States is to support and encourage the structures for subregional co-operation so as to help them build and consolidate their mutual confidence. In lending such support, the extraregional Powers should not use these sub-regional organisations as instruments of their objectives and interests in the Indian Ocean region.

Though the idea of confidence-building was inherent in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as it was adopted in 1971, it 'is only recently, that is, in the past couple of years, that

specific proposals have been made in this respect. There are two documents before the United Nations *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean which contain concrete CBM proposals. These documents are a working paper by the German Democratic Republic, entitled "Confidence-Building Measures in the Indian Ocean", and a list of "Substantive issues and principles" identified for consideration at the level of a working group for the establishment of the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

The measures identified in the German Democratic Republic's paper are positive, and cover a wide area. The proposal calls for quantitative restraints on the military activities of the extraregional Powers. It suggests a gradual approach for the removal of military bases from the region. The paper also lays down guidelines for the safety of international sea lanes and air communications in the region. However, it suffers from being too general. On the very important question of verification of the CBMs themselves, it does not propose anything concrete. It does not mention that such verification should be multilateral and not left to national means which, in the case of most of the regional countries, are highly inadequate.

The other document also contains useful ideas for confidence-building. But it incorporates many general principles which are outside the scope of the United Nations Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. For example, it mentions non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the question of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These are issues of a wider nature and are already under deliberation in other United Nations forums. The document is very vague on the nuclear presence of the extraregional Powers. "Assurances by the nuclear-weapon States of the non-use of nuclear weapons against littoral and hinterland States". No one knows who is expected to guarantee such assurances. And even if such assurances were honoured, what would happen if a nuclear duel were to start in the Indian Ocean near the littoral States between the vessels of the extraregional adversaries? There is no mention of the threat of nuclear weapons. This is how such proposals dilute the substance of the Declaration and create a case for the legitimacy of the military presence of the powerful extraregional States. Some of these issues, therefore, need to be drastically revised before being brought up for serious deliberation.

The foregoing discussion underlines the complexity of the peace process in the Indian Ocean region. Although initiatives for CBMs may play a constructive role in this peace process, they will in no way

reduce its complexity. What is desired is that the CBMs advance and facilitate the peace process and not halt or freeze it in the form of just CBMs. There is no success story of such a nature. And the security situation of the Indian Ocean region is so multifaceted and diverse that CBMs are not able to break fresh ground in this respect. It would therefore be advisable to handle the question of confidence-building with great care and circumspection.

INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

It strikes me as peculiarly inappropriate these days, when so much seems to be changing in the Soviet Union, for an American scholar and one-time Government servant to comment before a meeting sponsored by the United Nations Association of the USSR on the "interests" of his host as well as on the interests of other major Powers. However, that was the task assigned to me for today. I hope—and suspect—that my comments will open a useful discussion.

By "major Powers", I take it, the organisers mean the States that are the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. I must admit to a sense of genuine paradox in this. I find it very difficult to consider power relationships within the Indian Ocean without also considering the largest littoral States, for I have always considered India, by far the largest State in the Indian Ocean region, as well as Pakistan or Indonesia as also important to the evolution of relations within the region.

Nevertheless, I shall follow the convention of your vocabulary and make a few observations about the "interests" of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom, and France. And, admittedly, I will abstain from presuming to discuss the interests of India and those other Indian Ocean States—Pakistan, Indonesia, and Australia. I hope that in the course of the discussion to follow, they too will be heard.

This study attempts to capture the central perspectives of each of the subject States.

I have two introductory points:

(a) It has been said that "States have no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests". Yet, we know that great States do change their perceptions of their interests, depending on the rise to power of different leaders, changing capabilities and changing perceptions of the dynamic international realities

that may harm or serve them. I take it that one purpose of the organizers of this seminar is to contribute to that process of changing perceptions.

(b) While considering mainly the interests of the relevant major Powers, one cannot forget that there are also some 25 other States directly washed by the Indian Ocean and its associated gulfs and estuaries. And since as statesmen—and as students of these matters—we are considering an international system based on the notion of sovereign equality, the concerns of smaller States cannot properly be ignored.

Because I am more familiar with American perspectives, I shall begin with those.

Interests of the United States

The Indian Ocean is of importance to the United States primarily as: (a) *un ocean de passage;* (b) a critical source of energy for the whole world economy; (c) a region affected by Asia's particular geostrategic structure; and (d) a region where bitter hostilities and sometimes open conflicts have been highly destructive for the lives of the region's "ordinary people" and which at times have threatened to involve major Powers more deeply in regional affairs.

As a major user of the Indian Ocean, the assured and uninhibited flow of ships, of goods and services through the Indian Ocean and its associated gulfs and natural extensions is one major American interest. This derives from Washington's concern for the economic health of its allies in Europe and Asia and that of other trading partners. It may become less derivative and more direct in the future as America imports more energy resources from the Gulf as its own wells become depleted. This is encapsulated in a concern for the freedom of the seas—the right to peaceful use, transit and overflight of the Indian Ocean and its access straits as one of the world's high seas.

This concern not only derives from a long tradition in international practice of freedom of the high seas, which belong to no single State or group of States, but also from the peculiar character of the American political economy. As an island nation, dependent for its prosperity on a world-wide network of commercial and exchange relations, it contrasts most sharply with that other continental Power, the Soviet Union. The United States, the States of Western Europe, Japan, and the newly industrialised countries of South-East Asia all depend upon the uninterrupted transit of the Indian Ocean for their economic well-being and prosperity. While the Indian Ocean may be unique for the

States directly washed by it, for all these other States, it is not that peculiar. They all depend equally upon far-flung sea lanes across the other oceans of the world. As a result, the American Government, on fundamental principle, I understand, is opposed to the efforts of any littoral States to set limits to the types or movements of ships that may ply the Indian Ocean as well as any of the other oceans.

More particularly, the Persian Gulf and the sea lanes leading to and from it are of the highest priority for America and those other States. This means that the assured passage of the key choke points—the Strait of Hormuz, the Babel Mandeb, the route through Suez or around the Cape to Europe or through the Straits of Malacca to Taiwan, Japan or on to Panama and continental North or South America—is of global importance, quite beyond the Indian Ocean itself. Moreover, the littoral States of the Indian Ocean are equally if not even more concerned that these narrow choke points not be blocked.

This concern was known and affirmed well before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Moscow's withdrawal, which everyone applauds—and many are grateful for—is indeed a relief to us all. But that does not now downgrade the importance of freedom of commercial and naval movements through the Indian Ocean, and most especially to and from the Persian Gulf.

Two events confirmed for American policy makers the importance of the Gulf over all other regions in the Indian Ocean. First, the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and OPEC's oil embargo and the sudden eight-fold price rise in oil underlined the dependence of the Western and developing economies on an assured flow of oil from the Gulf. This was a major stimulus to the expansion of Diego Garcia beyond its austere communications configuration, as testimony before Congressional committees in succeeding years make clear. Secondly, the United States-Soviet "alert-crisis" confrontation towards the end of that conflict dramatised to both Washington and Moscow, as well as to the Indian Ocean capitals, that super-Power support for opposing third world clients could be very dangerous. It was a reminder that unresolved regional conflicts can pose severe policy dilemmas for the major Powers as well as for the contending regional States.

The tragic Iran-Iraq war which began in 1980 was a sharp reminder that it was a false diagnosis to blame major "outside Powers" for all regional conflicts, as some members of the Non-Aligned Movement have often alleged. Kautilya, the great Indian commentator, long ago recognised that neighbouring States are often rivals, and that, from time immemorial, small States have been worried about their larger

neighbours and have sought help from more distant Powers to offset these "threatening" States. Kuwait, a small and peculiarly exposed State threatened by a large belligerent, appealed to the major Powers. They responded with the much increased naval presence of Washington, Moscow and others in the Gulf to help keep shipping lanes open. It is hard for me to see how the naval escort system that was established—and which eventually was widely acknowledged by all world shipping as useful—could have been put in place if the restrictions called for in the maximalist view of the Indian Ocean peace zone advocates had been in force. It is deeply regretted that towards the end of that miserable conflict an erroneous American naval decision error led to the loss of an Iranian airliner with all aboard.

No doubt, there are some who would object to the presence of any forces from outside the Indian Ocean. But I would argue that it was the naval presence of the major Powers and their diplomatic collaboration with other members of the Security Council which eventually put in place the framework for the ceasefire. When the warring protagonists were sufficiently exhausted, the framework was there for them to use. This development illustrates how the presence and constructive diplomacy of the major Powers can be useful. Indeed, the smaller Gulf States continue inconspicuous requests to the United States to withdraw their naval forces only slowly even though the war is over, suggesting that the major Powers have their utility for the weaker, smaller littoral States when they fear regional conflicts or when zealous or ambitious neighbours pose what are seen as serious risks. As I understand it, the United States is expecting to run down its naval forces in the region to the more normal, pre-war level as soon as feasible.

A third consideration which has been important in American perceptions of its interests may be called the peculiar geostrategic structure of the landmass. It is noted that the huge Soviet Union, stretching 13 time zones from the north Atlantic all the way to the Pacific and the Sea of Japan, is surrounded, particularly along the Indian Ocean rim, apart from India, by numerous smaller, inherently weaker. States. By that geographical asymmetry, all these smaller States, living on the margins of the Soviet Union, exist in the shadow of this huge land Power. This would be the case even if the smaller neighbouring States in the Middle East and South Asia did not recall efforts by Stalin or some of his successors to push Soviet frontiers or a Soviet-type regime westward and southward, or at times even to encourage small but committed minorities to destabilize some of the newly independent countries that separate the Sino-Soviet realm from

the Indian Ocean. As a result, a number of littoral States including Iran and certain other States of the Persian Gulf, as well as Pakistan, Thailand and Malaysia were ready to develop special relations with the United States for reasons of their own. Unhappily, actions during the Brezhnev era in Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Afghanistan and Vietnam reawakened these memories.

Such relationships are subject to change, as we have experienced with the Islamic Republic of Iran during the last ten years. Moreover, many Americans hope President Gorbachev's new approaches will successfully allay these old fears. As Americans see it, this intractable structural geographical fact nevertheless means that serious consideration of naval restrictions in the Indian Ocean requires simultaneous concern for land-based manpower and air power that project their shadow across the littoral States from the north.

Fourthly, Washington has been distressed by the frequency of regional hostilities, by long-standing unresolved regional rivalries and periodic open conflict within the region to be designated a Zone of Peace. Until recently, it has seemed to me, regional statesmen have made fewer attempts to deal with their differences than have the major Powers, whose periodic summits and sustained diplomatic interchanges have moderated misunderstanding and led to a number of arms control, hot line, and confidence-building measures.

We all know that economic development is not an easy enterprise. But one thing I believe from watching the Indian Ocean States for many years is that expenditures for arms, generated in the light of long-standing regional rivalries, have distracted Governments from constructive tasks, wasted resources, and contributed to the poverty that afflicts so many. Understandably, therefore, Washington, along with many other Governments, welcomes the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), just as many countries also welcomed the efforts of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote regional co-operation in that part of the world.

Economic and technical assistance programmes from the major Powers have at times provided substantial resource transfers. And, in emergency periods, large quantities of food grains have been made available. Fortunately, thanks in part to these efforts at technological transfers but mainly to the reforms effected by a number of Indian Ocean Governments and agriculturalists, the principal States of South Asia now at least feed themselves even though their populations continue to grow rapidly.

Interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

No doubt, it will seem pretentious of me to interpret in this company the interests of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, let me make a serious attempt to enter the perspectives of our Soviet friends.

For the USSR, as for the United States, the Indian Ocean is also an *ocean de passage.* As the Soviet Union develops a more complex and sophisticated economy, there will be even more exchanges between the economies of the European part of the USSR in the West with those of Siberia and the Eastern provinces on the Pacific. Even with the double-tracking of the trans-Siberian railroad, that line is the most overloaded major rail line anywhere. We all know that shipping by sea is the most economical for bulk cargoes and for heavy machinery and capital goods.

Assured passage through key choke points therefore is as important for Moscow as it is for the Western countries. To be sure, the Strait of Hormuz is less consequential for Moscow, since the Soviet Union ships no oil in the Gulf for its own use, although Gulf oil obtained in exchange for weapons may be useful in its economic relations with other States in the Indian Ocean region. Suez, the Bab-al-Mandeb, Malacca and the Cape, however, are important for the commercial movement of goods and services and for the transit of naval vessels into and across the Indian Ocean. It is no accident, as our friends used to say, that the Soviet Union has devoted special attention to the key port of Aden, to Socotra and to installations that oversee the Bab-al-Mandeb, or to Cam Ranh Bay that monitors the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean crossing the South China Sea.

On a different, second, level, what happens to the Indian Ocean littoral States could affect the world correlation of forces.

The Indian Ocean region could contain sources of threat, particularly to the southern parts of the Soviet Union. This might be perceived as political/ideological or nationalistic/religious, as the Muslim peoples of the "sun-belt" republics might be disturbed by the exuberance of fundamentalist Shiites or by the less excitable Sunnis.

Alternatively, strategic anxieties might suggest the possibility of a more conventional American military initiative, projected through one or another of the southern border States, such as Iran, or perhaps even Pakistan. Security specialists are paid to worry about the worst conceivable case, but surely this is too fanciful for serious people to take seriously. On the other hand, the intense agitation among

Moscow's Indian Ocean littoral friends concerning SLBM-carrying submarines have suggested genuine Soviet anxieties on this score, which were largely allayed, I understand, during the Carter administration. To be sure, carrier-based aircraft in the Arabian Sea could strike southern Russia, but submarines within sight of America's great coastal cities more than checkmate such hypothetical threats. Along this line of thought, I cannot help but note that the development of New Delhi's submarine fleet, recently augmented by nuclear-powered vehicles, does seem to intensify anxieties among India's many smaller regional neighbours.

The shore of the Indian Ocean as well as some of the small island States instead might be seen as possibly providing political opportunities. There has been a string of newly independent States where memories of European imperialist rule has remained fresh. In many instances, political institutions may not yet be solidly established. Many of them are multi-ethnic States. Poverty in some has been hugely visible. There have been a number of long-standing inter-State rivalries that have sometimes erupted into armed conflict, as between India and Pakistan, Somalia and Ethiopia or Arabic peoples and Iranians. If, as we have sometimes been told, international politics should be seen in class-conflict terms, surely on occasion these States must have been perceived as promising targets for advancing the "world revolutionary cause".

Finally, on a more diplomatic level, the Indian Ocean States might be seen as a source of useful friends and allies, ready to support Soviet geostrategic interests or diplomatic initiatives if they are put forward in the right way. There could be shared interests. For example, following the Sino-Soviet split and the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, Moscow and New Delhi had a common interest in standing together against Chinese pressures. In earlier periods, India, more articulate than most of the others, found many reasons to object to American activities in the region. Moreover, India also could be for Moscow a useful source of light industrial and consumer goods obtainable with roubles.

In addition, the Non-Aligned Movement could be expected to take positions that generally would be helpful to Soviet interests. However, they could not really be counted upon. For instance, the responses to developments in Afghanistan or Kampuchea served to demonstrate true independence, and the readiness of many in the Movement to look at issues "on their merits", as Nehru used to say.

At a third, more mundane level, the Indian Ocean could be a reliable source of fish, a not insignificant interest in cases where animal

protein remains in short supply. Soviet trawler fleets have been a familiar sight in Indian Ocean waters; some of them have been remarkably well-equipped with sophisticated electronic gear that went well beyond the traditional trawler task of pursuing and landing fish.

Major Powers' Shared Interests

The two major Powers might be able to work jointly to bring about constructive change:

- Both Powers have specific reasons of interest and policy for being in the Indian Ocean, quite apart from whatever interests that might have been "conceived in the context of great Power rivalry".
- Both want to be sure the other does not turn Afghanistan into an instrument of its own foreign policy.
- Both have sought to induce India and Pakistan to find a mutual accommodation. To be sure, the flow of arms from each major Power to its respective regional friend can affect the regional balance of Power as between them, and hence may intensify an arms competition and induce either or both to be more reluctant to make genuine concessions to the other's fears and concerns. But more particularly, the pace of the naval buildup by littoral States, it is said, is affecting relations between those States.
- Both major Powers are concerned about the possibility of a nuclearised South Asia—and both have encouraged their respective friends to refrain from the acquisition of these awful weapons.
- Both appear to encourage confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan, and more reliable and regular communication between them.

Interests of China

Of all the major Powers, China has the least presence or stake in the Indian Ocean. For Beijing, the Indian Ocean is less of an *ocean de passage* and a source of raw materials than it is for the others. Yet, Beijing's policies suggest that the Indian Ocean has direct security significance all the same, depending largely upon its relations with its immediate neighbours, the Soviet Union and India.

Beijing's interpretations of its interests in the region have changed more than those of the other States and, without naval Power to spare for the Indian Ocean, its influence has been largely by means of political support, economic assistance and modest military transfers.

It has followed closely positions taken by the Non-Aligned Movement and has consistently stressed its identity with the third world states, vigorously criticising the former colonial Powers and, until the early 1970s, the United States. At the same time, in the 1960s, its deepening differences with Moscow as the more dangerous super-Power tended increasingly to define Beijing's priorities in the Indian Ocean. Until the recent exploratory detente with Moscow, Beijing saw the Indian Ocean as a critical arena wherein to strive against what it called Moscow's "hegemonism". In the 1950s it was friendly with its large neighbour India, and it supported what it considered ideologically sympathetic regimes in newly independent Africa. Its difficulties with India in the 1960s however, raised the importance of more traditional geopolitical concerns nearer home. It sought to consolidate relations with Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka, India's immediate neighbours. Like the other major Powers, China took strong exception to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and, with the United States, provided steady military support to the *Mujahadeen* through Pakistan. In South-East Asia, following the American withdrawal from Vietnam, China vigorously opposed Soviet activities in support of Indo-China, particularly its backing of Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea.

Sino-Soviet explorations suggest that there may be an easing of relations between the two, a development which might permit a much wider relaxation of relations within the Indian Ocean region. China has also encouraged India and Pakistan to resolve their differences and has encouraged the evolution of SAARC.

Interests of the United Kingdom

Even though United Kingdom's major South Asian colonies achieved independence in the late 1940s and a number of smaller States became independent later, most of them retained membership in the Commonwealth, and London continued to have constructive relations with many States in the region.

The United Kingdom's knowledgeable involvement in the affairs of the Gulf at one time deterred Iraqi ambitions towards Kuwait. In preparing to withdraw its establishments from East of the Suez in 1971, it helped induce the settlement of numerous other long-standing territorial and familial differences, for instance, between Saudi Arabia and its neighbours, and paved the way for an orderly development of the United Arab Emirates. Its assistance to Oman, in co-operation with the Shah, assisted Muscat in repressing the Dhofar rebellion which was receiving support from South Yemen. In West-central Africa,

the United Kingdom played a constructive diplomatic role in the finding of a way through the Zimbabwe devolution. Periodically, it has sought to encourage India and Pakistan to-moderate their differences and has quietly supported the evolution of SAARC, and of the GCC in the Gulf.

As an island State, acutely dependent upon freedom of movement of commercial and naval vessels on the high seas, the United Kingdom, like the United States, is reluctant to support measures that appear designed to limit the freedom of ships of all kinds to move through the high seas. More particularly, it believes that naval limitations in the Indian Ocean cannot be seriously considered without also taking into account land-based air power in areas contiguous to the littoral States. London welcomes steps by littoral States to pursue assuagement of the many conflicts within the region more energetically and does not accept the argument that the region's troubles are largely the result of the presence of outside forces.

It has seen its interests as sufficiently parallel to those of the United States to permit the American navy to use the support facility at Diego Garcia. That suggests a continued British strategic interest in developments in the Indian Ocean, which it periodically demonstrates with naval visits. On the other hand, it has retained a distinctive approach to many Indian Ocean issues, drawing upon its many years of special administrative experience and educational and commercial relationships. The United Kingdom retains a residual security relationship with Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand and Australia.

Interests of France

The Government of France considers itself to be an Indian Ocean littoral Power by virtue of the French possessions that have been recognised for centuries. Reunion is an overseas *Department* of France and the island of Mahore (Mayotte) is a *"collectivite speciale "* reflecting its unusual ethnic and religious mix. A number of sparsely inhabited islands in the Mozambique Channel oversee that sea lane and are said to encompass significant sea-bed resources, while several inhospitable islands in the southern waters attest more to France's long presence in the Indian Ocean than to any current utility of those isolated islets.

Unlike the other major Western Powers, the French have accepted the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace as a potentially plausible concept which could be appropriate if it were adequately modified. At the

same time, of course, any restrictive provisions, in its view, would not be applied to France since it is not an "outside" Power but quite as much an Indian Ocean Power as many of the newer States which have only recently received their independence.

All these *Departements, "collectivites"* and dependencies in the Indian Ocean are regarded as important elements in France's international presence, and must be defended. Accordingly, France must be able to move its ships and provide naval support for any likely contingency. That requires a naval base somewhere within reach, and Djibouti provides the necessary facility.

Like the British, Americans, Russians and Italians, the French, too, sent escort ships to the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. It would be highly unusual for any significant development in the security of the Indian Ocean to occur without a French presence.

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Coming in from the Cold War: Arctic Security in the Emerging Global Climate: A View from Canada

In his report of 17 June 1992, "An Agenda for Peace", United Nations former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asserted that:

> "Mutual confidence and good faith are essential to reducing the likelihood of conflict between States. Many such measures are available to Governments that have the will to employ them. Systematic exchange of military missions, formation of regional or subregional risk reduction centres, arrangements for the free flow of information, including the monitoring of regional arms agreements, are examples. I ask all regional organisations to consider what further confidence-building measures might be applied in their areas and to inform the United Nations of the results. I will undertake periodic consultations on confidence-building measures with parties to potential, current or past disputes and with regional organisations, offering such advisory assistance as the Secretariat can provide."

Introduction

In the wake of the post-Cold War rush of peoples to establish new countries based on outstanding religious, ethnic and other claims to national sovereignty, the universal Arctic is rapidly becoming an area around which is swirling much cautious preventive diplomacy and international negotiation. The Arctic as a security region is distinct from other regions around the world. It lacks the ancient quarrels of the Middle East, and the heavy concentration of arms of Europe; in addition, the prospects of violent ethnic conflict erupting in the Arctic region are remote to say the least.

Throughout the Cold War, the Arctic was an area of immense strategic importance; notwithstanding—or perhaps because of—its barrenness, it served mainly as a buffer zone between the Super-

Powers and was armed and defended accordingly. Its main significance was drawn from the prevailing East-West tensions; it was not regarded as a security region of concern unto itself. Military forces stationed in the Arctic served a very broad purpose: national defence of various countries' homelands and interests rather than defence of the Arctic *per se.* Many have believed, and continue to believe, that the Arctic itself has been and continues to be a relatively safe place, notwithstanding its position between the United States and Russia. Now that the Cold War is over and related tensions have eased, what are the implications for security in the Arctic? Can confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) play a role in an Arctic security regime?

As they begin to assess Arctic security considerations in the post-Cold War climate, the States in the region are moving cautiously and conservatively, largely because they are as yet unsure how to proceed, or perhaps even are unsure of the goal. They are assessing security not only in the traditional, classical military sense, but in the broadest possible meaning of the word, encompassing such factors as environmental, social and economic security.

In looking to the Antarctic for inspiration and guidance, both from the perspective of similar physical conditions and from that of the Antarctic Treaty regime, the leaders of the Arctic countries appear to have dismissed certain aspects of that regime, having reached an unspoken agreement that the path of "common heritage" followed in the case of the Antarctic Treaty is not one they wish to follow. Rather, there is a desire to secure and develop the Arctic area, for the time being at least, in alignment with the aspirations of the Arctic countries, while bearing in mind the larger question of universal security. Further, while there may well be certain features of the Antarctic regime that are transferable to the Arctic, it must be recognised that in a great many respects each of these areas is substantially different from the other. The caution of the Arctic States is compounded by a sense that there may not be more than one chance to ensure the security of the Arctic. If Governments and peoples fail to be deliberate in their negotiations, they may not reach an agreement at all, leaving the Arctic areas of individual countries open for unilateral, uncoordinated national action—a situation which would not be in the best interests of the region as a whole and which might indeed aggravate conditions throughout the Arctic.

Now is an opportune time, before tensions arise, to begin the establishment of a comprehensive security regime. The listing of CSBMs

which could be prime elements in such a regime for the Arctic is a proactive movement and solid first step in the proper direction.

The term *universal Arctic* needs to be clarified. There is i distressing tendency for analysts and commentators discussing the Arctic to see the area in national or regional terms. That is, Europeans, Asians and Canadians nearly always look due north and think of the object of their gazing as "the Arctic". It is necessary, when discussing the future of the region, to take a broader outlook: to look beyond national borders to see the region as a whole. Hence the use of the term "the universal Arctic" to describe the area of the world north of sixty degrees, thirty-three minutes north latitude. The Arctic countries are: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States. The Russian Federation has the largest Arctic land area, followed by Canada.

This chapter will briefly discuss the strategic importance of the Arctic during the Cold War years, before moving on to a consideration of the Canadian approach to the region and an outline of various Canadian governmental and private initiatives, as well as a brief description of one student project on the subject worthy of expansion. The question of whether CSBMs established in other areas are suitable for transfer to the Arctic will be answered and a tentative list of some measures that might most appropriately and effectively serve to make the Arctic more secure will be put forward for later and fuller discussion.

A Transformed Political Climate

During the visits of Russian President Yeltsin to Canada and the United States, the euphoria displayed by the public of both countries, and by the usually more staid parliamentarians, while reminiscent of that of the Gorbachev era, seemed more genuine. It is as if Canadians and Americans together with their Western allies desperately want to believe that from this time forward, Russia will march resolutely and unerringly into a democratic, secure future.

Today's political climate is certainly more relaxed than that of the Cold War. Yet, realistically, it ought not to be expected that peace, security, tranquillity and harmony will automatically become permanent features of the international landscape. It is true that traditional hostility and distrust are waning and in some areas are on the verge of disappearing, but the relationship of the future will be one of "healthy competition", rather than one in which companies and countries simply share all with one another. Healthy competition will require States to continue to act in their own best interests but also to

have a positive and progressive regard for the various ways in which they can assist Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet internal and external empires. The Arctic is one area in which this competition will be staged. However, this time the competition will have as its aim the establishment of security in a very broad sense.

During the Cold War, the Arctic was an area from which each super-Power kept surveillance over the other and in which each stationed military forces so as to be able to react quickly to aggressive moves by the other. As with other areas of the world, it was pervaded by an atmosphere of suspicion, with the moves of each side being met with immediate distrust by the adversary, whether nationally or as part of an alliance. Even the definition of where the Arctic began and ended, the very delineation of its geographic limits, was an issue. For example, some countries sought to exclude from their "Arctic" areas those locations in which were stationed military forces which were regarded by others as offensive in nature and far beyond what was needed for self-defence. In the new era of healthy competition, surveillance will still play a large role, but with a quite different intention.

Security and Competition in the Arctic

The first duty of a Government is to provide security of its citizens. This includes military security. But security, to be comprehensive and meaningful, must encompass many other aspects, involving human rights, the recognition and exercise of sovereignty claims, the protection of resources including land, air, water and oil and the all-encompassing question of the protection of the whole of the environment.

These are the areas from which will spring the international competition—and perhaps tensions and maybe even conflicts—of the future, as each country of the Arctic region strives to meet its national aspirations. Ideally, this will be accomplished to the detriment of none. Competition among and between nations is indeed healthy and is to be encouraged. However, in the interests of sustained peace, security and stability in the Arctic, multinational cooperative efforts must be undertaken to ensure a peaceful, coordinated approach. The successful results of such an undertaking will be a positive reflection not only on each country in the region, but also on the Arctic as a whole and, by positive extension, on the entire international community.

Healthy competition in heretofore unexplored functional and geographic areas leading to results beneficial to all participants can be possible only if suspicions of military intentions are non-existent or

kept to the lowest possible levels. It is thus necessary to devise and implement CSBMs which will be accepted by all and which will ensure maximum transparency to an effective and agreed level. The adoption of such a system will go a long way towards ensuring that the competition does indeed remain secure and "healthy" and does not degenerate into conflicts over, for example, development of resources.

Canada and the Arctic: Perspectives and Initiatives

Before proceeding to the suggestion of CSBMs for the universal Arctic, a review of Canada's past attitudes and initiatives with regard to its own Arctic territory is in order. This will serve to establish a point of departure for the measures that will be outlined later.

Canadians have always looked to the Arctic with pride. Yet, issues of sovereignty and security in the Arctic area claimed by Canada have been prominent and contentious since the formation of the country in 1867. The Canadian claim to the Arctic comes, of course, from the transfer of British rights and claims. Various other countries have, from time to time, disputed the Canadian claims, but most of these have been resolved.

Canada's ability to exercise sovereignty over its own waters, land mass and airspace has always been regarded as being of the utmost significance and importance for Canadian governments and for many citizens. Yet, the matter of providing the means to acquire that ability has been viewed as more a question of finance than of necessity—a luxury that would be nice to have, but only if it is affordable. Thus successive governments, while formulating foreign and defence policy, have attempted to provide the minimum required to be devoted to such matters, without unduly arousing the ire of those who would prefer to spend less—or more—on Canadian sovereignty.

In defining its security policy for the Arctic, Canada has had to take a number of factors into account. Canada's geographic position in the world has meant, first, that it has had to pay particular attention to the policies of its neighbour to the south, perhaps more than is the case with others. Second, with the onset of the Second World War and then the development of the Cold War, Canada's position between the two then-Super-Powers exerted a powerful influence on its defence policies.

In matters of national defence, Canada has always sheltered under the defence umbrella of another country. For the first seven decades of its existence, it took refuge under British protection; in 1938, the British umbrella was replaced by the American. The suggestions of

Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis St. Laurent, which led to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949, and the later Canadian-American establishment of the North American Air (now Aerospace) Defence Command agreement were attempts not only to make the world a more secure place, but also to ensure that Canada would not be overwhelmed by the unilateral actions of the United States. In its relations with the Americans, Canada has contributed to the common security effort, enough to ensure respectability, but perhaps not a penny more.

All of this has meant that Canadian defence expenditures with relation to the Arctic have not been at the level advocated by those who were convinced that the country needed the ability to accumulate detailed knowledge of the various activities taking place in the Arctic.

In the immediate post-Second World War period, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force cooperated in Arctic exercises conducted under plans for Defence of Canada Operations. These exercises were not maintained and complacency set in, although from time to time efforts were made to pass off the occasional Canadian military presence in the North as meaningful attempts at the exercise of sovereignty.

The Northwest Passage is a particular point of contention with those who do not recognize it as being Canadian property. Indeed, the United States, for a variety of reasons, in 1969 and in 1985 openly sailed civilian vessels through the passage in what was regarded by many as a challenge to Canadian sovereignty. These voyages caused much concern in Canada.

A New Defence Policy

In 1987, the Canadian Government published a White Paper: "Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canadians". It reflected, to a large degree, the rise in concern among Canadian parliamentarians and citizens about the Arctic.

This White Paper was the first comprehensive governmental statement on defence in a decade and a half. In his foreword, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney said:

> "But just as the Alliance can only prosper through shared effort and a common impulse, so too Canada must look to itself to safeguard its sovereignty and pursue its interests. Only we as a nation should decide what must be done to protect our shores, our waters and our airspace. This White Paper, therefore, takes as its first priority the protection and furtherance of Canada's sovereignty as a nation."

Some of the language of that White Paper has been rendered inoperative by the end of the Cold War. But the contention that the Arctic is "an area of growing strategic importance" remains valid, and it thus provides a government-approved philosophical basis on which to build future security measures.

The White Paper went on to discuss the growing accessibility of the Arctic due to the emergence of large numbers of nuclear-powered submarines. It posited the use of the Arctic by Soviet submarines and noted that "in light of these circumstances, the Canadian navy must be able to determine what is happening under the ice in the Canadian Arctic, and to deter hostile or potentially hostile intrusions. At present, the Canadian navy cannot carry out in the Arctic these roles essential to our security and sovereignty".

The White Paper debated the merits of nuclear-powered submarines versus other underwater detection devices and came down squarely on the side of the submarines, announcing plans to procure them for the Canadian Forces. A strong belief is held by some that the planned purchase of nuclear-powered submarines was as much to detect the underwater operations of its allies in the Canadian Arctic as it was to detect Soviet movements. Others believe as strongly in a slight variation of the foregoing, that is, that they were to carry out the tasks in Canadian defence responsibility that its allies were doing for it. It is difficult to have a country's national sovereignty exercised by another State. The acquisition of the submarines was seen to be for the promotion of Canada's security and sovereignty rather than for use against others. In other words, they were a national CSBM. Another example of a national CSBM is the Canadian Arctic Sub-Surface Surveillance System, which has as its aim the discouragement of unannounced use of the waters of the Northwest Passage and Canadian archipelago.

In less than two years, however, the submarine project, along with many other planned defence acquisition programmes, had been cancelled for financial reasons. The Minister of National Defence acknowledged that Canada did not have the capability to exercise sovereignty in the Arctic and that we would have to depend on our allies for information about what was happening in the Canadian north.

Governmental officials also pointed to the fact that Canada and the United States had, in early 1988, concluded the Arctic Cooperation Agreement, which bound the United States to seek the permission of Canada when it wished to send civilian ice-breakers through waters

claimed by Canada to be internal. It is to be emphasised, however, that the Agreement did not cover underwater vessels or military ships. Two years later, the Government cancelled plans to build the Class 8 ice-breaker. There are many in Canada who still believe that, given recent initiatives in the economic area, the need for a powerful Arctic ice-breaker may be greater than ever. It has been said that Canada's best way to assert its claims over the Northwest Passage and other northern internal waters would be to encourage international activity in the Canadian Arctic—on Canadian terms and in accordance with Canadian law.

Some Canadian Arctic Initiatives

Recently, we have witnessed the undertaking by Canada of a number of initiatives which have, as their broad and conceptual aim, the establishment of confidence in many and diverse areas.

Prime Minister Mulroney, on 24 November 1989, announced the establishment of the Canadian Polar Commission "to develop a new cooperative ethic with our northern allies and neighbours". The mandate of the Commission was multifaceted: to (a) enhance Canada's international polar profile by fostering and facilitating international and domestic liaison and cooperation in circumpolar research; (b) promote and encourage national institutions and organisations to support the development and dissemination of such northern knowledge; (c) increase international focus on circumpolar concerns such as Arctic haze, the greenhouse effect, and air-and water-borne toxins in the food chain; and (d) support the Government's Science and Technology Decision Framework and the role of the Innovation Strategy by improving the coordination of the diverse and dispersed Canadian polar research community.

On 20 November 1989, an agreement on "Cooperation in the Arctic and the North", designed to foster collaboration in scientific, technological, economic, social and cultural fields, was signed by Canada and the USSR. Four days later in Leningrad, Prime Minister Mulroney called for the establishment of an Arctic council to be composed of politicians of the eight Arctic countries to provide for increased bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

In the latter part of April 1990, the eight Arctic countries met in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, and discussed various environmental matters. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Right Honourable Joe dark, said that Canada was determined to solve "Arctic environmental problems through an overall circumpolar

strategy that combines environmental responsibility with sustained economic growth for the Arctic and its peoples".

Far-reaching consultations on many matters, including arms control and disarmament, were conducted by Soviet and Canadian officials in Ottawa in June 1990. Two months later, Canada was instrumental in the formation of the International Arctic Science Committee. In June 1991, Canada and the other seven Arctic countries signed a Declaration on the Arctic Environment flowing from an Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and establishing an Arctic monitoring and assessment programme.

As evidence of the greater desire on the part of those living in the Arctic to become more involved in the overall security of the area, the Northwest Territories government, on 1 November 1990, released a discussion paper on "Military Activity in the North and Establishment of a Circumpolar Zone of Peace and Security". The main recommendations of the paper were in the areas of: (a) a central Arctic demilitarised zone; (b) Arctic "open skies"; (c) aerial CBMs; (d) sea-and air-launched cruise missiles; (e) unilateral Soviet initiatives; (f) a conference on Arctic security and cooperation; and (g) the creation of an ambassador for circumpolar affairs.

Security in Arctic: Need for a Comprehensive Approach

The first duty of any Government is to establish and preserve the security of the nation and its citizens. National security may be defined as the preservation of a way of life acceptable to the population and compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others. It includes freedom from military attack or coercion, freedom from internal subversion and freedom from the erosion of political economic and social values which are essential to the quality of life.

Only by approaching the challenges of security in such a comprehensive manner can it be ensured that CBMs achieve their aim in the broadest possible sense. As was declared in the Final Document of the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development:

> "Security is an overriding priority for all nations. It is also fundamental for both disarmament and development. Security consists of not only military, but also political, economic, social, humanitarian and human rights and ecological aspects. Enhanced security can, on the one hand, create conditions conducive to disarmament and, on the other, provide the environment and confidence for the successful pursuit of development."

Clearly, there is a need for an "overall Arctic security strategy".

One of the challenges facing the design of any CSBMs is how to reconcile the right of a nation's control over its sovereign territory with its obligations to contribute to international peace, security and stability. Obviously, the approach to be adopted is one of integration and positive cooperation, even healthy competition, on the national and international levels. The resulting security framework will be one which takes into account the legitimate concerns of all and infringes on the rights and privileges of none.

Another aspect to be considered when designing CSBMs is the intended audience. Whose confidence and security are we attempting to strengthen? World leaders? The citizens in the street? Peace and security organisations? The media? The United Nations? The military? The native population? The developers? It ought to be clear that the answer must be "all of the above".

It is apparent that the new and changing security situation in the rapidly-evolving and emerging international order requires a consideration of many factors before the task of suggesting CSBMs is attempted. A suggested list of such factors might include:

(a) Traditional military factors. The inherent right of a country to take measures to ensure it is capable of self-defence and indeed of exercising sovereignty over all of its territory cannot, must not, be abrogated. One of the problems will be to prevent the institution of a maximising upward militarisation spiral which sees arms procurement and deployment increasing at a rate inconsistent with the legitimate needs of national security.

(b) Environmental factors. The ecosystems of the Arctic are unique and fragile, and have thus far remained relatively undisturbed. As the Arctic grows more important economically and politically, and as human activity and industrial development in the region increase, steps must be taken to ensure that degradation of the Arctic environment does not occur.

(c) Economic factors. It must be ensured that any necessary Arctic commercial development is carried out in a manner consistent with the attainment of the broadest possible level of security.

(d) Socio-political factors. Until recently, the sparse population of the Canadian Arctic has claimed only scant attention from the Federal Government. It is apparent that settlement of aboriginal land claims will proceed at a much faster rate in the future. Any future Arctic security regime, to be effective, will require significant input and substantial agreement from native communities.

(e) The need to solicit broad participation in designing an Arctic security regime. In establishing CSBMs, Governments ought to take into account suggestions put forward by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Also very valuable are the deliberations of independent but government-facilitated groups such as the Canadian Department of External Affairs Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control. Of particular importance is the attitude of the various native communities in the Arctic countries and their desire to become much more actively involved in their future Arctic security.

SEALS: A Student Initiative

Recently, a group of students at Glendon College of York University in Toronto (Glendon Commission on Arctic Security) released a proposal for greater Arctic security under the title "Security for the Environment of the Arctic Lands and Seas (SEALS)". The Commission defined a secure environment as one in which the core values of a State and of its citizens are protected from real or perceived threats, be they internal or external in nature. The core values of an Arctic security system would include: (a) the integrity of the physical environment; (b) preservation of the social and cultural characteristics; (c) prudent economic development; and (d) the maintenance of a stable, participatory political atmosphere. Further, the Commission asserted that a "security system should facilitate interpersonal and inter-state cooperation. It should also better coordinate security concerns of all members consistent with individual and national interests, while at the same time preserving individual integrity and national sovereignty".

It is precisely this type of student involvement in the very real challenges inherent in establishing a new international order which ought to be fostered and encouraged. If we are to achieve the broadest possible security regime, it is necessary to involve the broadest possible range of participation.

Thus, a comprehensive CSBM security framework will contain inputs on a wide range of functional areas from a diversely-drawn but philosophically-united groups of organisations and individuals.

CSBMs for the Arctic Region

While acknowledging the indispensability of CSBMs in non-military fields, such as cooperative international environmental and economic endeavours, and their great value in reinforcing overall security, detailed development and design of CSBMs in those fields will be left for a later occasion.

For Canada and most Canadians, the aim of CSBMs is to ensure the security and sovereignty of the country in a manner consistent with the attainment of international peace, security and stability. Such goals ought to be, and probably are, espoused by other countries as well, thus establishing a commonality of purpose.

CSBMs are unilateral, bilateral or multilateral in nature, establishment and application. One approach is not necessarily better than another. Initiatives by one country on a particular level ought not to be held hostage to progress in many or all areas.

What needs to be established is a broad "quilt" framework representing the complete security picture that is desired. States can then take unilateral or cooperative action in filling in the "security squares" of the quilt. To be completely effective and to provide the maximum possible assurance, all the squares of the quilt ought to be filled in. However, there is some reassurance to be gained from a quilt in which only some of the squares are filled in. The path to be followed is one of necessary action at the appropriate time by the Governments most disposed to declaring CSBMs.

One important point to stress is that while it may well be that CSBMs agreed in international negotiating bodies for application in certain geographic areas may not be transferable *en masse* to another theatre, there are, no doubt, some which have relevance and it may also be that there are lessons to be learned from the procedures employed by others.

It is clear that there is scant room for the development of original Arctic CSBMs. Where there is room for uniqueness is in the universality of the approach itself, that is, in the design and realisation of an overall Arctic security strategy.

Suggestions for Inclusion in a List of Possible Arctic CSBMS

(a) Confirmation of the need to act in all areas in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

(b) Acceptance of observers and participations from other countries on Arctic exercises and scientific expeditions.

(c) Opening territory, seas and airspace to "Open Skies" type inspections, including environmental monitoring.

(d) Opening of Arctic military facilities to inspection.

(e) Only those military personnel, weapons, equipment and ammunition necessary for the purposes of surveillance, exercise of sovereignty and national defence will be stationed in the Arctic. All those deemed to be excessive will be removed.

(f) Military forces will, at all times, be mindful of the need to respect the Arctic environment.

(g) Prior notification of major land, sea and air exercises and to significant increases or decreases in stationed military strength.

(h) Appointment of an Arctic ambassador with responsibility for all matters of Arctic security.

(i) Publication of political and military doctrine concerning the Arctic, including training methods and the complementary sharing of intelligence and information.

(j) Establishment of an international NGO concerned with Arctic security, fashioned along the lines of the Canadian Consultative Group on Disarmanent and Arms Control.

(k) Establishment of an Arctic council. Any Arctic council that is established should have within its mandate military security considerations. While these are discussed in other forums, a unified approach among Arctic nations would be of benefit.

(l) Establishment of an Arctic early warning system, including an Arctic crisis communication network.

(m) Establishment of "zones of security".

(n) A prohibition of nuclear testing in the region.

(o) The convening of a conference of representatives of the Arctic countries and NGOs to consider the whole question of CSBMs and an overall Arctic security system.

In suggesting possible CSBMs for the Arctic, it is perhaps best to start with those which can be declared and developed unilaterally. From that point, it will be easily recognizable where cooperative or multilateral steps can be taken which build on the actions of single States.

Conclusions

The adoption and implementation of CSBMs representative of those outlined above will go a long way towards enhancing security and stability in the Arctic and will be a positive and concrete reflection of the aspirations of the Secretary-General.

It must be acknowledged, however, that the absolutely essential agreement in the establishment of any system of security is the exercise of positive political will. If world events of the past five years have illustrated anything, it is the soundness of the maxim that if political will is present, the "impossible" very quickly moves through "probable" to "attainment".

A VIEW FROM THE SCANDINAVIAN NORTH

Land War and Maritime Strategy

The question of Arctic security is a relatively new issue in the history of international affairs and is still largely unknown to the general public. Nevertheless, political divisions in the modern world and development of new weapons and war-fighting techniques in the twentieth century extended strategic thinking and military operations to the far reaches of the Arctic. Consequently the European Arctic, with Svalbard and the Norwegian and Barents seas, long regarded as a distant region of scant military concern, began to attract interest. In the war of 1914-1918, the battle over maritime supply lines added a new dimension to war in Europe. Begun as a traditional continental land war, the First World War also became a war over overseas supplies, with supplies and reinforcement across the North Atlantic from North America as the most important target.

With that, questions were bound to arise about sea control in future wars and the advantage of securing bases for naval operations. The need for bases would be particularly great for major military Powers with limited access to open seas. In this regard, northern bases would be important, as evidenced by the German occupation of Norway in the Second World War and submarine and air strikes from Norwegian bases. Losses brought on allied convoys bound for Russia's northern ports were particularly heavy.

The Soviet Experience

For the Soviet Union, which suffered Western interference in the Far North in 1919-1920, with troops landing at Murmansk and in the White Sea region in support of the opposition to the Red Forces, and experienced the dangers of naval and shipping war in northern waters during the Second World War, the new development was a double lesson. On the one hand, it became obvious that defence of the northern maritime approaches would be essential in any major war where the Soviet Union might become involved and, on the other, that a strong navy and submarine fleet would be essential for effective fighting in a new protracted war in Europe. With open access to the Atlantic only from its northern ports—Baltic and Black sea ports have long, shallow and undefended approaches to the high seas—the Barents region would give optimum opportunity for Soviet naval operations, offensive as well as defensive. That conclusion was bound to raise political questions *vis-a-vis* neighbouring Norway, whose mainland coast and polar islands, including Svalbard and Bear Island in the middle of the Barents Sea,

could be used to secure or to endanger maritime operations in and through the Barents and Norwegian seas.

To secure control of these northern approaches, the Soviet Union demanded in 1944 that Norway should agree to cede Bear Island to the Soviet Union, allow Soviet political control over Svalbard by establishing joint rule—condominium—there, with equal rights for both countries to have military bases and troops on the islands. The demands were in direct conflict with the main provisions of the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920, which recognised "the fall and absolute sovereignty of Norway" over the islands with the specific provision that Norway was "not to create nor to allow the establishment of any naval base. .. [or] any fortification in the said territories, which may never be used for warlike purposes".

The demands would have facilitated Soviet political and military control over the European Arctic and were repeated in 1946, before they were shelved, probably for fear of reactions from other States, including the great Powers, which would have needed to agree to a revision of the Svalbard Treaty (the name of the Spitsbergen Archipelago was officially changed to Svalbard in 1925). Also, new developments in arms technology, notably the American possession of the atomic bomb, first used in the summer of 1945, upset traditional strategic thinking and required new priorities in Soviet military planning. The primary problem now lay in nuclear arms and the need to offset a nuclear threat from afar in a situation where protracted conventional land warfare depending on naval support and maritime supply might not be the primary danger.

Nuclear Strategy

With concentration on nuclear strategy, and for economic reasons as well, Stalin's original plan for naval development, which included a vast submarine fleet, was abandoned, and massive expansion of the Soviet Navy was delayed until the 1960s, when the lessons of the Cuban crisis (1962) called for a new and different Soviet Navy. In the new programme, the Northern Fleet operating out of the Murmansk region had first priority, and strategic submarines carrying nuclear-tipped missiles were to be a vital element, together with airborne atomic bombs and long-range intercontinental missiles, for nuclear balance *vis-a-vis* the United States. At first, with limited-range submarine missiles and a need for strategic submarines to operate close to intended targets, the passage problem and need for forward sea control remained. Later, however, in a bipolar world where Norway was protected under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organisation (NATO), political pressure for strategic advantage was no longer possible. Eventually, beginning in the 1980s, new developments in missile and submarine technology allowed for a new strategy where forward deployment of strategic submarines to distant waters was no longer necessary and, consequently, where the passage problem through the Norwegian Sea was less urgent. On the other, withdrawn deployment meant that the northernmost waters, including the Barents Sea, became more important in Soviet nuclear strategy.

The most recent Soviet submarines, the Typhoons and Delta IVs with deployment beginning early in the 1980s, carry, long-range missiles which can be fired against any target in the northern hemisphere from any position in Arctic waters, and they have a special capability for under-the-ice operation. They present a horrifying threat, with each submarine carrying arms with an explosive power equal to that of all the weapons used by all Powers during the entire Second World War, and a dozen such submarines operating from bases on the Kola peninsula, close to the Norwegian border. With American forces following these operations in Arctic waters in order to track and offset the threat and maintain the military balance, the northern waters have become an Arctic Mediterranean and meeting-ground for nuclear Super-Powers. A new dimension has thus been added to the waters between Norway's mainland and its polar islands, making them a nuclear staging area as well as a strategic passage to the polar basin and to Russia's northern ports.

Arctic security after the Second World War has been intimately linked to the strength, structure and strategy of Soviet forces, and to United States and NATO strategy to balance and offset a Soviet threat, and vice versa. The European Arctic, roughly defined as the region north of the Arctic Circle, between Greenland and Norway's Jan Mayen in the west and Russia's Novaya Zemlya and Pechora area in the east, now serves as a strategic fulcrum in the global naval and nuclear balance. The question now is whether the break-up of the Soviet system and progress in international disarmament and, most important, troop withdrawals and force reductions in Europe will open opportunities for strategic disengagement and peaceful cooperation in the Arctic as well. As a long-term observer of strategic developments in East-West relations in general, and of the northern region in particular, I find grounds for only guarded optimism.

Continued Insecurity

It must be noted that arms reductions and troop withdrawals in Central Europe so far have had no parallel in the Far North. Here,

Russian force levels are maintained and, in some regards, have been increased in the last few years. Also, while arms agreements and unilateral measures signal major reductions in long-range strategic and intermediate nuclear weapons, those reductions apply primarily to land-based systems and bombers, and sea-based systems are not reduced proportionally. Truly, some sea-based systems will be reduced, and a number of Russian submarines and surface vessels will be scrapped. However, the most modern missile systems may be retained, and their proportional weight in the total arsenal will increase. Thus, the relative value and strategic role of Russia's sea-based systems may be greater after the reductions than before. Moreover, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the value to Russia of its naval bases on the Baltic and the Black seas will be greatly reduced, with the result that the relative significance of the non-nuclear element of the Northern Fleet too will increase within the total defence structure. In these circumstances, the Arctic, and notably the Barents region in the European Arctic, will continue to be a focal point for strategic planning and security concern.

It is still quite impossible to predict how far security and strategic interest will affect overall policy planning and, specifically, if military concern will interfere with general improvement in Arctic relations and limit prospects for future international cooperation in the Arctic. As the largest Arctic State, Russia will have a key role. Russian performance in that role will be determined in large measure by the internal political and economic development in Russia itself, and by the statesmanship of its new leaders. To better understand the possibilities and pitfalls in future Arctic development, some knowledge of past events leading up to the present and its problems may be helpful.

Lessons of History

Northern Sea Routes

On 10 May 1553, three ships under the command of Hugh Willoughby, with Richard Chancellor as chief captain and deputy, left Greenwich on the Thames for a fateful voyage into then unknown waters of the Far North. This was only one of many expeditions sent forth in those days by monarchs and enterprising merchants to explore uncharted seas and distant lands for fame for captains and fortune for principals, but it was the first to explore the European Arctic for the specific purpose of finding a northern passage to the Far East. That was not achieved before Sweden's A.E. Nordenskiold succeeded in

navigating the length of the North-east Passage some three hundred years later, in 1878-1879.

The North-west Passage was sailed for the first time in 1903-1905, by Norway's Roald Amundsen (the man who was to "conquer" the South Pole in 1911, a month before Robert F. Scott reached it). Since then, new shipbuilding and propulsion techniques have opened Russia's northern sea route in the North-east Passage for commercial shipping in the summer and fall season. Ice conditions in the North American part of the Arctic, on the other hand, are more severe and so far have not allowed a similar development through the length of the North-west Passage. For all practical purposes, therefore, any hope of developing year-round traffic between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific through the Arctic must be based on the Russian route or, as has been proved possible by the Russians, a more direct route across the Arctic Ocean itself. In both cases, the Arctic approach will follow the course used by the first explorers, between Norway's mainland coast and the now Norwegian polar islands.

Unique Spitsbergen Regime

Early in this century the need for a legal regime for Spitsbergen could no longer be neglected, and Norway invited negotiations to establish one.

With Russia opposed to Norwegian sovereignty over Spitsbergen, and Sweden no longer willing to support a Norwegian claim, a proposal was made to maintain the fundamental principle *of terra nullius* for common use, and to establish a joint commission with representatives from Norway, Sweden and Russia to administer Spitsbergen on behalf of all interested parties. A draft treaty was prepared by the three and presented in 1914, shortly before the outbreak of the First World War, and was promptly rejected by other parties, with the United States as the main opponent. After the war, partly on American initiative, the question was raised in connection with the peace settlement, and negotiations between the most interested small States and the victorious great Powers led to adoption of the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920.

As losers in the war, Germany and the Soviet Union, which surrendered to Germany shortly after the revolution (Brest-Utovsk, March 1918), did not take part in the negotiations, and Soviet protests were of no avail. In the end, Norway secured Soviet approval of the Treaty in return for early Norwegian recognition of the Soviet regime.

This settlement of the Spitsbergen issue was possible both because

Norway enjoyed a high degree of goodwill among the winning parties for the role played by the Norwegian merchant marine and its losses during the war, and because the Treaty satisfied international interest.

- First of all, agreement on Norwegian sovereignty removed Spitsbergen from potential political contention and dispute among the major Powers. In this context, it should be noted that Germany had forced the Soviet Government to accept a provision for German rights on the islands in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.
- Secondly, Norway accepted a responsibility to avoid' and prevent the establishment of naval bases and fortifications on the islands, thus removing them from military influence and use in war, a possibility that otherwise could have become attractive to States with naval ambitions after their experience during the war.
- Thirdly, Norway agreed to retain the international commons principle to the extent that "subjects" from all parties should have free access and equal rights in mineral exploration and in resource development and other industrial and commercial activities.

As it turned out, economic opportunities proved to be far less attractive than expected, and in practice Norway and the Soviet Union were to be the only countries to maintain permanent settlements and operations on the islands. Norway now has one active mining town and Russia has two. Nevertheless, the Treaty right of any "subject" to access and equal conditions does imply that other States have a right and, indeed, an obligation to observe and, if necessary, to interfere on behalf of citizens if their rights are violated. Most important, though, is the right and interest States will have to prevent any party from violating the military restrictions of the Treaty. In this respect the Spitsbergen/Svalbard regime represents a common international interest.

The Russian Arctic

In purely statistical terms, Russia controls some 45 per cent of the coastal periphery around the Arctic Ocean. In addition to its northern lands, with nearly half its territory in the permafrost zone, Russia has an Arctic continental shelf extending up to 2,000 kilometres, or 1,250 miles, from the mainland, as the largest continuous shelf in the world. Most of Russia's Arctic waters and continental shelf suffer from heavy ice and hazardous operating conditions, and much of its northern land is barren, distant and devoid of communications. Yet, these are the very areas where Russia has its major potential for future development

of natural resources and, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and independence for the southern republics, Russia has become more dependent on Arctic resources for industrial and economic development. This is particularly true for energy resources, notably oil and natural gas, where the West Siberian Basin already accounts for the major part of Russian production. Future development to maintain and expand production depends heavily on improved ability to explore and exploit even less accessible regions, including continental shelf areas with extreme ice problems.

This is not the place to discuss future economic and industrial development in Russia, but it should be pointed out that the current systemic breakdown and the present serious industrial and economic crisis will restrict for a long time Russia's own capacity for rapid development of new natural resources in adverse Arctic conditions. Arctic development, like Russian economic and industrial improvement in general, may depend for a long time on the will and ability to secure outside support and participation. Desire for cooperation in Arctic ventures was expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev in the so-called "Murmansk Initiative", in a speech in October 1987, and later was reiterated by spokesmen for the new Russia. Western nations have shown interest, and the Norwegian Government recently initiated a plan for cooperation in the Barents region, beginning with land-based projects and moving into offshore ventures, if and when agreement is reached on a fixed border between the Norwegian and the Russian national zones in the Barents Sea. From the Norwegian point of view, a fixed border for clear distinction between separate national jurisdictions is a fundamental pre-condition to be met before projects for cooperation in the Barents Sea offshore region can begin. On land, on the other hand, cooperation and joint projects will be welcome now, including programmes for plant modernisation to reduce pollution and for updating nuclear power stations and disposal of nuclear waste.

Future Prospects

Borders and Barriers

Together with the deep sea-bed, polar regions are the last parts of the globe to be conquered by man and to be included in the international legal order and State structures. Even though systematic exploration of the Arctic began as early as 450 years ago and organised exploitation of Arctic resources and northern trade developed soon thereafter, fixed borders and distinct divisions between States and jurisdictions were late in coming in many parts. Even in Scandinavia, where there had

been nation-States for a long time, the Russian-Norwegian border was not established until 1826. Jealously guarded as the legal limit of national sovereignty and a sacred fence for national integrity, the new border was not seen as a barrier. Traffic and trade continued to move as freely as before and family ties across the border remained close. The traditional "pomor trade", which began early in the eighteenth century with ships and merchants from Kola and the White Sea area trading in northern towns in Norway, continued to thrive and Norwegians continued to fish, trade and settle on the Russian side of the border.

The Russian Revolution and the Soviet regime stopped all that, and old social and economic contacts between Norway and Russia in the north were broken, but continued in the narrow corridor to the Arctic coast which belonged to Finland after independence (1920). With Soviet conquest of the corridor in the Second World War, contact was broken and an impenetrable Soviet security zone was established along the border. Soviet protectiveness was not limited to the land border, and contacts were reduced to an absolute minimum throughout the Arctic, including in Svalbard, where both countries had mining towns. Soviet xenophobia was evident all around, but increased with political polarisation after the war, and in its Arctic, security and military demands barred even purely scientific projects where the Soviets themselves would have benefited. Thus, when a third International Polar Year was planned (the first two were organised in 1882-1883 and 1932-1933) and arranged as a more inclusive International Geophysical Year in 1957-1958, the Soviet Union refused joint planning and programmes for the Arctic, while cooperating closely in Antarctica. When Sweden planned a scientific expedition through the North-east Passage in 1972-1979 in celebration of the centennial of Nordenskiold's first passage, Soviet permission was not given even though Soviet scientists were invited to participate.

A Time for Change?

With glasnost, all that has changed and the border in the north is open again with traffic increasing in both directions, including a new generation of "pomors" who come in numbers to peddle trinkets for hard currency and Western tourists eager for a look at the other side and a taste of cheap vodka to boot. Far more important, local officials, entrepreneurs of all kinds and representatives from academic institutes and cultural organisations now find open doors and eager partners for discussion and planning of exchange programmes and joint ventures in many fields. The hope is that communication will nourish

understanding and that cooperation will promote interdependence and contribute to mutual goodwill and common security. In Norway, the Government has begun studies of confidence-building measures at sea as a first step to reduce military tension and to prevent incidents in sensitive northern waters.

Even so, progress towards active programmes and effective cooperation with Russia has been slow. Political indecisiveness and bureaucratic bungling no doubt contribute to the impasse and that problem probably is no worse in the north than elsewhere. On the other hand, Russian hesitation in the north may be deepened by military opposition and political sensitivity on security issues, as witnessed, for example, in the opposition to President Yeltsin's plan to hand back to Japan the captured Kuril Islands in return for needed credit and a desired peace treaty to formally end the Second World War. Similar barriers seem still to be effective in the European north, with the Northern Reet unwilling to accept measures that might affect its strategic advantage in Arctic waters.

Gorbachev's reform programme did indeed open the way for improved relations in the north, and his Murmansk Initiative in October 1987 outlined an ambitious plan for Arctic cooperation. Nevertheless, at about the same time, during his visit to Oslo in January 1988, Soviet Premier Ryzhkov stated flatly that the problems of the Barents Sea were so difficult and serious that the Soviet Union would not agree to establish a fixed border before conditions had improved. Instead, he now proposed, after some twenty years of negotiations for a border agreement, that a special zone be established for "partnership and mutual trust", with the clear implication that security, as defined by the Soviets, was the primary objective. To Norwegians, the Ryzhkov proposal was starkly reminiscent of several former Russian and Soviet efforts to establish condominium and other forms of mixed jurisdiction in the north in an apparent wish to establish a base for influence beyond fixed and secure borders.

The contrast between the President's inviting openness and the Premier's brusque assertiveness was more than a difference of style and it seemed to reflect strong internal disagreement within the Soviet apparatus. This time, however, Norway's protest and objections seemed to encourage a less rigid attitude in Moscow. After a while, negotiations were reopened with Soviet agreement that a fixed border was the goal. In quick order, agreement was reached on some 75 per cent of the 1,700-kilometre-long border, and negotiations now continue to settle the remaining part. This is the most important section, near the

mainland, where security and the strategic interest weigh most heavily and, also, where the fisheries as well as the potential for offshore oil and gas resources are greatest by far. From the Norwegian point of view, demonstrated determination on the part of the new Russian Government to complete the negotiations is essential for confidence in Russian intentions in the Far North, and final agreement on a fixed border is a precondition for economic and technical aid and joint ventures in these northern waters.

A further "test" of Russian intentions and attitudes may lie in the reaction to a Norwegian scientific expedition planned for 1994-1996 to mark the centennial of Fridtj of Nansen's drift across the Arctic Ocean with "Fram" (1893-1896). The expedition may employ a Russian icebreaker (with a Norwegian flag) to sail east along the Siberian coast before entering the ice to drift across the Arctic deep-water basin, and use Russian bases for crew rotation and supplies. Scientific programmes, with Russian scientists invited and eager to participate, will be conducted outside the Russian 200-mile zone, and include plans for seismic investigation of the deep sea-bed, which could interfere with submarine operations. Naval spokesmen might object to this, even if the programme is conducted in international waters, and with the Navy controlling the air bases to service the expedition, reactions could be indicative of problems in accepting proper balance between international freedom of the seas and national security in the Arctic.

In this context, it should not be forgotten that political as well as military elements still cling to an extreme interpretation of the so-called sector principle, which was used in 1926 to claim Soviet sovereignty over lands and islands within straight lines from the Soviet coast to the North Pole, and would like to see that sovereignty expanded to include the ice-covered waters as well. A nationalistic revival and hard-core military influence could move in that direction and insist that Russia's growing dependence on northern bases and resources would require more effective control to protect Russian security against infringement and threat in Arctic waters.

Cooperation and Security

The opposite argument, of course, is that the best approach to security is to encourage international cooperation in scientific investigation as well as in resource development and management, and that cooperation and coordination will result not only give in a better economy, but in improved security as well. There is no doubt that activities will increase in the Arctic, that Arctic as well as other

nations will benefit from the wise use of the whole region, and that we all depend on effective protection of the Arctic environment. As the greatest Arctic nation, Russia has greater opportunity and responsibility than most in drafting the Arctic course, but we have a common responsibility for the balance between national interest and international benefit.

SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

The concept of "Arctic security" did not exist at all as a topic on the international agenda until the middle of the twentieth century, and the Arctic has continued to be a poorly studied region.

Today, it is difficult to believe that the North Pole was reached by Robert E. Peary as recently as 1909, and that the North-east Passage was first navigated in one season as late as 1932 by the icebreaker *Sibiryakov.* Since that time, this harsh region has found itself the focus of major international attention. How did this happen, in such a brief period, to a single geographic region surrounded by a number of States not having undisputed claims to it? Today, as before, the Arctic is not and cannot be an independent subject of international relations; the indigenous peoples do not play a role independent of the States to which they belong.

While the circumpolar States have a tremendous impact on the state of affairs in the Arctic, they also have interests which go far beyond the borders of the region. The situation in this important area is therefore determined more by the general evolution of the international political climate than by specific regional questions, and appears to be a consequence of fluctuations in relations between the largest and most influential States.

From this perspective it is reasonable to ask whether the concept of Arctic security was born of the Cold War, and whether the end of the Cold War will put an end to the concept itself? Will it exist in the future, in a post-confrontational world, or will it be dissolved in the broader understanding of security which is emerging and may become dominant in the twenty-first century?

This study assesses the state of security in the Arctic in the past, in times of confrontation between East and West, at present, when the world is painfully overcoming the heritage of confrontation and attempting to find a formula for a "new world order", and with regard to the future. In the twenty-second century, international relations

may be concerned, not with rivalry, but with efforts on the part of all nations to respond to global challenges and non-military threats to security, and to ensure the security, rights and freedoms of individual citizens regardless of race, nationality, religion or the place where they live.

A Bit of History

Although the history of Arctic exploration covers hundreds of years, only at the end of the nineteenth century were efforts made to develop broad inter-State cooperation for research and development of the region. The traditional view, based on early experience of exploration and utilisation of the Arctic, was that the water and islands of the region were for common use, and did not belong to anyone. However, the situation started to change in the first decades of the twentieth century, as a trend developed for individual States to lay claim to Arctic islands. Though the United States recognised Danish interests in the whole of Greenland in 1916, it still kept an eye on the area. In 1920, the United States informed Denmark that it did not recognize the right of a third country to acquire Greenland, should Denmark wish to dispose of it.

The Paris Treaty, signed in 1920, recognised Norwegian sovereignty over Spitsbergen and determined that all the States participating in the Treaty had equal rights to utilize the territorial waters and land space of Spitsbergen. The former Soviet Union acceded to the Treaty in 1935.

The Treaty could have served as a good model of international cooperation, maintaining the Arctic as the common heritage of mankind or transforming it into an international condominium. This, however, did not take place. In fact, the Treaty of Spitsbergen stimulated the trend of States laying claim to parts of the Arctic.

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Spitsbergen, the Government of Soviet Russia declared the White Sea south of the Kanin-Nos-Sviatoi-Nos line to be its internal sea. The possibility of establishing a Canadian Arctic sector attracted the attention of the Canadian parliament in 1924. In connection with Russian-Canadian disputes concerning the affiliation of the Wrangell Island, the Soviet Government issued, on 15 April 1926,. a decree declaring all lands and islands, both those already discovered and those which would be discovered subsequently within the limits of the Soviet Arctic sector, as being Soviet territory (with the exception of the eastern islands of the Spitsbergen archipelago, internationally recognised at this moment as belonging

to Norway). Russia also put forward arguments in favour of declaring Siberian seas (Kara, Laptev, East-Siberian, Chukotsk) as historically Russian seas. The problem of sovereignty over the North-west Passage, that is, the northern maritime way between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans through the straits of the Canadian Arctic archipelago, is not resolved: Canada considers the straits to be its territorial waters, while the United States considers them international.

This is not the place to analyse why the trend towards international cooperation in exploration and utilisation of the Arctic, which began at the end of the nineteenth century, has not been further developed. It is appropriate, however, to note that any international cooperation in this region would be defective without the participation of Russia, whose northern coast extends through an are of almost 150 degrees.

The Russian revolution of 1917 and the two world wars did not promote international cooperation, while the trend towards laying claim to sectors of the Arctic became even stronger.

During the Second World War, the military rivalry of the opposing sides gave a powerful impetus to military utilisation of the Arctic and to a growing awareness of its strategic importance. "Security in the Arctic" was perceived by each rival in terms of promotion of its own military interests in the region. These interests, as it became clear, were interwoven. For example, control over Greenland was quite important militarily for preventing hostile forces from gaining access to North America.

Germany's extension of the battle zone to the eastern coast of Greenland in March 1941 (communication with meteorological stations in the north-eastern part of Greenland was maintained by Germany right up to 1943) impelled the United States and Denmark to sign an agreement on the defence of Greenland, under which the United States recognised Denmark's sovereignty over the island and got the authorisation to construct fortifications to be used by the air forces and navies of the North American States. The agreement was to remain in force until the threat to the peace and security of the American continent was over. By the end of the war, the United States had established thirteen army bases and four naval bases in Greenland. In the course of the war, Germany made a landing on Spitsbergen. The communication lines in the North Atlantic played an important role in delivering the Western allies' assistance to the USSR, and savage battles were fought for control over them.

Thus, during the Second World War great expanses of the North Atlantic and the Arctic were drawn into the confrontation, and the

struggle for control over these areas constituted a vital element of the military strategy of the belligerents.

At the beginning of the Cold War, territories and expanses of the Arctic were "snatched up" by the opposing sides rather than by polar and circumpolar States.

The post-war military strategy of the Western allies was determined mainly by military-technological capabilities of delivering nuclear and other warheads to targets on the territory of the adversary. Thus it became most urgent to establish a network of military bases in the vicinity of the USSR and its allies. These bases could also be helpful in controlling vital communications between North America and Western Europe, in accumulating a strategic potential for a war and in containing possible attempts on the part of the Eastern bloc to expand. Military facilities in Greenland and Iceland were seen as being able to play a tremendous role in the implementation of this strategy. While discussing the draft of the would-be North Atlantic Treaty, the United States stated that if use of such facilities could not be ensured, the goals of the military alliance would not be achieved.

The emergence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) helped to focus these concerns. Membership of Canada and some northern European countries possessing territories in the Arctic created the pre-conditions for involving the Arctic in the military security of East and West.

On 27 April 1951, Denmark and the United States signed an agreement on the defence of Greenland (to replace the 1941 agreement). The United States paid increasing attention to northern Greenland (closest to the Soviet polar borders) owing to the growing role of strategic bombers in the military policy of both sides. Norway declared the inclusion of Spitsbergen within the sphere of responsibility of NATO. Between the United States and Canada a military agreement on the control of the polar regions, where they abut each other's territories, was signed. The agreement contained provisions for the development of Alaska and the Canadian far north and for the establishment of a chain of aerodromes from Alaska to Greenland.

The old idea of colonisation was gradually being replaced by the concept of zones of political and economic influence. The process of claiming rights over sectors of the Arctic is going on today in the form of delimitation of continental shelves, and fisheries and economic zones.

As East-West confrontation intensified, the military and technological capability of the rivals continued to grow not only in the North

Atlantic, but also in Arctic waters covered by ice, and the airspace above the Arctic began to acquire strategic importance. It is in this context that the' modern concept of Arctic security has emerged.

Arctic Component of a Policy of Deterrence

East-West confrontation was rooted in ideology. Each side tried to reinforce its belief system by military power, which was justified in the public mind as a guarantee of peace and survival. One of the most important tasks of each side was to "deter" the enemy by demonstrating the ability to defeat or to inflict unacceptable damage in case of aggression. Deterrence could not work efficiently without the proper equipment. Military-technological superiority was perceived by political and military leaders on both sides not only as a means to prevent hasty actions of an adversary, but also as an instrument to gain important political and strategic advantage. In this confrontational pattern of international relations, which spread to other States and continents, other oceans and outer space, the Arctic had an extremely important role to play.

In contrast to other geographical areas, the Arctic touches the territories of both North American States and Russia. The Arctic Ocean provides the circumpolar States with an expanse of common water (the major part of which is covered by ice), which gives them the possibility of direct access to each other.

The Arctic is situated on the shortest airway between North America and the territory of the former USSR. There are vital navigational and transportation arteries along which intensive commercial and military exchanges between Western Europe and North America take place. In times of confrontation, it was inevitable that the geostrategic position of the Arctic would be exploited for military purposes. In addition, the Arctic was of growing interest because of its enormously rich natural resources.

During the Cold War, the military-strategic interests of the rival States were dominant in this region, very often at the expense of other considerations, including ecological problems and the well-being of indigenous peoples.

The Arctic's role in East-West military-political strategy evolved, adjusting to growing military-technological possibilities.

The loss of the West's monopoly on nuclear weapons as well as the emergence of new means of delivery induced both sides to bring their military strategy into conformity with new realities. The former

Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral G. S. Gorshkov, has pointed out that, within the framework of new military strategies, "oceans were declared to be rather extensive launching areas for different carriers of strategic weapons, designed for destruction of important targets on the territory of the adversary, rather than arenas of struggle for communications."

Under these changed circumstances, naval forces began to develop into the most important element of Western armed forces. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) tended to become a more significant part of strategic forces, while aircraft carriers became the basis of naval striking power and one of the main means of carrying out the "flexible response" strategy *vis-a-vis* the East.

The Western allies continued to enlarge their arsenals of heavy bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The Secretary of the Navy in Ronald Reagan's Administration, John Leman, formulated the most important function of the allied naval forces as that of fighting and winning in the most defended areas of the enemy.

American bases on polar territories of allied countries made possible the implementation of this strategy by helping to display and to supply large naval forces and to ensure their aerial coverage.

The emergence of military systems capable of undertaking surgical strikes against centres under the political and military control of the enemy stimulated a relative increase in the role of those elements of strategic forces that were mobile and could not be detected by an adversary. Opportunities to use SLBMs under the Arctic ice-cap made this element of the strategic balance as well as the Arctic region in general vital to the security of both sides.

Naturally, in order to maintain SLBM operations under the ice-cap of the Arctic, both sides had to acquire special military equipment to facilitate navigation, orientation, targeting, transmission of signals etc. and to reinforce anti-submarine defence. Special attention was devoted to the operation of submarine hunters, which pursued the adversary's strategic submarines from their home bases all over the open sea, including the Arctic Ocean.

East-West rivalry and the increasing significance of the naval segment in the military balance highlighted the prospects of the former USSR to acquire general sea power. Its geographical location set rather limited opportunities for direct access to the high seas, the straits of the Black and Baltic Seas being controlled by Turkey and Denmark; respectively. In the eastern region of the country, climate is

unfavourable and the possibilities of reaching the high sea are limited. Moreover, the eastern region is remote from the industrial centre of the country. Only on the Kola Peninsula did the former USSR have harbours open all year round and direct access to the high sea. In assessing the Soviet Union's potential for sea power, a group of American experts came to the conclusion that the USSR, even if it expended enormous effort, was doomed to have only a defensive maritime strategy." Thus it was natural that the major part of Soviet strategic submarines and surface vessels, as well as powerful naval aviation groupings, were concentrated at the Kola Peninsula for use in the Arctic basin.

NATO's military command tried to gain strategic advantage from these geostrategic "weaknesses" of the enemy through various means, among others, through deployment on the territory of the northern European members of the Alliance, and to make deterrence more convincing.

In spite of tensions between Canada and the United States related to the question of sovereignty over the North-west Passage, their common interest in opposing the military threat of the East helped them to overcome disagreements as far as North-West passage by American submarines on patrol under the ice-cap was concerned. The United States-Canadian air-defence system (NORAD), created in 1958, was dedicated to supervising the airspace of the circumpolar areas in order to intercept hostile bombers. In 1985 the agreement on NORAD was extended, and the United States combined the military structure of NORAD with the united outer space command of the American armed forces.

Further escalation of East-West military rivalry was to draw the Arctic more deeply into military confrontation and could have transformed the region into a neuralgic knot. Each side considered exploitation of this area in terms of its own interests. The possibility of destabilising international relations—a step that could have had uncontrollable consequences for international peace and security—was inherent in this philosophy.

The need to bring the arms race in the Arctic under control and to prevent further aggravation of military confrontation gave birth to the concept of Arctic security. This was perceived by each side in terms of ensuring its own security in the region. However, the means to achieve these objectives differed qualitatively.

Proponents *of detente* promoted stabilisation in the region, advocating the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones of different

configurations, implementation of confidence-building measures in the Arctic in general and in naval activities in particular, limitation of naval operations in the proximity of international communications lines and of international straits etc. It was hoped that such measures would pave the way for a political dialogue, which could limit military rivalry.

In addition, a wide variety of proposals was put forward by different Governments and by national and international non-governmental organisations with the aim of facilitating international cooperation in the exploration of the Arctic and protection of its ecology, exploiting opportunities for enhancing communications and transportation links between different States and continents, fostering closer cooperation between the indigenous peoples, and promoting the utilisation of the Arctic's natural resources for the benefit of humanity.

Proponents of a tough approach continued to emphasize that deterrence was the best way to signal that the West would defend its values and ideals by all available means. In their judgement, acceptance of the proposals mentioned above might make deterrence less convincing.

The confrontational character of international relations in the Arctic created quite rigid restrictions on any interaction of States belonging to different alliances, even in those fields where the need for cooperation was considered vital. Moreover, access to the polar regions was limited for security reasons, and thus other important problems were neglected.

Towards a Post-Confrontational World

Although the momentum of confrontational thinking and behaviour continues to leave its mark on international relations, it is dissipating. The Cold War is over, and the military policy of States is gradually being adjusted to these new political realities. Now the former adversaries are eager not to deter, but to convince each other that they do not have any aggressive intentions. It is very likely that a radical transformation of the functions of the armed forces will take place. They may, for example, guard borders on the basis of a non-offensive defence policy, and take part in peace-keeping and rescue operations. Although States will not renounce the possession of strategic nuclear armaments unilaterally, they have started to reduce them in accordance with the principle of equal security.

A number of important arms control agreements in both the conventional and nuclear fields have been concluded. In July 1992,

the United States and the Russian Federation agreed on further radical reductions in their arsenals of nuclear warheads.

These developments have obvious implications for the Arctic. Owing to the general relaxation of international tension, inter-State cooperation in the Arctic is gaining momentum. The trend towards replacing former confrontation with partnership is in the interests not only of the circumpolar States, but also of the international community as a whole.

Arctic security will, in the future, probably be based on cooperative efforts of the circumpolar States to solve specific problems of the region. For example, taking into account the fact that the Arctic ocean is an indivisible biological complex, they would exploit the natural resources of their continental shelves and fisheries in accordance with their common interest and the interest of the international community in preserving and augmenting these resources.

The political policies and economic activities of the circumpolar States cannot be solely their prerogative. In environmental issues, for example, they are obliged to follow commonly recognised standards and criteria, and to treat the Arctic as the common heritage of humanity.

One can suppose that international governmental and non-governmental organisations will play an important role in converting the concept of Arctic security into an integral element' of a general strategy of the international community—one aimed at establishing relations between modern society, on the one hand, and nature, on the other, which will promote sustainable development and fully recognize the security needs, rights and freedoms of every individual citizen of the world.

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Natural Resources and Conflict: Need for Confidence-building and Crisis Management

Introduction: Environment and Conflict

The crucial connections between environment and conflict among nations continue to escape political scrutiny. The international community as yet pays little attention to such connections, thereby missing the opportunity for both preventive measures and effective responses to managing the consequences after the outbreak of war. Such acute international myopia serves neither global welfare nor efforts to design a better world for the twenty-first century. This study addresses some crucial connections. However compelling they may be, facts alone are seldom enough. Facts must be interpreted and decisions based on coherent analysis; only then can we consider the merits of alternative policy options—and choose among the best.

By definition, conflict damages natural environments; ecological costs are always incurred; degradation leads to more degradation and invariably to environmental damage—and the vicious cycle can go on and on. Environmental damage in the Middle East following the Gulf war is among the most compelling cases to date.

Environment in the Gulf War

By some accident of history, the Gulf war erupted one year before the international Conference on Environment and Development. It is nearly impossible for the industrial States and the international coalition against Iraq to ignore that event or to expect that the Conference, in turn, will ignore one of the most environmentally threatening multinational confrontations since World War II.

Three kinds of environmental damage are already interacting to produce a dangerous ecological situation, which may have serious political consequences. First is the environmental degradation in the Gulf and in the Middle East related to "normal" development—industrialisation and other things we need and take for granted and which have nothing to do with war. This degradation is already extensive; by some counts the region's ecological budget already runs a large deficit. Second are the effects of the large-scale military presence in the Gulf—the pre-war preparations before the conduct of Desert Storm. And third are the ecological consequences of military engagement. The oil spill early on overshadowed the subsequent dangers of blazing oilfields.

The problem is this: any one of these sources of ecological damage alone poses remarkable problems—for which a bill must be paid—but taken together, the challenges for environmental management could well be daunting. At issue is less the dollar cost of clean-up—since no one has any idea what that could possibly be—than two other pressing difficulties. The first is to ascertain the scale and scope of these combined environmental effects, the second is to make sure that environmental damage does not turn into a wild card that could play *havoc* with post-war strategies for security, reconstruction, and development in the region. Untangling which damages are due to which causes and who is responsible for which part of the damage is a difficult job, perhaps even an impossible one.

The fact is that industrial countries and the international coalition will not be able to ignore the environmental costs of the Gulf war forever. A tentative strategy for management, however incomplete in scale and scope, is surely better than no strategy at all. Encountering ecological dislocation without assuming some responsibility for ecological repair is no longer sound politics. It sells nowhere, not even in the Middle East. Thus, for the crude *realpolitik* of self-interest, a strategy for managing the environmental costs of the Gulf war is a necessity, not a luxury.

The causes of damage—the normal causes and those tied to war preparation and the aftermath of war—are all distinct, and each has a unique ecological profile. Environmental degradation in the region carries a varied and multifaceted portfolio, and that portfolio looks roughly as follows:

Normal Development

Under normal conditions the Gulf and the Mediterranean are among the most thoroughly polluted regions in the world. Even a

rough accounting of the types of pollution shows the range of dislocations. Business as usual, especially that designed as successful economic growth, has already had high environmental costs. Nearly one fourth of the world's oil flows through the Mediterranean. The region is normally vulnerable; spills are a part of the standard procedures for loading and unloading operations in this industry. Oil is particularly tricky to deal with because of accidents and the tankers that rid themselves of ballast waters at sea to avoid paying for access to facilities which allow oily ballast to be off-loaded. Moreover, we have no substitutes for oil (Intentional, strategic spills are treated below).

Unrelated to oil is a wide inventory of industrial pollutants. There are domestic wastes, 90 per cent of which are untreated. There are metal breakages tied to industrial output, which seep into rivers and even into the atmosphere, as in the case of chromium and mercury. Then there are organic pollutants, such as chemicals like polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), or mineral oils from industrial processing or pesticides from agricultural practices—all of which are slow to decay. Also critical are the set of pollutants that turn into poison (e.g., sewage contaminating seafood), reminding us that not all pollution is created equal nor remains equal in its effects.

Beyond these facts there is good news and bad news. The good news is that the countries of this region have recognised the problem. The Med Plan of 1976 was a salient political issue. The bad news is that there never has been an environmental movement of any kind in the Gulf, nor have there been any serious restraints of an environmental nature on oil operations.

Preparations for War

Preparations for war brought a large-scale military presence to that subregion; it brought with it a wide range of novel sources of dislocation. A simple accounting looks like this. North and north-east Saudi Arabia, where most of the troops were massed, was thinly populated, having few permanent settlers. With war preparations, it suddenly had to host about half a million soldiers, together with thousands of tons of equipment and an arms arsenal. All of this amounted to a full-blown instant population boom—of the most ecologically damaging kind. A population of this size generates extensive wastes (both sewage and solids). Even if the estimates of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for per capita sewage in the United States were cut by half, the sewage produced by the military

force would be estimated at a minimum of 10-12 million gallons per day. There was also garbage, in terms of plastic water bottles and so forth, that needed to be disposed of. No analysis of the problem of waste was made nor was a strategy for waste disposal in the desert devised. The military had some sort of collection system in place, but follow-up is unclear. Liquid sewage migrated and continues to migrate through sandy soil. It could contaminate Saudi aquifers—and water remains a scarce resource in Saudi Arabia.

While in the United States there are rules and regulations on hazardous wastes and waste disposal, they were not enforced in the Gulf. The troops in the Gulf were using a wide array of toxic paints and solvents; the decontaminating substance for chemical weapons in itself may be highly toxic. The troops themselves may have been at risk. All this may become clear later on. Further, the "live fire" exercises in the desert were not neutral in terms of their environmental effects. These, too, may have longer-term" effects.

War Damage

Then there is the war damage—to the environment and to populations whose dislocation would in turn put stress on neighbouring environments. Among the environmental consequences of the Gulf war, five have become particularly salient:

1. Intentional damage to pipelines, terminals or related facilities created oil spills, ripple effects, and potential damage to ecosystems. This damage has also threatened crucial life-supporting facilities, such as the desalinisation plants in Saudi Arabia;
2. The setting on fire of Kuwaiti oilfields created unprecedented damage, far greater in scale and scope than in any fields elsewhere in the world, at any time; the ecological consequences are difficult to estimate;
3. Blazing on this scale produces black rain, a combination of soot and smoke, which could affect agriculture and growing seasons;
4. Water pollution occurred, owing to damage to oilfields and oil platforms;
5. Extensive damage to refineries was also environmentally deleterious.

The possibility of chemical warfare was never ruled out at any stage of the war, nor can that prospect be ruled out in the future. The potential use of chemicals and their dispersion depend on temperature

and prevailing winds; the contamination of rivers and reservoirs can seldom be avoided. Of uncertain dimensions is the problem of unexploded ordnance. About one half a million mines in Kuwait, plus bombs in Iraq and shells in both countries, punctuate an already damaged landscape. Along with these other factors, unexploded ordnance continues to create an environmental management problem of almost unimaginable proportions. And the list goes on. While these impacts are largely regional in scope, over the longer run there is some probability that they could be global as well, since it is difficult to prevent the effects from spreading.

Relatively little attention has been paid to environmental degradation due to population dislocations. Refugees, however unfortunate, seldom have a benign effect on the natural environment, thereby compounding human misfortune.

The combination of normal sources of environmental degradation, damage due to military presence, and damage resulting from war creates environmental costs whose scale cannot remain hidden for long. Environmental factors will not be marginal to the task of reconstruction. Environmental damage must be confronted, and a diplomatic strategy must be shaped.

Next Steps

By any count, the region's development has been built on the basis of highly toxic, highly polluting, and highly inefficient technologies and production processes. Inefficiencies are legendary, and we are running out of ideas about how to fix them. What is even more to the point is that we do not know where to begin fixing what it is that must be fixed. Tragic though it is, the destruction of the physical infrastructure through war may provide an opportunity for reconstruction on a less toxic or ecologically damaging basis. There are no principles to guide investments in "non-toxic development". It would be best to rethink the development process—hardly a priority at this point in time. The reconstruction of Kuwait (and eventually Iraq) could include not only environmental restoration, but also the re-engineering of the oil and gas processing facilities and the materials manufacturing facilities to reduce the toxicities inherent in industrial development.

At least an outline of some new principles for responsible reconstruction should be drawn up. We know that there must be both robust economics and solid diplomacy to improve prospects for success. The challenges on the economic and technical sides are rather clear.

These include (a) valuating environmental assets; (b) valuating environmental by-products of investments; (c) creating financial incentives for new technologies (solar cells for household use); (d) legitimising a conception of size and scale that does not reward size alone but stresses efficiency; (e) placing some responsibility for environmental audits of investment on the side of the suppliers; (f) creating new financial instruments and arrangements to encourage responsible reconstruction, such as debt for nature; environment for development; etc.; and (g) establishing equity participation by the private sector in environmental "bonds".

There is more, of course, but this is the type of new thinking needed.

The politics involved in addressing this reconstruction dilemma are also stark, and difficult questions are sure to arise. For example, who is responsible for which piece of the damage? Are there statutes of limitation on accountability for ecological dislocations? What about structural damage resulting from proximity to the war zone rather than from direct hits? What about errors of strategy, or intent or performance? What about accidents owing to failure, that is, damage that would not occur if equipment was "operating properly"?

The prospects are legion—truly a boon to the legal profession and an ecologist's nightmare. Now the economists are called upon to give us new tools and better means of evaluation, and to help us "get it right" this time. And then there are the diplomatic imperatives. The imperative of managing environmental damage—politically—in the Gulf is already apparent.

Daunting Diplomacy

The diplomacy required for managing environmental degradation in the aftermath of the Gulf war is daunting. Unlike Vietnam, no one will be able to walk away from ecological damage in the Gulf—either in good conscience or in political expedience. We cannot extricate ourselves from these realities, some of which are rather uncomfortable, not to mention costly. Five components make up a plausible diplomatic package—one that could actually sell on Wall Street, Madison Avenue, and in Washington, D.C.—a winning combination. These five components constitute a minimum of what must be done if the United States-led coalition is to manage the Gulf environment in the post-war era:

1. There must be a joint clean-up effort—under United States leadership—to reduce the most toxic damage already incurred;

2. The allies may find it diplomatically tactless to go to the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development without a strategy for environmental management in the Gulf in hand;
3. The parties must begin to frame an international partnership with nature—and issue shares against assets—for the Gulfs environmental future;
4. Corporate incentives for cleaner reconstruction must be devised, obviously some creative tax benefits;
5. Finally, a strategy for clean-up at the grass-roots level, mobilising people-power, would help show that democracy matters.

Why must this be done? Why should it be taken seriously?

The international coalition against Iraq has won— and it cannot ignore the reconstruction challenge or avoid confronting the environmental damage. The consequences of military action have simply been too extensive and they remain too visible to ignore.

Politically, there is also the need to retain the goodwill of the people in the region—300 million persons in the Middle East as a whole. Their goodwill is needed to ensure some political stability beyond the immediate crisis of war. In other words, a strategy for environmental reconstruction and protection is good, even necessary, politics. No one can walk away from environmental damage in the Gulf nor from the consequences of military engagement—regardless of who is responsible or how the damage was inflicted—or how the war was brought to an end.

Environmental Management after War

The politics of environmental management are complex, raising the same questions as those raised with reference to reconstruction. The environmental reconstruction of the Middle East will not take place in a *laissez-faire* atmosphere. National Governments, international agencies and local groups will all feature prominently in both planning and execution. If anything, it is clear that business will be constrained. The invisible hand of the competitive market may be replaced by the hand of a well-meaning but possibly misguided international community seeking to make amends for large-scale destruction.

Four steps can be taken to mitigate environmental consequences of conflict among nations, and important steps have already been made in each case. These are: (a) better data, (b) better accounting, (c) better analysis, and (d) better responses.

Already both national agencies and international institutions are beginning to consider the need for better data (on resources and on availability and access). Institutions like the World Resources Institute are developing guidelines for an improved collection of information.

Providing better accounting is undoubtedly difficult. Three sets of accounts must be improved:

(a) valuation of natural assets and resources in national accounts;

(b) valuation of the true resource and environmental costs incurred in preparations for conflict (i.e., military expenditures, investments, alterations, production and storage of war-related materials, such as nuclear devices, "normal" ordnance, etc.); and

(c) valuation of both the resource and the environmental consequences of war (in terms of damage to humans, ecological assets, raw material bases, and natural resources).

Facts and figures are not enough; good interpretation and good analysis are needed. This can be done only in the context of interdisciplinary and international modes of investigation.

Better policy response is essential everywhere. This means that individual countries must make an effort to foster resource/security analysis within the normal governmental channels so that the crucial connections identified earlier and the elements of the vicious cycle are taken into account in security assessments and in deliberations on national priorities—and the consequences of pursuing those priorities.

Principles of Environmental Conduct

Conflict and violence are, regrettably, facts of international life, and so are resource conflicts and mounting environmental degradation. To reduce both the scale and the scope of environmental damage in war, three principles of action must be considered by the international community to guide conduct in the twenty-first century.

1. Managing environmental insecurities;
2. Establishing mechanisms for early warning;
3. Institutionalising codes of conduct after war.

Implementing principle 1 would entail establishing an international forum for discussion of strategies for repairing environments following war.

Implementing principle 2 would mean establishing early warning mechanisms to alert both national authorities and the international

community of the potentials for conflict owing to resource constraints (depletion or impediments to access).

Implementing principle 3 would mean adopting a code of conduct after war for ecological reconstitution and resource rebuilding. Regardless of the political merits of or demands made in a violent conflict, the international community must protect the global environment. Adoption of Principle 3 would be a step in this direction.

To the extent that we can look beyond the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development to the next century, we can provide future generations with some basic principles of environmental conduct which they must elaborate as future conditions unfold. An important step in this direction is decision 16/11, entitled "Military conflicts and the environment", adopted by the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme on 31 May 1991. It could even provide the basis for crucial precedents in the formation of a code of conduct on environment during war.

Earlier generations have given us the ideas we now believe in regarding good governance in national and international life. Among these are constitutionality, participation, representation, equity, freedom, human rights, basic needs, due process—and the list goes on. We must bequeath to future generations principles of management for reducing environmental degradation in conflict situations. This is only fair and just.

ENVIRONMENTAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH ASIAN SUBCONTINENT

Preoccupation with environmental issues is now a world-wide phenomenon and it has reached the centre stage of national politics in many countries. While the industrialised countries possess the infrastructure and the resources to cope with the effects of environmental change, most underdeveloped countries do not, a fact which makes them vulnerable to environmental stress and sensitive to environmental policy issues. The task here is threefold: first, to discuss the nature of environmental stress and ifs role in inter-State conflict; second, to examine the nature of resource rivalry and its contribution to inter-State conflict; and third, to explore ways in which environment-related conflicts can be resolved and prevented. The focus of this essay is the South Asian subcontinent (comprising Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka), an environmentally ravaged region with a population of 1.13 billion, or one quarter of mankind.

Environmental Stress

South Asia is a region of high environmental stress caused by a variety of environmental problems, such as a huge population, deforestation, soil erosion and siltation, land degradation, floods, droughts, storms, earthquakes, sea-level rise and pollution. Of these issues, at least three have complicated current regional political relations.

Population

The demographic picture is particularly worrisome. In this already over-populated region, another 500 million people are likely to be added by the year 2010. The regional birth rate (37 per 1,000) is two and a half times the death rate (14.43 per 1,000). Despite fertility control measures, the annual population growth rate is still quite high, varying from 1.5 per cent in Sri Lanka to 3.7 per cent in Maldives. The great majority live in rural areas, but the rate of urban growth is on the rise.

These factors have thrown off the balance between the region's population and its environmental capacities. The low resource-to-population ratio suggests that in order for the population to survive, there will be a general tendency to exploit resources beyond renewable limits. The environmental stress caused by the population-resource imbalance already manifests itself in various ways.

First, increasing demands on water, agricultural lands, forests and fisheries have deteriorated or diminished these resources, setting in motion a continuous stream of ecological refugees bound for urban areas. This is causing highly skewed demographic redistribution, particularly serious in Nepal, Bangladesh and the Maldives, a situation that not only makes it difficult for the affected Governments to plan and manage national resource allocations, but also creates administrative dilemmas that subcontinental bureaucracies, lacking clear and consistent political direction, are ill-equipped to handle. The basic services available in the urban centres are unable to cope with the additional burdens placed on them by the environmental refugees, and this system-overload ignites conflict over jobs and access to urban facilities and resources. Recent experiences in India and Nepal also suggest that political parties find it electorally rewarding to appeal to the deprived millions who constitute the urban slums of South Asia. The disparity in infrastructural investment and growth caused by unplanned population redistribution only exacerbates social alienation, ethnic tension and political conflict.

Second, as the physical environment deteriorates in South Asia owing to increases in the net number of people and in human activity, food insecurity also increases. The burden of industrialisation is borne by agriculture, and as food crops yield to cash crops to finance industrialisation, poverty expands. Food insecurity affects the national stress level in a variety of ways.

1. Starvation and famine, not infrequent in the region, are sources of civil unrest and contribute to various types of instability.
2. Food insecurity can lead to the collapse of civilian rule. For example, the 1975 famine caused by inclement weather and the withholding of food-grain exports led to the collapse of democratic order in Bangladesh, which was recently restored after sixteen years of struggle.
3. The import of food-grains causes a major drain on foreign currency reserves, which are often meagre to start with.
4. Dependence on food-grain imports increases a country's vulnerability to external influence; for example, Bangladesh's suspension of trade with Cuba in order to gain access to the United States grain market.

Third, environmental stress appears to have an unsettling effect on the domestic political dynamics. As affected communities vacate degraded habitats and transplant themselves in other localities, conflict often ensues between them and the host communities and local authorities. When such rivalries and conflicts become exacerbated, aggrieved communities turn to subnational ideologies, parties and symbols to fight for their way of life. Extraneous interest groups (such as political parties) also usurp environmental issues for their own gains.

Fourth, environmental stress can trigger policy responses from Governments which do not necessarily enhance national security. For example, huge numbers of people whose habitats were destroyed by recurring floods and storms have been settled over the years in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in the southeastern part of Bangladesh; this has completely changed the ethnic balance in the region, creating fears among the native tribal people about the continued sanctity of their distinct society. The upshot has been an insurgency, with the insurgents finding sanctuary, training and arms in India. Thus, what was an internal response to rehabilitate an environmentally ravaged people became a transboundary issue affecting the security of, and worsening relations between, India and Bangladesh.

Also, Bhutan's concerns with ecological degradation in its southern provinces-have been one reason for the expulsion of thousands of illegal immigrants from its territory. Many of those evicted, however, have joined up with the Gurkha separatist movement located just across the border, heightening the security concerns of Bhutan and India.

Population displacement across international borders owing to environmental stress has raised the level of tension between several countries in the region. Floods and droughts, which have caused periodic famines, and scarcity of agricultural land have propelled population movement from Bangladesh to India (Assam and Tripura) in search of food and income. Over the years, these migrants have come to be seen as alien land-grabbers and as a demographic, cultural and religious threat to the indigenous peoples. The sharp rise in the immigrant population of Assam and Tripura has reduced the political power of the indigenous population, increased competition for jobs, depressed wages, and raised the level of social and economic tension. Political agitation and calls for, *inter alia,* deportation of immigrants have resulted in widespread riots, which, in 1980 in Tripura, became a movement for independence from India. The 1985 accord signed by late Rajiv Gandhi and the leaders of the Assamese anti-foreigner agitation, which calls for the deportation of all who entered Assam after March 1971, has proven impossible to implement because Bangladesh has refused to accept those deported. India's subsequent plan to fence off certain sections of the Assam-Bangladesh border has been denounced by Bangladesh as an unfriendly gesture.

Further population displacement in the subcontinent is a real possibility, given its extreme vulnerability to' environmental change. If the present trend of global warming remains unaltered, low-lying Maldives and Bangladesh will lose substantial amounts of territory to a rising sea, with harmful effects on freshwater aquifers, agricultural lands and inland fisheries. This will create millions of ecological refugees, for whom finding a home in the subcontinent will be a political nightmare. The alternative of mass migration to safer havens outside the subcontinent—most likely the countries of the North—may not be politically feasible either.

Deforestation

Forests are indispensable to South Asia for ecological, economic and social reasons, and therefore the high rate at which they are being destroyed today has caused general alarm. Deforestation affects most of the countries of the region, and in some cases it has contributed to bilateral tension and conflict as well.

Deforestation in the mountain region of Nepal continues to trigger migration to the lower lands of the Tarai bordering on India. Owing to Nepal's concerns over its open border with India (enforced by a treaty), which it feels allows India to influence political attitudes and electoral outcomes in the economically and politically important Tarai region, government policy encourages controlled immigration to dilute the presence of Indian nationals. This concern, as well as that of ensuring that the Nepalese can benefit from the economic investments in the region, led the official Task Force on Migration (1983) to make 70 recommendations to the Nepalese Government, among which are the creation of a limited number of entry points along the border to regulate migration, the introduction of a registration and entry permit system to control the influx of Indian nationals, and compulsory work permits for Indian citizens as well.

The Indian Government considered many of these recommendations as a violation of the spirit and letter of the Indo-Nepalese friendship and trade treaties, and even as contravention of some of the provisions therein. The controversy dragged on, and in March 1987 when the treaties expired, India withdrew the trade transit facilities enjoyed by landlocked Nepal. The blockade severely affected Nepal's economy and reinforced the threat perceptions of the Nepalese. Indo-Nepalese relations were "normalised" after the interim Government acquiesced to New Delhi's insistence that the traditional open-border policy be preserved, and have improved further since June 1991, when the pro-Indian Nepali Congress Party came to power.

While deforestation has contributed to conflict within and between States, the reverse is also true in South Asia. To fight insurgency, several regional armies have deliberately deforested portions of their territories: the Indian Army in the eastern states during its fight against the Nagas and the Mizos; the Bangladesh Army in the CHT in its confrontation with the Chakmas; and the Sri Lankan Army in the Jaffna peninsula in its fight against the Tamil insurgents. The Afghan conflict has also led to extensive deforestation in Pakistan along its border with Afghanistan, where the refugee settlements are located.

Floods

Floods are a recurrent phenomenon in the subcontinent, causing extensive damage each year. In India, flood-prone areas now exceed 45 million hectares. In Bhutan, river-bank erosion and inundation of agriculturally important valleys are a constant threat during the monsoon season. In Pakistan, monsoonal floods cause considerable damage to agriculture over vast areas. The floods of 1973 and 1976 destroyed 70 per cent of the standing agricultural crops, causing critical

food shortages. Flash floods occur regularly in Nepal, causing shifts in river channels and creating new flood zones which displace people. Much more critical are the floods in Bangladesh, which normally submerge 18 per cent of the total land area each year, although severe floods can affect twice that area and nearly 60 per cent of the net cultivable land.

Thus floods have become a critical issue in South Asia because of their effects on food production, soil erosion, the security of homesteads and demographic distribution. It is a particularly sensitive issue in Bangladesh, which is the outlet for 54 rivers flowing from India. Bangladesh has long sought India's assistance to regulate their flows, without any success. During the 1988 floods— the worst in living memory—the President of Bangladesh obliquely blamed India for its unwillingness to join in a collective effort to solve the flood problem. The inability to control the flow in these rivers has reinforced the belief among Bangladeshi elites that India is out to destroy Bangladesh economically, and this perception continues to be a major obstacle to the normalisation of relations with India.

Resource Rivalry

Three important resources which have precipitated destructive rivalry in the subcontinent are energy, water and land. While the first two are in ample supply, the last one is not; competition over their control and use has already led to several instances of both inter-State and intra-State conflict. The potential for future conflict is indeed high.

Energy

The drive for industrialisation is bound to accelerate in the coming years, and so also is the need to tap clean and relatively inexpensive energy. The hydroelectric power potential of the subcontinent is enormous: 250,000 megawatts or about 4.5 per cent of the world's hydroelectric potential. This renewable energy, while theoretically accessible, is proving politically difficult to tap because of conflicting security perceptions in the region.

Almost two thirds of this potential lies within India, much of which is in the Arunachal Pradesh, the remote north-eastern state whose ownership is disputed by China. The Brahmaputra, which flows eastward on the Tibetan side of the Himalayas and turns sharply southward to enter India, can be intercepted by the Chinese to render hydroelectric projects in the Arunachal Pradesh useless. Thus as long as this dispute remains unresolved, it would be politically very difficult for India to tap this resource. In the West, the hydroelectric potential

of the tributaries of the Indus river that flow through the Indian Punjab have already been developed, but New Delhi's control and distribution of Punjab's hydroelectricity to energy-hungry neighbouring states continues to fuel the Sikh separatist movement.

Developing Nepal's hydroelectric potential—83,000 megawatts—has also become politically difficult because Nepal's encounter with hydro-politics, which began in 1927 with the construction by the British of the Sarda barrage on the Mahakali, has proven to be unpalatable. The monarchy ceded water rights on the Mahakali to British India, which the Nepalese now regret. The Nepalese also lament that the subsequent Gandak and Kosi barrages built on Nepalese territory at the insistence of India provided electricity to India but floods to Nepal. India's insistence on water projects that are of doubtful benefit to Nepal (such as advocating a dam on the West Rapti which would flood agricultural land) and its efforts to veto Nepalese undertakings not to its liking (such as the "killing" of the Sitka irrigation project funded by the World Bank) have raised doubts in Nepal about India's goodwill.

There are other concerns as well that affect both Nepalese and Indian interests. If Nepal develops its hydroelectric potential, much of it will have to be exported to India; but since it is a single-country buyer's market, and the power relation is asymmetrical, Nepal feels it will lose out in the negotiations with India. India, for its part, will have to balance Nepal's push to maximize electricity pricing against the desire of the consumer states for cheap electricity. Also, Nepal wishes to retain control over the management of water projects that would export power to India, but so too does India, which is unwilling to expose the northern Indian grid that supplies power to its industrial heartland to the vicissitudes of Nepalese politics.

Thus, while there is potentially ample energy to satisfy rising Indian needs, the tenor of political relations between India and Nepal continues to feed a potential dispute. This is also true in the case of India and Bangladesh. In the heyday of Indo-Bangladeshi friendship, in the early 1970s, there was an Indian proposal to supply power from India to western Bangladesh in exchange for power to the eastern Indian states from Bangladesh's eastern grid. Also, in the late 1970s the Bangladesh Government had floated the idea of exporting natural gas to India, a project which would have, *inter alia,* restored the balance of payments with India. But both these proposals miscarried because of unfounded Bangladeshi fear of likely damage to its national interest. These examples demonstrate how resource control, exploitation and use are interlinked with perceptions of national security and the role this linkage plays in perpetuating international distrust and even dispute.

Water

The most explosive rivalry, however, is over the water resources of the region. Although there are hundreds of rivers in the subcontinent fed by Himalayan snow melt or monsoon rains, they are restricted to the north, much of their flow drains off to the Indian Ocean, and water availability is seasonal. Water disputes are frequent, the latest being that between the states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu in India over the sharing of the waters of the Cauvery river. The 25 June 1991 directive of the Cauvery Water Tribunal to the Karnataka government to release a certain quantum of Cauvery waters to ensure their availability in the Mettur Reservoir of Tamil Nadu from June 1991 to May 1992 was rejected by Karnataka, triggering strikes in both states and calls to New Delhi to intervene. Subsequently, the Karnataka government promulgated an ordinance seeking to nullify the effects of the Tribunal's orders. At the time of writing, the Union Government awaits the Supreme Court's advice on the constitutional and legal implications of the ordinance. Meanwhile, a Union minister from Tamil Nadu has resigned; political agitation has spread throughout the two states; and there is pandemonium in Parliament every time the issue is discussed.

The issue of water sharing has played a destabilising role in other parts of the Indian polity as well, jeopardizing the Union Government's relations with, for instance, Punjab, Assam and West Bengal—states whose interests affect India's foreign policies *vis-a-vis* Pakistan and Bangladesh. In Punjab, the Beas, Sutlej and Ravi rivers provided it with ample water up to the time of independence, but subsequently canals were built to channel their waters to the states of Rajasthan and Haryana. This reduced Punjab's share of water, which is essential to its high-yield agriculture and to its generation of electricity to pump water from tubewells. The Union Government's control of Punjab's water resources and its allocation of over 60 per cent of the water and energy to Rajasthan and Haryana have fuelled political alienation, which feeds the Sikh secessionist movement in the state.

Similarly, the Union Government's plan to divert some of the waters of the Brahmaputra that flow through Assam into Bangladesh is viewed by the Assamese as an attempt by the Union Government to bring their state under its political and economic control. This plan cannot be implemented without addressing Assam's grievances, some of which affect Bangladesh's interests.

The increasing withdrawal of the waters of the Ganges to meet the expanding industrial and agricultural needs in northern India has already reduced the ability of the Ganges river to flush the silt in the Hoogly river on which is situated the port of Calcutta, essential to the

economy of West Bengal. This issue continues to alienate the state of West Bengal from New Delhi, and has in the past been partially responsible for a number of extremist movements directed against the Indian polity.

In Pakistan a great deal of feuding has been going on between provinces over the waters of the Indus. Punjab, the most powerful province, has taken advantage of its upstream location to build dams and barrages across the Indus and to divert water for irrigation with little concern for the welfare of downstream Sind and Baluchistan, which feel cheated of their legitimate share. Meanwhile, the North-West Frontier Province, which lies upstream of Punjab, has been denied the right to build its own diversions. Since Punjab is home to the Pakistan military, these provinces have little clout to deal with the inequitable distribution of the resources of the Indus. Although an agreement to share the Indus waters equitably was signed in April 1991, there is considerable doubt in the other provinces whether the Punjab-based government will implement the accord.

The sharing of the waters of the subcontinent has become an issue in inter-State relations as well. The first serious crisis developed just after the partition of India (1947). During the spring growing season in 1948, India abruptly cut off water supplies to what was then West Pakistan by diverting the waters of the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi rivers which flow into Pakistan, putting Pakistan's agricultural output for that year into jeopardy. The crisis did not worsen, however, because the armed forces of the two countries were still under British influence if not control, and the fact that the disputants were politically weak allowed for immediate World Bank intervention. Subsequent mediation by the World Bank led to the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in the late 1950s.

But the Treaty has not prevented further flare-ups. Dispute over the use of the Indus waters partially contributed to the 1965 Indo-Pak war. It became an issue again in February 1985, when Pakistan learned that India had started constructing the Walur barrage on the Jhelum river in 1984. This was a violation of the Indus Treaty, which had given Pakistan exclusive rights to the waters of the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus, with similar Indian rights over the Beas, Sutlej and Ravi. Though the dispute is yet to be fully resolved, an inflexible stance *vis-a-vis* India has become a standard against which the patriotic credentials of the mainstream political forces are judged, thus complicating Pakistan's domestic politics immeasurably. The waters of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra are not immune to bilateral tension either. The dispute over the Ganges waters started some four decades ago when India initiated a plan to divert much of the main flow of the

Ganges from the Padma (the name given to the Ganges after it enters Bangladesh) to the Hoogly. The commissioning in April 1975 of the barrage across the Ganges at Farakka, about 18 kilometres west of the Indo-Bangladeshi border, reduced what Bangladesh considered to be its legitimate share of the Ganges waters. Although numerous meetings have taken place between the officials of the two countries, a permanent agreement on a formula for sharing is yet to materialize. The Bangladesh Government is unable to plan any long-term water resources utilisation because India continues to refuse to guarantee a minimum flow in the Ganges, especially during the dry season when reduced flow threatens the agriculture, ecology and economy of one third of the territory of Bangladesh.

New Delhi's plans to build barrages across other major rivers that enter Bangladesh has only increased bilateral tension. Its plan to build a link canal to divert Brahmaputra waters into the Ganges conjures up worst-case security scenarios in Dhaka. Therefore, as long as India takes unilateral decisions regarding common water resources, bilateral tension will continue to fester.

Land

The population density in the subcontinent is one of the highest in the world, and increases every year. The large majority lives below the poverty line and is landless. The land being the principal and often the only asset, competition to acquire this scarce commodity, whether for home-steading, cropping or social reasons such as status or dowry, has become intense. The society's least privileged are the first victims in this struggle, and it is usually out of desperation that they leave their ancestral lands, often for good. As already noted, the twin factors of population pressure in Bangladesh and land availability in the Indian border states have created a powerful impulse for the growing landless to emigrate from Bangladesh, thereby broadening the base for inter-State conflict.

So strong is the competition for land and other resources that India and Bangladesh almost went to war in 1981 over an island in the Bay of Bengal. The billions of tons of soil that have eroded each year from the Himalayas and along the lengths of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers created the island, whose area varies between 12 km at low tide and 2 km at high tide. Both India and Bangladesh have laid claim to it, and neither is willing to compromise because sovereignty over the island will determine the maritime border between them and their claim over territorial waters and undersea resources. Although there have been other instances of inter-State conflict in the subcontinent over land, such as the 1965 Indo-Pak war over a patch of

desert land (Rann of Kutch), the root of the present conflict appears to be mainly the environment.

What can be done?

In regions of strife, confidence-building measures have often been the route to peace and stability; but the degree of success has usually depended on the willingness of the regional actors to adapt their thinking to the demands of the period. South Asia is ripe for such a change in its thinking.

For close to a billion people, security is measured in terms of their day-to-day struggle for survival, and the margins of tolerance are diminishing fast. As security becomes synonymous with well-being, it will be necessary to re-fashion existing institutions and build new ones to reflect current realities. Long-established norms, principles and procedures for both intra-State and inter-State conduct will have to be revised or supplanted by new ones. The subcontinent's intellectuals have had little influence over policy matters in the past; they should now constructively engage themselves as creators of concepts, strategies, and social and national parameters.

While nationalism is releasing creative energies in some parts of the world today, in South Asia it is an obstacle to reconciliation and bold departures. It has become necessary for the nations of the subcontinent to give up some of their sovereignty and power so that national resources can be pooled in a collective effort to address the region's environmental stresses. Environmental alliances must replace traditional defence alliances, and resources saved should be ploughed into environmental undertakings.

Policy Options

Environmental education is a must. The Governments of South Asia should launch major national educational efforts to deepen knowledge of the environment. This could be done by offering courses on national and regional environment in schools, colleges and universities; evening courses for adults; extension courses for administrators; citation for public activity in support of the environment; and regular radio and television programmes with environmental themes woven into them. Reducing the high population growth rate is another must, and much the same strategy as above can be adopted here too. But two caveats are in order: current birth control strategies emphasize modern methods only; integrating them with traditional methods should significantly improve the success rate. Also, a singular deficiency in modern birth control strategies is their general insensitivity to individual cultures—a characteristic that should be corrected.

Poverty-elimination should receive a very high priority in government policy. This could involve various strategies or a combination of them. The Food for Work Programme in Bangladesh as well as the Employment Guarantee Scheme in the Indian state of Maharashtra are notable anti-poverty programmes which provide employment to the rural poor, raise their income level, and thereby minimize their impact on the environment. The Grameen Bank scheme in Bangladesh, which has successfully devised a system of circulating credit among the rural poor, is another internationally acclaimed programme which could be implemented in other parts of the subcontinent; however, support from NGOs and governmental and international financial institutions would be essential. But perhaps the best anti-poverty scheme that is yet to be implemented universally in the subcontinent is land reform: redistribution of private ownership of land to the landless. This would significantly lower the poverty line, reduce environmental degradation, increase food production, improve the economy, and reduce political instability.

An important institution that can play a pivotal role in environmental stress management and crisis prevention in the subcontinent is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). It has recently sponsored a common regional environmental security approach by requiring each member State to prepare a national report on its environment, which would then form the basis for a regional report. Given its many successes, SAARC is in an ideal position to spearhead environmental legislation, help build institutions for regional cooperation, create expertise that the subcontinent lacks, and improve the general climate of mutual trust and accommodation. Given the extent and frequency of natural disasters in South Asia, SAARC should seriously consider creating a multinational "Green Force", whose transnational mandate would be to monitor environmental change, take measures to prevent environmental degradation, take preventive measures against natural calamities, and serve as a rapid deployment force during and after environmental disasters to bring relief and rehabilitation to the affected. It is highly recommended that this "Green Force" be constituted by transferring contingents from each of the national armies; this would reduce force sizes, which is politically desirable, create a unit of highly skilled men and women requiring little additional training and financial investment, and plant the seeds of regional plan and camaraderie as the contingents work shoulder to shoulder, in some cases in stressful situations. It is this kind of cooperative endeavour unfettered by national allegiance that is necessary to reduce environmental stress and conflict in South Asia.

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